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Caroline Mall Dibiasi 
The Transformation of Palestinian Political Activism from the 
First to the Second Intifada: A Convergence of Politics, Territory 
and Society 
 
The central question this thesis poses is how and why the modes of Palestinian 
political activism have changed from the first to the second intifada.  The thesis will 
explore the underlying major political, territorial and social developments that created a 
new environment for the second uprising that was no longer conducive to the mass 
protests and acts of civil disobedience, which had dominated the first intifada in the late 
1980s.  The decline of civil society, the reassertion of Palestinian political factionalism 
and the unique geographical dislocation of the Palestinian territories, which created new 
physical obstacles to resistance but also caused division within society, were the key 
factors in reshaping the context of the second intifada.  In addition, rising support for 
violent resistance among the population was rooted in the sense of hopelessness and 
frustration that re-emerged over the Oslo period.  Much of the population’s frustration 
was directed at Israel’s colonial regime but in part it was also a response to the rule of 
the Palestinian Authority, which had failed to fulfil its commitments to its own 
population in view of its obligations under Oslo toward Israel.  In the absence of 
alternative non-violent outlets within either politics or civil society, what took root 
instead was individual activism via militant organisations. 
As such, this thesis offers an account of the development of Palestinian political 
action (and in particular political violence) that is indebted to an effort to employ 
historical and contextual analysis in ways that deepen the insights available from 
explanations of behaviour drawn from political science. 
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Introduction 
 
Palestinian political activism has changed dramatically over the years.  Why and 
how it has changed is the subject of this thesis.  The news from the territories of the first 
intifada were predominantly of large-scale protests, stone-throwing youths, and mass 
strikes.  The pictures of the second uprising were much grimmer with seemingly 
unremitting explosions on Israeli buses, in shopping centres, cafes and restaurants.  
More concealed to the eye of the Western observer remained the personal tragedies of 
Palestinians suffering under continued repression, heavy-handed military tactics and 
collective forms of punishment.  
The signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993 marked a major milestone in the 
conflict, promising a solution based on a two-state model.  However, almost twenty 
years later, rather than looking closer to its resolution, the conflict has become more 
complicated, bitter, and entrenched.  The violence of the second intifada, the 
reoccupation of the Palestinian-controlled areas of the West Bank, the construction of 
the Separation Wall and the growing distrust between the two sides almost nullified any 
achievements that may have been attained through the Oslo peace process.  Over the 
years the peace process began to adopt a life of its own, no longer to be primarily a 
vehicle for the resolution of the conflict.  In Deborah Sontag’s words, it ‘involved 
considerably more process than peace.’1  It attracted international attention and aid and 
to many international players it offered the gratification to be seen to be doing 
something.  The focus on aid often reframed the ‘problem’ to a humanitarian one when, 
in fact, the question of Palestine always was and still is an essentially political problem, 
one that necessitates a political solution.  
Successive Israeli governments have looked less likely to accept a land for peace 
deal.  Instead, unilateralism has dominated the agenda.  Sharon’s withdrawal from Gaza 
was often portrayed as a concession to peace but in fact it merely turned Gaza into an 
open air prison and re-focused settlement strategy on the West Bank.  The building of 
the Separation Wall on a route that only intermittently coincides with the internationally 
recognised pre-1967 armistice line was, again, commenced without international or 
Palestinian consultation.  This wall, hailed as the ultimate answer to suicide bombings 
inside Israel, has left many questions unanswered.  Since a substantial length of the wall 
                                                 
1 Deborah Sontag, “And Yet So Far: A Special Report.  Quest for Mideast Peace: How and Why It 
Failed,” New York Times, 26 July 2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/07/26/world/and-yet-so-far-a-
special-report-quest-for-mideast-peace-how-and-why-it-failed.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm (accessed 
11 October 2011). 
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has been completed, suicide bombings have largely ceased.  However, there is reason to 
doubt whether the relationship between these two events goes much beyond correlation.  
What is certain is that the Separation Wall had a detrimental impact on the daily life of 
many Palestinian communities and many of the repercussions are yet to be felt as whole 
villages and towns along the route of the barrier have become encircled by it and 
separated from their lands and livelihoods.  Al-Walajah in the Bethlehem governorate, 
which after the completion of the wall in the area will only be accessible through one 
road into the village guarded by a checkpoint and separated from the village’s farmland, 
is an exemplary case in point.
2
  Moreover, the construction of the wall further 
entrenched the physical and psychological division from what for Palestinians used to 
be their cultural, social and economic, even if not political, hub: East Jerusalem.  Since 
Oslo, access to East Jerusalem had always been difficult, reaching East Jerusalem 
without a permit has with the construction of the Separation Wall, however, become 
near to impossible.      
In the meantime, Palestinians are also plagued by problems of their own.  
Factionalism, corruption, and financial crises have all contributed to debilitating the 
performance of the Palestinian Authority (PA).  Arafat, of course, also deserves mention 
here.  The fighter turned politician, has become the symbol of Palestinian nationalism.  
He was able to unify Palestinians like no one else, yet his autocratic rule deeply crippled 
the potential for future democratic development.  
Since 1948 the fragmentation and dispersion of the Palestinian population has 
been one of the major challenges for Palestinian nationalism.  What Palestinians are left 
with at present, are three physically separated territorial entities that experience very 
different conditions.  In the long term, this status will further weaken the Palestinian 
project of an independent state.  In addition, there is a very large diaspora of 
Palestinians around the world, a substantial number of which still live in often 
dilapidated refugee camps under very poor conditions in Arab countries.  The stance of 
the host governments towards the refugees on their territory could be at best described 
as ambivalent.   
One of the perennial difficulties for the Palestinians has been that they have 
nothing to give except peace.  With virtually no control over land or resources, they 
could only bargain over things they did not have.  This thesis will enter its final stages 
as Palestinians embark on a new strategy.  In part, it is a return to an old approach.  In 
                                                 
2 See B’Tselem, “Separation Barrier Strangles al-Walajah,” 14 November 2010, http://www.btselem. 
org/separation_barrier/20101114_al_walajah_separation_barrier (accessed 11 October 2011). 
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1947 Palestinians had rejected UN General Assembly Resolution 181 calling for the 
partition of the British-ruled Palestine Mandate into independent Jewish and Arab states 
and a special international regime for the City of Jerusalem.
3
  In the decades to follow, 
the UN as a broker for peace became side-lined in favour of the United States.  Now 
Palestinians are returning to the UN to submit an application to seek recognition as a 
member state.  In how far this will in reality change the Palestinian situation remains to 
be seen.  What is certain is that the Palestinian statehood bid, even in its failure, directly 
challenges the American administration and its role as the ‘neutral’ third-party broker in 
Palestinian-Israeli negotiations.  Moreover, it has exposed the persistence of underlying 
power dynamics as none of the traditionally powerful have embraced the statehood bid 
as a positive step and seized this moment constructively to push forward a resolution of 
the conflict.  In the absence of progress in the long-stalled negotiations and any 
innovative alternative proposals, the very obvious and important question as to what are 
the remaining options for Palestinians to achieve self-determination arises, and the 
return to violence is a possibility to be taken seriously. 
While the conflict from its early stages had always been violent, violence began 
to reach new heights in the aftermath of the Oslo period.  Baruch Goldstein’s massacre 
of 29 worshippers in the Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron on 25 February 1994, was 
followed by a series of suicide bombings against civilians inside Israel as well as in 
Gaza, a trend which paused at times yet never quite subsided over the post-Oslo period.
4
  
While Hamas was the Palestinian group that initiated this tactic, other groups adopted it 
too.  It was, however, not until the second intifada that the phenomenon almost took on 
a life of its own.  The year 2002 saw an average of one bombing per week.  This sudden 
surge in suicide bombings carried out by Palestinian groups attracted much attention in 
academic circles as well as in the media.  It was not a new phenomenon, yet it seemed 
to take a new turn.  The sheer number of volunteers, the ferocity of the bombings, and 
their unpredictability raised many questions.  This thesis, however, will cast its net 
much wider.  Rather than focusing on one aspect of Palestinian action against Israel, it 
will trace evolving Palestinian political activism from the first to the second intifada and 
                                                 
3 UN General Assembly, Resolution 181 (II), “Resolution Adopted on the Report of the Ad Hoc 
Committee on the Palestinian Question,” 29 November 1947, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/ 
atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/IP%20ARES%20181.pdf (accessed 11 
October 2011). 
4 The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs dates the first suicide bombing attack 13 April 1994.  Hamas 
claimed responsibility for the attack on a bus in the central bus station of Hadera. See “Suicide and Other 
Bombing Attacks in Israel Since the Declaration of Principles (Sept 1993),” Israel Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism+Obstacle+to+Peace/Palestinian+terror+since 
+2000/Suicide+and+Other+Bombing+Attacks+in+Israel+Since.htm (accessed 11 October 2011). 
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show how the modes of violence that emerged in the second intifada were connected to 
transformations in the post-Oslo period and could as such not have emerged in the 
circumstances of the first intifada.  Essentially, it asks how the shift from a mass-based 
non-violent uprising to an uprising dominated by violence occurred and how we can 
understand suicide bombing, which almost eclipsed other forms of political activism in 
the second intifada.  Central to this is the convergence of transformations in politics, 
territory and society which shaped the conditions within which political activism would 
change.  Political activism is understood here as a very broad term referring to activity 
that is articulated as political vis-à-vis the Israeli occupation, encompassing violent as 
well as non-violent means ranging from civil disobedience and protest to political 
violence.  Considerable controversy surrounds the terminology used to describe the 
phenomenon of suicide bombing.  Scholars have used a number of different terms, 
including suicide terrorism, suicide attacks, human bombings, and martyrdom, which all 
reflect differing ontological, epistemic and even methodological assumptions.  While 
the term ‘suicide bombing’ is lacking in various ways – it does not, for example, include 
the intention to harm others in its semantics, rather it overemphasises the goal of self-
harm which appears to be far removed from how the individuals themselves as well as 
their communities see the phenomenon – the thesis opts for a pragmatic approach and 
retains the term ‘suicide bombing’.  The central reason for this is that the concept is 
widely used, and in want of a better term, the discussion can easily refer to an 
overarching body of literature.
5
 
The discussion of the research will be structured as follows.  The first chapter 
will locate the thesis vis-à-vis other literature in the field and formulate a set of research 
questions examining how and why Palestinian political action has changed from non-
violent mass protests and civil disobedience in the first uprising to violent action in the 
second intifada.  The topic of Palestinian political violence is generally addressed from 
a political science perspective that seeks to deliver explanations valid across cases with 
predictive power, while the dominant type of analysis within the Palestine literature is 
interpretative, historicist and contextualised.  The thesis will locate itself 
methodologically in between the two.  As such, the chapter will outline significant 
debates in the literature on Palestine as well as relevant contributions to the political 
violence literature and identify key features of both strands of literature.  The discussion 
                                                 
5 The thought process here is similar to Gunning who suggests that despite his reservations on the term 
‘terrorism’, he still sees the benefit of retaining it as an organising concept for research in the field.  See 
Jeroen Gunning, “A Case for Critical Terrorism Studies,” Government and Opposition 42, no.3 (Summer 
2007): 382-4. 
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will highlight a gap in the debates on political violence, namely the link between 
territorial fragmentation and forms of Palestinian political protest.  While the continued 
fragmentation of territory available to the Palestinians, starting with the creation of the 
state of Israel in 1948, is a key theme in the Palestine literature, its relevance has almost 
entirely been ignored in work on political violence.  The thesis will examine this link 
and argue that it is central in itself for explaining the emergence and persistence of 
violence in the second intifada but also because it fosters violence indirectly through 
shaping political and social fragmentation.  The focus on territorial and social 
fragmentation stems, at least in part, from the methodology advocated in this thesis 
which seeks to break down abstract concepts such as ‘territory’ and ‘society.’  The latter 
part of the chapter will establish interpretative understanding as a methodological 
framework for studying the topic, and drawing on Giddens and Wendt an approach that 
considers agency and structure as mutually constitutive.  Semi-structured interviews 
constitute the core component of the empirical aspect of this thesis and the section on 
research methods will set out the rationale behind the use of this kind of data collection 
for the research project. 
The second chapter begins the core discussion of the thesis by setting out the 
changes in the political context.  To begin with it sketches out the main characteristics 
of the first intifada with a particular insight into the rise and fall of mass-based popular 
action.  The main reasons for the decline of civil society and its potential for 
mobilisation lie to a significant extent in Arafat’s autocratic style of rule but are also in 
part simply a consequence of the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA) which 
was a direct product of Oslo and replaced pre-intifada self-organising mechanisms.  
Problems were further compounded by the failure of the PLO to democratise and the 
weakening of political parties.   As a result, there was no effective institutional outlet for 
the population through channels of either politics or civil society which could mobilise 
and direct frustration and grievances.  Hence, the popular activism through 
demonstrations and civil disobedience that dominated the first intifada was very short-
lived.  Instead, what took root was individual activism by those who were already inside 
the framework of militant groups, and later on in the course of the intifada with the 
increase in violence against the civilian population and the crumbling structure of 
organisations due to Israeli military operations, those outside these frameworks, lacking 
any political affiliation were also attracted.  Moreover, the chapter highlights where 
much of the population’s frustration came from.  The Oslo Accords had promised final 
status negotiations within five years and nurtured the expectations of the establishment 
15 
 
of an independent Palestinian state.  The primary object of frustration was hence the 
failure of Oslo as it failed to deliver a state to the Palestinians.  More immediately, 
however, frustration was directed at the PA.  The PA’s failure was symptomatic of the 
dual role it was expected to play, trying to satisfy two sets of incompatible needs.  As an 
offspring of the Oslo agreement, which was primarily designed to protect Israeli 
security, it ended up policing its own society without, however, being able to protect its 
own citizens.  Neither was it capable of providing basic services to Palestinians without 
full control over water and territory.  Hence, central to the PA’s failure to fulfil 
expectations on either side is the contradiction of how sovereignty was exercised as was 
simultaneously expected, denied and performed.  The PA’s incompatible roles were also 
reflected in the ambivalent approach it took to the second intifada: it neither stopped it, 
nor did it embrace it outright and develop a strategy. 
Yet, political fragmentation alone cannot account for the absence of mass-
mobilisation.  Recent developments in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya have shown that strong 
charismatic leadership and the involvement of strong organisations which shape the 
movement, be they political or social in nature, are not necessary ingredients for 
successful mass-mobilisation.
6
  Although conditions on many aspects of the uprisings 
differ in these countries, and I seek in no way to embark on a detailed comparison here, 
this observation should at least urge us to look beyond the explanation, even though it is 
an important one, that the failure of the second intifada is due to the debilitating impact 
of political fragmentation.   
The third chapter continues the project of contextualisation and focuses on the 
role of territory in this conflict.  The chapter will borrow from political geography and 
ask where Palestinian political activism occurred during the second intifada, if the 
location changed since the first intifada and if yes, why.  Territory has always been at 
the core of this conflict, yet to date the unique geographical dislocation has received 
little attention in the literature on Palestinian political violence.  
Confrontations during the second intifada were concentrated in particular 
geographical areas and the discussion will be whether socio-economic factors have 
shaped the pattern of geographical distribution or whether it is the result of the spatially 
                                                 
6
 Gudrun Krämer described the Arab spring movements as missing three components: charismatic 
leaders, organisations that shaped the movement, and an overarching ideology.  Gudrun Krämer, “The 
End of Exceptionalism: The Middle East in 2011” (keynote speech,18th Annual DAVO Congress, Free 
University Berlin, 6 October 2011). 
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defined nature of the occupation.  That confrontations occurred at certain flashpoints, 
namely where Palestinian administered areas meet those areas still fully controlled by 
Israel both in terms of security and administration, is not an entirely new observation.  
Less convincing are the accounts put forward to explain the propensity of suicide 
attacks within Israel proper and the chapter will reflect on the underlying rationale of 
this Palestinian tactic and its implications.  However, the thesis will not only ask where 
confrontations occurred and what that means; but it will also, in a second instance, 
consider whether we can identify particular localities that people who engaged in 
activism came from.  If so, we are moved to ask: why these particular localities and not 
others?  The chapter will contend that, rather than socio-economic differences, it is the 
un-equalising effect of occupation policies that, at least in part, explains why suicide 
bombers predominantly came from certain geographical areas.  It is here where, 
territory, politics and society meet.  The increasing fragmentation of Palestinian 
territory through division of administrative control, as well as control over movement 
and essentially the experience of different modes of governance, has affected society 
differently.  The underlying fragmentation has also translated into a reconfiguration of 
identity and how the individual relates with the rest of society.  While it is important 
that we do not overemphasise fragmentation in the sense that we do not allow for the 
possibility of collective action, we need to ask these questions.  All too often, society is 
treated as one coherent body without, in any way, taking into account its multi-layered 
dynamic character.   One of the objectives of the third chapter is to challenge the 
abstraction of both space and society that tends to dominate traditional geopolitical 
discussions of the Palestinian territories.   
The fourth chapter will present a contextual analysis of suicide bombing during 
the second intifada, revisiting the major themes examined in the previous two chapters.  
Israeli aggression, symptomatic of the inability of the PA to protect its own citizens, 
will be identified as a significant factor, both in terms of the psychological impact on 
individuals as well as a justification for retribution by organisations.  Changes in the 
structure of organisations will be traced back to the territorial fragmentation identified 
in chapter three as well as Israeli military operations.  The relevance of social 
fragmentation, also discussed in chapter three, will be assessed against the geographic 
origins and background of suicide bombers and the section will conclude that they 
primarily came from rural areas and refugee camps.  These are the areas that in the 
preceding chapter will be identified as those being the most affected by occupation 
policies.  Political fragmentation discussed in chapter two is particularly relevant in 
17 
 
explaining the inability to find a common platform and strategy among the political 
parties, and the chapter will demonstrate that there was a strong disagreement among 
the different parties on the use of violence inside Israel.  The chapter will close with a 
section on women as females, for the first time in the Palestinian context, participated in 
suicide bombings.  It will challenge the widespread analysis that women’s motivations 
differed from that of the male suicide bombers and it will highlight how women also 
formulated their motivations to engage in political activism in response to the Israeli 
occupation.  Bringing the different strands of argument together, the chapter finally 
contends that suicide bombing remains a phenomenon that should be understood in 
political terms. 
The thesis will conclude in the fifth chapter by recapitulating the central 
arguments that were developed throughout the thesis.  Additionally, the conclusion will 
offer reflections on the research process and propose avenues for further research.
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1. Studying the Palestine Question 
 
I have no hope of theoretical simplicity, not at this historical moment when so many 
stable oppositions of political and intellectual life have collapsed, but I also have no 
desire for simplicity, since a world that theory could fully grasp and neatly explain 
would not, I suspect, be a pleasant place.
1
 
 
To understand place requires that we have access to both an objective and subjective 
reality. From the decentred vantage point of the theoretical scientist, place becomes 
either location or a set of generic relations and thereby loses much of its significance 
for human action.  From the centred viewpoint of the subject, place has meaning only in 
relation to an individual’s or a group’s goals and concerns.  Place is best viewed from 
points in between.
2
  
 
Contrary to traditional approaches in political science to studying Palestinian 
political action, this thesis will offer a contextual and historical approach to explaining 
Palestinian political activism.  It will contend that in order to understand why political 
action in the second intifada took the form it did, it is mandatory to look at how social, 
political and cultural developments have influenced and shaped behaviour over time.  
The difference in modes of political action is striking when comparing the first and 
second intifada which necessitates the question, why and how has it changed?  
Palestinian political action, then, is varied, changeable and adaptable and suicide 
bombing is only one tool employed by the Palestinians.  Studying how this phenomenon 
relates to political action as a whole will produce a more complex and complete picture 
of when this particular form of political violence is used.  In addition, the key concepts 
that the argument will rest on, such as space and society, are not seen as monolithic and 
fixed, but rather as fluid, multi-layered and subjective.  By moving moving beyond the 
abstractions of ‘territory’ and ‘society’, the thesis will uncover the significance of 
different geographies, which in the Palestinian case is particularly relevant because of 
its territorial dislocation. Moreover, it will offer an insight into the different layers of 
Palestinian society.  Adopting this kind of perspective opens up a number of interesting 
questions in relation to political protest and political violence. 
In order to answer the overarching question, why and how Palestinian political 
activism has changed, one initial pressing question that arises will be, what happened to 
                                                 
1 Michael Walzer, “The Idea of Civil Society,” Dissent 39 (Spring 1991): 293. 
2 J. Nicholas Entrikin, The Betweenness of Place – Towards a Geography of Modernity (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1991), 5. 
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the unity and mass-based popular action that were so characteristic of the first intifada?  
Why and when did it begin to decline? Naturally, a key event between the two intifadas 
was the signing of Oslo and thus the impact of the establishment of the PA and, the 
political arrangements agreed on in more general terms, necessitate further enquiry.  
One of the most visible and lasting legacies of Oslo is the territorial fragmentation that 
has become institutionalised with the agreement and has in recent years, especially 
under Ariel Sharon’s rule, developed into a vast network of control. This aspect, despite 
a general obsession with the ‘territorial’ in political science, is strikingly absent from 
such studies of Palestinian political violence.   
In response to, what this thesis identifies to be a gap, it will explore the 
relationship between Palestinian territorial dislocation and the transformation of 
Palestinian political action.  Instead of drawing on perspectives from terrorism studies 
or social movement theory this thesis will rely on geographic insights as the core 
component in its explanation.  It will contend that the ‘where’ is central in asking and 
answering questions about political activism.  The particular geographically structured 
power arrangements instituted over Oslo, the patchwork of multiple borders created 
between Israeli and Palestinian-controlled areas, and the social impact of different forms 
of governance in the various zones of control, have crucially shaped the changes in 
Palestinian political action.   
Answering these questions, the thesis contends, will offer new insights into 
political activism over the two intifada periods, but especially also the use of suicide 
bombing in the al-Aqsa intifada.  
 
1.1 Introducing the Palestine Question 
 
 The Palestinian Israeli conflict has proven to be one of the most intractable, 
volatile and complex conflicts in modern history.  Current developments, especially the 
continuous and unhampered growth of settlements in the West Bank and in East 
Jerusalem, a fiercely enforced geographical division which began with Oslo, and the 
strengthening of right-wing elements within Israeli society leave us little hope that this 
conflict will be resolved in the near future. Lack of will power, opportunism, and 
strategic miscalculations, have often been the main perpetrators of a failed solution.  
The Oslo Accords that were signed in secret negotiations between Israeli government 
representatives and the PLO gave a brief glimpse of hope. Many that had lived the daily 
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realities of violence, occupation and destruction hoped for their own future state that 
would finally after more than two decades of occupation allow them to take their lives 
into their own hands.  From a Palestinian perspective, the biggest compromise was 
made with the recognition of the state of Israel, and the renouncing of 78% of the land 
which had been historical Palestine.  In a trade-off between peace and independence a 
Palestinian state within the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as the capital was 
proposed.  Most Palestinians had given up the goal of regaining the whole of Mandate 
Palestine, but many did retain the idea of a one state-solution with the land being shared 
by both peoples.  The latter, however, until now, were often silenced by a political elite 
that wanted to impose its will and on the Israeli side the option was never a popular one.  
In the case of a one-state solution, demographic realities would mean certain demise of 
the idea of a Jewish state as Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem 
combined with Palestinian citizens of Israel would soon outnumber Jewish citizenry.  
For similar reasons the return of refugees has always met with opposition.  While some 
refugee families have managed to settle and establish themselves in Europe or America, 
a large number still live in refugee camps, with those in Lebanon being widely known 
to be the most squalid ones.  The right of return keeps looming over any potential for a 
settlement of the conflict.  How many would in actuality want to return to their former 
homes is contested but there are certainly some, especially the older generations who 
grew up with the still very vivid narrative of the idyllic Palestinian village.  The 
declaration of the state of Israel soon after its establishment that absentees were not 
allowed to return, including the semantically curious category of ‘present absentees’ 
(those present within the boundaries of the state but not on their properties), garnered 
criticism from international governments at the time.
3
  Israel stood by its decision and 
even destroyed most of the Arab villages in order to deter those who attempted to return 
and to ensure that there was nothing to return to.  While a practical and just solution 
would have been possible at the time, the passing of decades has made it much more 
difficult to find a resolution of the refugee issue.  The two-state solution appears to 
follow a similar course.  Since the Oslo Accords Israeli governments have been busy 
creating facts on the ground.  Paradoxically, despite the two-state discourse settlements 
grew rapidly over the Oslo period, and so did the infrastructure and security to support 
                                                 
3 The Lausanne conference in 1949 was based on UN Resolution 194 and proposed an unconditional 
return of refugees, a two-state solution, and the internationalisation of Jerusalem.  The UN, US, the Arab 
world, the Palestinians and even Israel foreign minister Moshe Sharett accepted this comprehensive 
approach but these efforts were blocked by both Ben Gurion and Jordan’s King Abdullah who themselves 
had very different plans for the Palestinian territories.  See Ilan Pappe, The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine 
(Oxford: Oneworld, 2006), 213-4, 237. 
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them.  The territorial fragmentation created through checkpoints, barriers, bypass roads 
will be a key theme in the thesis.  These growing Israeli population centres that, 
together with their infrastructures, reach deep into Palestinian territory, enclose and 
separate Palestinian areas, make day by day a two state solution less viable. 
 One of the key weaknesses of Oslo was of course that none of the 'meaty' issues 
were dealt with at the time.  Effectively the Accords did what they promised: they were 
simply a declaration of principles.  All of the questions that constituted the essence of 
the conflict were postponed to be tackled at a later stage of negotiations.  Here 
Kimmerling perceptively points out how for Israelis all the benefits of the agreement 
were delivered essentially with the signing of the Accords (recognition by the PLO and 
effectively an assurance of security through the establishing of the PA and its role in 
policing its own society).  For the Palestinians, on the other hand, the benefits were to 
be delivered through final status negotiations.
4
  Before reaching this stage they were 
required to prove to Israel as well as the international community that they would be fit 
to govern themselves and, perhaps most crucially, to keep Israel safe.  Oslo basically 
institutionalised a relationship of dependency that was already a given in this 
asymmetric conflict.  Hence, for most astute observers, like Edward Said, the Oslo 
Accords were bound to fail.  Nevertheless, they were greeted with relief and 
celebrations by many among the local communities.  The Accords instilled hope after 
the catastrophe of 1948 and the later setback of 1967.  This hope however, as Mahmoud 
Darwish in his poem 'A State of Siege' observes, has almost turned into a ‘chronic 
illness’ for Palestinians and it was, in fact, the frustration and disappointment of the 
failure of Oslo which lay behind the outbreak of the second intifada.
5
  
One reason for the lack of a concerted effort on the Israeli side to find a solution 
to the conflict may be the fact that it does not existentially affect daily life in Israel in 
the same way it does for Palestinians who have to live with the frustrations and 
humiliations of occupation every day of their lives.  Moreover, for Israel, the conflict is 
a much wider issue and includes the question of its relations with its neighbours and its 
position within the region.  Hence Israeli priorities in the conflict have fluctuated 
between seeking a Palestinian solution and seeking recognition from its Arab 
neighbours.   
                                                 
4 Baruch Kimmerling and Joel S. Migdal, The Palestinian People: A History (Cambridge MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2003), 357-361. 
5 Mahmoud Darwish, “A State of Siege,” in The Butterfly’s Burden, trans. Fady Joudah (Highgreen, 
Tarset: Bloodaxe Books, 2007), 120-173. 
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 Inevitably, perceptions of the conflict have changed.  One reason for this is the 
transformation of the historical context.  In the aftermath of the Second World War 
sympathies lay firmly with the Jewish population and a quick solution to this question 
was welcomed.  In reality however, much of the way for the establishment of a Jewish 
state in Mandate Palestine was paved by the end of the 19
th
 century.  The first Zionist 
congress formulated this goal in Basel under the leadership of Theodor Herzl and 
immigration already began at the turn of the century.  An increased influx of Jewish 
immigrants already led to noticeable tension between the Jewish and Arab populations 
in the 1920s, while Jewish persecution in Europe reached its peak much later.  
Sympathies with the Jews as the victims of the Holocaust and their association with 
Western civilisation as mostly European emigrants has dominated the perception of the 
Palestinian Israeli conflict for a long time. Rosemary Sayigh articulated this succinctly 
as follows: 
 
The indifference of the outside world to what had really happened in 
Palestine during 1948, and the destruction of Palestinian national 
institutions, meant that many years were to pass before survivors of that 
War were able to record their experiences.  If what happened to them had 
happened to the Jews, or to Armenians, the whole ‘civilised’ world would 
have been vibrating with horror and disapproval.  But because this time the 
persecutors were Jews, and the victims Arabs, no one wanted to know.
6
 
 
Throughout the establishment of the Israeli state and up to fairly recently, Israeli 
public relations were very successful in portraying themselves as the victims of Arab 
aggression, without interlocutors for peace on the other side, and a Western outpost 
under siege in a hostile region.  Palestinians, on the other hand, without state and 
institutions were rendered voiceless.  For decades the only organised voice came from 
the PLO which with its often highly publicised resistance tactics gave Palestinians the 
image of the terrorist.  It was precisely this misrepresentation and imbalance that 
motivated Edward Said in writing The Question of Palestine.  He explains in his 
foreword that he wants to present the complexities of the Palestine question to the 
Western reader, going beyond the image of Palestinians as merely violent terrorists, and 
to highlight the roots of the conflict that precedes the occupation of the West Bank, 
Gaza, and East Jerusalem in 1967 but are inalienable from the dispossession of 1948.  
                                                 
6
 Sayigh, Rosemary, The Palestinians: From Peasants to Revolutionaries: A People’s History.(London: 
Zed Books, 1979), 81. 
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It is no secret that when the British took on the Mandate they were from the 
beginning more sympathetic towards the newly arrived Jewish immigrants from Europe 
than the local population.  A deeply ingrained racism and sense of superiority towards 
the non-Western world, its customs and habits, in the imperialist thinking manifested 
itself also in the articulation of the mandate: 
 
To those colonies and territories, which as a consequence of the late war 
have ceased to be under the sovereignty of States which formerly governed 
them, and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by 
themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there 
should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such 
peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation, and that securities for the 
performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.  The best 
method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such 
people should be entrusted to advanced nations.
7
  
 
While a complexity of reasons may explain the favouritism towards the Jewish 
immigrants over the indigenous population, the dominance of the Judeo-Christian 
conception of the world in Europe was undoubtedly a decisive factor.  A sense of 
superiority over the Palestinians has persevered until the present time and is perhaps 
best summarised in a very popular Israeli catch phrase that maintains that Israel made 
the desert bloom.  Although the skyline of Tel Aviv, the resorts in Eilat and the nature 
parks and forests across Israel may momentarily impress the visitor, this statement 
should be treated with caution for a number of reasons.  A survey carried out by the 
British Mandate authorities in 1945 and 1946 demonstrates that Palestinian production 
in relation to its land use is either slightly less, more or less the same, or higher, than 
Jewish agricultural production proportionate to land use.
8
  In the 1930s Palestine was 
also the second biggest exporter of citrus fruits after Spain.
9
  Hence the suggestion that 
Palestinians did not make use of the land is a flawed one.  Moreover, since 1948 social 
realities and modes of governance have had inhibitory effects on the Palestinian 
development while Israel has received an immense influx of aid.  US support for Israel 
is most indicative here and a conservative estimate would measure US aid at almost 
                                                 
7 Cited in Gudrun Krämer, A History of Palestine – From the Ottoman Conquest to the Founding of the 
State of Israel. Translated by Graham Haman and Gudrun Krämer (Princeton: Princeton University Press 
2008), 146. 
8
 J. V. W. Shaw, A Survey of Palestine: Prepared in December, 1945 and January, 1946 for the 
Information of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1991), 323.  The 
survey is available electronically at http://www.palestineremembered.com/Acre/Books/Story831.html. 
For page 323 see http://www.palestineremembered.com/Articles/A-Survey-of-Palestine/Story6764.html. 
9 Ted Swedenburg, Memories of Revolt: The 1936-1939 Rebellion and the Palestinian National Past 
(Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 2003), xxiii. 
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$114 billion between 1949 and 2008.
10
  Much of the aid received on the Palestinian side 
goes into alleviating the damage and destruction caused by decades of occupation, 
conflict and outright war.  Moreover, since the occupation of the territories, the 
Palestinians never had full control over land or water, making it impossible ‘to make the 
desert bloom.’  While Israel’s achievements may be sizeable for its short existence, this 
is ultimately only one side to the story.  A Palestinian whose land is flooded by sewage 
from settlements, whose village is surrounded by the Separation Wall, and who has to 
find his way daily through a maze of ugly concrete constructions of bypass roads, 
checkpoints, barriers and road blocks, may just wonder where it is that this desert is 
blooming.   
On the level of academic analysis, the way much social science is conducted has 
changed too, over the years, having become more self-reflective and critical.  Some 
scholars have become much more aware of their own self when they study others and 
question the tools and mechanisms that they employ in their research.  A significant 
contribution in opening up postcolonial debates in relation to the Middle East has, of 
course, been made by Said’s Orientalism.  Said is not only concerned with how the 
Orient is represented in Western literature and culture but also how Orientalism has 
been used as a discourse ‘for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the 
Orient.’11  The discourse surrounding the war in Iraq and George W. Bush’s Freedom 
Agenda are good recent examples here.  Such an agenda does not only echo the 
imperialist traits of the Mandate era in the sense that a civilised nation must assist 
people who cannot yet fend for themselves, but the selectivity in the application of the 
espoused principles, which in themselves are not neutral concepts, is an obvious 
manifestation of this intrinsic link of the discourse to power and politics. 
Many of the problems in the literature stem from unquestioningly applying our 
own concepts to different cultural contexts and the condensing of diverse societies and 
cultures into monolithic blocks.  Judging others to our own standards without asking 
themselves about their views reflects, at least, a subtle form of imperialist scholarship.  
Simplifying the world into civilisations, Islam, and the West creates entities that do not 
in this way exist.  Although Muslims all over the world have a common base in what 
they believe, Muslim societies differ hugely not the least because of their large 
                                                 
10 Shirl McArthur, “A Conservative Estimate of Total Direct U.S. Aid to Israel: Almost $114 Billion,” 
Congress Watch, Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, November 2008, 10-11, 
http://wrmea.org/component/content/article/2452008-november/3845-congress-watch-a-conservative-
estimate-of-total-direct-us-aid-to-israelalmost-114-billion.html (accessed 05 September 2011). 
11 Edward Said, Orientalism (London: Penguin, 1977), 3. 
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geographical spread from Indonesia to Morocco and Turkey to the Sudan.  How Islam is 
lived is part of a complex negotiation between traditionalist culture in these societies, 
socio-political and economic conditions.  The treatment of women in Muslim societies 
is always a popular topic among Western scholars and policy makers who engage with 
the region.  While abuse, lack of freedom, and rights are often manifest in traditional 
Muslim societies, creating a natural connotation between Islam and the abuse of women 
is large-scale paint brushing.  The conventional pairing of Islam with terrorism in much 
scholarship in the aftermath of 9/11 is another expression of this kind of thinking.   
Talal Asad in On Suicide Bombing questions why violence committed by 
terrorist groups invokes so much horror but atrocities committed by Western 
democracies seldom do.  It is not a clash of civilisations that Asad identifies to be at the 
core of these sentiments, but rather a perception that the latter occur in the context of 
conflicts between the ‘civilised’ and the ‘uncivilised’ and hence all rules of civilisation 
can be put aside and any means justified.
12
  Asad, in essence, reduces the question of 
violence to one of death.   More precisely, it is about how one deals with death, one’s 
own and that of others.
13
  One may imagine that suicide bombers select their targets 
because they do not attribute great value to the life of their victims but for Asad, the 
same is true for many politicians and intellectuals in the West:  ‘The perception that 
human life has differential exchange value in the market when it comes to “civilised” 
and “uncivilised” people is not only quite common in liberal democratic countries; it is 
necessary to a hierarchical global order.”14 
Keeping in mind the discourses that surround this mode of violence the thesis 
seeks to step away from state-centric paradigms and also critically views violence that is 
justified on the grounds of upholding freedom, democracy and security. Through its 
interpretive, historicist and contextual methodology the study will demonstrate that the 
question of Palestinian political violence, especially suicide bombing, is much more 
complex than portrayed in much of the literature on suicide bombing. 
 
 
1.2 Debates on the Palestine Question 
 
 Attempting to gain a due insight into the literature on Palestine within a limited 
time frame and limited space is a challenge that is beyond this chapter.  The literature 
                                                 
12 Talal Asad, On Suicide Bombing (New York: Columbia University Press 2007), 38. 
13 Ibid., 95. 
14 Ibid, 94. 
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on the subject has grown exponentially decade by decade.  While until the 1990s 
contributions may have been comparatively modest, with the outbreak of the first 
intifada and the signing of the Oslo Accords the Palestine question attracted the 
attention of international media and political class, as well as academic audiences.  This 
is even truer now.  The incessant spurts of violence and deteriorating humanitarian 
situation of Palestinians, despite huge aid-influxes, and intermittent talks about peace, 
have attracted writers from all levels of the spectrum from the hard-core pro-Zionist 
camp which questions the existence of a Palestinian people to those who advocate a 
one-state solution.  Some of the quality of the literature is dubious and often more 
driven by emotive issues rather than scholarship.  What carries particular relevance for 
this thesis is the literature presenting the Palestinian narrative on root causes of the 
conflict which is normally completely evaded by the traditional political science 
approach.  Of particular note here is the literature dealing with the events of 1948, 
which while for Israelis marks the War of Independence, by Palestinians these events 
are referred to as the nakba, or catastrophe.  In fact, in order to completely understand 
the events after the end of the Mandate and some of the decisions made at the time, it is 
necessary to go back to the nature of British rule and the different alliances formed.  
Especially interesting are the contributions made to this by Israeli historians who took a 
new turn in debates on the Palestinian exodus.  Until then the widespread and dominant 
official narrative was that Palestinians did not form a coherent body within the British 
Mandate of Palestine and that they left their homes and possession behind out of free 
will, often instigated by their Arab leaders.  Moreover, Israel's war efforts in 1948 had 
been depicted in a purely defensive fashion as the nascent state was under threat from 
aggressive Arab states on all sides.  Naming it the War of Independence also naturally 
gives it an anti-colonial ring despite the fact that the Mandate had already come to an 
end.   These debates are of particular interest here because in the traditional approach to 
studying Palestinian political violence this literature is largely ignored.  The history of 
dispossession of Palestinian refugees plays a key role in contextualising the Palestinian 
drive for national independence and the structural constraints as well as internal division 
that still haunts the Palestinian project of self-realisation, remain central themes in the 
literature.  This kind of literature provides an essential context for understanding how 
within the Palestinian field political violence is viewed and portrayed and discussions 
on armed struggle tend to tap into this long history of suffering and dispossession as 
well as resistance.  Another event central for the contextualisation of the conflict is, of 
course, Oslo which marks a crucial milestone in Palestinian history because it is the 
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only peace agreement that has been signed between the two parties.  Its importance also 
lies with the repercussions it has had and the way it has shaped the continuation of the 
conflict.  Discussion of the Accords is significant primarily for two reasons: first, the 
political arrangements it introduced and second, the geographical consequences it has 
had through territorial division of control. Chapter 2 will deal with literature on Oslo 
and chapter 3, in particular, will discuss at length the resulting geographical dislocation.  
In the late eighties the fairly radical ideas of the New Historians caused much 
uproar leading to intense debates within Israel.  A significant contribution to the debate 
on 1948 and the question as to why Palestinian refugees left was made by Benny Morris 
in a meticulous and much-praised study of the Palestinian exodus.
15
  Using archive 
material that had recently been declassified, Morris identifies 369 localities and 
describes in detail the reasons for leaving as well as the different stages of the war. 
Although he acknowledges the expulsion of the inhabitants in many cases, the 
intimidation and psychological warfare, and atrocities committed by the Jewish armed 
forces, he concludes that the refugee exodus was simply a side-effect of the war and not 
the result of a systematic policy of expulsion.  Morris is an interesting case because his 
views changed drastically in his later work, and in a Haaretz interview that caused much 
controversy, he came to the conclusion that ethnic cleansing was justified in particular 
contexts.  While he does not negate his previous research findings and, in fact, confirms 
that newer research showed that rape and massacres were committed by Israeli forces 
during the 1948 expulsions on a much larger scale than he had previously assumed, 
Morris also admits that transfer was integral to Ben Gurion's plans.  Morris believes that 
for the creation of the Jewish state the expulsion of around 700,000 Palestinians was 
justified.  He argues that executions came to no more than 800 people, describing this as 
small war crimes in the light of other crimes in history.  He also very clearly states that 
the non-completion of the transfer in 1948 was a mistake because a large number of 
Palestinians were left in Gaza, West Bank and parts of Israel.  For Morris, nations like 
the US could have never been established without the annihilation of the Indians.  
Interesting in the interview is also Morris’ culturalist explanation.  Islam, in his view, 
does not accredit the same value to human life as the West.  He describes Palestinians as 
wild animals and serial killers that need to be kept in a cage and the root for this 
problem lies with Arab culture and Islam, which, for Morris, are inherently barbarian.
16
   
                                                 
15 Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem: 1947-49 (Cambridge: CUP, 1987) 
16 Ari Shavit, “Survival of the Fittest: An Interview with Benny Morris,” The Haaretz, 9 January 2004, 
http://www.logosjournal.com/morris.htm (accessed 18 November 2011). 
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 Ilan Pappe, being the most radical of the New Historians, goes much further 
than Morris in his assessment of the Palestinian refugees.  Pappe seeks to replace the 
paradigm of war in the debates on 1948 and the view of the Palestinian exodus as 
collateral damage. While Morris came to the initial conclusion that the massacres were 
by-products of war, inevitable in warfare and the creation of a state, Pappe argues that 
ethnic cleansing of all of Palestine was the goal of the Zionist movement because it 
envisaged the land as the location for the creation of the new Jewish state.  Much of the 
cleansing and expulsion already occurred whilst the British were still in control, with 
little interference from the latter.  Pappe demonstrates this in the case of Jerusalem 
where in the Western neighbourhoods Palestinian residents were expelled in April 1948 
but in the small quarter of Sheikh Jarrah a British commander stepped in to stop full 
implementation.
17
  Pappe articulates his study as an alternative to the Zionist Israeli 
narrative, which predominantly argues that the local population left voluntarily, and the 
Palestinian narrative of the nakba dealing with the events from the perspective of 
expulsion.  Neither narrative deals with the actors behind the events.
18
   
The ensuing refugee crisis in the aftermath of 1948, the question of property, and 
the right of return, as well as refugee identity have all received attention in academic 
debates.
19
  Numerous cultural and research centres in Palestine and abroad have 
collected testimonies from refugees about the nakba, in an attempt to give the victims of 
the conflict a voice, but these potential sources for research have often received little 
attention in Western and especially Israeli academic debates.  
The myth that Israel has lived under constant threat from its neighbours and with 
no partners for peace, which has been a large building block in its justification for 
militarisation and establishment of its vast security apparatus, has been challenged very 
articulately by Avi Shlaim.  In The Iron Wall Shlaim traces the policy of the various 
dove and hawk governments towards their Arab neighbours and contends, contrary, to 
the main Israeli narrative that Arab leaders were at various stages willing to recognise 
Israel, and even make peace with it.
20
  He shows for example how Syrian Colonel Husni 
Zaim as early as 1949 in his very brief reign between 30 March and 14 August pursued 
negotiations with Israel over a peace agreement and even offered to absorb 300,000 
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19 Michael Dumper, The Future of Palestinian Refugees: Towards Equity and Peace (Boulder: Lynne 
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Palestinian refugees in Syria.
21
  Ben Gurion’s response, however, was a negative one, 
preferring to focus on armistice agreements with the neighbouring Arab countries 
because a pursuit of peace would have come at a higher cost for the Israelis and, from 
an Israeli point of view, there was no need to hurry.
22
 
The events of 1948, especially the nakba, are recurring and crucial debates, 
especially from a Palestinian perspective.  They are seen as the origins of the conflict 
and are hence closely tied to the question of who bears responsibility and what a just 
and lasting solution to the conflict would entail.  The most common Israeli viewpoint is 
that the problems with the Palestinians started in 1967 and the occupation of the West 
Bank and Gaza, which is reflected in the fact that little scholarship on the Palestinians 
focuses on the displacement of the refugees as the origins of the conflict, and that even 
by Israeli NGOs engaged with the Palestinian issues there is little recognition of 1948 as 
the root of the conflict.  Israeli activism, where it exists, largely tends to focus on the 
occupation. 
One very pressing question, that until then had largely been neglected, was 
posed by Rashid Khalidi.  He explores in The Iron Cage why the Palestinians were 
unable to avert the nakba and argues contrary to general assumptions, that the 
Palestinians were not less educated or backward in comparison to their neighbours at 
the time, but that it was surrounding conditions that inhibited Palestinian self-
determination.  From the beginning they were destined for something different in 
comparison to their neighbours and subject to special regulations devised to foster 
Zionist claims to national self-realisation.
23
  For Khalidi, the British favoured the Jewish 
immigrants from the outset while they hampered any political developments among the 
indigenous population and barred them from involvement in the administration, which 
prevented Palestinians from beginning to build their own national institutions.
24
  The 
divide and rule principle that was so typical of the imperialist regimes significantly 
contributed to the fragmentation of society.  Reading Sayigh, however, one gets the 
impression that the problem was at least in part also an internal one.  She maintains that 
even in the presence of a strong leadership it would have been difficult to unite the 
different segments in society:  
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22 Ibid., 73. 
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There were sectarian differences between Muslim, Christian, and Druze 
which, though largely suppressed by the growth of Arab consciousness 
during the Mandate, still existed at the level of the peasants.  There were 
also the ancient class categories of peasant, nomad, and city-dweller, 
distinguished by marked differences of status, occupation and way of life.  
And on top of these traditional categories were new ones introduced by 
‘modernisation’. The drift of landless peasants to the cities had begun to 
create an Arab proletariat, while the slow spread of modern education gave 
birth to an intelligentsia distinct from the traditional liberati.
25
 
 
Unlike the Jewish Zionists arriving in Palestine who managed to forge a social 
and ethnic conglomeration on a national level that transcended ethnic and social class 
lines, internal power struggles inhibited Palestinian mobilisation towards the goal of 
national liberation.
26
  The semi-feudal system in Palestine and the leadership it 
produced are particularly significant in explaining the internal power struggle behind 
some of the strategic decisions taken: 
 
Such a leadership was naturally alarmed by the central role played by the 
peasants during the twenties and during the 1936-1939 revolution and 
consequently sought to compromise with the British through the mediation 
of Arab regimes thus initiating progressive dependence on the Arab 
regimes.
27
 
 
These debates on the nakba give context to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The 
now over six decade old history of the conflict is largely ignored in studies on 
Palestinian violence. In particular there is an absence of engagement with the 
longstanding violence against and dispossession of Palestinians.  Anat Berko’s 
‘revelation’, for example, that suicide bombings did not start with the second intifada, 
but much earlier, and that Palestinian violence goes back even further to hijackings in 
the 1960s and 1970s is not balanced by an equal appraisal of the 1948 expulsion of 
Palestinians and the violence and discrimination dominating the lives of Palestinians in 
the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza since 1967.    
Other themes that have received attention in the literature are the PLO, the 
Palestinian national movement and the first intifada.  Much debate was naturally 
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generated by Oslo which was a turning point in Palestinian-Israeli relations and had 
significant aftereffects.
28
  One of these legacies is the separation of the two populations, 
the closures and the division of territory into different areas of control.  These aspects 
have been crucial in shaping society and politics in the coming years and much of the 
discussion in this thesis will be devoted to how these changes have shaped the 
transformations in political activism.  Initially greeted with euphoria, Oslo and its 
failure to bring a resolution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict have generated much 
debate.  By the end of the first intifada Hamas had gained popularity and not long after 
the signing of the Accords the movement staged the first suicide bombing, giving it 
international attention.
29
 
 With the exception of refugees, debates on the Palestine Question and the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict, have at least in the English literature, primarily focused on 
the political elite level but less literature has been devoted to societal transformations.  
Although the gender literature would lend itself to offer insights into societal aspects, 
even here the occupation, militarisation and politics often dominate the agenda.
30
 
 Moreover, the literature shows relative scarcity when it comes to Palestine in 
relation to regional and international actors.  This is partly a symptom of the focus in IR 
on states and the absence of statehood in the Palestinian case but is also in practical 
terms a by-product of Israeli occupation and in academic terms a reflection of the field.  
Israeli occupation, particularly its control over movement, is not conducive to academic 
exchange as it exercises restrictions on the free movement of Palestinian academics as 
well as control over foreign academics visiting and even more so over those wishing to 
work in the territories.  The increasing closure or isolation of Palestinians makes the 
question of why one should have an interest in other regions outside the Middle East 
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(and indeed how one would acquire such knowledge and experience) a less immediate 
one. However, the absence of such literature is also a function of the nature of area 
studies itself within which particular areas are seen as unique and different and hence 
looking beyond such confines is not seen as desirable or even possible.     
 
1.3 Palestinian Political Violence 
 
 Within the Palestine literature only a small proportion deals with the topic of 
political violence.  Authors who contribute to debates on radicalisation and Palestinian 
violence tend to make their contributions through discussions on Islamic 
fundamentalism, Hamas, the Israeli occupation, the PLO and development.  
 One possible explanation for the absence of a clear-cut subfield on violence may 
be the political sensitivity of the subject.  Another convincing explanation is also the 
fact that the phenomenon is not viewed as a freestanding issue but rather as a symptom 
of underlying causes and because of that is discussed in relation to other topics.  
Debates on the transformation of forms of resistance and the evolution of political 
violence throughout different contexts are rare.  It is especially noticeable that only a 
small body of literature comes to terms with the second intifada.  Some authors have 
tried to make sense of the second intifada in terms of the first intifada, asking how it 
changed and why.
31
  Ramzi Baroud's work on the second intifada offers an account of 
the major events of that period but it is journalistic in style and is therefore limited in its 
analysis of events beyond the uprising.  Ami Pedhazur and Clive Jones’ edited work on 
the second intifada is a quest for understanding what kind of conflict the second intifada 
should be understood as.  There is even less literature on the evolution of political 
activism and how political activism and its more violent manifestations have emerged in 
particular contexts.  Mazin Qumsiyeh, who is himself a political activist, describes 
different phases of the non-violent resistance but his account is a collection of personal 
experiences and is not academic in its nature.
32
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Julie Norman in a recent examination of civil resistance in the second intifada 
explores attitudes of youth towards both non-violent means of struggle as well as 
violence.  Her findings suggest that the majority of youth thought that violence was the 
most effective means of challenging the occupation.  However, 64.3% of those 
respondents also agreed or strongly agreed that both violence and non-violence are 
effective means of resisting the occupation.  Norman concludes from this that the 
majority of those that support violence still acknowledge the benefits of non-violent 
action.
33
  For Norman, one of the major reasons for decline in non-violent activism was 
the reframing of non-violence in the context of dialogue and peacebuilding during the 
Oslo period, which eventually led to an understanding of non-violence as 
accommodation instead of resistance.
34
  This, together with the institutionalisation of 
NGOs and the repression of resistance by the PA and Israel, debilitated non-violent 
activism.
35
  The reframing of non-violent activism as accommodation swayed those that 
sought resistance toward violence. 
Rosemary Sayigh, Ted Swedenburg and Yezid Sayigh deal with the armed 
struggle of a different historical period.  Rosemary Sayigh’s study of refugee camps in 
Lebanon finds that Palestinian peasants were the most active during the whole period of 
the British occupation and contributed more than other classes to the national resistance 
movement but they never came close to leading it, or stamping it with their own 
character because of their exclusion from knowledge and decision-making.
36
  Sayigh 
also looks into the connection between militancy and class division, finding that the 
national leadership fluctuated between struggle and negotiation, while the mercantile 
and middle classes contributed little to the struggle.
37
  Greater participation in militancy 
from the poor rather than middle classes, especially after 1948, was rooted in the greater 
oppression that they experienced and which made the return to Palestine an absolute 
priority.
38
  Swedenburg’s work focuses on one particular set of events in the Palestinian 
struggle before 1948, the 1936-39 revolts. Focusing on how the revolts were 
remembered by the peasantry and challenging the standard accounts of both Western 
and Palestinian historiography, his work is essentially about how memory is constructed 
and deconstructed.  What role armed struggle served in the Palestinian national 
movement from 1949-1993 was a focus for Yezid Sayigh.  He argues that armed 
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struggle was central in re-mobilising Palestinians after 1948 and provided a key basis 
for state-building but it had only limited use in terms of actual ‘military’ achievements.  
Total liberation was impossible under the given historical circumstances in which 
Palestinian national liberation waged its struggle after 1948.  Western nations and even 
the Soviet Union and its allies were firmly committed to the survival of Israel after the 
Holocaust.
39
  However, the complexity of the regional environment and multiplicity of 
its actors always opened crucial avenues at critical moments to Palestinians.
40
  Hence, 
Sayigh presents a very detailed, complex and contextual account of Palestinian violence 
during this period which shows its roots, strategies and the different kind of roles it has 
played in the national project.  A continuation of this study, namely how armed struggle 
related to national politics in the aftermath of the Oslo Accords is missing in the 
Palestine literature.   
Debates on suicide bombing within the Palestine literature are very limited.  
They occur in the framework of political strategy
41
 or as part of the discussion of 
organisations, especially Hamas.
42
  Violence, however, is not the central focus in 
scholarship on Hamas and Islamic politics.  Contributions normally draw attention to 
the political and social aspects of these movements, as well as their complexity, 
adaptability and development over time.
43
 
 
1.4 Central Features of the Palestine Literature 
 
 One can identify some central features of the body of ‘Palestine literature’.  It is 
characterised by an interpretative, historical and contextualised approach.  We have 
seen this in our review of the major debates on the subject.  The Palestine literature 
favours an approach from within, rather than a detached analysis from the outside.  
What is also a very clear characteristic of the field is its emphasis on the uniqueness of 
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the case.  It is almost universally emphasised within the field that the Palestinian 
situation is different and this needs to be taken into account for the study of any aspect 
of the problem. Understanding the occupation and its characteristics are crucial, for 
example, for understanding women in the Palestinian context.  The eruptions of the first 
and second intifada cannot be explained without an understanding of the development 
of nationalism, dispossession and identity formation since the British Mandate.  What is 
also key is the emphasis on the uniqueness of Israel's colonialism.  Israel's occupation is 
the longest lasting contemporary occupation and has a number of unique facets which 
are necessary to understand in order to explain the course of the conflict.  The 
combination of Zionist ideology and the post-Holocaust trauma explain the strong 
emphasis on security, the drive to create and retain a Jewish state and the continuous 
seizing of land.   
In terms of political violence, the Palestine literature views the phenomenon as 
the outgrowth or reaction to particular conditions in the Palestinian context.  Its roots 
are seen in the nature of the occupation and Israel's colonialism, the continuing 
dispossession and discrimination, the deadlock of negotiations, Palestinian 
powerlessness, political as well as military, against an overwhelmingly strong opponent, 
backed by the one remaining superpower. 
 This has been especially relevant since 9/11 when Sharon succeeded in framing 
the discourse on Palestine in terms of security and the war on terrorism by equating the 
nature of 9/11 with the events of the Al-Aqsa intifada, and by the same token 
Palestinian militant groups with al-Qaeda.  Hence, the 'Palestine Question' was no 
longer a discourse on occupation but became one on Israeli security.  Much effort in 
studies on Palestine has been invested in drawing out and emphasising the 
particularities of the Palestinian situation, in disconnecting the discourse on the 
Palestine question from the prevalent terrorism discourse and in highlighting the 
historical grievances, injustice and violence of the occupation.   
The thinking that the Israeli occupation has particular characteristics that need to 
be taken into consideration has also permeated more policy-oriented thought.  Edward 
Said for example, a fierce critic of the Oslo negotiations, criticised negotiators for not 
having sufficient knowledge of the situation on the ground.  In his view the leadership 
had no grasp of the extent and permanent nature of the settlements that had begun to 
spread throughout the territories, and hence completely misjudged the implications of 
the Oslo agreement.  Ghada Karmi also emphasises in Married to Another Man the need 
36 
 
to understand the Zionist drive behind the establishment of the state of Israel and the 
current occupation in order to fully grasp the issue at hand and its implications. 
 Understanding the threat to Palestinian independence; i.e. understanding the 
occupation and what fuels it, would be key to developing adequate strategies for 
resistance and a resolution to the conflict.  Equally, a thorough understanding of the 
local context and how Palestinians themselves perceive it, is mandatory for 
understanding how Palestinians formulate resistance strategies.  
 
1.5 Studying Palestinian Political Violence in Political Science and is 
there Scope for Hybrids? 
 
Although the literature on suicide bombing has burgeoned since 9/11, only few 
of the theories put forward have made a significant impact.  Two notable examples 
here are Pape and Bloom. The former proposes a theory focused on the strategic logic 
of organisations while the latter centres on the domestic level, advancing a theory of 
internal competition. Pape’s core thesis is that foreign policy and not religion is the 
driving force behind suicide terrorism.  Terrorist organisations use suicide attacks as a 
last resort in the struggle to free their homeland of foreign occupiers (particularly 
democracies).  He defines foreign occupation as ‘one in which a foreign power has the 
ability to control the local government independent of the wishes of the local 
community.’44  These organisations are generally the far weaker party to the conflict, 
often faced by opponents with vastly superior military resources and technology.  In a 
situation of asymmetric power relations suicide terrorism is often seen as the most 
effective means of confrontation.  Foreign occupation, by creating a sense of shared 
threat, unifies the community and has even an impact on those who previously had not 
harboured any nationalist sentiments.
45
   
Pape acknowledges the role of different levels of actors in suicide terrorism - the 
individual, the organisational and the societal level – and a need to explain how they 
jointly account for the occurrence of suicide terrorism.
46
  Although Pape’s account is a 
multi-level explanation it is not multi-causal.  For Pape, there is one central factor: 
foreign occupation.  It is the common denominator which explains why individuals 
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inspired by altruistic motivation decide to die for the sake of liberation of their 
community; why societies support and even applaud suicide attacks; and why 
organisations strategically deploy it.  Nationalist sentiment is the key driving force and 
suicide attacks are particularly likely to occur when the predominant religion of the 
occupiers is different from the predominant religion of the occupied.  Religious schism 
hardens the boundaries between national communities allowing the organisation to 
portray the conflict as zero-sum, to more easily demonise the enemy, and to gain 
support among the population for martyrdom. Pape concludes that suicide attacks are 
proliferating because terrorist organisations have learnt that they pay.  
Bloom, too, interprets suicide terrorism as strategic violence but in her view it is 
targeted at two audiences: an external audience – the perceived enemy – and an 
internal audience – the organisation’s community.47  According to Bloom, suicide 
terrorism needs to be understood in the context of national liberation and internal 
state-building processes.
48
  Organisations use suicide tactics under two conditions: 
when other military tactics have failed against the external opponent and when the 
organisation is in competition with other rival groups for popular support and financial 
resources.
49
  Such competition is especially acute in the absence of a monopoly over 
force.  In such circumstances groups compete over a ‘positive’ image to appear 
proactive and to have the ability to inflict damage on the enemy.
50
  In Palestine, more 
and more groups jumped on the bandwagon of suicide bombing and even secular 
groups which had previously eschewed suicide tactics started using religious language 
in order to bandwagon onto popularity achieved by Hamas.  In an attempt to outbid 
each other groups started to vie for a right to claim responsibility for each attack.
51
 
Whether suicide operations are sanctioned or rejected by the civilian population 
depends on specific conditions endogenous to each case.  Bloom explains (rather 
unclearly) that these conditions may depend on personal, economic, structural and 
organisational issues.
52
  In other sections in her book she offers more concrete 
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examples of circumstances that may drive a population to support suicide attacks:  
Such tactics particularly resonate against the backdrop of economic hardship and 
fading hope for peace.
53
  In some cases, it may depend on where the funding comes 
from.  In Sri Lanka, where the resistance had primarily been funded through taxes 
from within the community, the population became war-weary more quickly.
54
  Bloom 
also suggests that heavy-handed counter-terrorist measures play a crucial role.
55
  
There is of course literature that is much more firmly located in the political 
science camp than Pape and Bloom’s accounts but border cases are of much more 
interest here because they seek to achieve the standard of predictability and 
generalisability aspired to in political science but also attempt to contextualise their 
topics to some extent.  They are thus more challenging but also more useful for testing 
our case against, rather than those approaches that fall squarely into the political 
science literature, because they will enable us to show that despite limited 
contextualisation, these studies ignore central issues in studying the Palestinian case 
and come to some misleading conclusions.  In his article 'A Case for Critical 
Terrorism Studies,’ Jeroen Gunning argues that within the traditional terrorism 
literature there are some scholars who have sought to historicise the phenomena they 
study at least to some extent and question the dominant state-centric paradigm in the 
field.
56
  Drawing on Cox’s notion of a ‘problem solving’ approach he identifies the 
uncritical nature of terrorism studies as the underlying source for the shortcomings of 
terrorism research.
57
  A critical approach goes beyond states as the sole legitimate 
referents, beyond state-centric notions of security, to encompass a wider notion of 
human security and contextualises and historicises the conflict.
58
  For Gunning, the 
two approaches should be seen as two end-points on a continuum rather than a clear-
cut division and hence we can identify scholars who use a combination of elements 
pertaining to each approach.  
Pape engages with the occupational practice of democratic states as producing 
suicide terrorism but does not articulate particulars of the occupation and how they 
motivate individuals to engage in this form of violent resistance.  In fact, he argues 
that the severity of the occupation does not matter in motivating suicide attacks.  He 
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measures severity by casualties inflicted by the occupation and concludes that Israel’s 
occupation of the West Bank and Gaza is, together with US presence on the Arabian 
peninsula, among the least harmful cases of occupation, but Israeli and US occupation 
account together for 43% of suicide attacks.
59
  The figures Pape uses here are slightly 
problematic because he dates the beginning of the dispute from 1994 but appears to 
use data covering the second intifada period from 2000-2003.  This is, of course, 
questionable on two accounts.  Firstly, it excludes casualties incurred over the Oslo 
period and the first intifada and secondly even then it ignores another 27 years of 
occupation, in addition to the dispossession in 1948.  However, most importantly, 
measuring the severity of the occupation by casualties betrays ignorance of the true 
mechanisms of Israeli occupation.  Occupation is also treated as an inert block that 
remains stagnant with no changes, and hence cannot explain why at some points 
suicide bombings became almost the norm and at others the phenomenon has died 
down. 
Similarly, Bloom acknowledges the occupation and Israeli violence but does 
not problematise the concepts she applies.
60
  Her discussion of women suicide 
bombers is illustrative here.  She espouses a clearly Western perspective and sees 
women as exploited by their conservative patriarchal societies, as being pushed into 
such acts by their cultural environments, and at best, adopting this role in order to 
achieve some kind of tragic equality, ignoring the clear political grievances of these 
women and their capacity to formulate political or even militant strategies to act on 
these.
61
  In doing so, she herself divests women of equality with men. 
In addition to Pape, Gunning suggests that Sageman, makes some effort in 
locating the phenomenon within its historical context and problematising it, because in 
contrast to other authors, he considers the negative impact of state policies.
62
  However, 
historicisation and problematisation occur in a very limited way.  Sageman’s 
Understanding Terror Networks certainly made a significant contribution to the field of 
terrorism studies as he highlights one aspect of groups that engage in such activity, 
namely how they are linked as a network.
63
  This is particularly relevant for 
understanding al-Qaeda which in its form is much more loosely configured than some 
of the more traditional or hierarchical groups.  In chapter four we will see how Pedahzur 
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and Perlinger apply network analysis to the second Palestinian intifada and combine it 
with a competition model, similar to that presented by Mia Bloom. Sageman 
understands the global Salafi jihad in largely structuralist terms as a self-generated 
network.  Social network theory does offer a partial explanation on why individuals join 
these groups, tracing members’ participation back to their kinship and friendship links 
with others inside such organisations.  As such joining the jihad is, for Sageman, a 
process and not simply a single decision.  While he acknowledges, in his conclusion, 
that the outcome of the US-led war against Iraq will be crucial in determining the 
strength of the jihadi movement,
64
 his analysis is bereft of a larger reflection on the 
impact of US policy in the region.  He identifies anti-American sentiment as a central 
ideology that jihadist groups feed on,
65
 yet he does not investigate the basis of such a 
sentiment.  A very different approach here is put forward by Mahmoud Mamdani who 
sees the events of 9/11 as an outgrowth of the history of the Cold War.  In Good 
Muslim, Bad Muslim, he skilfully demonstrates how terror movements have grown out 
of a culture of impunity created by America’s patronage of state terror during the Cold 
War.
66
 
More promising for a contextual approach may at first sight seem the more 
recently emerging complex, often described as multi-causal and or multi-level studies.  
Hafez's Manufacturing Human Bombs is the most extensively elaborated example in 
this category.  The incorporation of different levels of analysis would promise some 
level of historicisation or problematisation but Hafez disappoints on both accounts.  
Drawing on social movement theory, Hafez develops an integrative theoretical 
framework for explaining the making of suicide bombers in which he identifies three 
levels of analysis.
67
  He explores individual motivations, organisational strategies and 
societal contexts using an interdisciplinary approach incorporating culturalist, 
rationalist, and structuralist approaches in order to present a more comprehensive 
explanation of suicide bombing.  In accordance with the three different levels he 
identifies three central questions for the study of suicide bombing:  First, why do 
individuals commit suicide attacks?  Second, why do organisations adopt it as a tactic?  
Third, why do some societies venerate ‘martyrdom’ and celebrate suicide bombers as 
                                                 
64 Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, 183. 
65 Ibid.,182. 
66 Mahmood Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War and the Roots of Terror 
(Three Leaves Press: New York, 2004), 118. 
67 Mohamed M. Hafez, “Rationality, Culture, and Structure in the Making of Suicide Bombers: A 
Preliminary Theoretical Synthesis and Illustrative Case Study,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29, 
no.2 (May 2006): 166. 
41 
 
their heroes?
68
  According to Hafez, these three levels and the corresponding research 
questions are interdependent and cannot be understood in isolation.  The Palestinian 
suicide campaign during the al-Aqsa intifada acts as an illustrative case study but Hafez 
claims that his theoretical framework is also applicable to suicide bombing campaigns 
in other cultural contexts.
69
  
The organisational level provides the central nexus in Hafez’s approach between 
societal conflicts and the individual suicide bombers.  The structure of the organisation 
enables aggrieved individuals to act out violence in a sustained manner.
70
  Without the 
financial and material resources, the infrastructure, intelligence and logistics provided 
by organisations, suicide attacks would be limited in scope and magnitude.
71
  
Rationalist approaches explain how organisations make strategic choices based on cost-
benefit calculations about their tactics.  Being the weaker party in an asymmetrical 
conflict, terrorist organisations use suicide bombers because they deem them to be 
inexpensive, versatile and effective weapons to achieve their desired goals against the 
stronger opponent.  
Culturalist approaches, on the other hand, explain how militant groups use 
cultural symbols and discourses such as religious texts and rituals to frame suicide 
bombing as an opportunity to demonstrate heroism, religious devotion, and gain 
personal redemption.
72
  As such, militant groups create an environment in which suicide 
bombing is deemed rational, legitimate and a means to achieve desired ends.  Hafez 
argues that the cultural framing approach answers the question that rationalist 
approaches cannot find a satisfactory response to, namely why individuals become 
suicide bombers. Within the specific cultural framework of self-sacrifice suicide 
bombing can become a rational choice for the individual.
73
 
A structural approach on the societal level helps to explain how such violent acts 
become possible.  By focusing on opportunities, resources, threats, and resonance it 
explains the permissive conditions that can either enable or restrict the occurrence of 
suicide bombing.  Moreover, it could potentially explain the scope, timing and social 
acceptance of suicide bombing.
74
  Hafez claims that suicide bombing becomes possible 
when three different conditions converge: First, the dominant cultural norms in society 
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include belief systems, narratives and traditions that accept and celebrate martyrdom.  
Second, legitimate authorities acquiesce to or even promote such forms of extreme 
violence.  Third, communities feel victimised and threatened by external enemies.
75
  
When these three conditions converge it becomes more likely that society will embrace 
and venerate suicidal violence. 
The difficulties that arise in Hafez from an interpretive and historicist 
perspective are, firstly, that he sees the drive behind suicide bombing simply located in 
an intense feeling of victimisation of Palestinians but neglects the underlying reasons 
that drive this victimisation, including the decades of military occupation, the use of 
excessive force, and continuing dispossession; rather he portrays it simply as subjective 
feelings.
76
  His account is devoid of any substantial engagement with the political and 
military realities, or Israel’s colonial objectives, surrounding the phenomenon.  
Moreover, with Hafez’s understanding of organisations as the cultivators of a culture of 
martyrdom which succeeds in framing the phenomenon as rational, ‘he portrays militant 
organisations mainly as cynical, coldly calculating groups that somehow act upon their 
societies from the outside […].’77  For Hafez, the militants belonging to these 
organisations seem to be somehow detached from the very society that has ‘produced’ 
them and are capable of imposing the meaning of these deeds on a society that appears 
to be deprived of any agency in this process.
78
  For Lori Allen, what is needed, is an 
approach from within: ‘a deeper understanding of suicide bombing and the people 
involved requires a more accurate analysis of Palestinians' own understanding of, 
debates about, and justification for political protest, and how they conceive of the 
audiences that those explanations must reach.’79 
Rashmi Singh, similarly defines her own research on the use of suicide bombing 
by Hamas as a multi-level and multi-causal approach.  However, her focus on Hamas 
locks her into an organisation-focussed perspective and her multi-level approach is 
limited to a dynamic between the individual and the organisation.  For Singh, both the 
individual and the organisational level need to be studied simultaneously in order to 
understand emergence and sustainability of the attacks because a dialectical relationship 
exists between organisational and individual rationalities and motives and hence neither 
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can be successfully examined in isolation.
80
  In fact, ‘[s]uicide attacks are therefore 
understood as the converging point of multiple rationalities and a complex 
amalgamation of expressive and instrumental violence where organisational and 
individual motivations in the Palestinian setting are identified as broadly conflated 
along three lines, i.e.: survival, retaliation and competition.’81   
In addition to rationality, nationalism and political Islam are also key concepts in 
Singh’s analysis.  She argues that, as the image of the heroic martyr who is willing to 
sacrifice his or her life for the homeland has become an intrinsic part of Palestinian 
identity, it has driven the increased militarisation of resistance and framed it as a 
necessary response to Israeli policies.  In contrast to Hafez, Singh is more specific about 
why this narrative of the heroic martyr resonates so well with Palestinians.  Yet her 
account of Palestinian suffering and humiliation is merely presented from the 
perspective of a tool bag used by organisations to further their own ends.
82
  Essentially, 
Singh identifies suicide bombing as a tool utilised by Hamas in the construction of 
Palestinian identity as well as the state, reframing suicide attacks as the culturally 
entrenched norm of militant heroism.  Political Islam, in Singh’s view, has facilitated 
the pairing between resistance activities and the Palestinian national narrative, framing 
Palestinian resistance, including suicide bombing, as a necessary jihad against the 
Israeli state in order to protect and defend the Palestinian nation. 
Singh’s study offers some historical introduction into the conflict, tracing back 
the origins of the conflict to Jewish immigration in the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century.  
However, on the whole, her account remains limited to political parties and political 
processes.  Further, by focusing solely on Hamas’ use of suicide bombing Singh runs 
the risk of overemphasising the role of the notion of jihad in its articulation of suicide 
attacks as a resistance strategy to preserve the homeland.  Finally, because Singh does 
not engage with other forms of resistance, suicide bombing is de-contextualised and the 
study is unable to demonstrate why and when suicide attacks have occurred in relation 
to other tactics. 
Particularly interesting in terms of challenging the standard orthodox terrorism 
discourse is Jason Franks’ approach.  Through the use of critical theory and discourse 
analysis he presents an alternative to the traditional orthodox discourse on terrorism, 
which he argues is still a remnant of the Cold War state-centric realist and positivist 
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understanding.  He locates his alternative complex and multi-level approach within the 
field of conflict studies which enables Franks to analyse the conflict on different levels.  
The traditional orthodox terrorism discourse locks debates on terrorism into a 
legitimacy vs. illegitimacy dynamic, constructing non-state violence as terrorist, while 
state violence is deemed to be legitimate and as such, this approach is unable or 
unwilling to engage with the roots debate.  Orthodox terrorism approaches can explain 
how it works, and what it seeks to achieve, but is silent on why it occurs.
83
   Hence 
these orthodox studies espouse an emphasis on intelligence, surveillance and counter-
terrorism in their recommendations rather than conflict resolution. Franks’ critical 
perspective exposes four levels in examining conflict which are not mutually exclusive: 
the state, non-state, structure and the individual.  An investigation of the historical and 
cultural context, Frank argues, can be particularly helpful for understanding the 
structural causes behind the conflict and is necessary for a more comprehensive 
understanding of the root causes of terrorism.  Combining the terrorist and conflict 
approach into a hybrid analytical framework, allows for a much more comprehensive 
and holistic account of the roots of terrorism.  While Frank’s approach and his study of 
the Palestinian-Israeli case offers useful insights into the Palestinian perspective and a 
counterpoint to the Israeli state-centred orthodox terrorism discourse, it can only 
provide a limited contextual understanding of Palestinian violence as it does little to 
account for internal dynamics or changes over time.  His framework is primarily an 
appeal to the field of terrorism studies, an area that he calls largely dormant, to ‘reform’ 
a step beyond the state-centric and positivist understanding, to include other 
perspectives on terrorism.  
 The field of ‘Critical Terrorism Studies’, as proposed by Jeroen Gunning, calls 
for more contextualisation and a move away from state-centrism.    Dalacoura, for 
example, highlights how Middle East area studies can make a contribution to terrorism 
debates by focusing on the politics of the region more widely and more deeply, and 
most crucially, taking ‘indigenous’ discourses more seriously.84   
A field that has engaged with violence, albeit to a more limited extent, is social 
movement studies where scholars have tended to explain such political action in a more 
complex and contextual fashion.
85
  One particular factor in the de-contextualisation 
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within terrorism perspectives is the reification of ‘terrorism’ that divorces the 
phenomenon from other forms of protests or politics more generally.
86
  Charles Tilly, by 
contrast, has treated different forms of collective violence not as distinct types with their 
own laws but rather as multiple varieties of collective violence in different phases of the 
conflict.
87
 Collective violence belongs to the realm of contentious politics, ‘where 
people make discontinuous, public, collective claims on each other.’88  Because not all 
contentious politics is violent, for Tilly, the challenge is ‘to explain when contention 
takes a violent turn.’89  Drawing on these insights the question of how forms of protest 
have changed over time in the context of the Palestinian – Israeli conflict, especially 
from non-violence to violence, is a legitimate and important question.  
 Wendy Pearlman poses exactly this question in relation to the Palestinian 
national movement.  She examines when and how Palestinian resistance turned violent 
over the period beginning from the British Mandate and ending with the second 
intifada. In relation to the literature above Pearlman offers both detail and context as 
well as generalisable claims.  Essentially, Pearlman pursues the reverse of Yezid 
Sayigh’s argument: rather than driving the development of state institutions, she argues, 
it is weaknesses in the Palestinian state formation that are key factors in contributing to 
armed struggle.
90
  Drawing on social movement theory and conflict studies she brings 
together a number of different perspectives and accepts that a multiplicity of factors 
explain the development of Palestinian forms of protest but argues that her 
organisational mediation theory can explain when and why violence eclipses non-
violent mass-based protest.  Her basic thesis is that movement cohesion facilitates non-
violent mass protest while fragmentation in a national movement leads to the 
persistence of violence.  While strategic decision-making, internal competition, access 
to resources all offer useful explanations they cannot by themselves answer the question 
of when and why violence erupted and persisted.  Rather, it was the structure of the 
Palestinian national movement that filtered all the various other factors and determined 
the use of violence.  Lack of strategy and cohesion of the national movement are not 
new lenses of analysis and indeed, commentators in the second intifada have repeatedly 
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pointed to these as reasons for the failure of the uprising.
91
  Similarly, Pearlman’s 
observation that non-cohesive structures become more brittle under external pressure 
and prone to fragmentation is not a particularly innovative conclusion.
92
  However, 
what Pearlman does is to apply it as a theory over an extended period of time, namely 
from the Mandate period to the second intifada.    
One of Pearlman’s central objectives is to counter the reification of composite 
political actors.  She defines ‘a movement’s cohesion as the degree to which it, which is 
not actually an “it”, acts as if it were.  Fragmentation is the degree to which it does 
not.’93  A movement’s level of cohesion or lack thereof is measured by ‘factors that 
facilitate cooperation among individuals and enable unified action.’94 The factors that, 
for Pearlman, are crucial in understanding a movement’s cohesion are leadership, 
institutions and the population’s sense of collective purpose.95  Pearlman convincingly 
makes the point that fragmentation is especially significant where movements for self-
determination are concerned because these non-state groups are presented with very 
similar challenges to states in terms of centralising decision making and guaranteeing 
social order but they lack the power of a state, in particular the monopoly over 
violence.
96
 
Although the theme of fragmentation is also central in this thesis, the 
explanations offered here differ in a number of ways.  Firstly, Pearlman’s question is 
more general.  She examines when and why violence was used in the Palestinian 
national struggle starting from the revolts under the British Mandate to the outbreak of 
the second intifada.  This thesis focuses on the transition from the first intifada to the 
second and specifically engages with the phenomenon of suicide bombing.  In fact, 
Pearlman has little to say on suicide bombing except that: ‘The decision of major 
factions to engage in suicide attacks did not reflect the enactment of a new policy in the 
national movement as much as free for all in the context of Israeli repression and 
fragmentation.’97  Moreover, she does not ask what kind of violence was generated by 
the political fragmentation she identifies and why.  Second, although she opens the 
‘black box’ of political organisations or movements she leaves that of ‘Palestine’ and its 
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society largely unopened.
98
  She does acknowledge the Palestinian territories’ 
geographical fragmentation but dismisses it as a central explanatory factor.  For 
Pearlman, ‘[t]he factors of repression and geography are important.  Yet they focus on 
the relationship between Palestinians and Israelis and neglect the organization of 
relationships among Palestinians themselves.’99  This comment betrays Pearlman’s 
focus on endogenous Palestinian factors in explaining violence which ignores the 
importance of how changing geography has necessitated the transformation of forms of 
protest.  She fails to explain why the relationship between Israelis and Palestinians is 
less important than internal cohesion.  This is particularly apparent in her lack of 
discussion of how the Oslo agreement, the ambivalent role of the PA, and Israel’s 
growing settlement project and its unilateralism, especially in matters of security, 
affected the fragmentation of the national movement.
100
  It is indeed questionable 
whether strong institutions, which Pearlman clearly views as a key component of 
safeguarding movement cohesion, could realistically arise in the Palestinian context.  
Moreover, although she acknowledges that a sense of collective purpose can build 
cohesion from the bottom-up there is little discussion on social transformations in 
Palestinian society and their significance.
101
 Her focus on movement cohesion also 
makes her appear fundamentally uncritical of a number of developments under the 
Palestinian Authority, especially the growing lack of freedom and democracy.
102
   
Fragmentation in this thesis is not viewed as a filter of other factors but what is 
central is the convergence of fragmentation in the political, geographical and the social 
spheres.  Pearlman’s approach does not explain why suicide bombing participants came 
predominantly from rural areas, refugee camps and the North.  Her theory explains why 
an environment existed that facilitated violence but not why individuals engage in 
violent acts or who in society supported it.  While Pearlman’s book is more about why 
and when violence cannot be contained, this thesis is more about when and why 
violence comes to be seen as the only effective way to protest. 
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1.6 Looking Beyond Palestine  
 
The aspect that has largely been ignored in analyses of political violence is the 
geographical fragmentation of the Palestinian territories.  The importance of geography 
and the particular geographical structures in terms of power distribution, security 
control and social division is missing in these accounts.  Yet, geography has always 
been of relevance in anti-colonial and national liberation movements. Fanon, writing 
against the background of the anti-colonial struggle in Algeria 1954-62, describes 
territorial structures of colonialism: 
The colonial world is a world divided into compartments. It is probably 
unnecessary to recall the existence of native quarters and European quarters, 
of schools for natives and schools for Europeans; in the same way we need 
not recall apartheid in South Africa.  Yet if we examine closely this system 
of compartments, we will at least be able to reveal the lines of force it 
implies.  This approach to the colonized world will allow us to mark out the 
lines on which a decolonized society will be reorganized. 
The colonial world is a world cut in two.  The dividing line, the frontiers are 
shown by barracks and police stations.
103
 
As already referred to by Fanon in this passage, another prime example of 
separation was apartheid South Africa.  Although segregation had begun much earlier, 
from the late 1960s onwards the government pursued a concerted policy to collect all 
black South Africans into designated Homelands except those that were needed by 
white employers as labourers.
104
  In order to reduce the influx of rural Africans into the 
major urban centres, the government implemented a policy that prohibited them from 
visiting towns for more than 72 hours without a special permit.
105
  However, the 
government’s policies were not limited to territorial racial segregation but also 
implemented a system that was intended to create internal division within the non-white 
community: 
Besides their common lot as victims of apartheid, Blacks had varied 
experiences.  Black residents of the cities, the white farming areas, and the 
African Homelands had vastly different lives.  The government accentuated 
black ethnic differences, favouring Coloreds and Indians over Africans and 
encouraging internal ethnic divisions among Africans.  The government also 
promoted class divisions among Blacks.  It supported collaborators and 
provided relative security of urban residence for some Africans, whereas it 
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kept African laborers tied to white farms and made it illegal for Africans to 
leave their Homelands, except as temporary migrant workers.
106
 
 Drawing on Murray and Boal, Feldman describes how violence is significant in 
shaping spatial structures in Northern Ireland.
107
  During periods of calm elements of 
both communities moved out from the segregated enclaves to mix, but during times of 
crises then regrouped again along more rigidified sectarian divisions.
108
  The burning 
out of houses and businesses that started with the riots in 1969 forced many residents to 
resettle within their ethnic communities.  However, the reverse is also true.  Spatial 
structures determine the lines of confrontation. Loyalist parades, which Feldman 
describes as a synthesis of commemorative history, the command of space and 
boundary transgression, offer a useful example:
109
  
The typical spatial pattern of these parades is the movement from the centre 
of the community (physical and/or symbolic), where the parade audience is 
ethnically homogenous, to a march along the boundaries demarcating an 
adjacent community composed of the opposed ethnic grouping.  Marching 
along the boundaries transforms the adjacent community into an involuntary 
audience and an object of defilement through the aggressive display of 
political symbols and music.
110
 
Loyalist marches could be particularly provocative as there was a tradition to include a 
new street into the parade route every year.  These new streets were usually on the 
boundary or within the recognised territory of a Catholic community.
111
  The following 
year, Catholics and often the police sought to stop the Loyalists from entering these 
‘new’ streets.  Boal and Murray use the term ‘interface’ to describe these boundaries 
and observe that most of the inter-group clashes have taken place along the boundaries 
between Protestant and Catholic areas.
112
  Hence geography shapes to a significant 
extent the dynamics of violence because it creates borders, frontiers and clear 
vulnerabilities.  Moreover, where space is largely sectarian there is no room for civil 
action.  Regardless of the intent of social actors, street marches or sitdowns, which have 
their origins in the moderate American civil rights movement, had very different 
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implications in Northern Ireland where marching through an area signifies the assertion 
of a territorial claim.
113
 
Frances Hasso observes a further dimension of spatial order in conflict.  She has 
pointed out that the Palestinian-Israeli geography is not only ‘racialised’ but also 
gendered.  Female suicide bombers challenged their placement within their own 
normative cultural gender-sexual structures and at the same time also Israeli 
assumptions that it is male bodies that pose a threat to Israel’s spatialised ordering and 
not female bodies.
114
  Where the women chose to carry out their attacks, for Hasso, 
demonstrates these women’s awareness of this racialised geography and their clear 
intention to challenge it.
115
 They challenged this geography by participating in these 
attacks but also conformed to it by dressing as Western- looking Israelis.  The efficacy 
of the mission was dependent on their invisibility as both Palestinians and as women.
116
 
Ricolfi links strategic thinking with spatial reordering in the case of suicide 
attacks in Lebanon.  He proposes that spectacular suicide attacks stopped after 1985 
because after the Israeli army left there were fewer targets with a higher concentration 
of people that were within the reach of the militants.
117
  The checkpoints and barracks 
that had been the main targets of militants in the early attacks were now either no longer 
there or no longer staffed.  However, Ricolfi offers no further evidence for this but 
suggests that a historical-geographical analysis of the location and concentration of 
Israeli military and diplomatic personnel in addition to information on movement 
restrictions of people and goods following the withdrawal of the Israeli army would 
shed light on such an interpretation.
118
    The Israeli government justified its invasion of 
Lebanon on the grounds that PLO attacks on Israeli territory were organised from the 
Palestinian refugee camps inside Lebanon.  The Lebanese population in the south had 
initially welcomed Israel hoping it would expel the PLO.
119
  The southern region had 
suffered the most from retaliatory attacks.   The invasion launched in 1982 was one of 
the most devastating and left between 4 June and 31 August 19,000 people (Palestinians 
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as well as Lebanese) killed in military attacks on predominantly civilian targets, 
including cars, buses, apartment buildings, hospitals, an orphanage, a home for the 
disabled, and Red Cross ambulances.
120
  The resistance to Israeli presence began on a 
small scale with boycotts against Israeli goods and developed into massive civil 
resistance in villages in the south and among thousands of prisoners held at Ansar 
Camp.  These included women demonstrations in front of prison gates, prisoner hunger 
strikes and the burning of tents in the camp.
121
  Alongside this, Lebanese militant 
groups also used a wide range of guerrilla style tactics against Israeli and international 
military targets.  The earliest and most spectacular suicide attacks targeted US and 
French military presence in the country and later focused on Israeli targets in the south 
of the country.
122
  Hezbollah was not the only group engaging in suicide bombings but 
Amal and some secular organisations under Syrian control were responsible for at least 
half of the attacks from 1983 onwards.
123
  Over the 1990s suicide bombings against IDF 
targets decreased dramatically, especially those attributed to Hezbollah. 
That violent forms of protest take over when non-violent resistance becomes 
ineffective is an observation that has also been made in relation to Sri Lanka where 
Tamils experienced a relatively swift radicalisation.
124
  Hopgood observes that when 
non-violent resistance was failing younger Tamils began to consider more violent 
options.
125
  Tamil radicalisation has to be seen in the context of Sinhalese indiscriminate 
violence against the Tamil population, day-to-day humiliation at checkpoints, and 
repression under hegemonic unitarist rule.
126
  The reason why non-violence was 
ineffectual in the Palestinian case was the geographical dislocation of Palestinian 
centres of control and the unequal experience of occupation policies. 
 
1.7 Formulating Key Questions 
 
This discussion has raised a number of questions that will help set the agenda for 
the rest of the thesis.   We can observe distinctly different forms of political action in 
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the first and in the second intifada.  Pearlman examined internal political mechanisms 
which created an environment conducive to violence.  Her work, however, gives little 
consideration to the kind of impact that the geographically defined division of control 
had on PA governance, how the Oslo agreement itself put the PA in a situation where it 
was not able to take a clear stance on violence, and how its ambivalent position 
consequently also generated support for violence among the population. 
We have seen that in other cases of national liberation struggles space and 
violence are intimately linked.  The question that arises in the Palestinian case is, how 
has the continuous fragmentation of Palestinian territory, and in particular the 
enclavisation of the Palestinian population, affected the forms of political action that 
Palestinians have used?  Connected to this, is also the question of how the territorial 
dislocation has impacted the populations that live in these dissimilarly affected locations 
where they are subject to different forms of governance.  Ricolfi has proposed a 
historical-geographical analysis to understand the decline of suicide bombings in 
Lebanon, one that looks at the distribution of military personnel and the population’s 
movement restriction over time.  This thesis will use a similar kind of analysis to 
explore why violent political action rose dramatically over the second intifada. 
Finally, the thesis is not only interested in why violence occurred but also, more 
specifically, it will ask, what explains the use and persistence of suicide bombing during 
the second intifada?  How can the transformations in politics, geography and society 
explain the rise of this phenomenon? Which strata in Palestinian society were most 
likely to participate, and what role did gender play in these attacks? 
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1.8  Methodology 
 
When we look at events in the world we do this with certain preconceptions 
about how things work.  We may not apply these preconceptions consciously but they 
act like patterns, filters or lenses that help us identify, categorise and make sense of 
information.  Through them we make sense of the interaction between individuals, 
groups of individuals and the impact of larger and more abstract entities, place emphasis 
on some entities over others, explain origins or causes of phenomena, and choose to 
zoom into events or zoom out and step back to look at the larger picture.  These 
preconceptions are not rigid, however, and certain events or observations will inform 
and change them.  In research we are required to reflect on them and when we embark 
on social enquiry and explain social phenomena we have to reflect on our choice of 
social systems, how we identify relevant agencies, and what their relationship is.  If we 
want to make a valuable and coherent research contribution and if we want our 
conclusions to stand up such choices and processes need to be laid bare for scrutiny.
127
  
This research project is based on a set of claims which will be explored further in this 
section.  It contends that social phenomena are complex, fluid, and the product of a 
unique configuration of a number of individual agencies as well as overarching 
structures.
128
  Phenomena are hence best understood through detailed studies of the 
multiple agencies and contingencies within their particular contexts.  Looking at the 
‘inside’ of the story will reveal these complexities and what they mean. 
 
Science vs. History  
 
Social phenomena are complex and much of their meaning is lost when they are 
reduced to simple explanations.  Pape and Bloom, discussed earlier in this chapter, have 
attempted to provide perhaps the most overarching or parsimonious explanations of 
suicide bombing.  Pape endorses the argument that suicide bombing is a strategic 
response to foreign occupation  while Bloom goes a little further to argue that suicide 
attacks are not only targeted at the perceived enemy but also at a domestic audience and 
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are a means of competing with rival groups for power and public support.  What is so 
appealing about these explanations is their simplicity and their potential for general 
application.  Their strength lies in their predictive power and scope for generalisation.  
However, the reason they work is that they simplify and decontextualise the concepts 
they use.  Pape’s use of democracy, for instance, is rather liberal.  Although he 
acknowledges that Russia, Sri Lanka and Turkey are only rated as ‘partly free’ by 
Freedom House, a non-profit organisation which monitors the status of democracy 
across the world, he contends that what is crucial is that these countries elect their chief 
executives and legislatures in multi-party elections and have seen at least one peaceful 
transfer of power.  He concludes that this makes them ‘solidly democratic by standard 
criteria.’129  Although multi-party elections and peaceful transfers of power may be 
sufficient conditions for a country to qualify as a democracy, in practical terms, it is still 
a long stretch between what democracy entails in Russia or Sri Lanka and the more 
long-standing democratic institutions in France, Britain or the US.  Some of the 
emerging democracies are also not necessarily stable and their status fluctuates easily. 
This is especially true in the case of Russia which subsequently was downgraded again 
by Freedom House to ‘not free’.  Pape hence widely applies this concept without taking 
into account the specifics of the various cases he is dealing with.  We have also seen in 
an earlier section how Pape’s treatment of the concept of occupation is problematic.  
Again, he decontextualises the various occupations in different countries around the 
world and simply reduces the concept to a numerical understanding, namely the severity 
of occupation is measured by the number of deaths inflicted on the occupied population.  
As this thesis will demonstrate, Israeli occupation is a complex multi-faceted 
mechanism that works on several different levels, reducing it to numbers of casualties 
misrepresents its true meaning for the daily life of Palestinians.  When concepts such as 
democracy and occupation no longer grasp the true reality on the ground, the usefulness 
of the generalisability and predictability of such scientific approaches becomes 
questionable as their results become distorted. 
Hollis and Smith refer to such approaches as looking at stories from the outside.  
This outside way of accounting for behaviour is modelled on the methods of natural 
science and is articulated in terms of a search for causes.  The underlying assumption is 
that events are governed by laws which apply whenever similar events occur in similar 
conditions.
130
  Based on this we can arrive at widely applicable theories and make 
                                                 
129 Pape, Dying to Win, 45. 
130 Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations (Clarendon 
55 
 
predictions about future developments.  This kind of tradition has its roots in the rise of 
the natural sciences after the 16
th
 century and particularly Comte’s articulation of 
positivism.  By contrast, the story from the inside is able to convey the meaning of 
events and therefore provides us with a much richer and detailed account and can lay 
bare the intricate relationship of the various components that constitute or trigger such 
events.  Hollis and Smith explain:  ‘We must know how actors defined the issues and 
the alternatives, what they believed about the situation and each other, what they aimed 
to achieve and how.  Only then can we ask more pointed questions about their clarity of 
vision, their underlying reasons, and the true meaning of episodes.’131  The concern over 
such approaches, however, is that they disintegrate into anecdotal detail and have 
nothing to say that is applicable beyond their immediate subject, making no contribution 
to the advancement of knowledge.  Moreover, the researcher is directly involved as the 
interpreter of these meanings but also partly in generating them as he or she is a direct 
participant in his or her research environment.  The scientific approach to studying 
human affairs negates such a role for the researcher but instead posits his or her role as 
an objective observer from the outside or from an Olympian position: detached from the 
events under investigation.  
 This debate has translated into the study of politics as a dispute between the 
discipline and area studies.  Social scientists within politics seek law-like regularities in 
human behaviour and use the same analytical categories and variables across any region 
in the world.  The aim is to arrive at general theories and to identify and test hypotheses 
derived from them.  Area studies specialists, by contrast, strive to understand regions in 
depth and expertise in the field ranges from politics, history, literature to languages with 
a view to understand events more fully.  Because of this focus on detail and context-
boundedness, the central criticisms directed at area studies is that their tendency to 
descriptiveness and dearth of theory development bars them from making a contribution 
to the advancement of knowledge.
132
  
However, for Dalacoura, area studies can make a significant contribution when 
it comes to the study of political violence and terrorism.  She highlights that while 
contemporary studies have focused on religion and Islam in particular, as the source of 
the so-called ‘new terrorism’, area specialists tend to point to secular political objectives 
and ideologies which lie underneath the religious imagery and discourse that is used by 
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many of these groups.
133
  Moreover, Middle East area literature highlights the 
considerable ambiguity that surrounds state action and how the description and 
definition of these actions are contestable and politicised.  Middle East area studies is 
able to disentangle facts from emotions and polemics: ‘[…] the meticulous and careful 
study of specific government policies and the use of case studies from the Middle East 
can reveal the dominance of state interests in the production of terrorism knowledge and 
terrorism discourse.’134  Hence area specialism reveals the subtleties of local politics, 
and the underlying meaning of symbolisms and rhetoric.  Without this sensitivity for 
local history and politics research findings and the conclusions drawn from them 
become superficial, even distorted, and unhelpful in explaining political trends and what 
to do about them. 
 
Between Aggressors and Victims 
 
There is a tendency to portray Palestinians as either victims or aggressors.  
Palestinians are hence seen as either locked into a position where they are at the 
receiving end of Israeli aggression and suffering within a complex system of 
discrimination and as a result are completely divested in such accounts of their own 
agency.  Alternatively, and this is often the case in traditional terrorism studies, they are 
seen simply as the aggressors against which the Israeli state has to protect itself and its 
citizen.  The context which has shaped their identities, motivations and interests is 
completely lost in such accounts.  This thesis will argue that Palestinians are somewhere 
between ‘aggressors’ and ‘victims’.  They are caught in system of power asymmetry 
that determines every area of Palestinian life from movement and labour to water and 
food and from which they can never quite escape but at times they are also active 
participants in shaping this very context.  Hence, it will be helpful to think of agency 
and structure in a more complementary and dynamic fashion.     
Alexander Wendt, for instance, argues that the challenge is not to establish 
which has more explanatory power – structure or agency – as if the two were separate, 
instead we ought to understand structure as having constitutive effects on agents 
constituting his or her identity and interests.  One of the central concepts here for action 
is meaning, which according to Wendt arises out of interaction with other entities.
135
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Previously to Wendt, Giddens had already argued for a symbiotic relationship between 
structure and agency.  He contends that in social theory the notions of action and 
structure presuppose one another but the recognition of this dependence requires a re-
working of the understanding of the concepts.
136
  ‘The structural properties of social 
systems are both the medium and outcome of the reproduction of the practices which 
constitute those systems.’137  This is what Giddens refers to as the duality of structure.  
For Giddens, it is social practices that form the basic component of social life rather 
than individuals or collective groups.  In fact, all social action consists of social 
practices which are located in time and space and are the result of the conduct of 
knowledgeable individual agents.    
 The central idea of the re-production of social practices may, nevertheless, still 
leave a slightly structural aftertaste with individual actors almost fully absorbed by the 
dynamics of structure as both medium and outcome.
138
  Agents in this context, however, 
are not ‘mechanical’ rule followers.  ‘Rules tell the actor how to go on and yet are 
constructed from the interpretations which actors place on this guidance.’139  Such 
agents abide with the demands of social life but at the same time also have the capacity 
to revise social conventions.  Wendt’s theoretical framework, for instance, does allow 
for the idea of change through intentional efforts by individual agents.  Under certain 
conditions, he argues, ‘actors can engage in self-reflection and practice specifically 
designed to transform their identities and interests and thus to “change the games” in 
which they are embedded.’140   
The account of Palestinian political activism presented in this thesis is an 
attempt to highlight the various external contingencies that shaped the context for 
Palestinian activism but it also seeks to demonstrate how Palestinians are agents in 
shaping their own environment.  In particular, it will argue that the transformation in 
political activism during the second uprising was a response to a context where political 
expression was no longer possible through the existing mechanisms.  The use of suicide 
bombing, particularly on the Israeli side of the Green Line then changed the Israeli 
experience and understanding of the conflict, albeit with negative consequences from a 
Palestinian perspective.  It helped reframe it into a more clearly existentialist discourse 
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for Israel and reinforced the already dominant security framework within which Israel 
operated.  The fact that Palestinian suicide bombing has largely stopped demonstrates 
that these practices are not fixed but the result of a complex negotiation between 
individual agency and environmental permissibility.  The subsequent chapters will 
demonstrate how the Palestinian experience has fluctuated between structural 
limitations and attempts to regain agency.  Suicide bombing, in particular, was an 
attempt to reassert agency amid a context of asymmetric power, manifested in multiple 
ways through military aggression, assassinations, sieges, curfews, closures, and wide-
spread destruction of property.  
 
How is it relevant? 
 
The interpretive approach from within has its roots in the 19
th
 century ideas of 
history and the manner in which history is writing from the inside.
141
  Cox notes that 
‘[…] Waltz’s work is fundamentally ahistorical.  The elegance he achieves in the clarity 
of his theoretical statement comes at the price of an unconvincing mode of historical 
understanding.’142  By contrast, the explanation advanced here does not envisage 
general or universally valid laws but sees the nature and structures of human interaction 
as changeable and context-dependent, enabling us to understand events and processes 
within the historical framework within which they occur.  Gardiner writes about 
historical explanation that ‘[h]istory is about what happened on particular occasions.  It 
is not about what usually happens or what always happens under certain circumstances; 
for this we go to science.’  He adds, however, that uniqueness does not preclude any 
form of generalisation and that the historian will, despite his attention to the individual 
and unique, have to rely on some general laws in his reconstruction.
143
  Understanding 
the local history is crucial for getting a better grasp of political reality, especially in 
complex and longstanding conflicts.  The Palestinian case is so rich in cultural and 
historical intricacies that it is difficult to see how it could be analysed and understood in 
isolation from its context.  Although some similarities with the Basque movement and 
the IRA exist – independence and territory playing a crucial role in all three cases – in 
the Basque region and Northern Ireland we do not have the particular history of the 
1948 expulsion; Jewish fears of elimination emanating from a trauma of century-long 
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persecution and discrimination; the on-going military occupation, the territorial 
fragmentation and settlement enterprise, as well as its particular dynamics originating 
from Israel’s position within the region and its close alliance with the US. 
The policy relevance of interpretive and historicist studies is often questioned 
because they do not deliver generalisable results and offer no basis for prediction.  
However, what they do is provide a deeper understanding of the conflict and offer more 
insightful, meaningful and plausible conclusions that touch directly at the roots of the 
conflict.  Israel’s response to Palestinian violence has to date primarily been one of pre-
emption, prevention and punishment but not one of conflict resolution.  Its dealing with 
the Palestinians is firmly located within a security discourse and hence its articulation of 
responses in terms of counter-terrorist policies targeted at organisations and their 
leaders is not surprising.  But it has also included whole-sale punishment of the 
Palestinian population: the siege of Gaza, the construction of the wall and the curfews 
during the second uprising being just a few examples.  Implicit in Israel’s policy is the 
desire to retain the status-quo. Any form of conflict resolution would have to include 
relinquishment of territorial control, at least a partial return of refugees and a 
compromise on Jerusalem.  Alternatively, a solution could take the form of a bi-national 
state which would, however, mean the end of Israel as a Jewish state.  This thesis will 
contribute to strengthening the dialogue on conflict resolution approaches and will point 
out the kind of risks the continuation of current trends in the absence of a resolution will 
pose to Palestinian society itself and ultimately, also to Israel.  
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1.9 Research Methods 
 
Having established the fundamental underlying theoretical framework of this 
research strategy in the previous section the pressing question that has to be confronted 
now is how to collect data in order to construct an explanation of the changing trends in 
Palestinian political activism and in particular the rise of suicide bombing during the 
second intifada.  The rich, in-depth and context-sensitive account that this thesis is 
striving for directly affects what data need to be collected and what methods of data 
collection are used.  As Bryman explains: ‘[…] methods of social research are closely 
tied to different visions of how social reality should be studied.  Methods are not simply 
neutral tools: they are linked with the ways in which social scientists envision the 
connection between different viewpoints about the nature of social reality and how it 
should be examined.’144  For this project a research technique is required which can 
tease out a multiplicity of factors across individuals, collectives and their environment 
and that allows those who are part of the conflict to speak for themselves.  Semi-
structured interviews, with their ability to give the interviewee the space to situate 
events within their own contexts are the most appropriate study tool for this type of 
research. In combination with documentary analysis this method will provide a 
confident analysis of the complex processes behind the changes in Palestinian political 
activism between the first and the second uprising.  
The field of political violence and terrorism studies has been repeatedly 
criticised for its weakness in research methods.  Andrew Silke bemoans the absence of 
statistical methods in the field and observes that the majority of research relies on 
qualitative and journalistic approaches which, he argues, lack the reliability and validity 
that is expected in high-quality social science research.
145
  Silke’s criticisms can be 
divided into two separate statements: one about data collection and the other about data 
analysis.  First, he suggests that qualitative research methods are insufficiently rigorous.  
He believes that interviews in the field are often carried out on an ad hoc basis and can 
hardly ever be conducted in a structured and systematic fashion.
146
  Because of the 
nature of the subject field interviews are largely carried out through opportunity 
sampling which raise concerns for the representativeness of the research findings.  If 
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interviews are to be used, Silke clearly favours the structured interview as it can prevent 
bias and minimise the impact of the interviewer on the data collected.
147
  Second, he 
stresses the importance of statistical analysis and its use in looking at broader patterns.  
Statistical methods are useful for looking at relationships and patterns and expressing 
these patterns with numbers.  Silke believes that both the quality of data collected, the 
closer one gets to the individuals engaging in militant activities, is lacking as is the level 
of analysis of data, and in the process essential information is lost.  In his view, the 
weakness of the data could, however, be compensated for by rigorous statistical 
analysis.
148
 As such, Silke represents a typical social science perspective. 
Qualitative methods, however, need not necessarily be weak and insufficiently 
rigorous.  Moreover, the debate between quantitative and qualitative methods should not 
be one of superiority of one over the other.  Rather, the two methods should be seen as 
providing answers to different types of questions and exhibit a difference in ontological 
and epistemological assumptions.
149
  As Silke points out the strength of statistical 
analysis lies in its ability to offer insights into broad patterns.  However, while it is 
useful for testing hypotheses, quantitative data analysis fails to offer new insights into a 
phenomenon, and with its numerical description of the world misses out on the detailed 
narratives and the more complex accounts of human perception.  Qualitative 
interviewing is largely based on an ontological position that postulates ‘that people’s 
knowledge, views, understandings, interpretations, experiences, and interactions are 
meaningful properties of the social reality which research questions are designed to 
explore.’150  Qualitative research allows the researcher to study these processes and to 
discern relationships between a multiplicity of factors.  Essentially they enable factors 
to be presented as embedded in their context and as perceived by the respondent.  An 
interview approach generally assumes that asking questions and listening to people is a 
legitimate and meaningful way of generating data on social phenomena.
151
  What this 
research seeks to understand is how social processes and individuals’ perception and 
understanding of the social and political factors around them shape and influence the 
changes in Palestinian political activism and increases the propensity to engage in 
militant activity.  This can only be achieved by speaking and listening to individuals 
actively involved in the given environment.  Listening carefully ‘to hear the meanings, 
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interpretations, and understanding that give shape to the worlds of the interviewees’ is a 
crucial skill in qualitative interviewing.
152
 
Qualitative interviews span a wide spectrum from completely unstructured 
conversations to interviews that follow a relatively fixed and rigid set of questions with 
little scope for change in direction.  One of the most significant strengths of qualitative 
interviewing lies in its potential for flexibility but, at the same time, this freedom also 
poses the greatest challenge for the researcher.  Striking the right balance between 
control and flexibility is one of the most difficult tasks in qualitative interviewing.
153
  
How interviewees responded to the semi-structured method during the fieldwork 
differed and hence the ability to adapt on the part of the researcher was required.  Some 
respondents felt fairly comfortable to elaborate on the topics freely, others needed to be 
prompted with additional questions regularly.  One respondent posed a particular 
challenge as she answered most questions with two sentences but with persistent 
follow-up questions I attempted to obtain fuller answers. 
The semi-structured interviews used for this research followed a list of questions 
on a number of specific topics.  This form of enquiry ensures that some degree of 
comparability is maintained while at the same time leaving sufficient room to ‘explore 
fully all the factors that underpin participant’s answers, reasons, feelings, opinions and 
beliefs’.154  The semi-structured format enables the interviewer to seek clarification and 
elaboration on the answers given.
155
  It gives the researcher the freedom to follow the 
direction in which the interviewee may take the interview and the researcher may re-
adjust the focus of the research as a result of key issues that emerge from the 
interview.
156
  Questions may be asked that are not in the interview guide as the 
interviewee may raise interesting issues that are worth pursuing further.  The emphasis 
of the interviews for this research project was on how the interviewee explains and 
understands events and behaviour within his or her political and social context and what 
elements he or she views as important.
157
  In contrast to questionnaires, where responses 
are made through pre-set answers, this method allows the respondents to answer in their 
own words and on their own terms and produces as a result much thicker and richer 
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data.
 158
  Interviews offer the depth and nuance that this research project is looking for.  
The more narrative approach to data collection also allows the researcher to grasp the 
interaction between various factors involved and gain contextual understanding of the 
issue in question.  Three groups of people were interviewed: academics, party members 
and NGO representatives. While in all three groups an attempt was made to cover the 
same topics as much as possible, each group also allowed for specific topics to be 
explored in more depth.  While a question on the characteristics of political activism in 
the second intifada was a question asked in all groups, for parties the focus then shifted 
particularly to specific activities pursued by the party during the uprising, the stance 
towards specific tactics, decision making on tactics, cooperation with other parties, and 
perceptions of the needs of Palestinian society and ways to tackle those.  In interviews 
with NGOs, questions focused on changes in society, provisions made to society during 
the intifada, ways in which organisations tried to affect politics during this period, and 
what kind of non-violent alternatives emerged, if any.  Interviews with academics were 
taken as an opportunity, in addition to the general questions, to explore more specific 
topics such as changes in identity or the particular impact of territorial division on the 
intifada.  In interviews with women, the role of women, how women were affected by 
the second intifada, what significance the participation of women in suicide bombing 
had, and the significance of personal motives versus political ones were explored. 
Within the social sciences there has recently been an increased focus on 
reflexivity. Except for structured interviews which follow questionnaires rigidly and 
where the impact of the researcher is arguably minimal, any interview approach that 
allows for some flexibility and freedom for both the researcher and researched will have 
to answer questions on reflexivity.  The concept of reflexivity entails an awareness of 
the researcher’s cultural, social and political context, and more specifically, refers to a 
self-awareness of beliefs, values, attitudes and their effects on the setting that is being 
studied.  This also includes a self-critical approach to one’s choices of research methods 
and application, which enhances the evaluation and understanding of the research 
findings.
159
  While Reinharz emphasises the importance of being aware of the variety of 
selves and their impact on others that a researcher brings to the field,
160
  Patai warns of 
an excessive emphasis on self-reflexivity.
161
  Patai criticises a tendency she identifies in 
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academia to think ‘that you can never tell enough’ when it comes to self-reflexivity.  
Although the context in which the research occurs and the impact of the researcher are 
certainly significant this ‘bias’ and ‘impact’ on the part of the researcher do not 
necessarily undermine qualitative research as Silke suggests, rather an awareness of 
these will improve our understanding of the research findings.   
There is a general assumption in the literature that sharing experiences and 
cultural background with the interviewee will enhance the interview process while an 
absence of such shared ground will make the process more difficult.
162
  Important 
characteristics that come to mind here and that will inevitably have some impact on the 
research is the gender of the researcher and status as a foreign national.  While both 
could be a disadvantage in a culturally very different setting, being an outsider and 
stranger can sometimes be of benefit as Reinharz recognised in her research on the 
elderly in the kibbutz.
163
  Moreover, shared experiences may in some circumstances also 
have the effect that the respondent may give less detailed answers on the assumption 
that the interviewer ‘knows what it’s like.’164  How the interviewer’s identity and 
particular background impacted on the research process will be elaborated in more 
detail in the concluding chapter. 
While Silke has pointed out some serious flaws and weaknesses of qualitative 
research and made some valid criticisms in its use for studies on political violence, 
many of these shortcomings can be remedied.  The use of semi-structured interviews 
will provide the researcher with some control over the data and allow a certain degree of 
comparability between the different accounts.  While bias and the impact of the 
researcher cannot be completely eliminated, valuable knowledge can still be obtained 
beyond this and an awareness and acknowledgement of the factors influencing the 
research process will open up the research process for full scrutiny.  In interpreting the 
data, a sign of good-quality academic work is an approach that engages critically with 
conflicting explanations and contradictory points of view.
165
  A Palestinian academic 
voiced the opinion that you could believe less than 20% of what people involved in 
politics in Palestine would tell you and hence interviewing as a research technique is 
only partly useful.  In the analysis, comments were never taken at face value but 
evaluated according to the context they were presented in and against other sources.  
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When party members where asked what kind of concrete activities they pursued during 
the second intifada, for example, the common response was that the party was very 
engaged but when prompted for specific examples the answers were vague.  This 
included a party without a militant wing and hence the vagueness of the answer is more 
likely connected to the lack of activities rather than a security concern in sharing this 
information.  However, it should also be said that it was generally difficult to obtain 
specific examples of events and this may in part be also due to the significant time lapse 
since the uprising.  Another example for the critical engagement with the data is the 
reconstruction of the second intifada in the current political context which will be 
discussed further in chapter two.  The accounts presented of the second intifada were 
carefully read within the political context at the time of interviewing.  The stance taken 
here is that the existing political climate reconfigured the understanding of the second 
intifada and contributed to portraying it as a very different movement to the first, driven 
primarily by organisations and detached from the rest of society.  Some of the meanings 
that emerged in the interviews were visible on the surface, others much more deeply 
buried.  There was undoubtedly an effort to give a good impression of the Palestinian 
people and their cause to someone who represents the Western world. Given that the 
conflict is still on-going, in combination with fast-paced changes in the political 
environment, there were was also some lack of interest apparent in talking about events 
that were not current, as more pressing issues were at hand. 
Interviewees were primarily selected through snowballing. However, the 
experience during this research project was that recommendations for further 
interviewees were not always easily obtained. Some individuals, however, were 
specifically targeted because of the role they played in parties or the expertise they had.  
Seven of the interviews were conducted with women, two in their capacity as party 
members, one as a representative of an NGO, four in their role as academics of which 
one was at the time actively involved in NGO work and one had previous involvement 
in activism.  One way of making qualitative research more reliable and open to 
assessment is to apply the method of triangulation.
166
  For the purpose of this research 
project, data collected through semi-structured interviews will be supplemented with 
documentary analysis and compared to findings in secondary literature.  A variety of 
reports and data produced by Israeli and Palestinian NGOs were used to supplement the 
interview material.  Moreover, agreements between Israel and the Palestinians, 
international agreements, UN documents and reports by other international bodies were 
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also consulted.  The research process and the particular difficulties it posed will be 
explored further in the concluding chapter of the thesis. 
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2. From the First to the Second intifada: Transformations in 
Politics and Civil Society 
 
They folded the scene 
allowing us space to go back to the others 
diminished. 
 
Smiling, we entered the movie screen, 
 since we’re supposed to be on a movie screen. 
We improvised a speech prepared for us beforehand, 
regretting the martyr’s last option. 
We took a bow, surrendered our names 
to pedestrians walking on either side 
 and returned to our tomorrow  
diminished. 
 
They folded the scene. 
They triumphed. 
They summed up our yesterday from beginning to end. 
They forgave the victim her mistakes  
when she apologized  
for words that were about to cross her mind. 
They changed time’s bell  
and triumphed.
1
 
 
… 
 
Palestinian modes of resisting Israeli rule and threats to national self-realisation 
have taken a variety of forms since the British Mandate period.  The first and the second 
intifada have constituted, to date, the most intense, persistent, and widespread 
manifestation of Palestinian political activism.  For Palestinians, the two intifadas are 
intrinsically connected but at the same time also markedly different.  The first intifada 
that erupted in 1987 saw wide participation from all sectors in society and was 
predominantly characterised by civil disobedience and mass demonstrations.  It was 
deeply embedded within a society’s quest for participation and emancipation and was as 
such inherently democratic.  The second intifada, on the other hand, was much more 
violent and visible participation was limited to a small number of militant groups.  
Armed action had become politicised and more organised.  Rather than mass protests, it 
was suicide bombing which came to be the phenomenon most associated with the 
second intifada and rocketed to an average of one per week during 2002.  Yet, for 
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Palestinians this was just a small part of their experience of the second intifada as they 
became engulfed by waves of violent retaliations, targeted assassinations, prolonged 
curfews, and reoccupation.   
The fact that the two uprisings diverged so drastically raises the question as to 
what had changed in the interim period; what social, cultural and political developments 
had influenced this transformation and who were the actors that determined this new 
course.  The position taken here is that understanding the political arrangements put in 
place with the Oslo Accords is crucial for explaining why the uprising in 2000 took the 
form it did.  The first intifada created a sense of Palestinian unity through the power of 
popular movements that managed to overcome the political factionalism that Palestinian 
politics was so notorious for in the 1970s.  The uprising was central in creating the 
opportunity of Oslo which promised a solution to this decade-old conflict within five 
years.  However, as Palestinians soon came to realise, Oslo was an inherently unequal 
agreement reflecting the enormous power asymmetry on the ground.  The Oslo 
agreements assigned a dual role to the Palestinian Authority, whose incompatible 
commitments it was unable to meet, laying the ground for a narrative, particularly 
pursued by the Israeli political elite on the right, of Palestinian incompetence, 
corruption, division and complicity in terrorism.  The Palestinian Authority’s 
obligations towards Israel’s security as enshrined in Oslo and its commitments to 
foreign donors guaranteeing its own survival, often contrasted starkly with its 
responsibilities towards its own population.  Without any real sovereignty, especially 
over the essential resources of water and land, it was unable to adequately provide for 
and protect the Palestinian people.  Moreover, the establishment of the Palestinian 
Authority and its quasi-state institutions and, not least, Arafat’s autocratic style of rule 
undermined the strong civil society networks established during the first intifada, and to 
some extent, even made them redundant.  The decline of civil society that had emerged 
with and sustained the first intifada was accompanied by a reassertion of factionalism 
which came to the fore during the second intifada.  While deeper divisions were still 
held at bay during the large scale Israeli military operations in Palestinian population 
centres this trend became most evident after the end of the uprising with the electoral 
victory of Hamas and the subsequent division between the West Bank and Gaza.  In 
contrast to the first intifada, the second uprising failed to generate a sense of unity that 
translated into a mass popular participation.  Rising Palestinian frustration at the failure 
of Oslo, and increasingly at what was seen as collusion by the PA in suppressing 
Palestinian resistance against Israeli occupation, generated the willingness among the 
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majority of the population to re-engage with, or at least tolerate, violent resistance to 
Israel and, eventually, also the PA.  At the end of the first intifada, as institutions of a 
nascent Palestinian state began to crystallise and the PLO had signalled its intention to 
negotiate a settlement with Israel based on a two-state model, armed struggle was no 
longer a viable source of legitimacy.  Hence, the PLO as it had originally been 
conceived as an alliance of resistance groups with its goal to liberate Palestine through 
armed struggle became anachronistic.
2
  However, the continued, albeit more 
sophisticated and often less visible, repression of Palestinian population over the Oslo 
period to which the PA out of necessity, even if often unwillingly so, was party to, 
brought armed struggle back on the agenda.  The increasing support for violence among 
the population was cultivated by the realisation that the political option, through 
negotiations and state-building, had failed to realise Palestinian national independence.  
This chapter will offer an account of the development of Palestinian political 
activism and political violence that is indebted to historical and contextual analysis and 
will deepen the insights available from explanations of political behaviour based on 
political science models.  While this account will confirm some of the observations 
made by Pape and Bloom, for example, on party competition, social isolation and 
political violence as coercion it will also highlight the shortcomings of such accounts.  
In the more traditional political science approaches peace agreements are seen simply as 
opportunities to end the conflict but how they contribute to the perpetuation of the 
conflict is largely neglected.  Acts of political violence are interpreted as spoilers that 
intend to disrupt agreements that they reject or as attempts of coercion, but the ways in 
which the very nature of an agreement institutionalises the conflict remain unexplored.  
Moreover, the significance of the role of civil society, for example, is neglected in both 
Pape and Bloom’s political science models.  Such approaches tend to depict society 
merely as a potential pool of recruits and a support base for acts of political violence.  
They do not consider its potential as an organised body offering alternative pathways of 
political activism.  Even if the growing frustration and desperation at the deteriorating 
conditions during the Oslo period are taken into consideration, as we have seen in Hafez 
in the previous chapter, their source still remains undefined.  Finally, accounts modelled 
on political science methodology do not acknowledge the existence of multiple 
narratives.  The discussion in this chapter will demonstrate how the PA constructs a 
dominant narrative of the past, and the understanding of peace and conflict, as a key 
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political move, one that cannot be captured by models that rest on epistemological 
claims of neutrality and impartiality. 
The first intifada, the impact of Oslo, the role of the PA, and the decline of civil 
society will be the subject of this chapter.  The next chapter will then discuss how the 
movement restrictions resulting from Oslo led to a territorial fragmentation that limited 
the options for resistance and made confrontations between the Israeli army and 
Palestinians inevitably more violent.  Moreover, it will also look at the long-term 
implications this territorial fragmentation has had on the make-up of Palestinian society 
and how this in turn has affected modes of political activism.  This will set the stage for 
the fourth chapter, which will contextualise suicide bombing and examine how 
territorial transformation and the political, societal and cultural context have determined 
its nature. 
 
2.1 The First Intifada: the Power of the People 
 
The outbreak of the first intifada took onlookers as well as Palestinian political 
organisations by surprise.  It occurred at a time when the PLO was weak, having lost its 
central bases of operation in Jordan and Lebanon, and now with PLO leaders exiled in 
Tunis, it was cut off from direct interaction with the large Palestinian communities, 
especially in Lebanon and Syria.
3
   The outbreak of the intifada, for the first time, 
shifted the focus to the occupied territories themselves which had never functioned for 
the PLO as the main arena for struggle but had always been seen as playing a supportive 
role.
4
  The eruption of the uprising was not orchestrated or called for by political 
organisations but it was the spontaneous collective expression of an accumulation of the 
unique experience of twenty years of occupation by the population in the Palestinian 
territories combined with the convergence of larger social and political transformations.  
The trigger for the outbreak was a traffic accident, which although tragic in itself, was a 
seemingly minor incident but the running of an army truck into a van that transported 
Palestinian workers and killed four was perceived by Palestinians as a revenge attack 
for the stabbing of an Israeli two days earlier in Gaza city.
5
  When soldiers then shot 
dead a 21-year old during the subsequent funeral demonstrations in the Jabalya camp, 
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the Gaza Strip erupted in anger and the demonstrations quickly spread to the West 
Bank.
6
 
Despite its apparent spontaneity, the first intifada is the result of a number of 
long-term processes, the convergence of which gave the accumulated frustration 
direction and provided the evolving activism with sustenance.
7
  Protests and 
confrontations had occurred since the territories had been occupied in 1967 but 
accelerated substantially in the year before the outbreak of the intifada.
8
  The 
destruction of the local municipalities and their replacement with an Israeli 
administration in the early 1980s,
9
 a more rigorous implementation of taxation coupled 
with low investment into Palestinian infrastructure and public services,
10
 the growth of 
Israeli settlements, the creeping annexation of the Palestinian territories economically 
into the Israeli economy were all clear manifestations of Israeli repression.  Parallel to 
this state of affairs Palestinians experienced deeper social and political changes.  Lisa 
Taraki argues that what had happened in the territories over the decades was a 
crystallisation of Palestinian political consciousness which was the product of a variety 
of factors and events that had shaped Palestinian collective experience.  The most 
significant factors in this development were the ambivalent position of the Arab states 
towards Palestinian nationalism, the rise of Palestinian resistance in the 1960s, the 
growing in strength and influence of the PLO, and the special circumstances of life 
under Israeli occupation. For Taraki, this political consciousness is distinctly 
Palestinian, as opposed to Arab or Jordanian, and is based on the idea that only the 
establishment of a Palestinian national authority can realise Palestinian national 
aspirations.
11
  Beyond parties and fronts, it was a number of frameworks through which 
this political consciousness was developed including mass organisations, artistic and 
literary groups, the press, universities and community colleges as well as charitable 
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societies.
12
  By the time the first intifada erupted this evolving political consciousness 
provided an organised, articulate and substantial social base for the Palestinian national 
movement.
13
 
In addition to a rise in politicisation, the socio-economic changes in the 
territories began to expose all strata of society to the effects of occupation policies in 
one form or another.  The unifying experiences that Israel’s occupation generated were 
crucial for the intifada to take hold as they fostered social bonds and transcended 
original schisms.  While the 1980s had already seen protests of professional groups in 
response to new taxes introduced by the Israeli government, their power remained 
limited because they only focussed on their own narrow agendas and wider mobilisation 
hence failed to materialise.
14
  Moreover, the land-owning elite had an interest in keeping 
the status-quo and sought a modus vivendi with the occupier.
15
  Any mobilisation of the 
poorer masses would have challenged their position.  However, due to socio-economic 
developments, the financial leverage of these elites decreased significantly over the 
1970s as more and more poor Gazans gained an alternative source of income through 
labour in Israel.  In addition to this, a rise in Israeli restrictions and taxes caused 
Palestinian landowners significant losses in the citrus industry, further undermining 
their financial powerbase.
16
  Over the years occupation policies were felt by all and had 
an intrinsically equalising effect.  Both students and professionals, for example, faced 
very similar restrictions imposed by the Israeli government regardless of their 
background, including restrictions on education and the practice of professions as well 
as limited career opportunities.
17
  The growing settlements impinged on both the 
indigenous population and the refugee residents, bringing the two traditionally distinct 
population groups together through a shared sense of problems and grievances.
18
  
Whilst the thinning out of refugee camps through harassment or settlement projects had 
been an Israeli policy in order to bring an end to the refugee question,
19
 the mixing of 
the urban poor and resettled refugees rather than depoliticising the refugees politicised 
the urban masses.
20
  Hence, what was so central during these stages of the occupation, 
and as we will see in more detail represented a significant difference to the Oslo period 
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and the second intifada, was that it affected all strata of society and this shared 
experience unified Palestinian society in its quest for national liberation.  
For the most part, and especially in the early stages of the first intifada, 
participants in civil disobedience were not armed.  The main tools employed were mass 
demonstrations, strikes, throwing rocks and burning tyres.  In an attempt to crush the 
uprising quickly Yitzhak Rabin, then Defence Minister, notoriously ordered his soldiers 
to break the arms and legs of those participating in the intifada.  However, these brutal 
measures did little to abate waves of protests.  Arrests were made at an unprecedented 
level, completely overwhelming the capacity of Israeli prisons, and prisoners had to be 
accommodated in tents and new detention facilities were opened in Ramallah, 
Bethlehem and the South of Israel.  The Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of 
International Affairs (PASSIA) estimates that between 1987 and 1994 210,000 
Palestinians were arrested.
21
 The Israeli administration imposed curfews, movement 
restrictions, (particularly at night) and sought to reverse any decision made by the 
United National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU) often through military orders.
22
  
Hospitals were required to report anyone injured to the authorities so that the army 
would then arrest them on the assumption they had taken part in demonstrations.  
Moreover, anyone who was a member of any committee was liable for a sentence of up 
to ten years.
23
  Israel’s response to the uprising was multifaceted.  In addition to the 
more obvious and condemnable activities such as curfews, arrests, harassment, violence 
and the targeting of activists, administrative controls played a key role in the Israeli 
response with a view to dispense collective punishment and exhaust the population.
24
 
However, what was so striking was the energy and creativity espoused during the 
uprising.  Through bureaucratic delays the Israeli authorities sought to assert their 
control over the Palestinian health care system ‘while avoiding the stigma of appearing 
to play the dirty game of punishing the victims of ill-health and injury.’25  In response to 
this medical committees bought normal commercial vehicles and converted them into 
‘quasi-ambulances’ or simply listed the vehicles as ‘health-buses’, thus avoiding the 
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requirement for specially licensed drivers.
26
  Another illustrative example here is the tax 
revolt in the middle-class, majority-Christian, town of Bayt Sahur, which epitomises the 
perseverance and deep sense of solidarity that characterised the first intifada.  During a 
42-day military closure and curfew on the town between 20 September and 31 October 
1989, Israeli tax authorities confiscated property and money valued between 1.5 and 7.5 
million dollars belonging to 350 families in the town who the Israeli authorities claimed 
failed to pay income tax and VAT.
27
  The large-scale confiscations had essentially 
destroyed the productive base of the town and much of its financial base had been 
seized or frozen.  The people of Bayt Sahur as a form of non-violent resistance refused 
to pay taxes to the Israeli authorities and to file tax returns.
28
  The protest was 
particularly targeted at the introduction of VAT, questioning the legality of this tax as 
an occupying power is not permitted under international law to institute new taxation 
that did not exist prior to the occupation.
29
  Many Sahuris had their homes almost 
completely emptied during the confiscation process and despite the serious hardships 
they faced as a result, observers noted the unity among the population, its confidence 
and the energy with which they planned for the future.
30
  While the first intifada is often 
associated with mass demonstrations, and these did indeed characterise the early stages 
of the uprising, it evolved over time to adapt, which ensured its continuation.  Activism 
became less spectacular but it transformed itself in such a way that it allowed for life to 
continue.
31
  Interestingly, after the first year of the first intifada debates over the use of 
arms in the uprising arose and supporters of this option argued that Israelis were 
apathetic to the intifada because they did not see Israeli casualties on a daily basis like 
they did in Lebanon.  The fourteenth leaflet of the UNLU contemplated the possibility 
of an armed element to the uprising.  It seems then, that the armed option that prevailed 
in the second intifada was already considered early on in the first intifada because it was 
felt that civil disobedience did not have a sufficient impact on Israel.
32
  However, armed 
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action, which was particularly popular with Hamas groups,
33
 never gained the upper 
hand and the first intifada remained a popular unarmed mass-based movement.  
Providing a practical link between the ambitions of the intifada and the 
grassroots were the popular committees that began to spring up throughout the 
Palestinian territories from December 1987 onwards, in particular in the area of food 
relief.
34
  Palestinians had begun to establish committees providing social services to the 
community with a view to replace the Israeli-run administration of the territories.  These 
committees covered a variety of functions and were largely needs-based. With the 
closing of schools and universities, committees of alternative education were 
established; an economic committee was in charge of finding neglected land and 
growing vegetables for the community; a special committee was established to oversee 
and enforce the boycott of Israeli products.  In total around 45,000 committees were 
established during this period.
35
  Community action and grassroots activity created a 
feeling of solidarity amongst the population that was one of the central factors in 
keeping the intifada alive for seven years.  What differentiated these committees from 
the organisations that had developed in the territories previously was that they were not 
organised along political lines but participation was open to everyone.  By establishing 
shadow administrative structures as an alternative to Israel’s administration in the 
Palestinian territories, which the population had rejected for the last 20 years, they 
succeeded in institutionalising and legitimising the intifada at the grassroots level.
36
  
While the services provided by the committees could not have replaced the public or 
private sector in the long-term, they did prove to be capable to cope should the need 
arise and in this way managed to dissipate the onset of mass anxiety.
37
  Committees 
established before the outbreak of the first intifada, which had developed in the areas of 
youth, students, women and workers continued and expanded their activities; especially 
women’s committees and those focusing on health and agriculture were particularly 
active.  What differentiated them, however, from the intifada popular committees is that 
they continued to be affiliated to one of the political parties.
38
  The extensive network of 
popular committees highlights the achievement of the intifada in fostering a popular 
inclusive response to immediate needs transcending factional division.  
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The driving force behind mobilising the grassroots was the United National 
Leadership of the Uprising which issued weekly communiqués, and with its directives 
provided cohesion and order to the activities implemented by the committees. It was 
composed of the four factions active in the territories: Fateh, the Popular Front, The 
Democratic Front, and the Palestine Communist Party.
39
  It was essentially a point of 
coordination between the political organisations in the territories but it was by no means 
a centralised or personalised leadership of the intifada.
40
  ‘Indeed, the decision jointly to 
coordinate intifada strategy never blunted broader differences, which arose on many 
occasions over a variety of questions.’41  However, the parties in the UNLU succeeded 
in overcoming these differences by prioritising the continuation of the intifada over 
differences in opinion over long-term objectives or ideology.
42
  The communiqués were 
the product of ongoing interaction between the leadership on the outside and the UNLU 
on the inside.
43
  This interplay between the inside and outside was crucial and it was the 
UNLU that through its interaction with the PLO acted as the connecting node between 
the leadership on the outside and the population inside the territories.  Despite the 
spontaneity and indigenousness of the uprising, the involvement of the PLO situated the 
events within a clear strategy of the national movement encompassing all Palestinians.  
Parallel to building alternative services which was accomplished by committee 
work there was also a call for dismantling the Israeli Administration’s rule in the 
Palestinian territories and dealing with Palestinians that collaborated with the Israeli 
authorities.  For this purpose, those working for the civil administration were asked to 
resign and the UNLU issued communiqués to this effect.  As one would expect, such 
measures were not always welcome as the economic situation of those who were 
previously employees of the Israeli-run civil administration deteriorated considerably.  
Communiqués were also issued asking collaborators with Israel to cease cooperation.  
As a result hundreds of collaborators handed their weapons over at mosques and 
churches.  Palestinian action against those collaborating with Israel was 
uncompromising as proven by the massacre of Qabatye village.  The killing of a 
collaborator by a group of villagers after he refused to cease working for Israel signalled 
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that Israel could no longer protect its collaborators among Palestinians.  As punishment 
for the killing, Israel imposed a 42 day curfew on the village.
44
 
Women were particularly active in the grassroots movement during the first 
intifada and the difference between the two intifadas is perhaps most illustrative when 
looking at women’s participation.  The first intifada had a much more inclusive social 
agenda. It provided a context for women’s empowerment and women were able to carve 
out a role for themselves within the larger movement for political change.  They were 
most active in organising and providing social and community services.  According to 
Islah Jad, it was not new for women to take on a political role but what was significant, 
was the scope of these roles and their various manifestations.
45
  ‘From the start, women 
of all ages and social classes took part in the demonstrations that broke out on 
December 9, 1987, throwing stones, burning tyres, transporting and preparing stones, 
building roadblocks, raising Palestinian flags, and preventing soldiers from arresting 
people.’46  These activities were most widespread in poor neighbourhoods in the towns, 
in the villages and refugee camps.
47
  Although women in refugee camps and villages 
were very active in these mass demonstrations their participation in committees was 
rare.
48
  It appears then, that the more conservative social structures in these areas also 
translated into committee formation, excluding women from such roles.
49
  That women 
could not liberate themselves from their social contexts becomes even more evident 
when we recognise that women activities were essentially an extension of their 
traditional roles as educators and carers.
50
  Hiltermann, in fact, highlights the limitations 
of the women’s movement by pointing out that the UNLU leadership only recognised 
women achievements in a very limited way and excluded it largely from its own 
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decision making apparatus.
51
  Jad, in particular, criticises the low level of feminist 
consciousness of the women’s movement at the time.  Despite the fact that women now 
worked inside and outside the home, they still remained at the lower end of the family 
hierarchy.
52
  The risk of disunity, especially once the Islamists began to gain strength, 
sidelined women’s issues as demonstrated by Rema Hammami’s account of the hijab 
campaign in Gaza.  Concerted efforts by Islamist supporters to pressurise women into 
wearing the hijab began in 1988, including harassment, threats and attacks on women 
by youth.  It took the UNLU over a year to respond by which time, although the 
statement had an immediate impact and the atmosphere for women in the streets 
changed, it was too late to reverse the trend.
53
  For the sake of nationalist goals then, 
women’s issues were simply postponed.  While this was naturally a setback for women 
activists, the extent of the concern of avoiding any ruptures along political lines can 
only be fully grasped when looking at the deep-rooted factionalism that characterised 
Palestinian politics in the 1970s. 
   
2.1.1 The Challenge of Palestinian Factionalism 
 
Considering the dispersal of the Palestinian population since 1948, subjecting 
the various segments of its society to distinctly different experiences, and in the absence 
of a permanent territorial base, deep division within the Palestinian national movement 
were not surprising.  Perhaps precisely because of the absence of a permanent territorial 
base, Palestinian political developments were particularly vulnerable to wider regional 
trends as the Palestinian leadership was financially and logistically dependent on 
external supporters.  The weakening of the left in the Palestinian context has internal 
reasons, but is undoubtedly also connected to the demise of the Soviet Union, both in 
ideological as well as in financial terms. Similarly, the rise of religious parties has 
internal as well as external causes; as the Islamic movement gained strength in 
Palestine, so it did elsewhere.  The defeat of the Arab states by Israel in the 1967 war, 
led to a change of course whereby Palestinians would no longer rely on Arab states to 
fulfil their nationalist ambitions.  This is the platform that the growing Fateh party 
adopted at the time:  in order to regain their independence Palestinians needed to rise up 
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to the task themselves.  Political developments and collective identities are mutually 
formative. The failure of Arab secular nationalism strengthened the emergence of a 
Palestinian identity but also set in motion a process by which the Islamist movement 
would later fill the gap left by the weakened nationalists.  The growth of the Islamist 
movement was also reflected in the strengthening of religious identity among the 
population.   
With the 1967 Arab defeat, support for independent Palestinian guerrilla action 
increased dramatically.  It also enabled Fateh, which initiated this idea, to adopt the 
quasi-official status of controlling the PLO.
54
  The subsequent two years saw a growth 
of other Palestinian guerrilla organisations partly because all the pan-Arabist-oriented 
Arab regimes and parties sought to establish their own position within the rapidly 
growing guerrilla movement.  Moreover, Fateh was also not able to absorb the scores of 
new volunteers to the Palestinian cause. 
55
  While to the outside, as Helen Cobban 
argues, it may have seemed that these new emerging groups were at times challenging 
the dominant position of Fateh, in reality Fateh’s leadership was never seriously at 
risk.
56
   
One of the emerging groups was the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine.  The PFLP was originally created as the Palestinian wing of the Arab 
Nationalist Movement (ANM).  It was founded in 1967 by George Habash, a 
Palestinian Christian, whilst at the American University in Beirut.  The party embraces 
a secularist ideology, socialist economic ideas and advocates armed struggle. It attracted 
considerable notoriety with a series of aircraft hijackings during the 1970s.  The PFLP’s 
armed wing, the Abu Ali Mustapha Brigades, carried out several suicide bombings 
(mostly against settlers and IDF personnel) during the second intifada
57
 and also took 
responsibility for the assassination of right-wing Israeli Tourism Minister Rehavam 
Ze’evi.  With Hamas operating outside the PLO framework, the PFLP is the second 
largest party after Fateh in the PLO.  The party rejects the Oslo Accords, and advocates 
a one-state solution in the form of a single bi-national state.
58
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The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine was formed as the result 
of a split between the PFLP and some of the left-wing elements within the movement 
that were to form the core of the new organisation in 1969.
59
  It was primarily those 
within the PFLP that had been under attack and subject to harassment from mainstream 
PFLP members who wanted to leave.  Only with the intervention of the Fateh 
leadership, the left-wingers led by Nayef Hawatama were able to split from the PFLP 
under the condition that they would renounce any claim to being the authentic PFLP.  
The DFLP participated from the beginning, unlike the PFLP, in Fateh-dominated bodies 
such as the PLO and throughout its existence retained a stance of loyal opposition 
towards the Fateh leadership.  Already early on, the DFLP showed signs of innovative 
thinking accepting some form of Israeli or Jewish cultural nationhood and was one of 
the first parties to advocate the idea of a Palestinian entity in the West Bank and Gaza 
alongside Israel.
60
  It opposed the Oslo Accords because it saw them as undemocratic 
and leading to the marginalisation of the PLO, but it did not reject the idea of a two-
state solution.
61
  During the second intifada the party took responsibility for a number of 
shooting attacks (but was not involved in suicide bombings).  In 1990 in an internal split 
the Palestinian Democratic Union or FIDA was established which takes a more 
moderate stance towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict than its parent organisation and 
has no armed wing.   
The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PFLP-
GC) has its origins in a group of Palestinians that had served in the Syrian Army in the 
1950s.  Ahmed Jibril, a former Palestinian officer in the Syrian Army has been the 
leader of this group throughout.  Initially, the organisation was referred to as the 
Palestine Liberation Front.  Once Fateh had begun to engage in armed struggle, in early 
1965, Jibril’s group sought to unite with Fateh.  Its inclusion into Fateh was one of the 
conditions imposed on Fateh by Syria in return for logistical support from Damascus.
62
  
However, Jibril’s alliance with Fateh did not last long. In 1967 the Palestinian 
Liberation Front responded to an appeal for guerrilla unity issued by George Habbash 
and so came to cofound the PFLP.
63
  However, after a PFLP conference in 1968 the 
Palestinian branch of Habash’s ANM was completely absorbed into the PFLP and as a 
result Jibril split from the ANM group within the PFLP.  The group that came to 
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surround Jibril was named the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General 
Command.  Jibril entered another alliance later, with the Rejection Front, of which he 
was also a founding member but the alliance ended with the secession under a former 
Jibril lieutenant assuming the original name of Jibril’s group, the Palestinian Liberation 
Front.
64
  The PFLP-GC’s primary focus is armed struggle and it essentially lacks a 
political platform.  It operates outside the PLO framework and rejects any settlement 
with Israel. The organisation did not take part in any high-profile activities during the 
second intifada.
65
 
Al-Saiqa is also the product of Syrian involvement in the Palestine question. 
Saiqa is the name of the armed wing of the ‘Vanguards of the Popular War of 
Liberation’ but usually the whole party is referred to as Saiqa.  It was established as the 
Palestinian wing of the pro-Syrian Baath Party.
66
 In its ideological outlook it is Arab 
socialist and nationalist with a strong commitment to pan-Arabism.  The party was kept 
under tight control of its parent organisation which throughout two decades of control of 
the Syrian state apparatus from 1963 had its own direct interest in the Palestinian 
issue.
67
  With Oslo and the end of the Lebanese war the party however has lost its 
usefulness to Syria and this is now reflected in its state and size.
68
  There is no record of 
activity during the second intifada. 
The Palestinian People’s Party was founded in 1982 as the Palestinian 
Communist Party.  In 1987 it joined the PLO.  The party was one of the four members 
comprising the United National Leadership during the first intifada and played an 
important role in mobilising the grassroots for the uprising but subsequently lost 
influence.   
Over the years splits within leftist parties considerably undermined their 
influence in the Palestinian territories and divided their supporter base: After Ahmed 
Jibril broke away from the PFLP to form the PFLP-GC, the DFLP formed a separate 
organisation and later FIDA split from its parent organisation, the DFLP. With the 
decline of the leftist parties the political map began to be dominated by a two-party 
antagonism between Fateh and Hamas, with the left parties often swinging from one 
side to the other.
69
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2.1.2. The Rise of the Islamists 
 
Whilst up to the first intifada the parties competing with Fateh emerged mostly 
from pan-Arab secular movements, the movements with religious agendas were both 
break-away parties from the Muslim Brotherhood and were a critical response to the 
Brotherhood’s perceived passivity towards Israeli occupation.70  The Muslim 
Brotherhood Society emerged in the late 1930s in Egypt.  It was founded by Hasan al-
Banna and a small group of his compatriots.  The Muslim Brotherhood society’s 
involvement in Palestine began in 1935 with a visit by Abd-al-Rahman al-Banna, Hasan 
al-Banna’s brother, to Palestine where he met with Hajj Amin al-Husseini, who was the 
then Mufti of Jerusalem and head of the Higher Islamic Council.
71
 During the revolt of 
1936, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt initiated a propaganda campaign to support the 
Palestinian cause.  In October 1945 the Muslim Brotherhood opened its first branch in 
Jerusalem.  Two years later twenty-five Brotherhood branches had been established in 
the country with a membership ranging from twelve thousand to twenty thousand active 
members.
72
  Many Muslim Brotherhood volunteers joined the 1948 war, which 
increased the movement’s popularity considerably.73 After 1948 the Brotherhood went 
through a distinctly different experience in the West Bank compared to its counterpart 
in the Gaza Strip. While in the West Bank the Muslim Brotherhood could flourish in 
loyal opposition to the Jordanian king, Egypt who banned the Brotherhood on its own 
soil in 1949, kept tight control on the movement in the Gaza Strip which was under its 
administration until 1967.
74
   
For the Muslim Brotherhood all of Palestine is Muslim land and nobody is in a 
position to concede any part of it.  The society rejects the establishment of a Palestinian 
state in the West Bank and Gaza, as this entails the concession of the rest of Palestine to 
Israel.
75
  From the Brotherhood’s perspective the jihad for Palestine will begin after the 
completion of the Islamic transformation of Palestinian society.  Only after internal 
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social change can Palestinians be liberated and the call for jihad be meaningful.
76
  It is 
here that Hamas and Islamic Jihad have both taken a different route from the 
Brotherhood.  Both groups have embraced armed struggle to advance the goal of the 
liberation of Palestine, yet Hamas has at the same time still retained elements of social 
transformation through education and charity work within the core of its programme 
while the Islamic Jihad’s focus has remained distinctly military. 
Many Western commentators have, since the movement’s inception, always 
referred to and often sought to understand Hamas through its Charter.  Shaul Mishal and 
Avraham Sela, however, have emphasised the movement’s adaptability and 
pragmatism.
77
  The Hamas Charter was drawn up less than a year after the founding of 
the movement and it was a direct response to the first intifada when its very raison 
d’être was armed struggle against the occupation.78  Khaled Hroub argues that Hamas 
has gone through significant transformations over time in response to political 
developments.  By 2005 and 2006 Hroub notes a progressive de-emphasis of religion 
and a strong emphasis on state-building in some of the organisation’s documents.  Its 
proposed national unity government programme implicitly recognised a two-state 
solution and ‘without a hint of the “liberation of the entire land of Palestine” or the 
“destruction of Israel” found in the charter.’79 
Because of its focus on military actions only, the much smaller Islamic Jihad, 
could not extend its supporter base in the same way Hamas had done.  The organisation 
was founded by Fathi Shiqaqi in Gaza in the early 1980s.  Shiqaqi had been a member 
of the Muslim Brotherhood before he was expelled.  For him the liberation of Palestine 
was a priority because the Palestinian situation was the source of all other problems and 
hence should be the central cause of the Islamic movement.
80
  The Muslim 
Brotherhood, on the other hand, did not at the time put Palestine before Islamic issues 
and focussed on their social reform programme centring on education and charitable 
activities.  Shiqaqi was the leader of Islamic Jihad and was then succeeded by Abdallah 
Ramadan Shallah, after his assassination in 1995.  When Israel came to regard him as a 
threat, Shiqaqi spent a brief period in prison in 1983 where he made acquaintances from 
a number of organisations that had participated in resistance activities.  As they had 
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experience of armed struggle they were ideal recruits for his project.
81
  The group was 
particularly active with a number of daring operations in the run-up to the first intifada 
and also organised suicide bombing operations in the second intifada.   
The appearance of the Islamists in the Palestinian political arena added a new 
dimension to Palestinian factionalism.  In the early stages Hamas did not contradict or 
challenge the UNLU and its directive openly but did issue separate leaflets.  Obvious 
differences in instructions did not appear until late August 1988.
82
  On 9 September 
Hamas used strong-arm tactics, frightening shopkeepers into closing their shops, to 
enforce a strike in Ramallah that had not been called for by the UNLU.
83
  These scenes 
were repeated in other locations in November but led to general public disapproval even 
in the more Islamic-oriented areas such as Nablus and Gaza and as a result Hamas 
returned to synchronise with UNLU directives.
84
  The pressure of the public then and 
Hamas’ fear to remain isolated led the party to backtrack on its course and hence 
reversed potential division. 
 
2.1.3 Achievements of the Intifada 
 
Talking to Palestinians one quickly gets a clear sense that the first intifada is a 
proud moment in Palestinian history.  Although in retrospect some aspects will most 
certainly be idealised it did produce some clear achievements.  One of the most 
surprising accomplishments was that it managed to overcome the deep political 
factionalism that was so characteristic of Palestinian politics in the 1970s.  However, 
these divisions never quite disappeared, as is evident in debates within the UNLU, but 
even more obvious in the decline of the popular committees towards the end of the 
intifada when their open and democratic frameworks were replaced by factional 
committees.
85
  It was no doubt the popular dimension of the intifada that succeeded in 
overcoming political divisions.  Once the grassroots involvement and democratic 
participation ceased factional schisms reasserted themselves.  It was the common 
decision to reject a return to normalcy and determination to continue the intifada until 
the demands of Palestinian self-determination, the establishment of a state and the 
PLO’s recognition as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people were 
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met, that for Nassar and Heacock marked the Palestinians’ revolutionary 
transformation.
86
  The intifada made Palestinians more united and proud of their 
national identity and most importantly unarmed Palestinians managed to expose the 
brutality of the Israeli military occupation and by transforming the image of Palestinians 
in the international community, succeeded in garnering support for an independent 
Palestinian state.  It is on this latter aspect that the second intifada has failed most 
blatantly. 
87
  
Beyond overcoming the stumbling block of internal factionalism the intifada 
also delivered clear external political achievements.  Central here was King Hussein’s 
renunciation of any claims to the West Bank and the recognition of the PLO as the sole 
representative of the Palestinian people.  Furthermore, through its grassroots 
organisations, the PLO and the UNLU, the intifada also led to the declaration of an 
independent Palestinian state in 1988.
88
  However, it also set new challenges.  The 
acceptance of the principle of a two-state solution at the Palestinian National Council in 
Algier in 1988 and the participation of Palestinians in the negotiations in Madrid in 
1991 set in motion a process where armed struggle could no longer be the main 
legitimating source for the PLO.  Armed struggle had fulfilled an important role giving 
the Palestinian national movement a focus, but no longer seemed viable in the changing 
context, especially as the PLO tried to portray itself as moderate and open to reasonable 
compromise and with a clear intention to disassociate itself from international 
terrorism.
89
  Hence, it faced the challenge of restructuring if it wanted to survive, 
moving away from an overly bureaucratic apparatus and opening itself up to 
democratisation.
90
  Internal reformation was especially pressing as it faced challenges 
from the outside.  In the absence of democratic elections the true strength of the Islamic 
movement was unknown at the end of the uprising but its following was growing.
91
  In 
addition, being in opposition it had the luxury of being able to hold on to ideological 
maxims while the PLO, if it wanted to deliver results, would be required to make 
painful compromises.
92
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2.2 Oslo: The Roadmap from Hope to Despair 
 
The iconic handshake between PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat and the Israeli 
Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin on the White House lawn in 1993 sealing the Oslo Peace 
Accords, promised Palestinians a first step to self-determination.  The Oslo Accords 
constituted a framework for future negotiations and agreements between the two sides. 
The negotiations were largely greeted with euphoria inside the territories as well as by 
the diaspora.  Many Palestinians truly believed that a Palestinian state would only be a 
stone’s throw away.  One interviewee recounted that she left her life and job in London 
to return to the West Bank in order to be part of building the new state.
93
  Polls 
conducted by the Palestinian Centre for Survey and Policy Research in September 1993 
suggest that the majority of the Palestinian population supported the so-called “Gaza-
Jericho First” agreement with 64.9% being in support of the agreement, 6.6% being 
unsure about it, and 27.9% disagreeing with it.  Confidence that the agreement would 
lead to a Palestinian state and achieve rights for Palestinians was slightly lower, with 
44.9% responding yes, 34.1% saying no and 20.6% being sceptical.  Interestingly, the 
population was divided over whether the intifada should be stopped to ensure the 
success of the agreement.  A substantial group within the population thought that the 
intifada should be continued alongside negotiations.  A clear majority believed it 
necessary that the Palestinian people should be polled over the proposed agreement and 
almost 60% thought that negotiations over Jerusalem, settlements and refugees should 
not be postponed to the ‘final status’ talks.94  The majority of respondents were 
confident that Oslo would bring economic improvement to the West Bank and Gaza. 
The road from the first intifada to Oslo was neither an immediate nor a 
straightforward one.  The replacement of Shamir with Rabin was key to the progress in 
negotiations between the two parties.  Both described as hawks by Shlaim, the former’s 
unwillingness to negotiate with the Palestinians was rooted in his ideological 
commitment to the land of Israel while Rabin’s primary concern was security.95  On 
security issues Rabin was uncompromising and his views were tougher than those of 
some of the Likud ministers.
96
  He ordered the military to ‘break their bones’ in the first 
intifada, closed the borders to Palestinian workers from the territories resulting in 
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collective punishment of nearly 120,000 families, and gave orders for the deportation of 
416 Hamas activists to Lebanon.
97
  Yet, Rabin’s pragmatism enabled him to accept a 
deal with the PLO as long as it would not put Israel’s security at risk.98  The 
development of the Palestinian national movement to a point where it was in a position 
to devise a clear political strategy, and demonstrated pragmatism in its programme 
combined with efforts at portraying itself as reasonable and open to compromise with 
the Israeli side were the other essential ingredients for the agreement to come to 
fruition.  Moreover, what the intifada had done was to draw attention to the suffering of 
Palestinians under military occupation, creating an environment of international support 
for a resolution to the conflict.  It is easy to understand the enthusiasm for the Oslo 
Accords at the time. It marked the first occasion that Palestinian and Israeli 
representatives had come together to negotiate on the practical issues of sharing the land 
between the two peoples and came to some kind of agreement, or at least basic 
principles. 
 
2.2.1 Setting Up a Narrative of Palestinian Incompetence and Complicity in 
Terrorism 
 
Ironically, in practice, Oslo inverted many of the achievements of the intifada 
years, paving the way for a narrative that associated the Palestinian leadership with 
incompetence, weakness and terrorism.  Key in this process was the role that was 
assigned to the PA for protecting Israel’s security.  In fact it was a dual role, a self-
government authority on the one hand and a policing force on the other, controlling its 
own people in order to safeguard Israeli security.  This set-up put the PA routinely in 
situations where it was expected to act against its own population, sacrifices that were 
not substantially rewarded with increased autonomy or control over resources from the 
Israeli side.  The existence of the PA gave both the Palestinians and Israelis someone to 
blame for the dire state of internal affairs.  Moreover, Israel made the PA accountable 
for any instance of Palestinian violence and imposed punitive measures when it did not 
fulfil its security obligations towards Israel.      
By making the PA responsible for threats against Israel’s security, Israeli leaders 
temporarily conferred sovereignty to the Palestinian government.  Sovereignty was 
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projected on the PA despite its very limited control over territory and its population 
whenever it was made accountable for security within the territories.  Derek Gregory 
identifies such cartographic performance as being essential to what he calls the 
‘Colonial Present’.  Sovereignty is performed when ruptured spaces are treated as 
coherent spaces or states.
99
  The occupied territories, similarly to Iraq and Afghanistan, 
are simulated as coherent states in order to make political action meaningful.  The PA is 
treated as sovereign when it is made responsible for activity occurring in the West Bank 
of which it only fully controls around 20%.  During the second intifada Israel held the 
Palestinian Authority accountable for the ever more violent and militant response from 
the Palestinian side.  The PA was accused of not doing enough to reign in the militants 
and curb people’s reaction to Israeli policies.100  Despite a series of assassinations 
targeting leaders and militants across the different parties, the main wrath of Israel 
during its campaign in the West Bank focussed on the Palestinian leadership, most 
notably Yasser Arafat.  While the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, an offshoot of the Fateh 
movement and under the leadership of the young guard, were active participants in 
many militant operations as well as suicide bombings, together with Hamas and Islamic 
Jihad, the PA was largely absent from the scene.
101
  During the siege of Ramallah, 
Arafat was confined to his compound and at the same time it was demanded of him to 
put a stop to militant operations.  It is controversial how much control Arafat had over 
the intifada as a whole and individual operations.   
 The question of sovereignty is intrinsically tied to the issue of legitimate use of 
violence.  Under the conventional understanding in international relations it is the 
sovereign state that holds the monopoly on violence.  A reflection on the kind of entities 
we are dealing with in this conflict necessarily follows.  Ami Pedahzur in his 
observations on the nature of the al-Aqsa intifada notes that Israel has recognised the 
legitimacy of national aspirations of the Palestinian people through the signing of the 
Oslo Accords in 1993.  Hence the conflict appeared to have the trademarks of an inter-
state conflict, albeit within the framework of an unmistakably asymmetric power 
relationship.
102
  On the other hand, with Israel being the only member state of the 
United Nations that has not yet declared its borders, the absence of borders is for 
Pedahzur a defining issue and tips the scales in favour of an intra-state interpretation of 
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the conflict within the frame of civil war and terrorism as its main public 
manifestation.
103
  In his analysis, Pedahzur very appropriately points out that the 
terminology used in describing a conflict says more about the political positions of the 
speaker, than it does about the nature of the conflict itself.
104
   
Israel was quick to pursue its campaign during the second intifada as one aimed 
at eradicating the structures of terrorism.  The use of the word terrorism is in itself an 
act of politics because it defines certain forms of violence, political goals and agency as 
illegitimate while at the same time making others legitimate.
105
  While this statement is 
not intended to defend the killing of innocent civilians, it does seek to challenge the 
framework through which we examine some of the acts of violence that were 
committed, especially on the Palestinian side.  In the absence of a defined status of the 
PA and legitimate mechanisms for the protection of its civilians, Palestinian policing is 
caught between two types of legitimacy: the legitimacy among the community from 
which it was recruited, and the legitimacy conferred to it by Israel and the international 
community which is dependent on the PA fulfilling its commitments towards Israel.  
The Palestinian police force had not been established to provide services and security 
for its own people, but rather its main purpose was to ensure security for another state 
and its citizens.
106
  As many security employees turned into militants and began 
guerrilla style operations against the Israeli army they saw themselves as protecting 
their own population.
107
  The peace process however, had never foreseen any role of 
protection of the Palestinian population against the Israeli army.  Their role was to 
provide internal security and to perform duties commensurate with the protection of 
Israeli citizens.  Israeli decision makers always determined the remit for Palestinian 
police, controlled the size of the force, and even had the power to reject recruits.
108
  
Now that the forces turned against Israel and employed their arms against the military 
they were no longer legitimate. 
 The policy of attributing blame to the Palestinian Authority for events in the 
West Bank despite its limited level of control has continued to the present day.  The PA 
is held fully accountable for controlling its own population to such an extent that any 
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form of violent activism is repressed. As a result, some of those considered to be 
security risks for Israel are now in Palestinian prisons and not Israeli prisons.
109
  Despite 
these momentous efforts on part of the Palestinian Authority to prove good governance 
even at the cost of democracy and its basic principles such as freedom of speech, it has 
never looked likely that Israel will agree to grant full sovereignty to the Palestinians.  
As it is, the Palestinian Authority is a body that takes responsibility for Palestinians, is 
accountable for this to Israel and at the same time relieves the Israeli government of this 
burden both in financial and administrative terms.  This client relationship with Israel 
leads to resentment, especially when the police force is required by Israel to go against 
its own people.
110
  The PA’s inability and at times unwillingness to reign in the 
militants enabled a narrative driven by the Israeli political elite, especially on the right 
but also more moderate elements, of Palestinian incompetence, division and 
indebtedness to terrorism. 
 
2.2.2 The Reality of the Agreements 
 
At the time, only very few were openly critical of the Accords.  Edward Said 
was one of the most prominent and vocal critics of the agreement.  In a series of articles 
published throughout 1993 and 1994, mainly in the London-based Al-Hayat and Cairo’s 
Al-Ahram Weekly, Said describes the agreement essentially as surrender.  In these 
articles he highlights a number of significant shortcomings.  Said is critical of the PLO 
decision to end the intifada, which stood for the right of Palestinians to resist, despite 
the fact that Israel was still occupying the West Bank and Gaza.
111
  Moreover, he points 
out that the documents clearly put Israel’s security first and say nothing about the 
protection of Palestinians from Israeli incursions.
112
  The documents do not demand an 
end to Israeli violence against Palestinians nor do they suggest it should compensate 
victims of Israeli policies since 1967.
113
  For Said, the agreement was inherently 
unequal, and for Arafat’s recognition of Israel’s right to exist, he got little in return.114  
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The concession made by Arafat carried with it a number of renunciations such as the 
PLO Charter, the use of violence and terrorism, and all relevant resolutions, except 
resolutions 242 and 338, which do not include anything on Palestinians, their rights and 
aspirations.
115
  In Said’s view there had been much more favourable opportunities for 
agreements in the past but those opportunities were missed.  However, the Oslo Accords 
were signed when the PLO had begun to lose both external and internal support.  With 
the end of the Cold War the former Soviet Union would no longer be a powerful ally.  
Moreover, Arafat’s siding with Iraq in the Gulf War had serious financial repercussions 
for the PLO as the Gulf States cut off financial assistance to the organisation. When it 
came to the 1991 Madrid conference the PLO was not represented.  Instead, Israel held 
talks with Lebanon, Syria and Jordan and a Palestinian delegation, which was in 
consultation with the PLO, but without official ties to it.  As Arafat and his organisation 
were losing external support the pressure to deliver increased.  Furthermore, a strong 
inside leadership had developed during the first intifada from among the people.  In 
response, the PLO, which was not a direct participant in the territories during the first 
intifada, sought to reassert control over the events as well as the inside leadership.  By 
initiating secret talks at Oslo and reaching an agreement, Arafat and the PLO had 
managed to regain power and support from the Palestinian people. 
As a consequence, one of the central issues was of course, that the Oslo Accords 
were primarily negotiated by an outside leadership that had no real grasp of the internal 
situation and Israeli strategy.  Said writes in October 1993: ‘Neither Arafat, nor any of 
its Palestinian partners negotiating with the Israelis in Oslo, has ever seen an Israeli 
settlement. There are now over 200 of them, principally on the hills, promontories, and 
strategic points throughout the West Bank and Gaza.  Some may shrivel and die, but the 
largest are designed for permanence.’116    
Soon after the signing of the Accords, Sara Roy voiced her concerns that the 
Accords would have a detrimental effect on the Palestinian territories, especially on the 
already very weak Gaza Strip.  The closure policies that the Israeli government had 
begun to implement in Spring 1993 hit both the West Bank and Gaza hard.  However, 
labourers from Gaza were particularly dependent on employment in Israel. With Oslo 
these closure policies became institutionalised which led to a significant deterioration of 
the economic conditions in the Palestinian territories.  For Roy the terms of the process 
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were inherently unfair and hence did in no way strengthen the Palestinian position.  The 
power asymmetry between the two parties became enshrined in this framework for 
future negotiations.  The paradox of separating the two peoples while integrating their 
economies, principles initiated by the Israeli government under Oslo, were targeted at 
providing security but also ensuring Israeli state control over Palestinian resources in 
case of unforeseen or unwanted political outcomes.
117
  Palestinians in Gaza in particular 
became quickly disillusioned with the process due to the rapidly deteriorating economic 
situation, the realisation that Israel retained control over the key resources – land and 
water – and disappointment with the visibly corrupt and incompetent Palestinian 
Authority under Arafat.  For Roy, Oslo’s devastating impact on the Palestinian socio-
economic base cannot be fully grasped in terms of underdevelopment.  To describe the 
situation in the Palestinian territories she coined the term de-development, which differs 
from underdevelopment in that it does not allow for any form of economic 
development:   
 
De-development ensures that there will be no economic base – even one that 
is malformed – to support an indigenous economy (and society).  Another 
way to think about it is this: Whereas the effect of underdevelopment is to 
reorder economic relations into a less meaningful, less integrated and 
disfigured whole, the effect of de-development over the long term is to 
damage those relations so that no whole can, in fact, emerge.
118
 
 
The huge influx of aid that came with the Oslo Accords did little to counteract 
this trend.  The Palestinian territories are among the highest aid recipients in the world.  
From 1994 – 2000 annual disbursements averaged US $500 million.  In total, the 
international community provided US $9 billion to the Occupied Territories between 
1993 and 2004.
119
  Despite this high level of aid the Palestinian economy has not just 
failed to grow but it has even declined, and has left the Gaza Strip one of the poorest 
regions in the world.
120
  One cause of the failing economy is the corruption of the PA, 
but a more significant factor is the tight control of Israel over the West Bank and Gaza 
and its sources of production i.e. the very structures that became institutionalised with 
Oslo.  Anne Le More highlights the adverse effect that prolonged international aid has 
had on the Palestinian economy and the consequences of aid, when it is used as a 
substitute for politics in conflict situations.  International aid came as a direct response 
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to the peace process and had the specific political aim of keeping the process alive.
121
  
This being the overriding aim, politics became sidelined and the peace process became a 
goal in itself.  Because of the dominant Israeli-US power relationship donor funding 
was also the only option for other parties to be involved in the process.
122
  While Israel 
established facts on the ground that deprived Palestinians of any opportunity to establish 
a long-term viable economy, aid continued to pour into the territories to alleviate the 
humanitarian crisis that Israeli policies were creating.  This gave the appearance that 
something was being done for the Palestinians while at the same time allowing Israel to 
pursue its own plans.  In essence, this pattern reinforces the power asymmetry between 
Israel and the Palestinians and took any urgency away from a resolution of the conflict.  
Israel was no longer responsible for the welfare of the population despite still occupying 
the territories with its military.  Under international law an occupying power holds a 
number of obligations towards the occupied population.
123
  Rather than conflict 
resolution the peace process became an exercise in the management of a humanitarian 
situation.  Foreign donor funding is the most significant source of government revenues.  
According to figures from the PA Ministry of Finance, foreign aid covered over 50% of 
the PA budget in 2003, 2004 as well as in 2005. 
124
 
What has to be problematised in relation to Oslo and its failures, is not just the 
continued repression by the Israeli government, but the illusion of sovereignty that the 
Oslo peace process created while at the same time eroding the very principle.  The PA is 
visible but it is essentially powerless.  Oslo created a semi-sovereign entity and 
transferred responsibility for running the daily lives of Palestinians to the Palestinian 
Authority.  The Declaration of Principles outlines the interim self-government 
arrangements and the Cairo agreement, being a plan for transferring authority to 
Palestinians within Gaza and the West Bank town of Jericho, set out the specific 
conditions for the establishment of the Palestinian Authority.  The PA was envisaged as 
an interim administrative body to take over from the Israeli military administration in 
the populated centres until the conclusion of final status agreements, which were set to 
take place five years from the signing of the Declaration of Principles.  The remit of the 
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PA covered civilian matters and internal security but not external security and foreign 
affairs.  The Oslo II Interim Agreement signed in 1995 also gave the Palestinians self-
rule in Bethlehem, Hebron, Jenin, Nablus, Qalqilya, Ramallah and Tulkarm, and some 
450 villages.
125
  The Cairo agreement signed in 1994 had already outlined that the 
territory of the West Bank and Gaza Strip would come under the jurisdiction of the 
Palestinian Authority in a phased manner within 18 months from the inauguration of the 
interim self-governing body except for issues to be negotiated in the permanent status 
negotiations.  The agreement foresaw three phases of redeployment all occurring after 
an interval of six months. The first phase of redeployment included land in the 
populated areas (Areas A and B) including government and waqf land.  Moreover all 
civil powers as well as responsibilities, including planning and zoning, as regards area 
A and B, would also be transferred to the Council during the first phase of the 
redeployment.  In area C Israel was envisaged to transfer all civil powers and 
responsibilities which do not relate to territory to the Council.  This division into Areas 
A, B, C was supposed to expire in 1999, five years after the signing of the Oslo 
Accords.  The PA was intended as a purely temporary administrative body.  Its lack of 
sovereignty and control over crucial resources such as land and water severely limited 
its possibility to develop and improve the lives of the people it was supposed to govern.  
Moreover, it lacked the ability to protect its population from outside attacks. 
The existence of the PA is one of the main features that differentiates the two 
uprisings as its existence altered the dynamics of the uprising significantly.  An intifada 
according to the model of the first, was no longer possible because quasi-state structures 
were now in place.  Quasi-state institutions had been established that were intended to 
deliver services to the population.  However, with little control over land, resources and 
mobility it was difficult to provide services and implement policy. The creation of the 
PA and its institutions fostered the illusion of a kind of normalcy that was not 
sustainable.  However, the PA cannot issue building permits for area C which comprises 
60% of the West Bank.  The 1995 Interim Agreement (Oslo II) had called for the 
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gradual transfer of power and responsibility regarding planning and zoning in Area C to 
be transferred from the Israeli Civil Administration to the Palestinian Authority, yet this 
was never implemented.
126
  Consequently, any type of structure (private home, animal 
shelter, or donor-funded infrastructure) cannot be built without approval from the Israeli 
Civil Administration, which is under the authority of the Israeli Ministry of Defence.  
Around 70% of Area C (around 44% of the total West Bank area) is largely designated 
for the use of settlements, the Israeli military or has been declared a nature reserve.
127
  
In the remaining 30% there are a number of other restrictions in place which limit the 
ability of Palestinians to obtain a permit for construction.
128
  Construction for 
Palestinians is effectively only permitted where it is consistent with an approved 
planning scheme, and normally permits are only successful where construction is 
proposed within the boundaries of an Israeli Civil Administration or special plan.  
Those plans cover less than 1% of Area C.
129
  The Oslo II agreement also provides the 
most up-to-date agreement on water distribution.  Article 40 of the Protocol on Civil 
Affairs details the understanding on water issues.  Although the agreement is often seen 
as transferring responsibility for the water sector to the Palestinian Authority, it did not 
in essence change Israel’s remit of control.130  The agreement did not foresee any 
redistribution of the existing shared sources.  It specifically stipulated that there would 
be no reduction in the existing quantity that Israel extracts from the shared sources, both 
for the use within Israel and the Israeli settlements.
131
  Based on this principle, 
additional water for Palestinians would have to be provided from previously unutilised 
sources.
132
  According to an Amnesty International Report in 2009, Palestinian 
consumption in the Territories is about 70 litres per day (and in some cases barely 20 
litres per day) and is significantly below the average recommended 100 litres per capita 
daily by the World Health Organisation. Israeli daily per capita consumption, on the 
other hand, stands at around 300 litres.
133
  Moreover, according to B’Tselem, 134 
villages in the West Bank are not connected to the running water network.  An 
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additional 190,000 Palestinians live in communities in which the water system is limited 
and where residents rely mainly on rainwater collected in nearby pits during the autumn 
and winter months.
134
  Pursuant to Oslo II the Joint Water Committee (JWC) was 
established, representing both parties, and charged with approving every new water and 
sewage project in the West Bank.  All decisions are agreed by consensus.  The lack of a 
mechanism to settle disputes where a consensus cannot be reached, means that Israel 
can easily block any request by the Palestinians to drill a new well.  Even if a well is 
approved in the JWC but it is located in Area C, additional permits must then be gained 
from the Israeli army.
135
  When Israel took control over the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
in 1967, the Israeli army issued a number of military orders regarding control over land 
and water resources.  Military Order 92, issued on August 15 1967, granted complete 
authority over all issues related to water in the occupied Palestinian territories to the 
Israeli army.
136
  On 19 November 1967 the army issued Military Order 158 stipulating 
that Palestinians cannot construct any new water installation without prior permit from 
the Israeli army.  Military Order 291 issued on 19 December 1968 annulled all previous 
arrangements concerning land or water which existed prior to the occupation.  These 
military orders are still in force to this day and do apply to Palestinians only.  Israeli 
settlers in the Occupied Palestinian Territories are subject to Israeli civilian law.
137
  
Permits are not only required for projects such as wells, pumping stations, 
reservoirs and sewage treatment plants, but also for installing or repairing water mains 
and supply pipes, which are intended to connect water distribution or sewage collection 
networks in Area A and B, as well as those which pass through Area C.
138
  The process 
of obtaining such permits is normally lengthy and difficult. Many applications are 
rejected or subject to long delays.  Even if a permit is granted, whether the project can 
go ahead, depends on the Israeli army’s ‘security considerations’ at the time the work is 
scheduled for.  Subject to the army’s security considerations, areas can be out of bounds 
for Palestinians for hours, weeks, months, or indefinitely.
139
  While part of the blame 
certainly lies also with the Palestinian Authority itself and its corruption and 
inefficiency, Israeli restrictions and scope of control have placed severe limits on the 
ability of the PA to access water to provide for the needs of its own population. Hence, 
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despite the establishment of the PA the Palestinian Water Authority did not acquire any 
control or decision-making powers over water resources.  Rather, it simply gained the 
responsibility for managing an insufficient supply of water allocated to the Palestinians 
and for maintaining and repairing long-neglected water infrastructure that was already 
in a dire state before the PA took over.
140
  During the dry hot summers the Palestinian 
Authority is unable to alleviate the water shortage.  Ramallah is generally less affected 
by the shortage but in some areas the Water Authority could not provide water at 
weekends during the summer of 2010, for example.  Because of the scarcity, 
Palestinians have to severely ration their water consumption and sometimes have to buy 
water from owners of private water-tankers at often inflated prices while the Israeli 
settlements that surround them enjoy unrestricted water supplies on a daily basis. 
The implications of Israel’s control over resources in the Palestinian territories 
go beyond access to water and land and affect PA performance in all sectors. Movement 
restrictions, for instance, limit the effectiveness of services provided to Palestinians 
severely. While the PA, for example, provides hospital and medical services, it cannot 
not ensure the free mobility of ambulances and access to victims in areas controlled by 
Israel.
141
  The failure to provide services to Palestinians became of course very apparent 
during the second intifada.  The government ceased to function and so did its services.  
For most of the intifada only emergency rooms in hospitals were able to operate.  
Charities and UNRWA assumed responsibility for providing for the population and the 
latter even began to distribute food to non-refugees.
142
  
Investment in education can only pay off if the Palestinian Authority can create 
jobs.  Economic development is limited under occupation and the frustration of those 
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educated in not finding employment can be particularly significant.
143
  Moreover, the 
higher education system can only flourish and be competitive if institutions have 
resources and stability.  Currently universities draw on a significant number of faculty 
with foreign passports, many from the Palestinian Diaspora, but the PA cannot grant 
work visas and therefore employees have to enter Israel on tourist visas and are subject 
to Israel’s discriminate and unpredictable policy of access.144  Israeli travel restrictions 
also affect the ability of Palestinian academic staff to participate in the wider research 
community.  West Bank ID holders are not permitted to travel from Ben Gurion 
Airport.  Instead, they have to travel via Jordan, which is more expensive and time-
consuming.  As most countries do not have consular representation in Ramallah, visas 
have to be obtained from the destination country’s consulate in Jerusalem.  In order to 
do this, West Bank ID holders have to request a permit from the Israeli Authorities in 
order to visit Jerusalem.  Such permits are often not issued.
145
  Universities and colleges 
have also been subject to closure by the Israeli Authorities.  Some universities remained 
closed for prolonged periods prior to, and following the first intifada.  When Human 
Rights Watch investigated the closure of Birzeit University following the al-Aqsa 
intifada the IDF was unable to provide any specific security considerations motivating 
the decision.
146
  General travel restrictions affect the ability of staff and students to 
reach universities to deliver and attend lectures and the frequent installation of flying 
checkpoints throughout the West Bank makes travelling unpredictable.  For this reason, 
most facilities on campus tend to close early in order to allow staff and students to get 
home safely (most services at Birzeit University, including the library, close at 4pm 
during term time and 3pm outside term time).  However, these measures restrict access 
to learning facilities and resources for students.
147
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In terms of civil administration, the PA acquired through the Interim agreement 
responsibility over the population register which was the result of a census carried out 
by the Israeli administration shortly after occupying the Palestinian territories.  
Although the PA was authorised to make changes to the registry there was no guarantee 
that Israeli officials would make the same changes to their copy of the registry.  
Naturally, Israel would rely on its own copy for its decision making and military 
operations.  This is particularly significant for Palestinians with Gazan addresses 
residing in the West Bank.  Many have lived in the West Bank for years, are married or 
even born there but Israel has, in many cases, not transferred residence in its records.
148
  
Under Israel’s permit regime these individuals require a special permit to reside in the 
West Bank and the process of obtaining such a permit is extremely difficult.
149
  A 
subsequent Military Order (no. 1650) which came into force in April 2010 and defines 
anyone present in the West Bank without the correct permit as an infiltrator, calling for 
him or her to be deported or sentenced for up to seven years,
150
 is thought to affect this 
category of Palestinians in particular, but also international passport holders married to 
Palestinians, those working in the West Bank, or those simply intending to visit.  The 
Palestinian family-reunification process is controlled by Israel and in 2000 Israel froze 
all applications preventing thousands of individuals to legalise their status in the West 
Bank.
 151
  As a result, international spouses have to leave and re-enter the country every 
three months on a tourist visa or risk deportation if their visa expires.  Hence, Israel has 
complete control over the movement in and access to the Palestinian territories. 
Not only did Oslo fail to provide an adequate framework to enable the 
Palestinian Authority to deliver services to its population but it also did not incorporate 
any mechanisms for protecting Palestinians against Israeli aggression.  The Oslo 
agreement included provisions for the establishment of security and a police force but 
not a military for the protection of the Palestinian people from external threats.  Article 
8 of the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, permits 
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the establishment of a ‘strong police force’ to ensure ‘public order and internal security 
for the Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.’  At the same time ‘Israel will 
continue to carry the responsibility for defending against external threats, as well as the 
responsibility for overall security of Israelis for the purpose of safeguarding their 
internal security and public order.’152  The Israel-PLO agreement on the Gaza Strip and 
the Jericho area signed in 1994 set out the arrangements for Israeli withdrawal from the 
Gaza Strip and the Jericho area.  The agreement outlines in more detail the conditions 
for the establishment of a police force and its area of remit.  Annex I, Article 3 
elaborates on the functions: the police force will perform normal police functions, 
including maintaining public order and providing security; it protects the public and its 
property; adopts measures necessary for preventing crime and protects public 
installations and places of special importance.
153
  The agreement foresees an integral 
unit under the command of the Council, which will consist of four branches: civil 
police, public security, intelligence, emergency services and rescue. In addition to this, a 
coastal police will also be established.
154
  The agreement reiterates that Israel will 
continue to carry responsibility for defending against any external threats and Article 9 
clearly states that no other armed force except the Palestinian Police force and the 
Israeli military forces shall be established or operate in the area.
155
  
Israeli security forces are reported to have used excessive and indiscriminate 
force against civilians during the early months of the intifada.  In many cases the Israeli 
response went beyond traditional means of riot dispersal such as tear gas and rubber 
coated bullets as Palestinian casualties had sustained wounds from live bullets in the 
upper parts of the body demonstrating clear intent of killing.
156
  When protestors at 
peaceful demonstrations were met with excessive force at Israeli checkpoints, the 
crowds became infuriated with the PA police on their return to the urban centres and 
challenged them to use their guns to protect their own people.
157
  The presence of arms 
among Palestinian security and police undoubtedly contributed to the militarisation of 
the intifada.  Under the provisions of the Oslo framework, the PA is not authorised to 
protect its population with its own security personnel against the Israeli army.
158
  It was 
                                                 
152 “Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements,” Washington, 13 September 
1993, art. 8. 
153 “Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area,” Cairo, 4 May 1994. 
154 Ibid., ann. 1, art.3. 
155 Ibid. 
156 “The IDF’s Riot Dispersal Means,” Israel Defence Forces, 17 May 2011, http://dover.idf.il/IDF/ 
English/News/today/2011/05/1702.htm (accessed 18 September 2011). 
157 INTERVIEW #23. 
158 This contrast has perhaps always been most apparent in Hebron.  As outlined in Oslo II and the 1997 
101 
 
this dissonance between the presence of the PA and its powerlessness when it came to 
confronting the Israeli military that fuelled the frustration of the population but the PA’s 
existence also provided the means for a more institutionalised and violent response to 
the occupation.  
The PA’s ambivalent status arises from the absence of any explicit reference to 
national independence in the agreements.  Palestinians had recognised Israel’s right to 
exist and with Oslo Israel had acknowledged Palestinian national aspiration even if it 
did not explicitly accept the existence of a Palestinian state.159  In fact, none of the 
agreements as part of the process stipulate the establishment of a state for the 
Palestinians. The aim of the negotiations as stated in the Declaration of Principles 
signed in 1993 is the following: 
 
The aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations within the current Middle East 
peace process is, among other things, to establish a Palestinian Interim Self-
Government Authority, the elected Council (the "Council"), for the 
Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional 
period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on 
Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.160 
 
The declaration calls for the establishment of an interim self-government and 
postpones negotiations on ‘Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, 
borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbours, and other issues of common 
interest.’161  It does not explicitly call for the establishment of a state for Palestinians 
but refers to a ‘permanent settlement’, a state of affairs which is open to interpretation.  
As Edward Said noted, UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 do not include 
anything on the right of Palestinians to self-determination.  Resolution 242 calls for the 
withdrawal from territory acquired through war, respect for the territorial integrity and 
political independence of every State in the region, and a just settlement of the refugee 
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problem.162  Resolution 338 issued in response to the 1973 Arab-Israeli war demands 
the implementation of Resolution 242 and the commencement of negotiations to 
establish a ‘just and durable peace in the Middle East.’163  The two resolutions then, 
denounce Israeli occupation of territory occupied since 1967, call for a solution for 
refugees, the inviolability of territorial integrity of existing states, and a resolution of the 
conflict.  Neither of the resolutions refers to Palestinian nationalist aspirations,164 nor do 
they stipulate a right of return for refugees.165   
Nevertheless, the Oslo Accords were clearly embedded in a discourse of a two-
state solution.  Much foreign donor funding went into the building of institutions and 
projects aimed at the strengthening of democracy and governance in order to prepare 
Palestinians for independent statehood.  On the ground, the PA developed what 
Palestinians, at least, refer to as ‘ministries’ covering all essential areas of government 
to provide services to the Palestinian population, including a Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs.   
The weakness of the PA and its own corruption, its need to meet the demands of 
foreign donors for its own survival and its suppression of violent resistance, while at the 
same time not being able to meet the needs of the population, led to growing 
dissatisfaction with its performance.   
 
2.3 The Decline of Civil Society and the Reassertion of Factionalism 
 
Looking at the two intifadas and their very different manifestations, the obvious 
question that poses itself is what happened to the informal forms of politics and 
grassroots mobilisation that were so wide-spread during the first intifada?  Why was the 
Palestinian ‘street’ largely absent from the second uprising?  If the violent forms of 
activism took precedence in the second intifada, what happened to the structures that 
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facilitated other forms of political activism during the first intifada?  While the 
militarisation and excessive violence against Palestinian civilians may be one 
explanation for the lack of popular participation, the reasons for the population’s 
absence go deeper than that.
166
   
The vibrancy of civil society during the first intifada led many to hope for the 
rise of a genuinely democratic and pluralistic Palestinian state.
167
  Civil society in 
Palestine, which largely consists of NGOs,
168
 has been influenced by two developments: 
the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967 and the establishment of the 
Palestinian Authority.
169
  According to Giacaman, ensuring the Palestinians’ continued 
presence on the land, especially after the occupation in 1967, required the development 
of organisations that would provide services, create a support system, network and 
mobilise.  This resulted in the rise of a new generation of organisations that would 
satisfy some of the needs of the Palestinian population outside the framework of the 
Israeli administrations and that were distinctly different from charities that had been 
operating in the field previously.
170
  Of course, the absence of a state in the Palestinian 
context warrants some reflection.  ‘The idea of civil society is the idea of a part of 
society which has a life of its own, which is distinctly different from the state, and 
which is largely in autonomy of it.  Civil society lies beyond the boundaries of the 
family and the clan and beyond the locality; it lies short of the state.’171  Normally, one 
of the central roles of civil society ‘is either to insure the democratic nature of the state 
or hold the state accountable for its offenses.’172  Until Oslo there had of course never 
been a Palestinian state-like structure on Palestinian territory to monitor or demand 
accountability from.  In the absence of a state and under occupation Palestinian civil 
society faced particular challenges.  The associational forms that arose did so in 
opposition to an illegitimate power with survival as their central goal, and not 
democratisation.
173
  For Roy this explains why civil formations failed to transcend 
problems such as factionalism, tribalism, classism and parochialism as they were unable 
                                                 
166 The new geography taking shape during the Oslo period also partly determined its nature. This will be 
discussed further in Chapter Three. 
167 Parsons, Politics of the Palestinian Authority, 153. 
168 Ibid., 175. 
169 George Giacaman, “Perspectives on Civil Society in Palestine” (conference paper presented  at  a 
conference held by the Welfare Association, Ramallah, 14-16 February 2000), http://www.muwatin.org 
/george/welfare.html (accessed 15 September 2011). 
170 Giacaman, “Perspectives on Civil Society in Palestine”.  Also see Roy, Failing Peace, 131. 
171 Edward Shils, “The Virtue of Civil Society,” Government and Opposition 26, no.1 (January 1991): 
3. 
172 Roy, Failing Peace, 125. 
173 Ibid., 126. 
104 
 
to see beyond ending the occupation.  At the same time, putting an end to occupation is 
a necessary precondition for civil society in order to move beyond satisfying basic 
needs.  This dual challenge is also manifest in the women’s movement: women have to 
address gender issues in an emerging state while also responding to the need for 
independence.
174
  As funding for NGOs comes primarily from international donors, 
NGOs have to adapt their goals to donor agendas.  However, the focus on 
developmental goals by the international donor community addresses Palestinian needs 
in a very limited way, primarily in the context of state building, but not the need for an 
end to occupation and genuine democracy.
175
  Over time, this dependency led to the de-
politicisation of NGOs. 
Besides the challenges posed by the Israeli occupation and international donor 
agendas, it is the PA’s authoritarian nature which severely stifled the development of 
civil society.  The particular situation of the PLO – a movement of national liberation in 
the diaspora – demanded an all-encompassing organisation in order to ensure its 
survival, the continuation of national struggle and the ‘development’ and preservation 
of national collective identity.
176
  Hence, the PLO model does not distinguish between 
government and civil society; in addition to exercising the role of the sole legitimate 
representative of the Palestinian people, it also includes in its structures unions, research 
centres and NGOs.
177
  With its authoritarian features, this unitary model, when 
transplanted onto the Palestinian territories, posed a considerable threat to the advance 
of civil society.  Further, the establishment of the PA and its quasi-state institutions 
have called the role of NGOs into question.  Not only did it marginalise the role of 
NGOs in promoting the nationalist agenda, the PA also replaced NGOs in providing 
services through the expansion of the PA apparatus.  The return of the leadership 
allowed for some of the NGO proxies to be dissolved, which had been affiliated with 
the leftist factions while also replacing welfare provision functions of NGOs with 
centralised programmes.
178
  Many of the professionals in the NGO sector were also 
absorbed into the emerging PA apparatus, essentially demobilising them.  Centralisation 
efforts and new legislation also resulted in increased control over NGO activity and a 
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weakening of their political role.  The mass-base and grassroots involvement that was 
so central to the first intifada came to be replaced by advocacy, educational and 
developmental activities.
179
  Moreover, the interests of the professionals working for 
these NGOs often differ from the interests of the people they seek to represent.  The 
women’s movement for example is largely run by middle class women whose needs and 
interests are not necessarily aligned with women in Gaza of which, prior to the outbreak 
of the second intifada, around 40% lived in households that were below the poverty 
line.
180
  The decline of mass organisations then, together with the weakness of the leftist 
parties left Palestinian public space to be dominated by the Palestinian Authority.
181
  
While changes in the civil society sector were partly due to the impact of foreign 
funding, they were also primarily a function of the failure of the PLO to heed Hilal’s 
advice to reform its overly bureaucratic apparatus and become more representative.   
It would be inaccurate to say that civil society had no role during the second 
intifada: rather, it had no influence on the politics of the intifada.
182
  The initial absence 
of a state, Israel’s occupation and later the establishment of the PA, all determined the 
reverse development of civil society from a vibrant active mass base movement being 
the central driving force of the first intifada to a largely marginalised onlooker in the 
second, offering no option of alternative politics for the population, aside from political 
violence. 
Parallel to this decline of civil society we can observe a reassertion of 
factionalism. The difference is most obvious when looking at how the intifada was 
directed.  By the time the second intifada erupted the number of parties had increased 
significantly.  Similarly to the first intifada, there was also an effort to establish 
coordination between the different parties through the establishment of a coalition 
named the National Islamic High Committee for the Follow-up of the Intifada (NIHC).  
This thirteen party committee comprised Fateh, Hamas, the PFLP, the PFLP-GC, 
DFLP, FIDA, the Palestinian People’s Party, the Palestinian Popular Struggle Front, the 
Palestinian Liberation Front, the Arab Liberation Front, the Islamic Jihad, the 
Palestinian Arab Front, and al-Saiqa.
183
  Hence, it included PLO-members as well as 
parties outside the PLO framework.  Compared to the UNLU the National and Islamic 
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Forces were not as active and effective.  Explanation for this lies in part in the 
difference in nature and purpose of the two unions.  The UNLU’s purpose was to take 
the lead in driving the grassroots movement.  The idea behind the NIHC by contrast, 
was to coordinate agendas between the parties and draw up policy.  Rather than 
mobilising the population the NIHC was intended to institutionalise cross-factional 
cooperation and present a unified front.  To the people, it offered direction instead of 
leadership.
184
  Inside the committee however, there was radical disagreement on tactics 
and positions.  Intense debates ensued over whether military operations should be 
confined to the occupied territories, or extended to Israel and whether attacks on 
civilians were legitimate.
185
  The disagreement was however, at least initially, not 
sufficiently significant to break up the coalition.  After the first two years and with the 
onset of major Israeli incursions, the committee became however largely ineffective and 
the leadership more fragmented with each faction becoming its own decision-maker.
186
   
 
2.4 Hopelessness Revisited: The Rise of Violent Resistance 
 
Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount on 28 September 2000 may not have 
been the cause for the uprising but it certainly acted as a trigger.  His unwelcome 
intrusion into what Palestinians call the Noble Sanctuary or al-Haram al-Sharif, which 
for Sunni Muslims houses the third holiest site in Islam, led to clashes between 
Palestinians and Israeli police in the Old City of Jerusalem, resulting in dozens of 
injuries on both sides.
187
  Demonstrations, confrontations and violence quickly spread to 
the West Bank, Gaza and even Palestinian areas inside Israel, leading to a death toll of 
at least 74 in a little over a week’s violence.188   
The Temple Mount, as it is referred to by Jews, is the most contested religious 
site in Jerusalem.  The mount is holy to Jews because it is considered to be the site of 
the first and second temple.  It now houses the Dome of the Rock and the al-Aqsa 
mosque, sacred to Muslims. The compound is guarded by Israeli police but the Muslim 
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areas are administered by the Jerusalem Islamic Waqf.  Normally, right-wing Jewish 
groups are banned from visiting the area due to the sensitivity surrounding the location.  
However, Sharon’s visit went ahead despite clear concerns expressed in internal police 
and army reports as was found by a later investigation into the events.
189
  An army 
intelligence report dated 27 September, one day before the event was due to take place, 
warned against Sharon’s visit.  In this particular case, the nature of the visit was not 
only provocative because of its destination but also because of the nature of the 
individual.  The report referred to reasons articulated by the Palestinian leadership in the 
Occupied Territories for their opposition to the Likud leader’s visit citing Sharon’s role 
in the 1982 massacre of Palestinian refugees in the Sabra and Shatila camps in 
Lebanon,
190
 his provocative house purchase in the Muslim Quarter of the Old City, and 
his actions and positions against Palestinians as well as Arabs more generally.
191
  The 
Sharm al-Sheikh fact-finding mission headed by George Mitchell found that from an 
Israeli viewpoint Sharon’s visit was a domestic political act, but it concludes that it was 
poorly timed and highly provocative.
192
  In a resolution adopted on 7 October 2000, the 
UN Security Council also criticised the events at al-Haram al-Sharif in Jerusalem on 28 
September 2000 as provocative.
193
 
While Sharon’s tour of the Temple Mount was highly incendiary for 
Palestinians, clearly signalling Israeli claims over this very sensitive area, the causes of 
the uprising were much more deep-rooted.  The visit has to be seen against the backdrop 
of Palestinian economic decline, the failed peace process and the incessant expansion of 
Israeli settlements in the Palestinian areas.  Contrary to the assumptions that Oslo would 
bring economic growth to the Palestinian territories, the increasing dependency of the 
Palestinian economy on Israel, in combination with the prolonged closures of the West 
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Bank and Gaza that resulted in vast job losses for Palestinians who had previously 
worked in Israel, the Palestinian economy had been continuously declining.
194
  In 
addition, the rapid increase in settlements in the period from the signing of Oslo to the 
outbreak of the second intifada, epitomised the failure of the peace process and the 
demise of any hopes for a future Palestinian state.
195
  The euphoria and expectations 
surrounding Oslo had quickly vanished over the subsequent years as facts on the ground 
betrayed the weaknesses of the process.  The tunnel riots in 1996 offered a precursor to 
the second intifada and a reliable indicator of the frustration with the status quo among 
the Palestinian population.  The riots erupted following events surrounding the very 
same site that four years later would be the centre of the outbreak of the second intifada: 
the al-Haram al-Sharif.  The 1996 riots were sparked by the opening of an exit from the 
Western Wall tunnel onto the Via Dolorosa, leading underneath the Umariya 
Elementary School in the Old City’s Muslim Quarter, on the orders of the then Prime 
Minister Benyamin Netanyahu.  Driven by fears that the tunnel might damage the 
foundations of the Al Aqsa Mosque, the clashes resulted in over 80 deaths and lasted for 
several days.
196
  A research group at the Institute of Palestine Studies identified the 
underlying causes as “[…] the accumulated wrath and frustration born of the closures, 
the political impasse, the proliferation of byroads, the official green light to new 
settlement activity, Israel’s insistence on renegotiating Hebron, the sense that 
Netanyahu was not intending to implement the agreement, and so on …”197  One 
member also pointed out how the fragmented Oslo map posed a strategic challenge to 
the IDF in a general uprising and how the direct confrontation between Palestinian 
police and IDF in area A, which under Oslo is under full Palestinian control, had broken 
a taboo and changed the rules of engagement.
198
  Gal Luft, a lieutenant colonel in the 
reserves of the IDF, argues that the Palestinian security services evolved as a hybrid 
between police and army.  The concomitant tendency to militarisation, he argues, 
changed the dynamics of confrontation during the 1996 tunnel crisis which was no 
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longer simply a civil uprising as seen during the first intifada, but ‘a large-scale use of 
armed forces supported by the Palestinian masses.’199  Luft also identifies the friction 
points during the confrontations as the outskirts of Palestinian cities and isolated Jewish 
settlements and enclaves, and correctly predicts these to be the central friction points of 
future confrontations.
200
  Chapter three will look at the territorial changes behind this.  
In terms of underlying reasons, the militarisation of the conflict and the sites of 
confrontation, the 1996 tunnel crisis set a precedent for what later came to materialise 
during the second intifada.   
The failure to reach a final status agreement at Camp David in July 2000 
undoubtedly also contributed to disillusionment and frustration fuelling the outbreak of 
the second intifada.  The talks failed despite what in the aftermath were, mostly by 
American and Israeli sources, described as generous offers to Yasser Arafat.  In fact, the 
Israeli offer still entailed a major compromise on the Palestinian side.
201
  Arguably, 
Israel’s position was ultimately just an extension of the occupation in a different 
guise.
202
  However, even after the lack of success at Camp David and the unfolding 
violence after September 2000, negotiations continued.  In December 2000 President 
Clinton put forward a US plan which formed the basis of negotiations in January 2001 
at Taba where the parties came closer to a deal over the final status issues than ever 
before but the summit was discontinued because of the upcoming Israeli elections 
which were won by Ariel Sharon.
203
  The fact that Ariel Sharon, who never accepted 
Arafat’s position, succeeded Ehud Barak as Prime minister strongly indicates that the 
majority of the Israeli public did not support Barak’s position on the talks.  With Bill 
Clinton leaving office after serving the maximum of two terms, there was also a 
changeover on the American side.  Within a fragile and changing political environment, 
especially on the Israeli and American side, the Taba summit failed to halt the ensuing 
cycles of violence.  
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The Oslo process had promised sovereignty to Palestinians within five years of 
the signing of the Declaration of Principles.  The Accords paved the way for the 
establishment of an administrative body that took care of civil matters and internal 
security in areas under its control and in essence this is what the Palestinian Authority 
has always remained.  An increasing awareness of this by the people has brought with it 
disillusionment, criticism and even distrust.  As the expectations for an independent 
Palestinian state failed to materialise the gap between reality and illusion became 
increasingly more difficult to bridge.  For Nigel Parsons the discrepancy lies in what 
Palestinians believe they have a right to under the principles of justice and international 
law, and what they could realistically achieve within the framework of the Oslo peace 
process.
204
  Drawing on Ted Gurr’s concept of relative deprivation and its capacity to 
lead men (and women) to rebel, Parsons argues that it is this gap between what 
Palestinians thought they deserved and what Oslo was able to deliver that explains the 
return to an uprising.
205
  However, while this is a very valid observation, it appears the 
problem is not just one of ‘what ought to be’ and ‘what is’.  Rather, dissonance was also 
intrinsic to Oslo itself and manifested by the practices accompanying the process as 
sovereignty was limited, fostered, as well as demanded at the same time.  According to 
Leon Festinger’s theory of cognitive dissonance humans naturally strive to obtain a 
state of harmony and therefore seek ways to reduce, eliminate or avoid any kind of 
conflicting cognition.
206
  Possibilities to achieve this include the change of one’s 
behaviour, the change of one’s social environment, or the adding of new cognitive 
elements that tie in with our beliefs.  Reducing dissonance may have been exactly what 
underpinned the action of the returning protestors into the city centres as they were 
urging PA security to use their arms to defend the population against Israeli forces’ 
violence at Palestinian demonstrations.
207
   
An article by Sayigh suggests that this dissonance could have also been eased 
considerably had the Palestinian leadership engaged with the restrictions on Palestinian 
sovereignty in a more realistic fashion.  He cautioned that Palestinian policymakers may 
not have fully considered the package of Oslo in its entirety, specifically what 
sovereignty means in the context of the arrangements accompanying Palestinian 
statehood.
208
  Constraints from the Israeli side including conditions of demilitarisation, 
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the determination to keep Jerusalem and the refusal to accept refugee return are unlikely 
to be relaxed by most governments.  Nor is the balance of support from the international 
community for the Israeli and Palestinian positions likely to change considerably.
209
  
The absence of contiguous territory, the mixed population concentrations and the 
consequent overlapping of jurisdictions, the limitations on refugee return and 
sovereignty in East Jerusalem – both Palestinian national symbols – would all threaten 
meaningful Palestinian statehood.
210
  In Sayigh’s assessment, an insistence by the 
Palestinians on a clearly demarcated territory and politically sovereign entity, may result 
in loosing even more territory.  As Palestinians have little ability to compel Israel to 
make concessions, their only means for achieving better terms ‘will be to view 
sovereignty as a multifaceted, multi-layered attribute in which the degree of Palestinian 
control varies from zone to zone and from level to level.’211  It is not quite clear in how 
far a Palestinian state with layered sovereignty and soft borders as envisaged by Sayigh, 
would adequately protect Palestinians against Israeli expansionist attempts, especially 
given Israeli propensity over the last two decades to establish facts on the ground 
irrespective of legal constraints.  Nevertheless, the failure to engage with the realities of 
Palestinian statehood and to devise a strategy accordingly is a real shortcoming on the 
part of Palestinian policy makers and may ultimately have contributed significantly to 
exacerbating Palestinian frustration over the sense of fragmented sovereignty. 
The existence of the PA is crucial for explaining why the second intifada was 
markedly different to the first.  At its core, the purpose of the uprising had remained the 
same: Palestinians wanted to rid themselves of the Israeli occupation.  However, an 
element of domestic dissatisfaction with the performance of the PA merged with anti-
Israeli sentiments. With easy access to means of violence a different kind of political 
activism took place in a changed political arena: changes in the party constellation had 
shifted influence away from the left and fostered an increasingly entrenched dichotomy 
between Fateh and Hamas; the ability of civil society to mobilise had been seriously 
weakened, and the establishment of a quasi-government and quasi-state institutions had 
made much of the self-organising capacity of the masses superfluous.  However, at the 
same time the grip of control by Israel over Palestinians themselves, their movement 
and access to services, and their resources had tightened.  Having focussed in this 
chapter on the transformations in politics and civil society since the first intifada, the 
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next chapter will explore the role of territory and society. More specifically, it will look 
at how Israel’s territorial policies implemented after Oslo determined the modes of how 
the second intifada could be conducted and how Israeli control over land also 
fragmented society in a number of ways, shaping the social landscape of the second 
intifada. 
 
2.5 Conclusions 
 
While observations made in both Bloom and Pape on party competition and 
social isolation were confirmed with this account of Palestinian political factionalism 
and embedded power asymmetry, crucial developments in this period, are overlooked 
by traditional political science accounts of Palestinian political violence.  The particular 
shortcomings that this chapter has sought to highlight are the superficial view of Oslo, 
the neglect of civil society, and the failure of traditional political science accounts to 
acknowledge the existence of multiple narratives. 
In political science approaches, Oslo is seen as a missed opportunity which 
could have brought a solution to the conflict but also provided a possibility for those 
that were excluded from the political and economic benefits of the agreement to seek its 
disruption.  Walter and Kydd suggest that Hamas suicide bombings are a result of their 
intention to derail the Oslo peace process and develop a model that demonstrates that 
attacks coincided with particular agreements.  Pape supports the opposite scenario of 
Walter and Kydd’s spoiler theory.  In his view groups like Hamas saw themselves as 
exerting pressure on Israel to ensure they would comply with agreements.
212
  The 
spoiler theory does tie in with Hamas’ efforts of trying to portray itself as continuing the 
resistance and not playing by Israeli rules, whilst, of course, at the same time playing 
into Israeli hands with their use of violence.  As we have seen in this chapter the PA, by 
contrast, began to be seen as complicit in Israeli policies and the Hamas’ electoral 
victory in 2006 was a reflection of this sentiment within the Palestinian population.  
Spoiler theory and Pape’s variation of coercion do not engage with the nature of the 
Oslo Accords and their structural implications with locked the PA into incompatible 
obligations and paved the way for an Israeli narrative of Palestinian incompetence, 
division, corruption and complicity in terrorism.  Bloom notes in her account on 
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Palestinian violence in the second intifada that the absence of strong leadership was one 
of the main factors in generating party competition.  However, this absence of a strong 
leadership remains undefined.  The ambivalent role played by Arafat was not simply a 
sign of leadership weakness, rather it was a clear tactical decision within an setting that 
had its roots in Oslo and did not allow him to fully put his weight behind the intifada if 
he wanted the PA to survive but did also not permit him to reign in the uprising if he 
wanted to keep the population’s support.  Hence, without a contextual and historical 
analysis the absence of leadership in the second intifada remains unexplained. 
 The second significant shortcoming is the neglect of the role of civil society.  As 
far as political science models go beyond political parties and militant organisations, 
they do not conceive of society as an organised political body.  In Bloom it is society 
who gives support to militant groups when they compete for power.  Similarly in Hafez, 
society is the source of support and the organisations’ target of manipulation through 
religious language and symbolism as well as the pool of recruits.  In Pape too, society 
features as a base of support and not as an alternative form of organisation that offers 
the potential for non-violent protests.  In fact none of these works consider the 
relationship between the first intifada and the second intifada and hence do not ask how 
the modes of political activism have changed and why. 
 As this chapter has demonstrated, civil society played a crucial role in the first 
Palestinian intifada.  The unity established via mass popular movements was able to 
overcome the party factionalism that Palestine was so notorious for in the 1970s.  The 
strong role of the inside grassroots movement, created the opportunity of an outlet that 
was not violent and truly participatory.  With the establishment of the PA and its 
replacement of the services which had previously been provided by a lively civil society 
network, Arafat’s autocratic style of rule and an increased influence over these 
organisation’s agendas by foreign donors, civil society was seriously debilitated over 
the Oslo years.  As these organisations lost their grassroots base they were no longer 
able to mobilise and offer a non-violent alternative outlet for the hopelessness and 
helplessness that had remerged over the Oslo period.  
 The desperation and helplessness that were the topic of the final section in this 
discussion were identified in Hafez, for example, but its origins and content remained 
largely undefined.  The discussion in this chapter has given body to these observations 
and explained how the frustration and despair at the continued repression, the PA’s 
failure to alleviate it and even more so its collusion in it, generated growing support 
among the population for violent resistance against Israel, and increasingly also the PA. 
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A great deal of this discussion has focussed on the weaknesses of the PA but it 
would be an oversimplification to cast it solely as a victim of Oslo.  The Palestinian 
leadership has used its power and position to assert a particular kind of narrative of the 
peace process, and more generally, what peace and resistance have come to mean, in a 
political move to ensure its continued rule.  This was in part a response to efforts on the 
Israeli political right to discredit the PA but also targeted at internal audiences, in 
particular its main competitors.  The PA’s pursuit of a strategy of good governance, its 
attempt to build a Western-oriented secular culture in the West Bank and its endeavour 
to fulfil its security obligations toward Israel in order to be rewarded with an 
independent Palestinian state, situates it in distinct opposition to Hamas which is, by 
Israel and much of the West, seen as a terrorist organisation incapable of negotiation 
and peace.  Violent resistance was for the parties that accepted the Oslo process no 
longer viable and activism became the remit of NGOs, which since Oslo became 
dependent on foreign funding, and hence required to meet developmental and no longer 
political goals.
213
  Hamas, on the other hand, continued to use violence against Israeli 
targets, portraying itself as the party that carried on the history of resistance against the 
Israeli state, a narrative that began to resonate particularly well against the backdrop of 
increasing frustration among the population with the process.  The re-emergence of 
factionalism in the second intifada and debates among the parties over the most 
appropriate tactics highlighted the existence of these different narratives.  Over the 
second intifada it was violent resistance that momentarily won the upper hand.  With the 
end of the second intifada and coming into power of Mahmoud Abbas activism against 
Israel in the West Bank gradually declined and is now no longer permissible.  Those 
who are suspected of it or engage in it end up in Palestinian prisons, instead of Israeli 
ones.  Even non-violent activism encounters increasing scrutiny and harassment from 
police and security officials.
214
   
Finally, this chapter has also raised a methodological issue. The more traditional 
political science-rooted explanations of political violence do not acknowledge the 
existence of multiple narratives.  The most prominent one has been the narrative 
adopted by Israeli political elites, particularly conducive to the political right, which 
portrayed any kind of Palestinian political activism as terrorism, understanding it as an 
essential threat to Israel’s security.  Such a narrative has of course its roots in traditional 
                                                 
213 Rema Hammami, “Palestinian NGOs since Oslo: From NGO Politics to Social Movements?”  Middle 
East Report, no.214 (Spring 2000): 17.  INTERVIEW #22. 
214 “A Prospect of Palestine: Can Palestinians Peacefully Build a State?” The Economist, 20 May 2010, 
http://www.economist.com/node/16167856 (accessed 20 October 2011). 
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political science and the realist IR tradition which posits the state as the central actor in 
the international system.  We have seen in the first chapter that Jason Franks challenges 
the state-centric positivist discourses advanced by the Israeli state with an alternative 
framework that reveals a multi-dimensional understanding of root causes to the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict.  However, what Franks has not done, is to look at the 
multiple competing narratives within the Palestinian context itself which were 
highlighted in this chapter by looking at how the PA has imposed its own dominant 
narrative of the past and its understanding of peace and resistance as a political move to 
ensure its own survival.  This existence of multiple narratives challenges traditional 
political science models because they rest on epistemological claims of neutrality and 
impartiality and espouse an ontology of fixed entities, and can therefore not capture 
such diversity. 
Beyond undermining PA governance and weakening civil society, which had 
been so crucial in sustaining the first intifada as a popular movement of national 
liberation, Oslo spatially dislocated the Palestinian territories. This is a factor that has 
been neglected pretty much entirely by the political science literature on Palestinian 
political activism to date.  The next chapter seeks to fill this gap by examining how 
territorial fragmentation has shaped the second intifada through its unique geographical 
configuration. 
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3. Fragmenting territory and society 
 
 
The stability of geography and the continuity of land – these have 
completely disappeared from my life and the life of all Palestinians.  If we 
are not stopped at borders, or herded into new camps, or denied reentry and 
residence, or barred from travel from one place to another, more of our land 
is taken, our lives are interfered with arbitrarily, our voices are prevented 
from reaching each other, our identity is confined to frightened little islands 
in an inhospitable environment of superior military force sanitized by the 
clinical jargon of pure administration.
1
 
 
 
Since its establishment in 1948 and the occupation of Palestinian territories later 
in 1967, Israel’s various forms of control have gradually diminished the land accessible 
to Palestinians.  Contraction of Palestinian space and its consequences have received 
much attention in recent academic debates on the conflict.
2
  The cantonisation of 
Palestinian territory has had severe economic, political and social implications.  The 
literature, however, has not paid much attention to how Israel’s territorial policies and 
its consequences may have affected the dynamics of the second intifada, a key event in 
Palestinian history.  Scholarship has largely focused on political processes and the 
strategy and tactics of the leadership,
3
 military aspects as well as militant campaigns.
4
  
Less has been said about the role of structural changes and internal social dynamics.   
This chapter will engage with the unique dislocation of the occupied Palestinian 
territories, an aspect that is almost entirely ignored by the political science models of 
Palestinian political violence.  It will trace the history of the fragmentation of the 
territories and demonstrate how it has affected the conduct of the second intifada on the 
ground and highlight the kind of impact it has had on Palestinian society.  As such, the 
                                                 
1 Edward Said, After the Last Sky: Palestinian Lives (London: Faber and Faber, 1986), 19-20. 
2 Harker notes the proliferation particularly of geographical studies on the geography of Palestine and the 
Palestinians.  Christopher Harker, “New Geographies of Palestine/Palestinians,” The Arab World 
Geographer 13, no.3-4 (Autumn/Winter 2010): especially 200. 
3
 Rema Hammami and Jamil Hilal, “An Uprising at Crossroads,” Middle East Report 219 (Summer 
2001), http://www.merip.org/mer/mer219/uprising-crossroads (accessed 20 January 2012). Rashid 
Khalidi, “Toward a Clear Palestinian Strategy,” Journal of Palestine Studies 31, No.4 (Summer 2002): 5-
12. Rema Hammami and Salim Tamari. “The Second Uprising: End or New Beginning,” Journal of 
Palestine Studies 30, no.2 (Winter 2001): 5-25. 
4 See, for instance, Michele K. Esposito, “The al-Aqsa Intifada: Military Operations, Suicide Attacks, 
Assassinations, and Losses in the First Four Years,” Journal of Palestine Studies 34, no.2 (Winter 2005), 
85-122. Yoram Schweitzer, “Palestinian Istishhadia: A Developing Instrument,” Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism 30, no.8 (August 2007), 667-89. Clive Jones and Ami Pedahzur (ed.), Between War and 
Terrorism: The Al-Aqsa Intifada (Abingdon: Routledge, 2005). 
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chapter continues from the discussion of the previous chapter on transformations in 
politics and civil society over the Oslo period to look at the territorial and social 
implications of the peace process, and will find that the disintegration of Palestinian 
unity and the resurfacing of political factionalism were further exacerbated by territorial 
dislocation and growing social division. 
Any engagement with the realities of territoriality in the Palestinian case is 
strikingly ignored in the major works on suicide bombing.  While Pape acknowledges 
the importance of territory in his thesis by arguing that suicide bombing is grounded in 
the logic of national liberation and hence admits to the territorial nature of the conflict, 
he does not deal with the territorial particularities of the Palestinian-Israeli case.  More 
specifically, his study does not recognise how territorial transformation has affected the 
circumstances in which political activism is possible.  The rupturing of territory through 
closures and checkpoints that started with Oslo and grew in sophistication over the 
years, prohibited mass-based mobilisation which, combined with the division into 
different zones of control, rendered mass-based forms of resistance ineffective.  Access 
and division of control created an environment where only confrontational activities can 
have an impact on Israeli forces and authorities. 
One reason why such concerns have been absent from explanations modelled on 
political science, is the dominance of the nation-state type of territorial homogeneity 
which tends to be prominent in the study of international relations and politics.  Such an 
understanding of territory has been the target for critical political geography for many 
years.  With this thesis taking a contextual and historical approach the territorial 
developments originating from the Oslo agreements play a key role in examining 
political activism during the second intifada.  It is impossible to entirely get away from 
the concepts of territory, sovereignty and the nation; Palestinians do seek national 
independence in form of a sovereign state on territory within the 1967 boundaries and 
identity formation is intimately tied up with territory on both sides of the conflict.  
However, as Sayigh suggested, it would be much more conducive and realistic from a 
Palestinian point of view not to consider these concepts in absolute terms. 
In an attempt to further break down monolithic conceptions, the chapter will 
argue that the occupation has affected society unequally and as the subsequent chapter 
will show there is some indication that the strata of society whose living experience was 
most affected by manifestations of the occupation were also those most likely to engage 
in suicide bombing.  Political science accounts of society tend to treat it as uniform and 
internal dynamics are routinely overlooked.  In Bloom, Hafez, Pape and Merari society 
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takes the role of the supporter.  In these accounts we do not learn much about ‘society’ 
except that its support is central for the continuation of attacks.  Pape’s homogenisation 
is perhaps most explicit as he identifies difference in religion between the occupier and 
the occupied as a crucial indicator for whether militants will employ suicide bombings.  
For Pape, then, ‘official’ religious affiliation is the key identifying factor of a people.5  
If internal differentiations are taken into account it is usually in economic terms, as in 
Sayre for example, but the argument here will be that the distinctly different 
geographical experiences have shaped attitudes vis-à-vis political activism.  Instead of 
treating Palestinians simply as a homogenous population, the chapter will make an 
effort to explore Palestinians as communities affected by the occupation, especially 
along the lines of urban, rural and refugee residents.  Hence the approach in this chapter 
will question the abstraction of both space and its subjects that is so characteristic of 
traditional geopolitics.
6
  Finally, the point that this chapter seeks to make is not that 
political violence is simply a reaction to the discrimination, hardships and injustice 
experienced by Palestinians but that their very structure and instantiation has 
determined the modes of political violence in the second intifada. 
 
3.1 The Significance of Territory and its Continuous Fragmentation 
 
In ‘Des Espaces Autres’, a manuscript which formed the basis of a lecture 
delivered in 1967, Michel Foucault observed that while the nineteenth century had been 
that of time, the current century was that of space.
7
  Space is a fundamental concept in 
understanding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict both in a horizontal sense as the control 
over land, movement and borders, as well as in its vertical sense as the control over 
resources underground, on the ground and the air-space above ground.  Division and 
terms of control over the various instantiations of space have been hotly contested and 
are key to any negotiated settlement.  In essence, the conflict between Israel and the 
Palestinians is one of two peoples seeking control over a small piece of land in a region 
with limited resources. The desire for control may be shaped and driven by different 
motives for different groups but in essence it remains a dispute over who is in charge of 
a particular spatial entity. 
                                                 
5 Pape, Dying to Win, 87-8. 
6 Harker, “New Geographies,” 203-4. 
7 Michel Foucault, “Of Other Spaces,” Diacritics 16, no.1 (Spring 1986): 22. 
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The land which had formerly comprised the British Mandate has seen significant 
transformation resulting in continuous fragmentation over the last sixty years. 
Palestinian hills have become dotted with red-roofed Jewish settlements, separated by 
bypass roads – marked out for use by Israelis only and perhaps most significantly 
separated from East Jerusalem, some West Bank land, and the pre-1948 Palestinian 
territory by the separation barrier constructed on security grounds in 2003.  A visitor 
from the British Mandate era would also note changes in the appearance of the 
landscape beyond the Green Line, with many olive groves replaced by mixed-shrub 
forests, especially in the vicinity of Jerusalem, and most of the original Palestinian 
villages destroyed or in ruins.  Landscapes seldom remain the same over time.  Many 
transformations take place during periods of intense economic development such as the 
industrial revolution, but in this case many of the changes, especially on the Palestinian 
side of the Green Line where economic development has been lacking, are distinctly 
political. The most salient recent development from a Palestinian point of view, at the 
time of writing, is the physical and political severance between the West Bank, and 
Gaza (and, to some extent, also East Jerusalem) which, some believe, will in the long-
run inevitably lead to an ideological division also.
8
  The territorial fragmentation 
experienced by Palestinians has many facets and a number of wide-ranging 
consequences, raising questions about the future of the Palestinian national project.  The 
structural transformations of the land inhabited by Palestinians have deeply impacted on 
all aspects of their lives as well as the avenues open to them for affecting change.  
 
3.1.1. Space and State 
 
Humans have always organised their lives around space; however, not until 
more recently in human history has spatial organisation come to be institutionalised.  
The dominant concern over space in politics is with the institution of the state, the 
territory it controls, and the boundaries that contain it.  The concept of the sovereign 
territorial state has dominated IR theory for some time but has more recently been called 
into question, both conceptually and practically.  Andreas Osiander calls the IR 
narrative of the peace of Westphalia a myth.  The agreements of 1648 contain nothing 
on the issue of sovereignty, and the ‘sovereign state’ as we know it, is a development of 
                                                 
8 See Roger Heacock, “Of the Advantages (and Perils) of the Deficit of Secularism in Contemporary 
Palestinian Political Culture,” in Temps et Espaces en Palestine, ed. Roger Heacock (Beirut: Institut 
Français de Proche-Orient, 2008): 293-305. 
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a much later period, the 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries, where industrialisation led to a much 
more extensive and at the same time integrated economy, calling for central 
administration over large territorial areas and resulting in more power of central 
governments.  Hence, under these conditions, the state developed into a socially, 
economically and politically more closed circuit.
9
  Modern nationalism was the 
functionally crucial ideology to bind this political unit together.  This congruence of 
society and state are a transitory phenomenon which has its roots in particular historical 
circumstances.  As industrialisation and with it division of labour increased in scale, 
growing interdependence across state borders began to challenge states as cohesive, 
‘self-sufficient’ units.10  While these changes may have their roots in economic 
development challenges to borders have become more complex.  In addition to 
developments in trade, communication, migration, it is also the emergence of 
international terrorism networks and transnational criminal organisations that have 
called the traditional role of the sovereign state into question and necessitate increased 
institutionalised forms of economic as well as political cooperation between states.  The 
concept of the sovereign state has long acted as the ultimate benchmark that change in 
the international system was judged against.  However, if, as Osiander argues, the 
sovereign territorial state is not indispensable or central to international relations, but 
that different forms of relationships between autonomous actors have existed at 
different points in history, we can draw three conclusions. First, and a point made 
extensively by Osiander, current phenomena of integration will seem less revolutionary.  
Second, it challenges the place of the sovereign territorial state as the central unit of 
analysis in IR.  Third, national movements that seek self-determination would have a 
number of different viable options of autonomous governance available to them.  Here 
we have already seen the criticism levelled at the Palestinians by Sayigh who 
maintained that the Palestinian leaderships’ emphasis on a clearly demarcated territory 
and political sovereign entity may lead Palestinians to lose out on even more territory.  
Palestinian official discourse has since the late 1980s been dominated by the two-state 
solution.  Although there have always been vocal supporters of a one-state solution, 
which would envisage some kind of power sharing arrangement between the two 
peoples, what such an option would look like has not yet received a comparable amount 
of attention.  However, the call for a one-state solution has intensified among the 
                                                 
9 Andreas Osiander, “Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth,” International 
Organization 55, no.2 (Spring 2001): 281. 
10 Ibid., especially, 282-3. 
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general population especially in the aftermath of the second intifada as facts on the 
ground are making the two-state model increasingly unviable.
11
 
Thinking about the sovereign territorial state as the only meaningful form of 
governance is described by John Agnew as a ‘trap’.12  Falling into the territorial trap 
limits our ways of thinking about alternative spaces that co-exist with the territorial state 
and the failure to progress in the way we are thinking about this, despite the functional 
transformations of the sovereign state, has affected political thinkers and actors alike.
13
  
The next section will demonstrate how deeply entrenched this way of thinking is in the 
Palestinian-Israeli case and highlight the centrality of identity in binding society and 
territory together, and ensuring their congruence by rendering other societies invisible. 
In domestic terms, spatial arrangements also order our lives.  They regulate 
which areas we can lawfully access and which we cannot on the basis of different 
spheres of control.  The market square or Hyde Park are for everyone to enjoy, while 
one cannot expect to be able to walk freely into other people’s homes, their gardens, or 
even their wood – or farmland.  Here the notion of space is linked to property and the 
division between the public and private.  These spatial arrangements shape the way we 
conduct our lives and changes to this could easily turn our life upside down.
14
  For 
Palestinians, it is not so much the division between private and public that is the central 
mechanism of spatial organisation of daily life but rather it is identity that has come to 
define space, interweaving with public and private spheres in complex ways.  Access to 
and mobility in public places is based on what kind of identity card (Palestinian, 
Jerusalemite, Arab Israeli, Israeli) one carries (and sometimes also on age and gender)
15
 
and rules of where one can go and when may change at an instant’s notice, often at the 
discretion of a single soldier.  In the private sphere, different procedures apply to Jews 
and Palestinians in terms of buying, owning land and accessing one’s land, as well as 
                                                 
11 INTERVIEW #4.  
12 John Agnew, “The Territorial Trap: the Geographical Assumptions of International Relations Theory,” 
Review of International Political Economy 1, no.1 (Spring 1994): 53-80. 
13 Alexander B. Murphy, “Identity and Territory,” Geopolitics 15, no. 4 (November 2010): 771. 
14 David Delaney, Territory: A Short Introduction (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005), 5. 
15 During Ramadan Israel allows Palestinian women over the age of 45 and Palestinian men over 50 with 
West Bank IDs access to East Jerusalem for Friday prayers without permits.  See, for example, OCHA, 
“Protection of Civilians, 17-24 August 2010,” 24 August 2010, http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/ 
0/A01DACAE64FD97A18525778C004FBCB4 (accessed 8 March 2011).  In this respect, Muslims from 
Gaza are discriminated against on two accounts.  Unlike Christian worshippers from Gaza, as well as 
Muslims from the West Bank, Muslims from Gaza do not receive permits to visit holy sites in Israel 
during religious holidays.  See Gisha, “Israeli Defense Ministry – for Worshippers from Gaza Access to 
Holy Sites Allowed for Christians Only,” 9 March 2011, http://occupiedgaza.blogspot.com/2011/03/ 
gisha-israeli-defense-ministry-for.html.  See also, “AdmPet 11268-01-11Kishawi v Ministry of Interior,” 
Court of Administrative Affairs in Beer’Sheva, trans. Gisha, 11 May 2011.  Moreover, age and gender 
restrictions for access to the al-Aqsa compound are often even enforced on East Jerusalem ID holders 
throughout the year on security grounds.  
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constructing and maintaining property.  Because Palestinians are subject to military law 
their private spheres are much more precarious and house demolitions and military 
incursions regularly target these private spaces as a form of punishment or simply as an 
assertion of power.
16
 
 
3.1.2. Memory, Society and Space 
 
Although the manifestations of a territorial conflict are inevitably first and 
foremost spatial, time too plays a role.  This is perhaps nowhere else more evident than 
in the case of the Palestinian – Israeli conflict.  While many Jews may feel that Israel 
provides a safe haven for their people, a significant number do believe it to be the 
Promised Land for the chosen people that they have now, after almost two thousand 
years, been able to return to.  For this latter group in particular, Israel’s legitimacy to 
exist is rooted in the history of the Jewish people. History and archaeology have 
therefore become prime tools in legitimising claims to sovereignty over this land.  
Excavations and studies into demography and migration are intended to prove the roots 
of the Jewish people as some of the oldest inhabitants of the land.  In order to reinforce 
this link, historical events and sites have come to occupy a central role in contemporary 
Israeli national narrative and practice.  It is telling that Masada, the desert fortress which 
is thought to have been the site of the collective suicide of the Sicarii rebels refusing to 
submit to Roman conquest, is the site for the swearing-in ceremony of soldiers who 
have completed their IDF basic training.
17
 
In the previous chapter we have already seen competing Palestinian narratives 
over the concepts of resistance, peace and conflict as well as the narrative favoured by 
the Israeli right of Palestinian incompetence, weakness and complicity in terrorism.  
This chapter will explore the development of ‘historical’ narratives, or how a people 
remember themselves, through the connection between identity and territory.   
Palestinians are often criticised for having failed to understand the importance of 
constructing a collective identity as part of gaining independence. In order to become a 
nation in the formal sense, a people must be something more than a collective of 
                                                 
16 On the targeting of Palestinian public and private spaces during the second intifada see Ghazi-Walid 
Falah and Colin Flint, “Geopolitical Spaces: The Dialectic of Public and Private Space in the Palestine-
Israel Conflict,” The Arab World Geographer 7, no.1-2 (Spring-Summer 2004): 117-34. 
17 Drawing on Zerubavel, Whitelam describes the political appropriation of Masada as a national symbol 
of liberation that has divorced itself from the past and although the historicity and significance of 
Josephus’ account of Masada are contested, it is accepted uncritically by Israeli popular culture. See Keith 
W. Withelam, The Invention of Ancient Israel: The Silencing of Palestinian History (London: Routledge, 
1996), 16-7. 
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tribes.
18
  Israel on the other hand, has been very successful in creating a collective 
identity, especially given how diverse Jewish immigrants were in terms of places of 
origin, original language and culture.  Palestinian society, on the other hand, was highly 
homogenous in ethnic, cultural and linguistic terms, but was divided internally by 
political and social differences.
19
 These political and social differences, often nurtured 
by their occupiers, divided Palestinians deeply despite their common ethnic background 
and meant they were unable to clearly define and act on a common national interest.  
The newly immigrated Jews, on the other hand, were united and driven by their political 
ambition to secure a homeland and their narrative of the ancestral roots.
20
  
 Critical to the shaping of the Israeli discourse and ensuring its dominance over 
other narratives was, according to Whitelam, the emergence of biblical studies. 
Palestine had always been home to many diverse people and histories but biblical 
studies turned the story of the Israelites – the chosen people - into the dominant 
narrative.
21
 Krämer too demonstrates that the Jews, for a large part, occupied a minority 
among a population which had always been mixed and further finds that the term 
‘Palestinian’ had been in continuous use and was not a later invention.22 The ancient 
history of Palestine was gradually replaced by a largely fabricated image of ancient 
Israel, which in reality had played only a small role in geographical Palestine, but by 
biblical studies was represented as the root of Western civilisation.
23
  
Since the establishment of the Israeli state in 1948 a number of measures were 
taken to eradicate remnants and reminders of its previously largely Palestinian 
inhabitants. Although Palestinians are also participants to this ‘game’, their potential 
and impact is severely limited because of the existing power asymmetry between the 
two parties.   
One of the most obvious measures taken to destroy the memory of Palestinian 
presence was the physical destruction of Palestinian property, including 418 Palestinian 
villages that had been depopulated during the 1948 war.
24
  The levels of destruction in 
these villages vary.  In some cases houses have been completely destroyed, in other 
cases most houses show major destruction, and in some instances houses are now 
                                                 
18 Withelam, Invention of Ancient Israel,16-7. 
19 Khalidi, Iron Cage, 21. 
20 Jeremy Salt, The Unmaking of the Middle East- A History of Western Disorder in Arab Lands 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 123. 
21 Withelam, Invention of Ancient Israel, 2-3, 5,11. 
22 Gudrun Krämer, History of Palestine, 3-17. 
23 Withelam, Invention of Ancient Israel, 13. 
24 Ghazi Falah, “The Transformation and De-Signification of Palestine’s Cultural Landscape” in The 
Landscape of Palestine, ed. Ibrahim Abu Lughod et al., 97-106. 
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occupied by Jewish families.
25
  With the passing of the Israeli Absentee Property Laws 
in 1948 it became impossible for Palestinian refugees to return to their former homes.
26
  
Under this law, the confiscated Palestinian land and property were initially transferred 
to a custodian and then later passed on to the development authority.  Two million 
dunams of land of ‘missing persons’ – that is property belonging to Palestinian refugees 
– was purchased by the Jewish National Fund from the government in the 1950s.27  The 
JNF turned some of the village lands into forests and parks named after international 
dignitaries or countries.  Canada Park for example was established in 1973 on the ruins 
of three Latrun villages: ‘Imwas, Yalu, and Beit Nuba which were captured and 
destroyed in 1967.
28
  For Palestinians, the ruins of former Palestinian villages, where 
they still exist, keep alive the claim that Palestinians feel they have to this land.
29
   
Expropriation of Palestinian property has continued to the present day and is at 
the time of writing perhaps most significant in East Jerusalem, in the neighbourhood of 
Sheikh Jarrah, where several Palestinian families have lost legal battles to keep their 
homes.  Most of the families affected are Palestinian refugees who moved to the area 
under an UNRWA-sponsored housing scheme under which 28 Palestinian refugee 
families were granted funds to build homes on land made available by the Jordanian 
government under the condition that they renounced UNRWA food assistance. After 
paying nominal rent for three years, ownership of the land and properties would be 
transferred to them.
30
  
                                                 
25 Falah, “Transformation and De-Signification”, 99-104. 
26 Absentees’ Property Law 5710-1950, 14 March 1950, art.4. 
27 “Ex-Minister Rubinstein: State Should Reclaim Land Given to JNF,” The Haaretz, 24 July 2007, 
http://haaretz.com/news/ex-minister-rubinstein-state-should-reclaim-land-given-to-jnf-1.226146 
(accessed 8 March 2011).  Habitat International Coalition and Adalah, “Racism, Racial Discrimination, 
Xenophobia and All Forms of Discrimination,” Statement submitted to UN Commission on Human 
Rights 60 – 2nd session, (13 March – 21 April 2006), 1; http: www.adalah.org/eng/intl06/un-i6-jnf.pdf 
(accessed 18 February 2011). 
28 Eitan Bronstein, “Restless Park: On the Latrun Villages and Zochorot,” Zochorot, trans. Charles 
Kamen, 2-3;  http://www.zochrot.org/sites/default/files/latrun_booklet_english_supplement.pdf (accessed 
13 January 2012). 
29 Falah, “Transformation and De-Signification,” 105. Many cultural centres and projects in and outside 
Palestine have collected the testimonies of the 1948 nakba witnesses and material on the fate of the 
various villages. Such organisations and projects include the Khalil Sakakini Centre, Badil, The Palestine 
Remembered Nakba Oral History Project, the Palestinian Association for Cultural Exchange etc.  
30 The Hanoun and al-Ghawi families, for example, were evicted from their homes on 2 August 2009. The 
cases in East Jerusalem are so controversial because the Jordanian government never registered the 
refugees as owners. The Legal and Administrative Matters Law of 1970 enables Jews to make claims on 
property that belonged to Jews before 1948.  This has, of course, created a double standard because 
Palestinians are not able to reclaim the property they owned before 1948 in West Jerusalem or anywhere 
else in Israel due to the Absentee Property Law.  Moreover, the application of Israeli law, administration, 
and jurisdiction in East Jerusalem is not recognised under international law because East Jerusalem is 
considered occupied territory in international legal terms.  Security Council Resolution 252 ‘[c]onsiders 
that all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel, including expropriation of 
land and properties thereon, which tend to change the legal status of Jerusalem are invalid and cannot 
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A more subtle, but widely practiced, approach to eradicating memory is the 
renaming of places. The Hebraisation of the map began shortly after the establishment 
of Israel.  Arabic names of villages and towns were largely replaced with Hebrew 
names: Isdud was changed to Ashdod; Asqalan to Ashqelon; Bisan to Bet She’an etc. 
While Hebrew names within Israel have become largely accepted, names for areas in 
the West Bank, for example, are still hotly contested and controversial. An Israeli 
tourism map issued by the Israeli Ministry of Tourism displayed on the London 
underground network in 2009, referring to the West Bank as Samaria and Judea, 
attracted significant criticism and had to be withdrawn.
31
 However, sometimes the 
politics of toponymy is more subtle; road signs for Jerusalem, for example, in Arabic 
script do not use the Arabic name for Jerusalem, which is ‘al-Quds’, but the Hebrew 
‘Yerushalayim’ in Arabic script. 
Filling the gap of the disappearing history of one people are the acts of claiming 
presence of another.  The most efficient way to achieve presence is to settle one’s 
people on the given territory.  Settlements are among the most controversial issues in 
peace negotiations and as the evacuations from Gaza in 2005 and debates over a 
construction freeze in 2009 and 2010 have shown, a highly emotive topic within Israel. 
Although settlements may be a very effective means for establishing presence on a 
given a territory, they are economically and politically very costly.  Hence, Cohen 
argues, that Israel is unable and unwilling to settle large parts of the land with people.  
Trees, on the other hand, can establish presence at a much lesser cost.  The afforestation 
projects around Jerusalem serve as a suitable example.  Previous to 1967 Israel had 
begun to plant forests around West Jerusalem and after 1967 and the expansion of the 
Jerusalem municipal boundary, the municipality continued its afforestation efforts to 
complete a green belt within the new municipal boundaries.
32
  This went hand in hand 
with one of the primary goals of Israeli national policy which was to create and 
                                                                                                                                               
change that status.’  See U.N. Security Council, Resolution 252,  “The Situation in the Middle East,” 21 
November 1968, http://daccessddsny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/248/33/IMG/NR024833 
.pdf?OpenElement.  Also see OCHA oPt, “The Case of Sheikh Jarrah,” updated version, October 2010, 
1,3; http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_sheikh_jarrah_Factsheet_2010_10_11_english.pdf.  
(accessed 13 February 2011).  Sheikh Jarrah Solidarity, “The Legal Struggle In Sheikh Jarrah,” 
http://www.en.justjlm.org/what-is-our-struggle-about/sheikh-jarrah-solidarity/the-legal-struggle-in-
sheikh-jarrah (accessed 13 February 2011). 
31 Associated Press, “Controversial Israeli Tourism Poster Pulled from London Tube,” The Haaretz, 22 
May 2009, http://www.haaretz.com/news/controversial-israeli-tourism-poster-pulled-from-london-tube-
1.276552 (accessed 12 January 2012). 
32 Israel increased the area of the Jerusalem municipality by 200%.  See Shaul Ephraim Cohen, The 
Politics of Planting: Israeli-Palestinian Competition for Control of Land in the Jerusalem Periphery 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 1. On politically-motivated planting in the green belt see 
Ibid., 112-5, 116-7. 
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consolidate an enlarged capital for Israel.
33
  However, these projects often infringed on 
the land and livelihood of Palestinians in the surrounding villages and continued to 
create conflict over the years.
34
  The JNF is particularly active in land development with 
a view to consolidate and expand Jewish presence.  It was founded in 1901 with the 
primary objective of purchasing land for the establishment of a Jewish state in the then 
Ottoman-controlled Palestine.
35
  The organisation prides itself of having planted 250 
million trees, developed over 250,000 acres of land and created more than 1,000 parks 
amongst other things in the past 109 years.
36
  Many of the JNF’s forests and recreational 
parks were built on the land of destroyed Palestinian villages.  The JNF is well known 
for its preference of conifer trees – mainly pine trees – despite the fact that they are not 
suitable for the local climate, rather than indigenous species such as olive trees, which 
for Palestinians have become somewhat of a national symbol.
37
  Hence, even the choice 
of trees in planting projects has turned into a political statement.
38
   
Palestinian responses to Israeli claims on the land have taken a number of forms.  
At the core of Palestinian resistance to being ‘forgotten’, is the concept of sumud which 
has its origins in a pan-Arabist nationalist ideology that strives for independent 
statehood but has come to mean ‘the struggle of the Palestinians under occupation to 
“stay on the land” and develop into a viable community with social, economic, and 
educational institutions.’39  Maintaining Palestinian presence on the land is central to 
this concept, which is often translated with ‘steadfastness’.  Numerous planting projects 
in various localities, especially along the separation wall and near settlements, have 
been initiated to achieve exactly that, through reclaiming land by planting olive trees.
40
  
Such efforts usually remain purely symbolic, with no real impact, as the army in the 
West Bank regularly interferes with such projects and soon uproots any saplings.  
Declaring Jerusalem as the capital of Arab culture in 2010 is another example of 
                                                 
33 Cohen, Politics of Planting, 1-2. 
34 Ibid. 
35 See Jewish National Fund, “Our History,” under “1901: It All Started with A Dream…,” 
http://www.jnf.org/about-jnf/history/ (accessed 18 February 2011). 
36 Ibid. 
37 Cohen, Politics of Planting, 8.  The Stop the JNF Campaign takes particular issue with the planting of 
pine trees by the JNF and its environmental impact.  See Stop the JNF Campaign, “Environmental 
Destruction and Racism: The JNF Destroys Natural Environments and Ways of Life,” http://stopthe 
jnf.org/jnfkklintro_environment.html (accessed 7 January 2012). 
38 See Cohen, Politics of Planting, 115-6. 
39 Emile A. Nakhleh, “The West Bank and Gaza: Twenty Years Later,” Middle East Journal 42, no.2 
(Spring 1988): 213; also Giacaman, “Perspectives on Civil Society in Palestine”. 
40 The Arab Group for the Protection of Nature for example launched a five year project which aimed to 
plan approximately one million trees (not exclusively olive trees) on Palestinian land razed by Israeli 
bulldozers or in areas where settlements and Israeli bypass roads are expanding.  See Arab Group for the 
Protection of Nature, “One Million Trees Project,” http://www.apnature.org/Project01_project.html 
(accessed 12 January 2012). 
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Palestinian efforts to establish their presence.  In a contested city such as Jerusalem 
cultural activities inevitably have a political message.  Several of the cultural events 
taking place in Jerusalem prompted harassment from the Israeli police or were even 
banned.
41
  Maintaining cultural presence is particularly difficult for Palestinians in East 
Jerusalem.  More and more Palestinian think tanks and NGOs are moving away from 
East Jerusalem to neighbourhoods closer to the West Bank because they find it 
increasingly difficult to function in East Jerusalem.  Unsurprisingly, sites with political 
symbolism are particularly a target for Israeli pressure or closure.  Orient House, the 
PLO headquarters in East Jerusalem, was closed for the first time by Israeli forces in 
1988 for security reasons.  The site re-opened in 1992, only to be closed down again on 
10
th
 August 2001.  Until then, Orient House was the official body in charge of 
negotiating the final status of Jerusalem.
42
  In the last raid, Israeli army and police 
confiscated computer equipment, files, data and any valuable and confidential 
information regarding Jerusalem that was intended for use in negotiations with Israel.
43
  
Any efforts to re-open the site have until now been unsuccessful.   
In a conflict between two national movements that seek to control territory, 
establishing presence is an exclusionary practice. For many Israelis and Palestinians the 
conflict is an existentialist one: it is either us or them.
44
  If the Zionist imperative is to 
create a state with a Jewish majority the ideology is not compatible with the presence of 
another people.
45
 In Sacred Landscapes Benvenisti suggests that eliminating another 
people’s memory is inevitable in this conflict.  In his view, had the Arabs won the war, 
they would have done the same to the Jewish landscape,
46
 and would have equally 
excluded the Jewish narrative from their cultural celebrations or museums and historical 
sites.
47
  One gets the sense from reading Benvenisti that this is an inherently 
                                                 
41 See “Jerusalem Artists Go underground,” BBC, 3 November 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/ 
8338316.stm (accessed 12 January 2012). “Israel Bans Palestinian Cultural Events,” Ynetnews, 20 March 
2009, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3689673,00.html (accessed 12 January 2012).  Varsen 
Aghabekian, “Under Occupation: Celebrations and Contradictions of al-Quds Capital of Arab Culture 
2009,” Jerusalem Quarterly 38 (Summer 2009): 78-82. 
42 In its platform for the 1999 elections Likud had committed itself as part of its policy for Jerusalem as a 
united capital of Israel to ensure that “[n]o diplomatic activity will be permitted at Orient House.” See 
“Likud Platform,” Knesset, Lists Running in the ’99 Knesset Elections, http://www.knesset.gov.il/ 
elections/knesset15/elikud_m.htm (accessed 17 January 2012). 
43 See “About the Orient House,” The Orient House, http://www.orienthouse.org/about/index.html 
(accessed 13 February 2011). 
44 Author, informal conversations, August 2009. 
45 Karmi, Married to Another Man, 7. 
46 Meron Benvenisti, Sacred Landscape: The Buried History of the Holy Land since 1948 (Berkley: 
University of California Press 2000), 3. 
47 Meron Benvenisti, City of Stones: A Hidden History of Jerusalem, trans. Maxine Kaufman Nunn 
(Berkley: University of California Press 1996): 1-10. 
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irreconcilable conflict in which there is no room for both an Israeli and a Palestinian 
narrative. 
For now, due to the Palestinians being the weaker party in this conflict, it is their 
spaces that have continuously been shrinking. The majority of Palestinians lost access to 
the territory that, after 1948 became Israel, as entry to Israel is now controlled by a strict 
permit system.  Since Oslo, the expansion of settlements, the frequent closures, the 
division into different zones of control, have impeded Palestinian mobility severely; the 
construction of the separation wall, the political split between Gaza and the West Bank, 
and the physical severance from East Jerusalem have further aggravated this situation.  
These developments have seriously called into question the possibility of establishing a 
Palestinian state within the Green Line.  In June 2009, Prime Minister Benyamin 
Netanyahu for the first time acknowledged the possibility of a Palestinian state, albeit 
with considerable limitations: a demilitarised state, without control over its borders with 
Jordan
48
 or its airspace, and banned from entering military agreements with other 
states.
49
 Conceiving of a state without an army to control its territory and borders and a 
contiguous territory to be controlled,
50
 would certainly be a radical break from the 
understanding of the traditional territorial sovereign state.  That the territorial sovereign 
state is still the dominant paradigm for political actors is demonstrated by the fact that 
Palestinians do not appear likely to accept the offer of a powerless Swiss cheese state. 
 
3.1.3. Territory in the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict 
 
The beginnings of the Zionist project of establishing a state for Jews in this very 
land is often dated with the first Zionist Congress in Basel in 1897, where the congress, 
chaired by Theodor Herzl, declared its central programme: ‘Zionism seeks for the 
Jewish people a publicly recognized legally secured homeland in Palestine.’51  
Settlement activities had begun long before the war in 1948 in a Palestine that 
was then under the mandate of the British Empire.  The British were sympathetic and 
                                                 
48 B’Tselem, “Israel Has De Facto annexed the Jordan Valley,” 13 February 2006, http://www.btselem.org 
/settlements/20060213_annexation_of_the_jordan_valley (accessed 12 January 2012) 
49 Rory McCarthy, “Netanyahu Backs Independent Palestinian State for the First Time,” The Guardian, 14 
June 2009 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jun/14/binyamin-netanyahu-israel-palestinian-state 
(accessed 18 February 2011).  For excerpts of speech see “Netanyahu Speech – Key Excerpts,” BBC, 14 
June 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/8099749.stm (accessed 18 February 2011). 
50 There was no indication in Netanyahu’s speech that he intended to evacuate settlements in the West 
Bank. On the contrary, he stated that settlements needed to be able to accommodate natural growth. 
51 The Herzl Museum, “First Zionist Congress: Basel 29-31 August 1897,” http://www.herzl.org/ 
english/Article.aspx?Item=544 (accessed 3 January 2012). 
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supportive of the Zionist project, as perhaps best showcased by the Balfour Declaration 
of 1917.
52
  With the writing of the Balfour declaration into the mandate, the British 
created, what Jeremy Salt refers to as double colonialism: ‘the occupying British did not 
settle the land themselves but held the door open so that their protégés could.’53  For 
Rashid Khalidi, the clear favouritism for the Jewish population in all sectors put the 
Palestinians at a clear disadvantage, pushing them into a corner or an ‘iron cage’ from 
which Palestinian independence could not have escaped.  While the yishuv, with British 
support had built quasi-state structures by the time it came to the war in 1948, 
Palestinian party formation had been delayed due to the firm grip of the British on the 
administration and a continuous denial of access to state structures to the Palestinians.  
The British kept the indigenous population under tight control by practicing a politics of 
division and ensured that the interests of the notables were closely tied up with the 
British.
54
 When it came to the confrontation with the Haganah, the Palestinians were 
divided, badly equipped, not organised and without credible leaders.  
What for Jewish Israelis marks the independence and establishment of the Israeli 
State, is for Palestinians the ‘catastrophe’, or in Arabic, the nakba.  For a long time 
official Israeli historical narrative denied the fate of the approximately 750,000 refugees 
that fled to neighbouring countries or ‘settled’ outside the main urban centres in the 
West Bank and East Jerusalem, then both under Jordanian control, and in Gaza which 
was then governed by Egypt. The official Israeli narrative maintained that the 
Palestinians left their homes out of free will, that they were instructed to do so by their 
Arab leaders, and that at the time Palestinian national identity was not sufficiently 
developed to constitute a people
55
 until it was challenged, as we have seen in chapter 
two, by the New Historians.   
Until 1967 the West Bank (with East Jerusalem and the Old City), and Gaza 
remained under the control of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and Egypt 
respectively.  When Israel occupied these areas after the six-day war, it began not only 
to control the territory but also the lives of Palestinians.  Israel controlled these areas 
militarily, but also civilian daily affairs came under Israeli administration.  However, 
                                                 
52 The British position changed later, most notably with the White Paper of 1939, giving political 
recognition and representation for the Arab population, limiting Jewish immigration, and recommending 
the creation of an independent Palestine governed by Palestinian Arabs and Jews in proportion to their 
representation in the population. 
53 Jeremy Salt, Unmaking of the Middle East, 122. 
54 Khalidi, Iron Cage, 21-2. 
55 Former Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir famously said: ‘There is no such thing as a Palestinian 
people.  It is not as if we came and threw them out and took their country.  They didn't exist.’  Statement 
made by Golda Meir, The Sunday Times, 15 June 1969. 
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the West Bank and Gaza were not annexed by Israel, and Palestinians in these areas 
were never given any political representation in the state of Israel.  East Jerusalem, on 
the other hand, was annexed and Israel declared Jerusalem the united capital of the state 
of Israel.  Prior to 1967 East Jerusalem contained an area of around 6 km².  After the 
war Israel annexed approximately 70 km², including 64 km² which mostly belonged to 
28 villages in the West Bank.
56
  It is clear that the objective of the Israeli decision-
makers was to guarantee a Jewish majority within the city: while many of the 
Palestinian villages were placed outside the boundaries of the municipality, their lands 
were included within the boundaries.
57
  Palestinians resident in Jerusalem, and present 
during the time that the Israeli census was taken after the annexation, began to occupy a 
different status and received special Jerusalem identity cards.  Their status is one of 
permanent residents, the same status which is granted to foreign citizens i.e. immigrants 
who have chosen to come to live in Israel.
58
  
Holders of a Jerusalem identity card are not subject to the movement restrictions 
that affect those holding a West Bank or Gaza identity card, and they also have access 
to social security benefits and state healthcare.  However, since 1995 Israel has begun to 
revoke permanent residency of Arab residents who could not prove that their centre of 
life was in Jerusalem.  This policy was implemented without any prior warning and 
affected thousands of former Jerusalemites,
59
 as they had moved outside the city’s limits 
for employment,
60
 better housing,
61
 or had moved to live with their West Bank or Gazan 
spouses.
62
 
                                                 
56 The majority of the land had previously belonged to the municipalities of Bethlehem and Beit Jala.  
B’Tselem, “Legal Status of East Jerusalem and its Residents,” http://www.btselem.org/english/ 
jerusalem/legal_status.asp (accessed 3 January 2012). 
57 Examples here are Beit Iksa and Beit Hanina in the north, and Beit Sahour in the south. Ibid. 
58 It would be possible for them to become Israeli citizens on certain conditions.  They would, for 
example, have to swear allegiance to the Israeli state, and would have to renounce any other nationality 
they may hold.  Jewish Israeli citizens, on the other hand, can be nationals of more than one country.  
Ibid. 
59 B’Tselem, “Revocation of Residency in East Jerusalem,” http://www.btselem.org/English/Jerusalem 
/Revocation_of_Residency.asp (accessed 19 March 2011). Shahar Ilan, “Interior Ministry increasingly 
revoking East Jerusalem Arabs’ Residency Permits,” The Haaretz, 24 June 2007, http://www.haaretz. 
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Return,” The Haaretz, 20 June 2010, http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/features/palestinian-
jerusalemites-go-work-abroad-and-get-residency-revoked-upon-return-1.297136 (accessed 23 September 
2011). For a detailed report see Hamoked and B’Tselem, The Quiet Deportation – Revocation of 
Residency of East Jerusalem Palestinians (April 1997), http://www.hamoked.org/items/10200_eng.pdf 
(accessed 13 January 2012). 
60 East Jerusalem which had previously been the hub of Palestinian economic and social life has suffered 
significantly, especially in economic terms, since the construction of the Separation Wall.  
61 It is extremely difficult for Palestinian residents in Jerusalem to obtain a building permit and the permit 
regime is much more rigorously applied to Palestinians than to Jews. From the territory that was annexed 
under the extension of the municipal boundaries, Israel expropriated about a third of the territory for 
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The movement restrictions that have so come to characterise the lives of 
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza are a development of the later years of the 
occupation.  Israel’s policy of closure became institutionalised with Oslo and its logic of 
division of control and separation of the two peoples.  Prior to Oslo Palestinian youths 
went to Tel Aviv to night clubs to dance and enjoy themselves without being stopped or 
harassed by anyone.
63
 Moreover, a large percentage of the Palestinian labour force had 
been absorbed by the growing Israeli market.  The movement restrictions with Oslo cost 
many Palestinians their income.  Paradoxically, it was also during the Oslo period that 
settlement expansion intensified.
64
 Settlement construction began in the 1970s and was 
often driven by religious groups which committed themselves to the project of 
repopulating the areas known in Jewish history as Judea and Samaria but also included 
those that were attracted by cheap housing and government subsidies.  Palestinian 
frustration, fuelled by the lack of any real economic or political returns from Oslo and 
the growing reports of the corruption of the Palestinian leadership, culminated in the 
outbreak of the second intifada in September 2000. 
 
3.1.4. Territorial Transformations and the Second Intifada 
 
As already established in the previous chapter, there is almost unanimous 
agreement that the second intifada, or al-Aqsa intifada, was a very different kind of 
movement from the first intifada.  While the first intifada was a spontaneous popular 
eruption, characterised by public demonstrations and civil disobedience, the second 
intifada is largely perceived to have been an organised militant 'uprising' led by certain 
political and militant groups.  Only the first few months were dominated by public 
                                                                                                                                               
residential construction.  By 2001 over 45,000 housing units had been constructed for Jews on this land, 
and not one single one for Palestinians who constitute a third of the city’s population.  In its outline plans 
for all the Palestinian neighbourhoods, the Jerusalem municipality declared around 40 % of the land as 
“open landscape areas” on which construction is forbidden.  B’Tselem, “East-Jerusalem – Discrimination 
in Planning, Building and Land Expropriation,” http://www.btselem.org/english/jerusalem/discriminating 
_policy.asp (accessed 15 January 2012). 
62 In July 2003, the government issued a statute that prohibits Israeli citizens and residents married to 
residents of the Occupied Territories to live with their spouses in Israel. The statue was initially only valid 
for one year but was prolonged through Knesset approval.  B’Tselem, “Residency and Family Separation: 
Family Unification and Child Registration in East Jerusalem,” http://www.btselem.org/english/family_ 
separation/east_jerusalem.asp (accessed 15 January 2012).   
63 Author, informal conversations, Summer 2010. 
64 Between 1993 and 2000 the total settler population grew by 77% from 110,000 to 195,000.  These 
statistics exclude settlements in Jerusalem and environs. The annual implantation of Jewish settlers in the 
West Bank and Gaza rose from an average of 9,600 in the ten years between 1986 to 1996 to over 12,000 
in 6 years from 1994-2000. See Mouin Rabbani, “Rocks and Rockets: Oslo’s Inevitable Conclusion,” 
Journal of Palestine Studies 30, no.3 (Spring 2001): 75. 
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demonstrations but then the more organised violence took over.
65
 The previous chapter 
had examined how changes in the political environment had affected the ability of civil 
society organisations and political parties to mobilise the masses.  Here we will see how 
Israeli-driven transformations of Palestinian geography have altered the modes of 
predominant political activism during the second intifada. 
One of the central structural features that drove the transformation of political 
activism during the al-Aqsa intifada is the division of Palestinian territory into different 
zones of control.  As a result, the Israeli army was no longer present in the cities, 
villages, and refugee camps and no longer among the Palestinian population on a daily 
basis.  Instead, the army had moved outside the population centres guarding the 
transport network and the access routes to and from Palestinian population centres. This 
has created spaces within which the Palestinian population can move fairly freely, and 
spaces in between, where they cannot.  As discussed in the previous chapter, this system 
of control has its roots in Oslo and was devised by the military, dividing the West Bank 
territory into Area A (Palestinian control over administration and security) Area B 
(Palestinian administration and joint Israeli control over security) and Area C (full 
Israeli control over administration and security).
66
  The declared intention behind this 
categorisation was a gradual redeployment of the military from the Palestinian areas as 
envisaged under the Oslo Accords.  
With these changes and the arrival of the PA, which was subsequently 
responsible for the running of daily affairs in the territories, the Israeli government had 
alleviated itself of a great administrative, military and financial burden.  Israel was no 
longer in charge of the daily running of Palestinian lives.  However, this set-up enabled 
it to still control Palestinian lives through controlling movement and access. Even 
without being present within the urban centres, Israel was in full control and could 
easily bring Palestinian movement to a complete standstill by closing just a few 
checkpoints.
67
  
In order to maintain control, Israel implemented a multifaceted system of 
restrictions on movement including permanent and temporary checkpoints,
68
 physical 
                                                 
65 There was a general consensus in the interviews that the second intifada was characterised by the 
absence of the masses. 
66 Camille Mansour, “The Palestinian-Israeli Peace Negotiations: An Overview and Assessment,” Journal 
of Palestine Studies 22, no.3 (Spring 1993): 5-31.  
67 The only route for Palestinian travellers that connects the South of the West Bank with the Centre, for 
example, is through Wadi Nar; if the checkpoint in Wadi Nar is closed there is no alternative route and the 
traffic to and from the South comes to a standstill. 
68 In October 2010, there were 99 fixed checkpoints installed, 62 of which were internal checkpoints. 
B’Tselem, “Checkpoints, Physical Obstructions, and Forbidden Roads,” http://www.btselem.org/ 
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obstructions such as concrete blocks, iron gates or trenches, the Separation Wall, 
forbidden roads or roads with restrictions for Palestinians,
69
 and a complex permit 
system.  By implementing these restrictions, Israel effectively divided the area into five 
distinct geographical zones: the North, Centre, South, The Jordan Valley, and the 
northern Dead Sea.  The resulting cantonisation of the West Bank will become evident 
to any visitor travelling throughout the area using Palestinian transport and roads and 
any reference to the ‘West Bank’ in the sense of a contiguous territory will seem naïve 
or misleading.  
Consecutive Israeli governments, then, have managed to establish a situation in 
which Israel is no longer responsible for the daily affairs in the West Bank, but still 
controls mobility and even more importantly, the essential resources for sustaining lives 
and ensuring economic growth: land and water. By retreating from the population 
centres, Israel allowed the PA to take over administration in the urban centres and some 
control over security in certain areas, but did not lose control of the territory as a whole 
nor its resources. It is less costly to withdraw and implement and control through an 
authority that would be made responsible for what happens there.
70
  At the same time, 
Jewish settlements expanded relatively undisturbed both in the West Bank and in East 
Jerusalem.  Moreover, with this system in place Israel still maintains final control over 
its security.  A resolution of the conflict would mean loss for Israel of one sort or 
another.  Whilst managing the conflict Israel can still reap the benefits of the land’s 
resources. 
Jeff Halper, the director of the Israeli Committee against House Demolitions, 
describes Israeli policies towards Palestinians as a matrix of control by which he means 
a system that enables Israel to control every aspect of Palestinian life while at the same 
time endeavouring to keep the occupation invisible under the guise of ‘security’, ‘proper 
administration’, ‘upholding the law’, and ‘keeping the public order.’71  With this 
outward bureaucratic and legal appearance, international criticism is being deflected and 
                                                                                                                                               
freedom_of_movement/checkpoints_and_forbidden_roads (accessed 06 January 2012).  A recent 
Amnesty International Report estimates that there is a total of over 550 checkpoints, blockades and 
obstacles across the West Bank and East Jerusalem.  See Amnesty International, Troubled Waters, Map 2. 
69 According to statistics issued by B’Tselem in August 2010, Palestinian vehicles are barred from 
travelling on 73.3 km of the West Bank road network.  See B’Tselem, “West Bank Roads on Which 
Palestinian Vehicles are Forbidden,” 31 January 2011, http://www.btselem.org/sites/default/files/ 
forbidden_roads_table_eng.pdf (accessed 06 January 2012)  
70 Camille Mansour, “Israel’s Colonial Impasse,” Journal of Palestine Studies 30, no.4 (Summer 2001): 
84. 
71 Jeff Halper, “The Key to Peace: Dismantling the Matrix of Control,” The Israeli Committee against 
House Demolitions, http://www.icahd.org/?page_id=79 (accessed 8 March 2011). 
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control can be maintained indefinitely.
72
  For Camille Mansour this project of division 
and control was ingrained in the Oslo Accords and the on-going territorial 
fragmentation is not the result of an Oslo gone wrong.
73
  The ensuing separation and 
failure to redeploy was the result of a particular reading of the agreement that Israeli 
policy makers chose and implemented from the beginning.  In fact, the prevalent 
opinion among Palestinians is that Israel’s intention is to simply manage the conflict 
and not to resolve it.
74
   
The shift to the ‘matrix of control’ is the outcome of a realisation that the 
continuation of the occupation as it was could no longer be sustained.  However, for 
Gordon it is elements in the occupation’s structure, rather than the decisions made by 
particular individuals in politics or the military establishment that explain the changes in 
the forms of control.  For many years Israel’s occupation of the territories followed the 
colonisation principle which seeks to administer people and normalise the occupation.  
Colonisers attempt to manage the lives of people not for the sake of administering the 
population but in order to facilitate the extraction of resources.
75
  Initially, for the first 
two decades Israel was managing the population in a non-violent way whilst at the same 
time exploiting the Palestinian labour force for the Israeli market, and the area’s 
important natural resources such as land and water for its own use.
76
   
However, with Oslo, Israel gradually began to pursue a principle of separation 
under which Israel no longer administers people’s lives but still seeks to exploit the 
land’s resources.  Gordon argues that it is the exclusive focus on resources and the lack 
of interest in the lives of the local population that characterises the principle of 
separation and explains the recent increase in lethal violence.  The occupation has cost 
more lives because it directly and indirectly harms the local population by limiting 
movement, enclosing Palestinians in enclaves while at the same time exploiting 
resources that the local population becomes deprived of.  This shift occurred at some 
point during the first intifada when Israel realised that the colonisation principle was no 
longer viable as the basic principle that would allow it to continue its occupation.
77
  The 
logic of the separation principle does not offer a solution (especially not in terms of a 
withdrawal from the territories) but it alters and reorganises its power in order to 
continue occupation of the territories.  
                                                 
72 Halper, “The Key to Peace.” 
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75 Neve Gordon, Israel’s Occupation (Berkley: University of California Press, 2008), 199. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid.199-200. 
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Israel acted differently in comparison to other colonial powers.  In other cases, 
after the withdrawal of troops, movement within the country was no longer controlled 
by the former colonial power.  In the West Bank and even in Gaza, however, Israel has 
maintained its control over movement.
78
  The withdrawal of troops to the outskirts of 
urban centres may have wrongly given the impression that Israel transferred sovereignty 
to the Palestinians.  On the contrary, Israel has implemented internal and external 
closures and has as such retained ultimate power over decisions affecting the daily lives 
of Palestinians. As Gordon points out, ironically, when the Israeli government adopted 
the separation policy, it implemented strategies that further shrank Palestinian space:
79
 
‘Following the adoption of the separation principle, only those Palestinians who want to 
move within the OT or to leave the region are subjected to Israel’s disciplinary practices 
and must, in order to become moving subjects, adopt a series of normative fiats. 
Palestinians who do not want any contact with Israel must remain within the confines of 
their refugee camp, village, town, or city.’80  In order to impose this ‘unnatural’ form of 
separation, Israel resorted to a three-level remodelling of space through walls, barriers, 
tunnels and bridges in order to reconnect the fragmented spaces to build two separate, 
one almost invisible to another, but overlapping national geographies.
81
 
In the context of an uprising these measures alter the nature and possibilities for 
confrontation considerably and have played a significant role in determining the nature 
of the second intifada as a violent and militarised uprising. With the administration no 
longer in direct control of the population and no visible Israeli presence inside the urban 
centres, civil disobedience would not be effective.  Civil disobedience in the first 
intifada included strikes, marches, demonstrations, and the alternative organisation of 
social services.  Kindergartens and parallel education were set up and catered to satisfy 
these important needs with low-level capabilities.
82
  Women in particular, played an 
important role in organising these alternative services.   
However, now with the situation on the ground changed, acts of civil 
disobedience and mass protests would no longer have any impact in Israel.  There was 
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no incentive to organise alternative services for the population either because the PA 
had established quasi-institutions fulfilling this role.  The mass demonstrations, as 
witnessed during the first intifada, were no longer effective because the Israeli military 
was no longer stationed within the population centres so there was no opportunity for 
confrontations of this kind.  Any demonstration inside Ramallah under these changed 
circumstances would have been purely for the benefit of TV cameras and would have 
had no direct impact on the Israeli military.  In order to hold mass demonstrations 
during the second intifada people had to go to checkpoints. When demonstrators 
reached Qalandia, for example, which, situated 10 km inside the West Bank near 
Ramallah, is the main access point for Palestinians (if they hold the correct permit) to 
East Jerusalem, they found the army in their barracks, behind barriers, protected by 
concrete, sand, and walls.  Under such circumstances, a ‘civil or political’ confrontation 
is not possible.
83
  For the Israeli army it was easier to protect itself and to confine the 
insurgency to specific sites while the first uprising inside the urban centres was harder 
to control because it was more widespread.
84
  The fractured map imposed on 
Palestinians generated a fractured uprising with checkpoints and settlements as the focal 
points of confrontation,
85
 moving to borderlines with areas from which Palestinians had 
been marginalised through Oslo.
86
 
Moreover, there is also a practical issue that merits consideration.  If people 
have to go to checkpoints to protest, they have to get there in the first place.  With the 
Israeli military controlling access between urban centres and villages it would be 
difficult to transport large numbers of protestors to demonstration sites without 
interference from the army.  This is also true of the current situation and raises 
questions about what kind of peaceful options of resistance are available to Palestinians. 
When demonstrations occur in the Bethlehem vicinity, for example, or at Qalandia, the 
army at the checkpoints en route carry out much more thorough checks and questioning 
in an effort to intercept potential protestors.  This became very apparent during the 
unrest in the West Bank, especially in Hebron, Bethlehem, Nablus, and Qalandia in 
February and March 2010 after Benyamin Netanyahu granted Israeli national heritage 
status to religious sites located in the West Bank.  In one instance, PA security even 
erected their own checkpoint on the route from Ramallah to Qalandia, stopping 
outgoing traffic to check drivers’ and passengers’ identity documents and purpose of 
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travel.  The weekly demonstrations in Ni’lin and Bi’lin also provide a good example 
here.  In February 2010 the OC Central Command signed two orders proclaiming a 
military zone imposed on Bil’in and Nil’in.87  It is evident that the military use their 
control over access in a variety of ways to curb even peaceful expressions of resistance. 
However, the military has gone even further in its legal approach to suppress Palestinian 
protests.  Since 2010 the army has also reinstated Military Order 101, which originates 
from 1967 and prohibits any assembly, procession or vigil of ten or more persons for 
political reasons or which may be construed as such, unless a permit from a military 
commander has been obtained beforehand.
88
  The revival of this order seriously 
undermines the freedom of Palestinians who live in Area B or C to demonstrate. 
Maintaining demonstrations is also a question of ‘manpower’. Because the main 
population concentration lies within the urban centres and the camps, people would be 
required to travel outside these centres in order to participate in demonstrations at 
checkpoints, in villages, near observation towers etc. It is normally villages that lie 
within or the near the remit of Area C and they do not have the size of population to 
maintain protests over a long time on a large scale.
89
  This makes the issue of mobility 
even more salient.  
These changes on the ground and the absence of the military among the 
population favoured more confrontational encounters.
90
  One recurring theme among 
interviewees is the emphasis on the excessive violence used by the military against 
peaceful and unarmed protestors.
91
  Interviewees recounted how each peaceful 
demonstration saw ‘martyrs’92 sustaining injuries in the upper parts of the body.93  Mass 
demonstrations continued, albeit with little impact, until the second year of the 
intifada.
94
  They largely ceased after the invasion and reoccupation of the West Bank 
cities by the Israeli army.  The confrontations thereafter were mostly limited to armed 
Palestinian groups and the Israeli military.  When the military invaded the cities it 
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imposed prolonged curfews which made mass action and demonstrations impossible.
95
  
These closures also impeded the organisation and mobilisation of the grassroots 
movement, which had been so active during the first intifada.  Most of the leadership of 
the women’s organisations, for example, was based in Ramallah and could not travel 
outside Ramallah to organise or coordinate activities.
96
  During the first intifada, on the 
other hand, despite curfews Palestinians were still largely able to travel anywhere they 
wanted.
97
 
The changes in the system of control over Palestinians altered the possibilities of 
resistance.  In particular, how the Israeli military controlled the territory had a 
significant impact on transformations in the means available for resistance.  Mass 
demonstrations and civil disobedience were no longer viable and sustainable during the 
second intifada.  The separation principle, which according to authors such as Camille 
Mansour had already been on the agenda for Israelis since Oslo, and is now epitomised 
by the Separation Wall, has shifted the confrontations to ‘borderlines’ and has therefore 
made it necessarily more violent. When protestors reached the checkpoints they found 
soldiers behind barricades responding with disproportionate use of force.  There was 
structurally no possibility for the masses to take the lead in the second intifada with 
non-violent action.  In essence, territorial fragmentation had also fragmented the 
uprising, making any large-scale coordination impossible and creating focal points of 
conflict.
98
 
 
3.1.5. Suicide Bombing as a Territorial Statement 
 
The question of space and territory is not only relevant for assessing the 
structures that existed for formulating the Palestinian response to the occupation but 
Palestinians themselves also shaped the spaces available to them.  More specifically, 
Palestinian suicide bombings inside Israel made a territorial statement and had an 
impact on how Israelis experienced and perceived space.  During the al-Aqsa intifada 
numerous suicide bombing attacks were carried out by various factions inside Israel.  
Although this is not a new phenomenon (suicide bombings had been carried out inside 
the Green Line before by both Hamas and Islamic Jihad), with the al-Aqsa intifada the 
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phenomenon reached new dimensions with an average of one bombing per week in 
2002.  Some of the bombings took place on the Palestinian side of the Green Line, the 
1967 Armistice Line, which for Palestinians who accept a two-state solution demarcates 
the borders of what they aspire to be their future state.  Most of the bombings during the 
second intifada, however, occurred on the Israeli side of the Green Line.
99
  
Debates on suicide bombing in the second intifada often centre on the distinction 
between civilian vs. non-civilian targets and this is indeed a helpful prism for viewing 
the phenomenon.  The attacks have targeted both civilians and non-civilians, yet the 
overwhelming majority of victims during the second intifada were of the former kind.  
Killing is part of the concept or, we might even say, it is the goal of such operations, but 
I would argue there is also an important spatial and territorial aspect to it.  The target of 
suicide bombings may have been civilians but there was also a message about taking the 
conflict to the public sphere in Israel, in spite of and perhaps particularly because of the 
ghettoisation and movement restrictions imposed on Palestinians.  It has always been 
Israel’s strategy to isolate its civilian population from the dangers of conflict while at 
the same time controlling as much of the land as possible.
100
  With the logic of 
separation gradually consolidating after Oslo, it is not only the effects of war that the 
Israeli population was spared, but the occupation was also painstakingly kept out of 
sight and at low cost to Israeli civilians.  Although the majority of Israelis perform 
national service and hence will have some experience of the conflict, it is also true that 
in West Jerusalem, for example, there would be no signs of the daily confrontations and 
conflicts a mere 15km away, were it not for the intermittent bombings in the city.  What 
Jeff Halper identified as the matrix of control helps to disguise the reality of the 
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occupation even from Israel’s own population.  Careful selection of terminology and a 
strong security discourse are essential tools in keeping up the appearance.  The military 
government over the occupied territories, for instance, is called the ‘Civil 
Administration’, despite the fact that it is headed by a colonel and is under direct control 
of the Ministry of Defence.
101
  With this legal and bureaucratic exterior, it is only by 
digging deeper, discovering how laws are implemented and by questioning the basis of 
the laws applied to Palestinians, that injustice, discrimination and violence are exposed.  
The debate on the distinction between civilians and non-civilians is not clear cut, 
particularly when it comes to how Palestinians perceive Israelis. It is often argued that 
Palestinians do not distinguish between Israeli civilians and non-civilians because 
military service is compulsory for all Israeli citizens, men and women, except for 
Palestinians resident within 1948 borders and religious observant Jews.  However, there 
was no indication with most interviewees that Palestinians do not distinguish between 
civilians and non-civilians.
102
  Rather most of the interviewees made a clear distinction 
between civilians, on the one hand, and settlers and the military on the other.  Several 
stressed that any operations that targeted women and children were particularly 
abhorrent.  
The distinction that Palestinians make between civilians and non-civilians is a 
geographical one: they distinguish between Israelis to the east of the Green Line i.e. 
settlers and army, and Israelis to the west of the Green Line.
103
  Palestinians often point 
to the Fourth Geneva Convention as justifying any means of resistance to the 
occupation within their borders of the Green Line.
104
  They view settlers as part of the 
occupation and their civilian status is compromised because of the territory they find 
themselves on.  What are considered to be legitimate ‘targets’ then is evaluated on the 
basis of an anti-colonial rationale. For Parsons, settler colonialism is the single most 
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important cause behind the outbreak of the second intifada.  It is the rapid and 
unrelenting growth of settlements that dwarfed the capacity of the PA and ‘distorted 
Palestinian social, economic and political development.’105  Undoubtedly, it was the 
desire to retain as much as land as possible and to protect settlers’ homes as well as 
transport networks that led to territorial fragmentation and the ensuing political, social 
and economic difficulties for Palestinians.  Settlers represent the extension or the 
‘civilian face’ of the military occupation in the Palestinian territories.  Conversely, one 
could also argue that they are simply a means to an end because it is their very existence 
that justifies the continued presence of the army in the occupied territories.  From this 
anti-colonial perspective, settlers are seen as legitimate targets because they are part and 
parcel of Israel’s military occupation.106 
Furthermore, in the eyes of Palestinians, their civilian status is also undermined 
because they often carry arms and frequently commit attacks against Palestinians and 
their property.
107
  However, Israeli human rights organisations such as B’Tselem, for 
example, deny the validity of such a claim and argue that neither the fact that settlers 
live in the occupied territory, that many of the settlers belong to security services, nor 
the illegality of settlements under international law, justifies any kind of violence 
against them, and does not undermine their civilian status.  B’Tselem’s official line is 
that ‘settlers constitute a distinctly civilian population, which is entitled to all the 
protections granted to civilians by international law.’108  B’Tselem, however, does not 
comment in its statement on the often organised nature of violence carried out by 
settlers.  It is difficult to establish how wide-spread violence among settlers is because 
there is only limited research, media coverage, or legal action on the issue.  However, it 
is clear that settler violence is rapidly increasing.  The OCHA office responsible for the 
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Palestinian territory has declared that in comparison to 2010, settler violence had 
increased by 40% in 2011, and in comparison to 2009, by 165%.
109
  In July 2011 a 
whole community of 127 people was displaced due to repeated settler attacks and 
attacks on places of worship have also increased.
110
  Nevertheless, settler violence is far 
from being a new phenomenon.  In the 1980s Jewish settler councils and militias 
frequently engaged in vigilante violence against Palestinians.
111
  In 1979 Israel had 
created six regional councils to serve the needs of West Bank and Gaza settlers.  Five 
years later the settlers created an umbrella organisation known as Moetzet Yesha which 
became politically very influential
112
 and later began to develop its own militia.
113
  The 
militias received weapons from the military for self-defence.  Settler patrols worked 
with nearby military units and were led by hired security coordinators.
114
  Their purpose 
during peacetime was to patrol locally, but in practice what they did was policing 
nearby Palestinian villages, and their conduct earned the Judea Company a reputation 
for brutality.
115
  Since the first intifada around 150 Palestinians had been killed by 
Israeli civilians. (During the second intifada 34 Palestinians were killed by Israelis). 
Some may have acted in self-defence, but settler violence is much more comprehensive 
and some activities betray a clear agenda of forcing Palestinians to leave.  Settler 
violence ranges from chasing and firing at stone throwers; attacks on Palestinians using 
weapons and ammunition received by the IDF that are meant to frighten or deter them; 
preventing Palestinians from reaching their land, effectively creating ‘no go zones’ in 
areas surrounding settlements and outposts; harassment during harvest season; blocking 
roadways so as to impede life and commerce; shooting solar panels on roofs; torching 
cars; shattering window panes; destroying crops and uprooting trees; and abusing 
merchants and stall owners at the market.
116
  According to findings by Amnesty 
International, settlers have also poisoned Palestinian wells, cut and diverted water pipes 
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leading into Palestinian villages to fill their own swimming pool, and sabotaged a truck 
carrying water supplied by Oxfam to the Palestinian village of Susyia by placing spikes 
across the road prior to the scheduled arrival of the truck.
117
  In recent years many of the 
acts have been motivated by a distorted kind of punishment, carried out under the 
banner of a price tag policy, a morally very dubious practice that enacts revenge on 
Palestinians for what settlers perceive to be injustices imposed on them by the 
government.  Israeli Authorities tend to respond with an undeclared policy of leniency 
to settler violence.  Many acts of violence are not investigated.  In the rare cases where 
settlers are tried and convicted, the offenders are generally given extremely lenient 
sentences.
118
 According to Yesh Din, around 90 % of the files opened by the Police (and 
monitored by Yesh Din) investigating settler attacks against Palestinians or their 
property since 2005 were closed without an indictment being filed, due to investigation 
failure.
119
  By contrast, if Palestinians are suspected to have harmed Israelis, the 
authorities respond with an iron fist.  Towns and villages near where the incident 
occurred are placed under curfew, which can last for days, and intensive searches and 
questioning are conducted and arrests are made.  In many instances, the army also seals 
or demolishes the suspect’s home.  If Palestinians are tried and convicted of the 
offences they are accused of, they normally receive the maximum sentence.
120
  While it 
may be less explicitly legally articulated than in the case of ownership, property 
acquisition, and construction, a dual system of law is in force yet again.  Likewise, the 
press is complicit in ‘discrimination’ too.  Weeks of settler attacks on Palestinians and 
their property go almost entirely unnoticed, while one act against settlers catches the 
media’s undivided attention and immediately puts the spotlight on Palestinians.121  
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Taken out of the context of weeks of settler violence, a Palestinian attack would 
naturally appear to be an irrational and inexplicable act of violence. 
Even if we accept the Palestinian interpretation and view settlers as non-
civilians, the attacks on buses, restaurants, cafes, shopping malls in Jerusalem, Haifa, 
Tel Aviv, Hadera should clearly be understood as attacks against Israeli civilians for 
whatever motivations.  Such attacks brought the conflict to public spaces in Israel and 
reshaped the experience of space for Israelis.  It also changed its exterior.  Cafes and 
restaurants became fortified with gates and security guards checked bags and tried to 
identify visitors’ accents.  Many Israelis started to retreat to their homes for 
entertainment and began to avoid public areas.  Even now, several years after the end of 
the second intifada, shopping centres, large stores, bus stations and even several smaller 
shops operate security checks for customers.  As suicide bombings moved the conflict 
into public spaces in Israel, it served to signal that the separation principle failed.  Here, 
the civilian vs. non-civilian framework for discussing suicide bombing is a useful one.  
However, if we adopt B’Tselem’s view that settlers are civilians, the territorial aspect 
becomes particularly salient in this reading of suicide attacks.  We need to pose the 
question why civilians, and their public spaces, were targeted in Israel at a higher rate 
than in the Palestinian territories?   There may be operational considerations such as 
ease of access, for example.  Settlements are well protected but it is questionable if they 
are better guarded than the crossing points to Israel.  Falah and Flint have offered a 
geographical interpretation of suicide bombing during the second intifada, arguing that: 
‘Israeli public space is […] a target for suicide bombers because carnage in the public 
arena illustrates the impossibility of Israel’s attaining security through a policy of 
violent subjugation of the Palestinian people and confiscation of their territory.’122  
Even on this geographical reading, however, we have no explanation of why it is public 
spaces in Israel proper and not in settlements in the West Bank or Gaza that were 
targeted.  The message which it sent to the Israeli public and that the government 
capitalised on was that it was Israeli territory and the state of Israel that were at stake.  If 
the focus on territory within Israel proper was a political strategy of Palestinian 
organisations, this turned out to be a strategic faux-pas for those who had committed 
themselves to a two-state solution.  If the purpose was to bring the conflict to the 
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general Israeli public it still appears to be logically disjointed from the claim that 
Palestinians objected to the presence of settlers and soldiers on what they perceived to 
be their future state, but would accept the Israeli state as a neighbour. 
In 1993 Yasser Arafat as the chairman of the PLO had officially recognised 
Israel and its right to exist in peace and security, and this acceptance became enshrined 
in the Oslo Agreement.  Since then the public discourse of Arafat and the PLO had 
always promoted a two-state solution.  However, the two-state solution poses an 
essential difficulty for Palestinians.  The recognition of a Jewish Israeli state on 78% of 
the original land of historical Palestine would preclude the return of refugees in any 
form because any influx of a non-Jewish population would threaten the Jewish majority 
of the state of Israel.  Yet, maintaining a Jewish majority is at the heart of Zionist 
ideology.  The two-state solution leaves untouched the nature of the state of Israel and 
the ideology it promotes.
123
  However, many Palestinians saw it as the only possibility 
to salvage what was left of the historical lands of Palestine, to regain social integrity and 
to strengthen a Palestinian identity that had been severely damaged by Israel’s decades-
long occupation.
124
  
Since the failure of Oslo, especially after the end of the second intifada, the 
voices for a one-state solution have become much louder despite the fact that the official 
discourse still promotes a two-state solution.  The main issue with the two-state solution 
is not just one of justice for refugees but it is also a practical one that is becoming more 
and more apparent.  Any traveller in the West Bank will note the large number of 
settlements that dot the hills around cities, villages, in the north, the south, as well as in 
the centre.  As Edward Said noted, everywhere one looks Jews and Palestinians live 
together, and therefore the notion of separation and partition is not feasible.
125
  With an 
adamant refusal by the current Israeli government to freeze any settlement construction, 
it is difficult to see how this course could be halted and even more difficult to see how it 
could be reversed.  Further, taking into consideration the public outcry in Israel over the 
evacuation of the Gaza settlements, and keeping in mind that the West Bank had always 
been more at the heart of the Zionist project, housing some of the most significant 
religious sites such as the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron, Rachel’s Tomb in 
Bethlehem, or St Joseph’s tomb outside Nablus, a withdrawal from the West Bank looks 
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unlikely.  Moreover, the West Bank possesses more significant resources, especially the 
large underground water aquifers, the fertile land of the Jordan valley, and access to the 
Dead Sea as a major economic resource for tourism as well as industry. The 
overcrowded and poor Gaza Strip, on the other hand, had for some time been a burden 
to Israeli decision makers.
126
 
Given that Yasser Arafat, as leader of Fateh and chairman of the PLO had 
recognised Israel and officially pursued a two-state solution, it was, in Khalidi’s view, a 
significant policy misjudgement to 'quietly' condone suicide operations inside Israel by 
the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, which is widely assumed to have been affiliated with 
Fateh.
127
  Thus, to ‘unofficially’ condone suicide bombings within Israel undermined 
their own earlier policies and played into the hands of Israel who could now point at 
Yasser Arafat and his party as being inconsistent and breaking previous commitments.  
It enabled the Israeli government to garner support among the Israeli population because 
the conflict could now be framed in existentialist terms.  It helped to convince the 
public that Palestinians do not distinguish between inside and outside what they had 
claimed to be their future state.  This has led to increased public support for anything 
that is done in the name of security.
128
  Carrying out suicide bombings inside Israel may 
be consistent with the policy of Hamas and Islamic Jihad because they do not accept a 
two-state solution, and envisage a state for Palestinians in historical Palestine.  
Rendering the land that is attractive to Jews, repellent to potential immigrants by 
making its residents insecure may also be part of Hamas’ logic.129  However, suicide 
bombings inside Israel did not conform to Fateh’s and the PLO’s official political 
discourse and therefore even silent tolerance was an illogical policy step and shows a 
clear breakdown between objectives and tactics.   
Khalidi argues that campaigns that are intended to bring an end to occupation by 
attacking the civilian population are generally ineffective at breaking the will of the 
society under attack.  By contrast, Pape argues that organisations resort to suicide 
bombings because they have learnt they pay and they are perceived to be especially 
effective against democracies because they are thought to have low ‘thresholds of cost 
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tolerance and high ability to affect state policy.’130  However, attacking civilians in 
Israel’s public spaces has hardened Israeli public opinion.  What is necessary in 
changing the balance of forces is the increase of potential supporters for the Palestinian 
cause, and at the same time a decrease in the supporters for occupation and 
settlements.
131
  By tacitly allowing suicide bombings to be carried out in Israel, the 
Palestinian leadership has failed to change this balance of power.  Although the atrocity 
and violence of the acts ensured intense media interest, the sympathies of the audiences 
were overwhelmingly with the Israeli victims.
132
  In the light of the 9/11 attacks and the 
resultant call for a war on terror Israel’s leadership seized the opportunity to capitalise 
on the US administration’s rhetoric while the Palestinian leadership policies proved to 
be misplaced and damaging to their cause.  As a result the Palestinian leadership did not 
succeed in refocusing international attention on the continued occupation of Palestinian 
territory, and the ultimate source of the uprising, but lost the battle against an ever 
growing security discourse propelled by each new suicide attack.  
 
3.2 Dividing Palestinian Society 
 
As societies elsewhere, Palestinian society has not been immune to changes 
over the years.  In the Palestinian case in particular, it is major political events which 
deeply affected the fabric of society and the Palestinian way of life.  Heavily agriculture 
based societies have undergone significant transformations with the advancement of 
urbanisation.  This development has left the West Bank and Gaza largely untouched due 
to Israeli restrictions.  No major urban growth has taken place. Rather, what we have 
seen is the development of medium sized cities and labour migration has remained 
largely localised.
133
  Nevertheless, the life of villagers has been altered significantly 
through the loss of land and movement restrictions, both connected to the proximity of 
villages to settlements.  
What Palestinians identify with has changed too. After a slow beginning for 
Palestinian nationalism, interrupted by the war in 1948 and the subsequent displacement 
of Palestinians, Palestinian identity began to flourish with the outbreak of the first 
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intifada, and although it remained the strongest identity over time, other identities began 
to gain on it.  Mi’ari’s survey shows that both religious and clan identities have become 
stronger post-Oslo.
134
  However, almost paradoxically, despite the strengthening of clan 
identities, rifts along political lines within families have become more significant and 
apparent.  While previously the family had been the backbone of Palestinian society, 
political ties have become more powerful and successful in rupturing family 
affiliations.
135
  It is interesting too that, despite the cantonisation of Palestinian territory, 
local or regional allegiances have not become a more significant object of reference.  
Although localised cultures do exist and are perhaps becoming more differentiated, the 
above-mentioned survey did not register local allegiance as strong a factor as 
nationalism, religion and clan loyalty. 
Israeli measures of control have undoubtedly contributed to a difficult economic 
situation. The desire for economic well-being has supplanted the importance of the 
national project among the younger and more depoliticised generation.  Looking out for 
oneself and one’s family is a natural desire.  Over one third of yearly emigrants are 
young Palestinians in pursuit of education, employment opportunities and better life 
conditions.
136
  As the national project has lost importance the question arises whether 
the social fragmentation has occurred as a side effect of policies or whether 
fragmentation is actively encouraged as a policy to weaken the Palestinian drive for an 
independent state.  
 
3.2.1. The Impact of Loss of Land and Restricted Mobility 
 
Loss of land and restrictions on mobility have significantly affected Palestinian 
villagers. What was traditionally primarily a peasant society has experienced significant 
transformations in the past sixty years.  Beginning with the expulsion and exodus of 
Palestinians from the land that is now Israel, around 750,000 Palestinians from over 400 
villages as well as some urban neighbourhoods sought refuge under the protection of 
neighbouring countries (Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, the West Bank and East Jerusalem 
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which was under Jordanian administration, and Gaza which was then under Egyptian 
administration). A significant number of these refugees and their descendants, now in 
the third generation, still live in refugee camps in the West Bank, Gaza, and in the 
neighbouring Arab countries. UNRWA currently counts 4.7 million refugees overall, 
with 779,000 registered refugees in the West Bank of which a quarter live in 19 refugee 
camps.
137
  In Gaza the refugee population makes up three quarters of the total 
population which is over 1.5 million.  These previously rural communities are now 
packed into small dense areas on the outskirts or inside the cities of the West Bank and 
Gaza.  Balata is the most densely populated refugee camp in the West Bank with 
approximately 30,000 people living in an area of less than 0.25 square kilometre, and 
Beach Camp in Gaza counts as one of the world’s most densely populated places with 
approximately 82,000 people living on less than one square kilometre.  Fewer camps 
were established in rural areas, Far’a near the Jordan valley being one example.  The 
huge refugee influx added an additional category to the two-tiered rural vs. urban 
Palestinian society.  This has particularly affected cities as the majority of refugees 
settled in camps in the cities or near cities, adding to the urban population originally 
village-based dwellers.  As we have seen in the previous chapter, through Israeli 
resettlement plans, housing projects, house demolitions or sometimes as a result of 
economic betterment some refugees relocated to the urban centres but on the whole 
refugee camps remain closely-knit communities.
138
  They are particularly renowned for 
their political organisation which according to Yahya is characterised by intensity, 
radicalism, violence and dedication.
139
 
Since the start of the occupation of the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza, 
Israel’s land policy and settlement constructions have continuously diminished the land 
accessible to Palestinians to grow their produce and farm their animals.  The 
construction of the Separation Wall, which began in 2003, also swallowed up much 
farmland and made it inaccessible to villagers along its route.  The Bethlehem 
Governorate provides a useful example for illustrating the effects and the scale of these 
policies.  In 1967, Israel annexed approximately 10km² of land in the Northern 
Bethlehem Governorate contrary to international law.  Most of this land was 
incorporated into the new municipal boundaries of Jerusalem.  Much of the land was 
confiscated for settlement construction, infrastructure related to settlements and later, 
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the construction of the wall.  The loss of land for a society that is still heavily reliant on 
agriculture, is particularly significant.  For example, nearly 50% of the land traditionally 
belonging to the village of Beit Jala has been confiscated and so has up to 75% of the 
land which used to belong to the village of Al Khader.  Most of the olive groves 
traditionally belonging to the village of Bayt Sahur are separated from the village by the 
wall and now only those farmers that can obtain a permit issued by the Israeli military 
can access their lands.
140
  The number of permits issued to farmers to access their land 
which is now located on the other side of the wall have dropped drastically.  According 
to figures the state provided to the Association for Civil Rights in Israel, the number of 
permanent permits given to farmers living east of the Barrier to enable them to work 
their land west of the Barrier, dropped by 83% from 2006 to 2009 (from 10,037 to only 
1,640).
141
  During this period, the amount of Palestinian land west of the Barrier grew 
by 30%, and now stands at approximately 119,500 dunams.
142
  In January 2009 Israel 
issued a military order declaring the land annexed to the Israeli-controlled side of the 
wall as a closed military zone.
143
  Moreover, land loss through settlement expansion 
continues.  The major settlements located in the Bethlehem Governorate are all due to 
be expanded including Gilo, Har Gilo, Har Homa and Efrat and in addition, plans for a 
new settlement called Gi’vat Yael in the al-Walaja area have also been submitted.144  
The Bethlehem Governorate is no exception.  Most villages and towns along the 
separation wall or adjacent to settlements are affected.  In the Jordan valley Israel has 
prevented the growth of Palestinian communities by cutting off their water supply or 
declaring large areas as live fire zones.
145
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The village in its traditional sense no longer exists because most villagers seek 
work in the cities or the Israeli labour market.  Developments in machinery and large-
scale production have made it difficult for small-scale farmers to remain competitive in 
many parts of the world but expropriation of land, and restriction on mobility to access 
land (and also to market products), have deteriorated the situation of Palestinian farmers 
even further.
146
  It was mostly the rural labour force (and the refugee camp residents) 
that headed for the Israeli labour market.  When access to Israel became more difficult, 
many sought work in the nearby settlements. In 1987, for example, around 108,000 
Palestinians were employed in Israel, the number diminished in 1993 to around 84,000 
and then in 1996 further to 62,000, but before the outbreak of the second intifada at the 
end of 2000 the numbers had again increased to 145,000.
147
  Despite the fact that many 
Palestinians feel it is degrading to seek work in Israel or in settlements and within 
nationalist circles these workers are often seen with resentment,
148
 there are clear 
economic incentives with wages in the Palestinian territory being on average 
significantly lower than what a worker employed in Israel would earn.
149
  While the 
Palestinian share in the Israeli labour market has been shrinking since the first intifada, 
since 2006 Israel has begun to make a concerted effort to reduce its dependence even 
further on Palestinian workers for both economic and political reasons.
150
  With the 
boycott campaign against settlement goods and labour in settlements initiated under 
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Salam Fayyad, now this source of income has also become out of bounds for villagers.  
According to the Manufacturers Association of Israel around 22,000 Palestinians are 
employed by settlement businesses.
151
 
Despite the significant impact Israeli policies have had on villages, only very 
few have taken an active role in mobilising against the Israeli occupation. The villages 
of Nil’in, Bi’lin and Nabi Saleh are exceptions and their weekly protests attract 
journalists and international solidarity activists.  The suffering caused by the occupation 
no longer appears to lead to collective action, and Palestinians only come to protest 
when they are directly concerned.
152
 Large-scale political activism no longer takes place 
and if it does it is severely curbed by PA police presence or even intervention as has 
been described in the previous chapter.
153
  
 
3.2.2. Social, Cultural and Ideological Disintegration 
 
As Israel’s land and access policies have almost disproportionately affected rural 
areas, they have also created social division.  After the separation of the West Bank into 
three different zones of control, the majority of the rural areas came to belong to Area C 
which puts them under full Israeli security and administrative authority.  Although 
villages are often designated Area B, their adjacent lands may be situated in Area C.  
Most refugee camps, because they are located within cities or near cities are under full 
Palestinian Authority control in Area A, with the exception of Arroub, Fawwar, 
Jalazone, and Deir’Ammar, which are located in Area B which is under joint Palestinian 
and Israeli control, and Shu’fat camp (within the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem) 
and Qalandia camp, which both are in Area C.
154
  With an increase in settlement 
construction during and after Oslo, and since the start of the construction of the 
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separation wall rural areas came to be disproportionately affected by the occupation.  
Those residing or having property in area C are more vulnerable to Israeli policies.  
Beyond having to cope with various movement restrictions, they have to rely on Israel 
for anything related to territory, such as obtaining construction permits and securing 
access to water.
155
  Within zone A of the urban centres, on the other hand, the 
population can go about their daily lives mostly undisturbed with little or no contact 
with the Israeli army or administration for long periods of time.  A divide between rural 
and urban is not unusual or surprising but in the Palestinian case it has become more 
entrenched and accentuated because of Israeli policies.  A survey conducted by the PSR 
in 2000 found that 1.7% or 56,000 of the total Palestinian population changed their 
place of residence as a result of current Israeli measures.  For 60% for those who 
changed their place of residence, the proximity of residence with contact areas with 
Israeli settlements or the Israeli army was the main reason for relocation.
156
 
The question of what kind of roles the different groups – urban dwellers, 
villagers, and refugees – played in the run-up and during the intifada is difficult to 
answer. Responses in interviews were neither very informative nor conclusive.  
Refugees were thought to always have been the most vulnerable and villagers to have 
become most affected by settlements and the occupation after Oslo.  Members of 
political parties emphasised that all strata of society were represented in the intifada but 
these responses were not substantiated with much detail.
157
  The main participatory 
activities during the intifada appear to have concentrated on the refugee camps and the 
cities but in the villages activities were more specific, focusing on land loss, settlements 
and checkpoints.
158
  As has already been pointed out above, action was difficult to co-
ordinate across the different locations during the second intifada because the leadership 
was based in Ramallah and due to severe movement restrictions travel was not possible 
for prolonged periods.
159
  Centralisation does not work when mobility is impeded.  A 
woman interviewed by the Women’s Centre for Legal Aid and Counselling (WCLAC) 
during the second intifada commented that: ‘the closures and barriers that were forced 
on us by the Occupation, which denies us the freedom of movement, was a main reason 
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that we couldn’t play the supportive role to each other as before or participate in the 
events in the different regions.’160  What is true on the level of social action may also 
apply to militant action, which will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.   
In addition to creating a division between urban and rural dwellers, the 
movement restrictions have also created distinct geographical zones which could foster 
the emergence of localisms.
161
  The consolidation of localised cultures would in the 
long-term undoubtedly undermine the Palestinian national project.  Although the 
aforementioned survey by Mi’ari does not suggest that local or regional affiliation have 
become a significant factor of Palestinian identity, Palestinians do have a strong sense 
of where they are from and prejudice towards those from other areas: people from 
Ramallah often look down on those originating from the north and see them as 
conservative, while people from the north are eager to point out how conservative and 
narrow-minded society in Hebron is.  Trends in education point towards a localisation 
of Palestinian’s centre of life within their own regions.  The number of students 
attending universities located within their own regions has progressively increased since 
1996.
162
  This trend may partly be motivated by financial considerations but partly also 
has its roots in the growing system of movement control.  Localisation also manifests 
itself in terms of disparate social and economic experiences.  Economic figures from the 
late 1990s suggest an increasing disparity between the different regions with poverty 
being particularly high in Bethlehem, Jenin and Jericho. In a report issued in 1999 the 
Palestinian Economic and Policy Research Institute identified declining standards of 
living in the north of the West Bank and Bethlehem.
163
  This trend continued, with the 
Institute’s subsequent report stating that families with the lowest standards of living 
were in the south and the north and that the gap in comparison to other regions was 
widening with the centre being best off.
164
 
Meanwhile, Ramallah has turned into somewhat of an anomaly. With access to 
Jerusalem having become increasingly difficult since Oslo, Ramallah has developed 
into a ‘temporary’ capital.  All government offices are located in Ramallah and a 
number of countries have established representations in the city.  It is an exceptional 
case when it comes to internal migration too.  While internal migration in the West 
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Bank to urban centres is low because of slow urban development, Ramallah has 
attracted educated employees to work in services and educational institutions.
165
  
Ramallah, designated as area A and under full control of the Palestinian Authority, is 
often described as a ‘five star’ occupation and is the one place in the West Bank where 
occupation is least noticeable on a day-to-day basis.  Life in Ramallah stands in stark 
contrast to how it is experienced in other parts of the West Bank.   
The city is also hailed to be the most liberal place in the West Bank because of 
the presence of a Christian minority.  However, this cannot the sole factor because 
Bethlehem, for example, has a Christian minority, too, but is not as free and liberal.  
Rather, Ramallah’s special status is more likely to be explained by the lack of close 
family ties among its residents.  Young educated Palestinians move away from their 
families to Ramallah in search of employment. In other West Bank cities, such as 
Nablus, for example, family networks are much stronger within the city, keeping a 
check on the behaviour of family members.  The constraints then appear to be more of a 
social rather than religious nature.  Perhaps it is precisely because of its status as liberal, 
that the election results of the 2006 were so surprising.  Out of four available seats
166
 in 
the constituency vote in the Ramallah and al-Bireh district all four went to Hamas 
which stood as Change and Reform and only the Christian quota seat went to Fateh.  In 
Jenin on the other hand, which was described by Israel during the second intifada as the 
hotbed of extremists and terrorists,
167
 two seats went to Fateh and two to Hamas.
168
 
Ramallah has also attracted a high number of international NGOs as well as 
international organisations and with it many international employees.  Some restaurants 
and cafes in Ramallah cater solely for these internationals and the globalised Palestinian 
elite (which also includes returnees from the USA).
169
  Indeed, in many ways 
Ramallah’s outlook is almost more international than Palestinian.  For Lisa Taraki, 
Ramallah, in contrast to the more parochial cities of the West Bank like Hebron, Nablus 
or Jenin, incorporates more cosmopolitan aspects similar to the large metropolises in the 
region such as Cairo or Beirut.  At the same time, being subject to the same regime of 
spatial control, it is just like the other cities of the West Bank in being insulated from its 
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surroundings.  These two contradictory aspects – spatial restriction and globalised 
outlook – turn Ramallah into a kind of paradoxical case of a globalised localism.170  
Ultimately, the sense of freedom and global connectivity are simply an illusion that is 
easily shattered when stepping out of the perimeter of the city. 
For Rema Hammami the processes taking place in Palestine are akin to what has 
been taking place in other parts of the world.  The Palestinian experience is comparable 
to the more global convergence of new forms of inequality as well as a global 
convergence in how inequality is controlled through policing and securitisation rather 
than conflict resolution.
171
  As inequality has become spatially manifested, particular 
geographies and landscapes of exclusion have emerged.  Connected to this is the issue 
of mobility. While in the age of globalisation global capital and elites are extremely 
mobile, the underclasses, as Hammami calls them, are made immobile and are forced 
into confined spaces of territory.  While these new forms of inequality have similarities 
with the situation of Palestinians living under Israeli occupation, it is different in that 
the driving force in the Palestinian case is not economic, as it is in other parts of the 
world, but essentially colonial and political.
172
  Moreover, Hammami argues that 
Palestinians are subject to this as a whole nation because they lack citizenship.
173
 
However, what Hammami fails to point out is that within Palestinian society these 
measures have affected Palestinians unequally and have created a rift between a more 
mobile elite and a disadvantaged majority.  In fact, this has occurred in two ways.  
Firstly, as we have already seen the spatial regime has created a division between the 
marginalised, mostly rural, society who bear the brunt of the movement restrictions and 
settlement expansions, and the urban dwellers with easier access to services and 
opportunities.  Second, the political processes linked to Oslo have also created a 
political elite that enjoys certain benefits despite the Israeli occupation.  For example, 
the PA leadership receives special VIP passes from the Israeli Civil Administration that 
allow them to move around relatively freely, give them priority at checkpoints, and also 
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permit travel to Israel.
174
  In addition, Oslo had also created an economic elite with 
strong political connections benefiting from privileges in the private sector
175
 as well as 
a new social class through the influx of international funding into NGOs.  ‘NGOs are 
among the few workplaces perceived to operate according to professionalism.  They 
have thus become desirable workplaces for a new generation of middle class 
professionals who view NGO employment as a career path to more lucrative salaries 
and prestigious jobs in international organisations.  Speaking English, dressing well and 
maintaining a nice office are all part of this culture.’176  The salaries of NGO 
professionals stand in stark contrast to those of other Palestinian employees, especially 
the appallingly underpaid public sector, including teachers, social workers and the 
police.  The Palestinian Civil Servants Union chief stated in 2011 that most employees’ 
salaries run out within two weeks of each month.
177
 
The social divisions in Palestinian society came to the fore at the outbreak of the 
second intifada and lead Heacock to conclude that the second intifada was an uprising 
of the marginalised masses against the globalised elite.  Had Arafat not refused to 
accept the terms set by Israel and the US at Camp David, Palestinians might have been 
ready to turn against the Palestinian Authority.
178
  After Palestinians realised what the 
consequences of Oslo were and with increasing corruption within the PA, unrest may 
have easily erupted against the Palestinian Authority.  Arafat’s rejection of Camp David 
brought back some popularity for himself and his party.  Issues such as the status of 
Jerusalem and control over holy sites and refugees were not perceived to be negotiable 
and for refusing to compromise on these issues, Arafat was greeted by the population as 
a hero on his return to Gaza from Camp David.
179
 
Scholarship on the second intifada has largely focused on the political processes 
but has overlooked the social cleavages and internal struggle.  The second intifada was 
an uprising against the continuation of the Israeli occupation but at the same time, as we 
have seen in chapter two, also a reaction to the failure of the PA.  It was a movement 
imposed by the marginalised masses on their own political social and cultural elites who 
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were made responsible for the deterioration of the living conditions and the widespread 
corruption since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority:
180
  
 
There was no question for anyone witnessing the events as to who was from 
the start at the forefront: the Palestinian masses, self-organized and led by 
their organisations, Fateh’s Tanzim and al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades under 
populist and opposition-minded people like Marwan Barghouti, as well as 
the militias of Hamas – ‘Izzedin al-Qassam Brigades – and the Islamic Jihad 
– Saraya al-Quds. The PA was marginalized from the beginning, and very 
rapidly it dissolved de facto through its absence from the scene. This 
absence was noticed by all, and when mass rallies could be held, which was 
not frequently possible because of the violence of the Israeli response to 
crowds approaching their positions, they were neither organised nor 
frequently addressed by PA members.
181
   
 
While grassroot militants were able to attract a mass audience nobody in the PA was 
able to do so, contrary to conventional accounts, which emphasise the control by the 
leadership over the events, and Arafat’s popularity.182  
Indeed, one may even go so far as to suggest that the leadership abandoned its 
people during the intifada.  Raja Shehadeh notes in his diary on the Israeli siege on 
Ramallah in Spring 2003, that the militants were left to defend Ramallah and fend for 
themselves without any instructions or protection from the leadership against the might 
of the Israeli army.
183
  A female respondent in an interview carried out by the WCLAC 
during the second intifada expressed her frustration at the lack of leadership:  
 
The informed ones, however, did not buy the PNA’s line of talk.  They were 
out there participating in both intifadas. The leadership, however, didn’t 
leave them alone, but went after them.  There was never a time when the 
leadership was on the front lines, neither in the first or the second intifada. 
The leadership used to call for the people to follow, it actually was the 
leadership who followed … There was a big gap between the young people 
participating in the intifadas, the ones who were continuing to struggle, and 
the PNA leadership. In my view, the leadership played a destructive role by 
trying to calm the situation, and they were always in collaboration with the 
Israelis.
184
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Quiet tolerance of the uprising and quasi self-dissolution may have been the 
only option for the PA, as it lacked the structural requirements for balancing armed 
struggle and broader civil disobedience.  Throwing its full force behind the struggle 
would have amounted to political suicide, so would have policing and oppression of its 
people in the new intifada.
185
  In fact, Palestinians kept their leaders in check.  When 
Mahmoud Abbas repeatedly condemned the militarisation of the intifada he rapidly lost 
public support.
186
  Palestinians disliked his insistence that they should cease violence 
while Israel was imposing collective punishment on the entire population.
187
 It was clear 
that if Abbas had been able to obtain more power he would have curbed the resistance 
groups.
188
 The strong commitment he made to ending what he referred to as Palestinian 
violence in a speech during a televised ceremony in the course of the Aqaba summit in 
2003, cost him popular support and accelerated the demise of his government.
189
 
 
3.2.3 Solidarity and Social Action 
 
Rosemary Sayigh argued in From Peasants to Revolutionaries that the custom 
of giving and providing, central aspects of family solidarity, and help in times of 
sickness or unemployment has been far more the basis for economic survival of the 
Palestinian refugees than assistance provided by UNRWA.
190
  It is, in fact, this ability to 
organise themselves and their daily lives that has helped Palestinians to cope with the 
conditions of the occupation for decades.  Despite the military and economic measures 
and closure policies, localism and traditional family economics have enabled 
Palestinians to continue their lives.  It is noteworthy that the intifada continued despite 
the rapid deterioration of economic conditions.
191
 The brunt of the efforts and sacrifices 
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of the uprising was borne by the people in the refugee camps and the villages, many day 
labourers, some peasants, and many unemployed.
192
 
However, solidarity appears to have become less widespread and less organised 
in the second intifada.  The first intifada created small institutions that fostered 
solidarity.
193
  In the second intifada such institutions did not emerge for two reasons:  
Firstly, by the time the second intifada erupted, PA institutions providing services for 
the population had been in place and functioning, in either a sufficient or insufficient 
manner, for several years.  Unlike in the first intifada where the administration was 
under Israeli control, there was little scope and reason to create alternative institutions 
alongside these services.  Nevertheless, as the intifada unfolded, the government was no 
longer in a position to provide health services.  Hospitals for instance, were closed and 
only emergency rooms operated.
194
  Moreover, as already mentioned earlier, movement 
restrictions made any form of large-scale organisation and co-ordination impossible 
and, as such, precluded the possibility of far-reaching support efforts.  In the absence of 
governmental provisions, non-governmental mobilisation was crucial and spurts of 
social action among the population did occur, especially when in direct contact with 
Israeli violence.  As political violence intensified, people began to organise themselves 
again.  In a sense, it was a reactive approach to particular situations and extreme 
problems in comparison to the first intifada, where civil society actively mobilised and 
pursued strategies.  For example, several hotlines were set up when Ramallah was under 
curfew from 18 March to 23 April.  Doctors, for example, could phone in to request 
mattresses or medical equipment.  These requests were then coordinated with Um al 
Fahm, an Arab town just over the Green Line.  Donations were collected in support of 
Palestinians and once the curfew was lifted the much needed equipment was transported 
to Ramallah.
195
  Raja Shehadeh also describes how the medical services, together with 
the media and a group of foreigners managed to save 21 men trapped in a building near 
Arafat’s compound.  In a similar incident the day before, five men trapped in a building 
were shot by the Israeli army.
196
   
 Class divides and concerns of social conduct also disappear under such extreme 
circumstances.  During attacks people would shelter in any house they could find and 
doors would be open to anyone who needed assistance.  One interviewee recounted the 
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story of a conservative women she knew who was living with her children by herself.  
Despite the consequences this might have for her she hid men who were trying to 
escape the army in her house.  When confronted with the Israeli army, she put at risk the 
job she had with an international organisation and potentially exposed herself to 
scrutiny over her social conduct by harbouring these men.
197
 
The decrease of solidarity and cooperation, however, can also be interpreted as a 
shift of focus to the external world.  While in the first intifada Palestine was comparable 
to a large village, during the second intifada the availability of technology enabled 
people to communicate with the outside world.  The fact that Palestinians were now 
connected with the world shifted focus away from the community.
198
  Rather than 
community action, then, it was the dissemination of information through the internet to 
the outside world that played an important role during the second intifada.  This fits in 
with what Khalili depicts as a trend of a discourse of suffering which, driven primarily 
by solidarity activists and NGOs, and juxtaposes the imagery of a heroic narrative 
embraced by militants as well as agents of the quasi-state, albeit in different ways.
199
   
The shift from community action and participation in the first intifada to information 
dissemination about human rights violations by the Israeli military and security forces 
embodies a sense of passivity of society at large that characterised the second intifada.  
Instead, responsibility for resistance was relocated to international actors.
200
  In the first 
intifada it had been the entire public that participated in heroic acts, while in the second 
uprising, the people were primarily victims with the exception of martyrs who became 
tragic heroes that sacrificed their lives for the community. 
Palestinian society’s non-participation and focus to the outside, was in large part 
due to the fact that it was unable to participate because it had become physically but 
also structurally impossible and one of the advantages of access to the internet, 
however, was that it enabled Palestinians to bypass the more selective media channels 
and in this way were able to mobilise their ‘audiences’ worldwide directly.  It should be 
stressed, however, that this was nevertheless a limited phenomenon as technology is not 
available to all Palestinians equally.   Although mobile phones appear to be widely used 
in the West Bank now, few homes have computers and even fewer have an internet 
connection.  A survey conducted by the PSR in February 2000 suggests that home 
                                                 
197 INTERVIEW #14. 
198 INTERVIEW # 17 
199 Laleh Khalili, Heroes and Martyrs of Palestine: The Politics of National Commemoration 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2007), 190-211. 
200 Phenomenon described by Khalili. Ibid., 204-5. 
162 
 
phone ownership stood at 54% and mobile phone ownership at 39%.  Satellite dish 
ownership was at 44%, home computer ownership at 13%, home internet subscription at 
6%, and office internet subscription at 5%. 
3.2.4 Identity 
 
As everywhere else in the world, identity for Palestinians has not remained static 
but has developed according to events and trends both within Palestinian society and 
outside it.  Rashid Khalidi argues that identity in the context of Arab peoples should be 
understood as multiple foci of identity.  Given the lack of a state or a unified 
educational system, a Palestinian would most likely refer to identity as a number of 
‘historical narratives’, each carrying a somewhat different message.201  Hence, 
Palestinian identity cannot be explained without looking at its interrelation with broad 
powerful transnational foci of identity, especially Arabism and Islam, and other 
influential regional as well as local identities.
202
  
The earlier cited study by Mahmoud Mi’ari suggests that while Palestinian 
identity has remained the prominent identity for most Palestinians, by the time the 
second intifada erupted, religious identities as well as identification with the clan (or 
hamula in Arabic), had gained significantly on Palestinian identity.  Arab identity was 
the strongest identity during the Mandate period and after the nakba but its strength 
deteriorated with the failure of the Arabs to achieve Arab unity and liberate Palestine 
which culminated in the Arabs’ immense defeat in 1967.  The conclusion that 
Palestinians drew from this was that they would have to rely on themselves to regain 
control of Palestinian territory.  After the 1967 war, Fateh began to dominate the 
Palestinian national movement and took over the PLO which had been established in 
1964.  Fateh emphasised Palestinian nationality by adopting a Palestinian nationalist 
ideology rather than an Arab nationalist ideology promising that Palestinians would be 
liberated through Palestinian action rather than Arab unity.  While Palestinian identity 
continued to be the strongest identity, it lost dominance under the PA, as a result of the 
strengthening of other identities, especially Muslim identity.
203
  Under the PA 
Palestinians became nearly polarised between those who consider themselves foremost 
Palestinian and those who consider themselves primarily Muslim.  However, this 
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polarisation was weakened during the al-Aqsa intifada in favour of national identity.
204
  
The strengthening of the Muslim identity is best explained by the increasing popularity 
of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, coupled with other factors such as the deterioration of 
socioeconomic conditions, the failure of the political peace process and growing reports 
of corruption within the ranks of the PA.
205
  
Traditional identities, such as the hamula identity, have also strengthened under 
PA rule, especially during the al- Aqsa intifada.
206
  Traditional social institutions gained 
importance and provided solutions to some problems faced by society.
207
  The same 
factors that strengthened Muslim identity during the years under PA control also 
strengthened traditional and parochial ties.  In addition to this, the weakening of the 
Palestinian parties, and PA support for clan structure also contributed to its rise.  What 
is interesting, however, is that clan identities have become stronger while family ties 
appear to have lost importance.
208
  Particularly, after the election of Hamas in 2006 
(Mi’ari’s survey ends in 2006), we have seen severe political divisions in Palestine, 
primarily between supporters of Fateh and supporters of Hamas, often within the same 
families.
209
  
Identities are often manipulated or even created in order to gain or maintain 
power.  Divide and rule was widely practiced by colonial powers, including the British, 
in Mandate Palestine and elsewhere, in order to keep the indigenous population under 
control. The politics of division applied by the British was later also emulated by the 
Israeli government both on a regional as well as local level.  Karmi argues that Israel 
and its supporters have been pursuing a politics of fragmentation in the entire region of 
the Middle East in order to ensure the supremacy of Israel but also to guarantee the 
survival of Israel as a Jewish state.  Because Palestinian land was already inhabited, it 
required considerable force and coercion in order to appropriate and retain the land.
210
 
The newly created state would have to maintain itself through military superiority 
which was guaranteed through the support of strong Western powers.  The 
fragmentation of Arabs into small minorities would ensure the supremacy of the Jewish 
state as one cohesive entity.  On the domestic level, Israel applied this principle of 
division by categorising Israel’s non-Jewish population into Muslims, Christians and 
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Druze and so disrupting the collective identity of the Arab inhabitants of the land.
211
  In 
fact, from the beginning Israeli governments bestowed a semi-privileged status on the 
Druze population.  The majority of the Druze consider themselves to be a distinct 
religious group, but the Israeli government also designated the Druze as a distinct ethnic 
group in 1957.  Culturally, the Druze are considered Arab and their language is Arabic, 
but they did not pursue Arab nationalism with the establishment of Israel in 1948.
212
   
The politics of identity practised by consecutive Israeli governments also led to 
a polarised and increasingly influential focus of religion in the conflict.  The division on 
the basis of religious identity, the rhetoric of the Promised Land, and the desire for 
recognition of Israel as a Jewish state, has strengthened the influence of religion on the 
Palestinian side too.  Ghada Karmi succinctly summarises this as follows:  ‘As a Jewish 
state, it had established a concept of statehood based on religion, in contradistinction to 
the modern state whose citizens are not defined by their creed.  It should be no surprise 
that this paradigm promoted by Israel and its supporters so fervently, in time provoked a 
reaction in kind, with Islam as the counter point to Judaism.’213  
Changes in identity and growing divisions are intrinsically tied to the Palestinian 
national project and find their expression in political activism.  The strengthening of 
both the hamula and religious identity have also found their expression in political 
activism during the second intifada, a topic that will be further examined in the next 
chapter. 
 
3.2.5 The Islamist and Secularist Divide 
 
Although Islamist and secular trends appear to presently co-exist in Palestinian 
society, Mahdi Abdul Hadi argues that secularists are losing their footing while the 
Islamists are extending their influence.  Secularists are increasingly less able to affect 
public opinion and they are also less willing to speak out publicly.  Their influence 
among the middle classes in particular, has diminished and for Abdul Hadi, it is this 
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class that had suffered the most from the deprivations of Palestinian society.
214
  Those 
marginalised through Israeli policies and PA misrule have come to see themselves more 
represented by Hamas.  As people have become disillusioned with the leftists who could 
not offer a solution and the nationalists who have failed to achieve any tangible results, 
it appears the population is increasingly turning to religion.
215
 
It is, for instance, noticeable that in Ramallah, despite its liberal status, the rules 
of Ramadan are strictly enforced by the police.  In the past, restaurants in Ramallah 
were open for eating out during Ramadan.  Those that wanted to fast could, but those 
who did not could still freely have a meal in public.
216
  This is no longer the case.  
Throughout the month of Ramadan all restaurants are closed and although some prepare 
food during the day it is only available for take-away.  A handful of the more Western-
oriented cafes are open, but very discreetly so.  A shopkeeper even sent a hungry 
customer away for fear of police punishment when he asked if he could eat his 
sandwich and drink his coke inside the shop.  
It should be noted, however, that secularism in Palestine is not comparable to 
secularism in Europe where religion and the state are considered separate entities. There 
are very few true secularists in Palestinian society.
217
  Even leftist parties usually use 
religious language in an attempt to broaden their support base.  Women have even 
begun to appear at leftist rallies wearing the hijab.
218
  Arafat too used religious elements 
in his speeches extensively because he wanted to appeal to a wider audience.
219
  It is, of 
course, often mistakenly assumed that Fateh is a secular party, when in fact it would 
more correctly be described as a movement incorporating a wide spectrum of ideologies 
from the far left to Islamists.
220
 
During the field work for this thesis, I attended a graduation ceremony of the 
Nursing College in al-Bireh.  Throughout the entire ceremony, which took place in the 
courtyard of the college, religious language was used and the ceremony also included a 
prayer.  By contrast, graduation ceremonies that are held at Durham University and 
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which take place in Durham Cathedral clearly state before the commencement of the 
ceremony that this is not a religious service, in order to accommodate those visitors that 
belong to a different faith or who are not religious at all.  Another example that may 
illustrate how deeply intertwined religion and society are in Palestine is the following.  
During a language session at Birzeit University, one student was asked by the teacher 
what her religion was.  She openly stated that she was not religious.  This was so 
inconceivable to the instructor that the rest of the teaching session could not move on 
until she gave in and said that she was Christian. For the teacher everybody was 
religious; one either had to be Christian, Jewish or Muslim. 
A traditional split between secular nationalism and Islamism does not exist in 
Palestine for cultural and historical reasons.  The Islamic movement in Palestine is not 
considered to be in antithesis to the national movement and most of the early Fateh 
leaders had been close to the Muslim Brotherhood and these influences continued to 
pervade the party.
221
  However, the spatial and political divide between the West Bank 
and Gaza has now almost artificially imposed such a split between secular and 
religious.
222
  Some division between Gaza and the West Bank has always been apparent.  
In the Palestinian Legislative Council, for example, there was a traditional divide 
between those members originating from the West Bank and those from Gaza.
223
  The 
current impasse between the political parties and the siege on Gaza, has created two de-
facto governments and two quasi-sovereign entities, a reality that would publicly never 
be admitted.
224
  In the long-term this separation could have much more serious 
consequences for Palestinian national unity because it geographically reinforces 
historical, political and potentially ideological divisions.  
An insight into the relationship between the secular and religious in Palestinian 
society will set the context for better understanding the debates that ensued on the role 
of religion in the al-Aqsa intifada and religious motivations behind suicide bombing.  
This will be discussed further in the following chapter. 
 
3.3. A Policy of Disempowerment or Natural Course? 
 
As suggested by Heacock’s analysis, some see the divisions created within 
Palestinian society as a policy pursued by Israel and the international community to 
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weaken Palestinian national ambitions.  Keeping Palestinians fragmented and dependent 
certainly has had a visible impact.  Dependency on foreign donors, in particular, 
provides a very effective check on political developments inside the Palestinian 
territories.
225
 The elections in 2006 are naturally the most obvious example here.  When 
Palestinians embraced democracy and cast their vote, foreign donors punished the 
Palestinian people for what to the international onlookers as well as Israel was evidently 
not an acceptable choice.   
Internally, the presence of the Palestinian Authority gives a misleading illusion 
of sovereignty and independence.  Indeed it creates a deceptive state of normalcy, 
especially for those that live directly under its control rather than those in the more rural 
parts that are confronted on a daily basis with the effects of occupation.  This bubble of 
illusion easily burst, even for Ramallah, with the outbreak of the second intifada where 
the leadership, partly unwilling but also partly powerless, was unable to protect and 
alleviate the strains on the population throughout the duration of the uprising.  As we 
have already seen in chapter two, this discrepancy between the expectations relating to a 
semi-sovereign entity, and the actual situation played a significant role in fuelling the 
frustration of the population at the outbreak of the intifada.  
It is not only analysts that come to this conclusion.  It is a development that 
many residents of Ramallah in particular, seem to be acutely aware of.  The ‘Ramallah 
Syndrome’ blog website was created precisely as a response to this sense of ruptured 
reality between occupation and illusive sovereignty and economic well-being.  The site 
describes its purpose as the following:  
 
Ramallah Syndrome is the side effect of the new spatial and social order that 
emerged after the collapse of the Oslo “peace process”.  It is manifested in a 
kind of “hallucination of normality”, the fantasy of a co-existence of 
occupation and freedom. It is as if the establishment of a sovereign 
Palestinian state – in effect, indefinitely postponed – will be achieved 
through pure illusion.  The consequence of this perpetual persistence of a 
colonial regime has not been sufficiently discussed.  The colonial legacy is a 
vital link in national identity, and it must be resolved. Ramallah Syndrome 
                                                 
225 Sara Roy argues that aid has depoliticised the roots of the suffering of the Palestinian people.  
Focusing solely on the humanitarian consequences of the occupation, Palestinians are deprived of their 
voices and desire for self-determination.  See Sara Roy in “Strangled by Aid,” Palestine Monitor 3 
October 2010, http://www.palestinemonitor.org/spip/spip.php?article1556.  Ilana Feldman has also 
pointed out that humanitarianism and aid are frequently used as a tool against Palestinians’ political 
aspirations.  See Ilana Feldman, “Gaza’s Humanitarianism Problem,” Journal of Palestine Studies 38, 
no.3 (Spring 2009): 22-37.  
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is ultimately about the critique and potentiality associated with forms of 
resistance and subjugation in a colonial context.
226
    
 
For participants in this blog, Ramallah has turned into a safe space, a bubble, where 
people do not care what occurs in the rest of the territory and where consumption takes 
priority over political activism. 
However social fragmentation could also be a natural course of development 
towards statehood.  One interviewee related a discussion with a painter working in her 
family home during the first intifada.  While the interviewee clearly stated that she was 
happy about the intifada and felt that things were going the right way, the painter 
challenged her view and argued that there will be no liberation before Palestine has seen 
a civil war.  He pointed to Europe and argued that Europeans could not have built their 
democratic states without a civil war.  By the same token, Palestinians must ‘tidy’ their 
homes first before they can build an independent state.
227
  
Certainly, there has often been much blame directed at the occupation for all the 
difficulties and problems in Palestinian society and politics. In a brief lecture on the 
American Civil Rights Movement delivered by Professor Clayborne Carson to a small 
group of students at Birzeit University, his suggestion that without internal social 
struggle justice against oppression cannot be achieved left most of the students rather 
unimpressed. Many certainly seemed to abide by the motto: occupation first, then 
internal reform.
228
 
 Returning to Rashid Khalidi’s observation on the social and political divisions in 
the wake of 1948, it seems that it was still political and social differences, albeit in a 
slightly different form and for different reasons, that were plaguing the Palestinians at 
the outset of the second intifada.  Oslo had created a spatial system of control that 
certainly affected some more than others, and created privileges for a small political 
elite.  Those marginalised turned their frustration against the leadership and followed 
the lead of the opposition-minded Young Guard of the Fateh movement and Hamas.  
How this context of political and social division has impeded the re-emergence of the 
kind of political activism of the first intifada was discussed in this and the previous 
chapter.  How it has given rise to militancy, especially the phenomenon of suicide 
bombing, during the second uprising will be the subject of the following chapter.  
                                                 
226 “Ramallah Syndrome – Side Effects of A Post-Oslo Spatial Regime,” Ramallah Syndrome Blog, 
http://ramallahsyndrome.blogspot.com/ (accessed 12 August 2011). 
227 INTERVIEW #12. 
228 Clayborne Carson, “The History of the Non-Violence Movement in the Context of the US Civil Rights 
Movement,” (Lecture, IALIIS, Birzeit University, 4 March 2010). 
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3.4 Conclusions 
 
The previous chapter had discussed the reassertion of political factionalism over 
the Oslo period, the rising frustration at occupation policies and the PA’s weakness at 
alleviating these and delivering services to its own population.  This chapter has dealt 
with social division, primarily emerging from the territorial dislocation that the 
Palestinians have experienced, especially since 1967.  The chapter has explored the 
unique situation of the Palestinian territories as a ruptured space, directly challenging 
accounts of Palestinian political violence based on a homogenous understanding of 
territory.  Moreover, it has continued to highlight the existence and construction of 
competing narratives, this time between Palestinians and Israelis in relation to the 
ownership of the land, which again challenges the epistemological claims to impartiality 
and neutrality implicit in explanations anchored within the political science discipline. 
An insight into the particular configuration of the territories also takes issue with 
some of the ontological claims made by explanations based on traditional political 
science models to fixed entities that do not vary across space and time. Treating 
territory as homogenous and ubiquitously similar, leads inevitably to a distortion of the 
explanation of suicide bombing in the second intifada.  Such models cannot explain 
why this particular form of political violence asserted itself vis-à-vis other tactics during 
this period and who within society engaged in it.  By looking at the unique territorial 
configuration of the Palestinian territories and the impact of the occupation, this thesis 
can offer a much clearer answer to these questions.   
The dislocation of the territories through Israel’s occupation policies has 
unsurprisingly created a number of different Palestinian lived geographies.  Hence this 
chapter has opened up the question as to how the occupation has affected the population 
in different ways, especially along the lines of urban, rural and refugee camp residents.  
Harker has noted that a few authors have begun to explore how the realities of the 
occupation ‘weave in and out of the daily lives of Palestinians living in the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip.’229  Rather than treating Palestinians simply as populations, approaches 
that break society down into individuals and communities allow for much richer 
accounts.
230
  Nevertheless, there is still a general dearth of studies investigating the 
particularities of these heterogeneous spaces, particularly in the traditional political 
                                                 
229 Harker, “New Geographies,” 204. 
230 Ibid. 
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violence literature where the tendency is to treat Palestinian society as a homogenous 
whole.   
The previous two chapters have traced the transformation in how the Israeli 
authorities have governed both the Palestinian territories and its people.  The Oslo 
Accords have played a key role in re-structuring the occupation in political, economic 
and territorial terms.  What has developed out of the discussion so far is that ‘different 
occupations’ enable different strategies of national liberation and this is why political 
activism has changed from the first to the second intifada.  Analysts such as Pape who 
treat occupation as a monolithic universally applicable principle, and measure its impact 
in terms of casualties, are unable to offer insights into the changing nature of political 
action, and answer why at certain points in time some forms of activism have prevailed 
over others.  The insights offered in this chapter are a critical response to accounts that 
ignore the changing nature of the occupation as well as those who compare it 
unquestioningly to other colonial instances.  The subtleties of this occupation, its 
relation to the territory and how it governs Palestinians can only fully be comprehended 
through an understanding of how the Israeli national project grew out of a particular set 
of historical circumstances, political ambitions and ideological justifications in relation 
to this particular plot of land.  The impact of which cannot simply be measured in 
casualties.  Israel’s desire to join the ranks of Western liberal democracies has imposed 
some constraint and has necessitated justification for its policies and treatment of 
Palestinians.  These have largely been formulated within a security framework, a 
discourse that resonates particularly well against the backdrop of century-long 
discrimination, persecution and killing of Jewish communities.  The primary concern of 
subsequent Israeli governments with territory has set in motion a process accomplished 
through bureaucratic, legal as well as military means that seeks to depopulate as much 
of this territory as possible and takes the form of house demolitions, denial of permits, 
discriminatory water distribution, and withdrawal of residency amongst other measures.  
Hence, the argument here is that knowing the intricacies of Israel’s occupation policies 
and how they affect Palestinians is essential for understanding how they connect to 
Palestinian political activism.  
The next chapter will bring the discussion of the previous two chapters together, 
examining how the territorial, political and social developments identified so far, have 
shaped the emergence and perseverance of suicide bombing as a means of Palestinian 
political activism during the second intifada.  
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4. Explaining Suicide Bombing 
 
… 
 
You standing at the doorsteps, enter 
and drink Arabic coffee with us 
(you might sense you are human like us) 
you standing at the doorstep of houses, 
get out of our mornings, 
we need reassurance that we 
are human like you! 
 
… 
 
The martyr clarifies for me: I didn’t search beyond the expanse 
for immortal virgins, because I love life 
on earth, among the pines and figs, but 
I couldn’t find a way to it, 
so I looked for it with the last thing I owned: 
blood in the lapis body 
 
The martyr teaches me: no aesthetic outside my freedom 
 
The martyr cautions me: Don’t believe the women’s zaghareed 
and believe my father when he looks into my picture tearfully: 
How did you swap our roles, my son, 
and walk ahead of me? 
Me first 
and me first!
1
 
 
 
 
 The aggression used by Israeli military forces, especially in the early stages 
of the uprising, undoubtedly contributed to the escalation of the violence.  Bloom 
notes that Sharon’s aggression led to a rise in support for suicide bombings among 
the Palestinian population.  However, the central argument advanced here is that 
Palestinian violence was not simply a reaction to Israeli military violence but, rather, 
it was deeply structured by the political, territorial and social developments that were 
discussed in previous chapters.  Territorial fragmentation and social division in 
participation as an outcome of unequal impact of the occupation will be central 
themes in the discussion.  Territorial fragmentation will prove useful both for 
explaining participation but also recruitment patterns.  This highlights, again, that 
neglecting the unique territorial dislocation in the Palestinian case is a major 
weakness of political science models of Palestinian political violence.  The political 
                                                 
1Verses taken from Mahmoud Darwish, “A State of Siege,” 121 – 78. 
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fragmentation which came to the fore during the second intifada, further 
demonstrates that organisations can also not be treated as homogenous as the 
question of suicide bombing did not only cause intense debates among the different 
political organisations but was even disputed internally, especially between military 
and political wings.  Finally, the chapter will conclude with a section on women to 
engage critically with de-contextualised accounts of female suicide bombing. 
 
4.1. A Context of Violence and Organisational Rationale 
 
The bulk of studies on suicide bombing focus exclusively on the 
manifestation of this phenomenon and do not see it as embedded in the wider range 
of tactics employed by groups and Palestinians in general.  Singling out suicide 
bombings portrays an imbalance in the range of activism made use of by Palestinians 
against Israel.  As stated at the outset, this thesis explores the transformation of 
political activism over a period of time and is as such able to provide a much more 
holistic insight into the reasons for its emergence.  Naturally, suicide bombings are 
more likely to attract attention because of their high lethality, the dramatic and 
graphic effects and its premeditated nature.  Looking at the second intifada as a 
whole, however, several strands of activism can be identified which at various stages 
took precedence over other tactics: in the early stages non-violent mass 
demonstrations and activities similar to the first intifada dominated the popular level; 
the PA leadership fluctuated between tacit consent and political strategies;  militant 
activities of various forms, driven predominantly by the militant wings of the 
political factions were widespread throughout the intifada and peaked particularly in 
the intermediate years.  These activities ranged from suicide bombings to more 
guerrilla-style tactics such as shooting attacks against military targets and 
settlements.
2
  While, according to data provided in the Journal of Palestine Studies, 
135 suicide bombings were carried out since the outbreak of the second intifada until 
                                                 
2
 Ricolfi’s statistical analysis of incidents during the second intifada reports three levels of conflict: 
extremist Palestinian militancy which include suicide and fratricidal missions; military combat; and 
popular street violence. Hence suicide bombings were only one tactic used alongside other more 
guerrilla-style tactics by organisations during the second intifada. See Luca Ricolfi, “Palestinians, 
1981-2003,” in Making Sense of Suicide Missions, ed. Diego Gambetta, 77-130 (Oxford: OUP 2005), 
127. 
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the end of 2004 as well as 84 non-suicide bombing attacks,
3
 it is much more difficult 
to obtain data on other kinds of Palestinian militant activity.  However, interviewees 
did report of shooting attacks against Israeli targets, often from Palestinian 
residential areas, or from among Palestinian crowds during demonstrations.
4
  
RAND’s terrorism database logs 112 armed attacks in Israel (including settlements) 
between 1 October 2000 and the end of December 2004.
5
  Although the identity of 
the perpetrators is not always identified the vast majority of these attacks appear to 
have been carried out by Palestinians or from Palestinian areas, especially Bethlehem 
and Beit Jala, which run alongside major Israeli settlements in the Jerusalem vicinity. 
That suicide bombing is heavily contextualised is also supported by the fact 
that suicide bombings almost entirely stopped with the end of the intifada.  While 
Israeli administration points to the separation wall as the main measure for protecting 
its citizens and indeed it has made it more difficult for Palestinians to reach Israel, it 
does not explain why suicide bombings stopped against settlements, settlers, or 
military personnel and checkpoints. Although settlements do have tight security 
restrictions, soldiers at many checkpoints are quite exposed, and some sections of the 
West Bank road network are shared which would offer further opportunities for 
attacks.  While such attacks may not result in a high number of casualties compared 
to attacks in Israel during the second intifada, the PFLP for example, and some 
Islamic Jihad attacks targeted settlements and checkpoints throughout the height of 
the second uprising.  It is interesting then, that these attacks were also largely 
discontinued.
6
 
Recent studies into employment and labour in Israel also point to a 
considerable number of Palestinians working in Israel without permits, offering an 
attractive labour force to Israeli employers because they cannot claim insurance or 
social security, and there have been cases of Palestinians that worked in Israel 
without permits in order to support their families and were subsequently caught by 
Israeli police.
7
 Hence, some Palestinians are still able to reach Israel without permits, 
                                                 
3 Esposito, “Al-Aqsa Intifada,” 105-11. 
4 INTERVIEW # 11. 
5 For RAND’s terrorism database see RAND, Terrorism Incident Database Search, http://smapp.rand. 
org/rwtid/search_form.php (accessed 13 September 2011). 
6 One notable incident that occurred during the fieldwork was the shooting of four settlers in the West 
Bank 2010 by a previously unknown group.  “4 Israelis Dead in West Bank Shooting Attack,” Ma’an, 
02 September 2010, http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=312242 (accessed 13 
September 2011). 
7 The earlier cited article in the Jerusalem Post from 2010 claims that 16,000 Palestinian workers out 
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albeit at high risk. Both the absence of suicide bombings against targets inside the 
West Bank and the fact that Palestinians still manage to enter Israel ‘illegally’ 
suggests that Israel’s separation measures cannot be the sole factor in deterring 
suicide bombings.  
None of the strategic goals for Palestinians have been achieved: no state, no 
end to occupation, no end to movement restrictions, and no end to settlements.  
However, suicide bombings have not continued, which suggests that contextual 
factors are no longer conducive to this tactic and hence resistance activities shifted to 
other means.  It certainly appears to be the Palestinian viewpoint that suicide 
bombing stopped because it was no longer in the interest of Palestinians.
8
  This 
would suggest that the phenomenon is rational, controlled and contextualised but it is 
not itself a strategy. 
The phenomenon is normally studied in a way that is disconnected from the 
military context in the occupied territories which deprives it of certain strands of 
explanation.  Hamas and the PFLP for example, have maintained repeatedly that 
their activities are a direct response, or reaction, to Israeli violence (especially 
assassinations) against Palestinians, usually members of either the political or 
military wing of a party.
9
  Contextual approaches are sometimes seen to deflect 
responsibility away from perpetrators, yet they do not seek to justify the killing of 
innocent civilians; lifting actions out of context makes it difficult to explain why 
certain events occurred.  Bates presents the following problem:  When we observe 
how someone is inflicting damage on someone else we rely on contextual knowledge 
in order to assess the political relevance of the act.  A family head may refuse the 
request for bridal dowry; a faction leader may withhold patronage; and a mayor may 
use law enforcement to rid himself of a political rival.  While in all three cases harm 
may be inflicted, it is only through knowledge of the context that we can make 
assumptions about the motivation and strategy of these behaviours.  Without the 
                                                                                                                                          
of 44,000 employed in the Israeli economy from the West Bank lacked a work permit, taking its 
figures from the Israeli Central Bank.  However, the figures do not differentiate between workers in 
settlements (who, also require work permits but these are easier to obtain) and workers in Israel.  
Sharon Wrobel, “Cheap Palestinian Workers.” The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics claims that 
17,000 Palestinians worked in Israel or Israeli settlements without a work permit in the last quarter of 
2010 and estimates the number of  Palestinian workers employed in the Israeli economy for this 
period at 78,000. See “Few Options for Educated Youth Under Occupation,” Ma’an, 1 June 2011, 
http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.apsx?ID=392229 (accessed 03 September 2011). 
8 INTERVIEW #4. 
9 INTERVIEW #15.  
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local knowledge the act of inflicting harm is ‘observationally equivalent’.10  
Exracting Palestinian violence from the surroundings of all violent and non-violent 
manifestations of military occupation, daily discrimination as well as settler 
violence, makes Palestinian violence inexplicable.  Anat Berko’s book The Path to 
Paradise exemplifies such a de-contextualised analysis.  Her analysis of her 
interviews with imprisoned potential or ‘failed’ suicide bombers and leaders 
advocating and supporting such acts, most notably the late Shaykh Ahmed Yassin, 
ignores the long list of political frustrations, injustices, and humiliation that 
interviewees regard Palestinians to have suffered at the hands of Israel.  She 
concludes that suicide bombers are motivated to commit these violent acts by deep-
felt hatred against Israel and blinded by a religious promise for a guaranteed path to 
heaven.  She talks in detail about the waves of hatred she feels emanating from one 
interviewee in particular towards herself but offers no reflection on the impact of her 
own identity, a Jewish career officer in the IDF, on the interview process or the 
content it produced.  Her unwillingness to ‘listen’ to the Palestinian narrative is 
exemplified in the following excerpt: 
 
According to Nazima, her father’s family came from a village near 
Ashdod and her mother was born in a village near Bersheeba.  Her 
mother told her about how the Jews shelled them and how they fled from 
their villages, although judging by her age it is hard to believe she could 
remember anything, and it is more probable that she heard stories from 
other people.  During the interviews I heard many stories about the 
experiences of refugees.  In 1947, after the Israelis accepted, the Arabs 
rejected the UN partition plan and the armies of all the Arab states 
attacked the Jewish state that had been established in Eretz-Israel.  In the 
wake of Israel’s War of Independence, the Arab population which fled 
during the fighting, concentrated in refugee camps established in places 
like Gaza Strip (which was Egyptian), the West Bank (which was 
Jordanian), Lebanon, and Syria.  Only Jordan absorbed the Arab refugees 
as citizens, and the term “Palestinians,” meaning Arabs living in Israel 
and the territories, only came into use around 1967.  Though there is 
some truth in the stories, they are often elaborated with imaginary 
experiences. The younger generation is brought up hearing them and 
                                                 
10 Robert Bates, “Area Studies and the Disciple: A Useful Controversy?” Political Science and 
Politics 30, no.2 (June 1997):168. 
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imbued with the trauma of being a refugee, perhaps the longest stretch of 
refugeedom in history.
11
 
 
Berko’s depiction of 1948 and the Palestinians is an exemplary account of the 
standard Israeli view of the historical events.  The view of the nascent Israeli state 
under threat from the mighty Arab armies, the de-contextualisation of the Palestinian 
rejection of the UN partition plan, the rejection of the existence of Palestinians as a 
people and their forceful evictions from their homes, are all characteristic of this 
view that has already been discussed in the previous chapter.  Although she is very 
critical of the stories of refugees, she does not appear to be so in relation to her own 
history.  Particularly interesting is also her comment on refugeehood. While self-
victimisation is regular rhetoric on both sides, refugee children do not need to be 
imbued “with the trauma of being a refugee,” for most of them, in the overcrowded 
and poor camps in Gaza, the West Bank and Lebanon it is a daily lived reality.  To 
Berko’s final remark one may cynically retort that a 60 odd year memory of 
refugeehood pales in comparison to an almost 2000 year old memory of the right of 
return. 
There is a tendency to define peace in the Middle East in terms of absence or 
presence of Palestinian attacks.
12
 While Palestinians live under constant military 
occupation and its daily manifestations of violence and aggression, assessments of 
‘peace’ and ‘peaceful’ are Israeli-centred.  Periods free of Palestinian attacks against 
Israeli targets are usually described as relatively calm.  By the same token, violence 
during the second intifada is often measured based on violent attacks carried out by 
Palestinians against Israeli citizens.  Violence against Palestinians, on the other hand, 
remains often unreported.  Because suicide bombings primarily target civilians and 
have the potential to result in high numbers of casualties, they attracted media 
attention worldwide.  Israeli operations by contrast remained relatively unnoticed to 
the outside world despite the fact that they caused high numbers of fatalities among 
Palestinians, leading to almost four times as many casualties on the Palestinian side 
as the Israeli side.
13
  According to JPS data 3,588 Palestinians were killed during the 
                                                 
11 Anat Berko, The Path to Paradise: The Inner World of Suicide Bombers and their Dispatchers, 
trans. Elizabeth Yuval (Westport, Praeger, 2007), 3. 
12 Baroud, “Second Palestinian Intifada,” 88. 
13 The understanding of peace in the Israeli-Palestinian context is hence normally one of a negative 
asymmetric peace where an absence of violence against Israelis denotes a calm or peaceful situation 
while violence against Palestinians goes mostly unnoticed or is framed as a necessary mechanism of 
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Al Aqsa intifada up to the end of 2004, 273 were assassinated, and 76 Palestinians 
died because of denial of medical treatment.
14
  Al-Haq also reported 27,600 injured 
and 8,000 in detention.  On the Israeli side, JPS recorded 930 Israeli casualties as the 
result of the intifada.
15
  The destruction of homes of suicide bombers became one of 
the major forms of punishment practiced by the Israeli military in response to suicide 
bombings.  B’Tselem reports that 3,700 houses were destroyed during the intifada.  
However, while 620 homes were demolished as punitive measures against 
Palestinians who carried out or were suspected of having carried out violent offences 
against Israeli civilians or members of the security forces,  2,270 houses were 
demolished for general ‘security’ reasons, and more than 800 houses were 
demolished because owners lacked the required permits.
16
   
At the beginning of the intifada, with Ehud Barak still in power and peace 
efforts still ongoing, Israeli operations focussed mainly on isolating Palestinian 
population centres and used disproportionate force to break up protests.
17
  According 
to an IDF estimate during the month of October between 850,000 and 1.3 million 
5.56mm bullets were used despite the fact that Palestinians were still mostly using 
stones, and only on a limited scale Molotov cocktails or firearms.
18
  Figures from the 
Palestinian Red Crescent Society support this observation, logging 5,984 injuries 
from live ammunition, rubber/plastic bullets and tear gas, and 141 deaths during the 
first month of the intifada.  In the second month injuries amounted to 3,838 and 123 
deaths were counted.  Only in the third month are the figures considerably lower, 
recording 781 injuries and 63 deaths.
19
 Comparing this to the overall figure of 
injuries until the end of 2004 which amounts to 28,372, the first three months 
account for 37% of injuries.  The preparedness of the Israeli military and police for a 
confrontation with the Palestinians, discussed in chapter two and three, played a 
significant role in this heavy-handedness in the first months of the intifada.  For the 
rest of the period injuries fluctuated from a low of 34 in July 2003 to a high of 932 in 
2001.  As for fatal injuries, the first three months claimed 327 deaths.  In contrast to 
                                                                                                                                          
control to ensure a state of calm on the Israeli side. 
14 Esposito, “Al-Aqsa Intifada,” 98. 
15 Up to the end of 2004. 
16 Esposito, “Al-Aqsa Intifada,” 100, see footnote 21. 
17 Ibid., 85. 
18 Ibid. 
19 PRCS, “Daily Numbers of Deaths and Injuries – West Bank & Gaza,” 30 September 2000 – 31 
August 2008, http://www.palestinercs.org/reports/casualtiestable1.pdf (accessed 20 January 2012). 
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injuries, the highest death toll is not found at the beginning of the intifada but in 
March and April 2002 with 234 casualties in March and 245 casualties in April, a 
period that covers two major Israeli operations: ‘Operation Colourful Journey’ and 
‘Operation Defensive Shield.’  
While the phenomenon of suicide bombing is often seen as the hallmark of 
Palestinian resistance during the second intifada, the first operation was not carried 
out until a month into the uprising.  As already discussed above, the early stages of 
the intifada were dominated by demonstrations and stone-throwing, with a 
disproportionate violent reaction from the Israeli forces, resulting in a high level of 
casualties among Palestinians.  The three bombings carried out at the end of 2000 
targeted crossings or settlements in the occupied territories.  The first bombing took 
place on 29 October 2000 at the Kissufim crossing
20
 and was claimed by Islamic 
Jihad, wounding one.  The second bombing targeted an IDF boat off the Gaza coast 
and the third bombing the Mehola settlement in the Jordan valley.  Both the latter 
two were unclaimed and resulted in neither injuries nor casualties. 
After the first suicide bombing claimed by Islamic Jihad and which injured 
one soldier, Barak implemented a plan aimed at pressuring Yasser Arafat to halt 
Palestinian violence.  The new IDF strategy targeted the offices, security posts and 
personnel of Fateh and Force 17.
21
  Israel’s first targeted assassination was carried 
out on 9 November 2000.  As of August 2001 the IDF began to implement 
operations with a clear aim, limited time frame, a sealing of the target area and a 
significant deployment of troops.  Such operations succeeded one another without 
much delay except for a brief pause between November 2002 and October 2003, 
which was the result of concerted diplomatic efforts to bring the parties to return to 
negotiations.  Israeli activity was, however, not limited to these military operations. 
The number of Palestinian casualties recorded outside these operations was twice as 
high.
22
  Once the IDF had essentially destroyed the PA infrastructure by the end of 
2002, operations were aimed at establishing new security lines: preparation for 
Israel’s disengagement of Gaza, the establishment of buffer zones on the northern 
and southern borders of Gaza, and the construction of the separation wall.
23
  
                                                 
20 Located in the Gaza Strip. 
21 Esposito, “Al-Aqsa Intifada,” 86. 
22 Ibid., 86-7. 
23 Ibid., 87. 
179 
 
 Israeli incursions and sieges had an impact on Palestinians that went far 
beyond what can be said in figures.  Interviews conducted with Palestinians during 
the second intifada describe how houses were besieged and destroyed, property was 
damaged during the occupation of homes,
24
 houses were bombed, electricity and 
water were cut off leading to acute water shortage, prolonged curfews led to food 
shortage, women had to deliver babies under curfew without medical assistance in 
some cases resulting in the death of new-borns, and there was no possibility to bury 
the dead.
25
 
A journalist during the intifada describes his experience as follows:  
 
So, I’ve been in cities such as Nablus and Jenin were bodies remained 
for almost a week for people being killed or even…I worked on a story 
where people…who died for normal causes were not able to be 
transferred to the hospital or to cemeteries to be buried. So, this can tell 
that, the situation was totally different and fear existed among people to 
leave their houses because the moment the people opened the door a 
bullet was expected to be shot in their direction. And I witnessed also 
battles where fighters were carrying only rifles were confronting a tank, 
and F16, or Apache.
26
 
 
The most intensive year of the intifada in terms of suicide bombing was 
certainly 2002, which at the same time also saw the most intensive and prolonged 
incursions into Palestinian residential areas.  28 bombings were carried out in 2001, 
while in 2002 the phenomenon reached an average of one bombing per week with 54 
bombings taking place.  During 2003, 24 bombings were recorded and the frequency 
declined in 2004 to 13 bombings.
27
  (These figures do not include suicide attacks.) 
What is interesting is that during the height of the operations of the IDF in the West 
Bank, the reoccupation of population centres, the prolonged curfews imposed, and 
                                                 
24 Many Palestinians have experience of their houses being searched and occupied by the Israeli army 
and have stories to tell about the damage to property and theft.  See for example Majdi al-Malki’s 
story at Majdi al-Malki, “Personal Account: How Israeli Soldiers Terrorized a Palestinian Family, 
Ransacked and Urinated all over Their Home,” Redress Information and Analysis, 7 April 2002, 
http://www.redress.btinternet.co.uk/mmalki.htm (accessed 15 January 2012) .  Governmental as well 
as non-governmental offices were also searched and occupied.  Al Haq’s office was broken into by the 
army during the 2002 incursion into Ramallah and much of the office equipment was damaged.  The 
IDF also occupied the building of the Ministry of Culture located in al Bireh several weeks, leaving 
behind it floors covered in faeces and urine.  See Amira Hass, “Someone Even Managed to Defecate 
into the Photocopier,” The Haaretz, 06 May 2002, http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/features/ 
someone-even-managed-to-defecate-into-the-photocopier-1.46032 (accessed 12 September 2011). 
25 See for example interviews conducted with women by WCLAC, “If I Were Given a Choice.” 
26 INTERVIEW #20. 
27 Based on statistics provided in Esposito, “Al-Aqsa Intifada.” 
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the extensive operational plan to isolate different areas from one another through 
movement restrictions, suicide bombings continued regardless of these restrictions.  
During Operation Defensive Shield, which lasted around six weeks, 13 bombings 
were conducted.  However, six of the operations were carried out on occupied 
territory, either targeting checkpoints or settlements.  This suggests that the 
deployment of troops and general movement restrictions during this period may have 
made it more difficult to carry out attacks on the other side of the Green Line.   
The question of whether suicide bombings are connected to Israeli violence 
and incursions into Palestinian territories naturally arises. For Ricolfi, there is no 
statistical connection between suicide bombings and Israeli military operations.
28
  He 
identifies a causal relationship between terrorism and anti-terrorism but not vice 
versa.  Statistically seen, suicide missions have had two main effects: they sparked 
off Israeli military response and they incited the crowds.  However, he argues that 
there is no causal relationship in the other direction.
29
   
 By contrast, Brym and Araj come to exactly the opposite conclusion; their 
paper argues that much of the impetus for suicide bombings during the second 
Palestinian intifada can be explained by a desire to avenge the killings of 
Palestinians by Israelis, and that much of the impetus of Israeli killings of 
Palestinians is driven by a desire to retaliate for suicide bombings.
30
  Their study 
points to the interactive nature between suicide bombing and Israeli military 
operations, locking both sides into destructive cycle of violence.  Brym and Araj 
relied on content analysis using newspaper sources and databases to determine the 
individual motives, organisational rationales and precipitants.  Ricolfi, by contrast, 
appears to have used a purely time-related analysis, ‘using markers of one factor as 
dependent variables and the markers of the other two, lagged by one week, as 
independent variables.’31  Brym and Araj’s analysis on the other hand identified 
primary, secondary, and tertiary motives, rationales and precipitants.  The preceding 
events affecting the timing of the suicide bombings were divided into reactive and 
proactive.  The analysis concluded that 82% of the 106 precipitants that were 
                                                 
28 Ricolfi, “Palestinians,” 127. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Robert J. Brym and Araj Bader, “Suicide Bombing as Strategy and Interaction: The Case of the 
Second Intifada,” Social Forces 84, no. 4 (June 2006): 1969-86. 
31 Ricolfi, Palestinians,127. 
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identified in the article were reactive.
32
  The article also points out that, due to Israeli 
security measures following a spate of particularly lethal suicide bombings in early 
2002, the time between precipitant and Palestinian reaction increased.  Hamas’ 
response to Israel’s assassination of Shaykh Ahmed Yassin and Abdel Aziz Rantisi 
came four and five months later while in the early stages of the intifada the typical 
response time was around three weeks. The assassination of Rehavam Ze’evi in 2001 
by the PFLP in response to the assassination of the party’s secretary general Abu Ali 
Mustafa through rockets fired from Israeli Apache helicopters, although not a suicide 
bombing, also fits into this pattern: Rehavam Zee’vi was assassinated on 17 October 
2001 while Abu Ali Mustafa had died around four weeks earlier.  It appears that 
Ricolfi underestimated the response time and hence claimed there was no causal 
relationship between Israeli military policies and Palestinian suicide bombings. 
Israel carried out 273 definite assassinations with 170 bystanders killed and 
550 wounded; 99 possible assassinations with 27 bystanders killed and 25 wounded; 
83 definite assassination attempts with 63 bystanders killed and 315 wounded; 10 
possible assassination attempts with 2 bystanders killed and 1 wounded.
33
  The term 
bystander in these figures does not denote civilian but also includes militants that 
were in proximity of the target but were not themselves the target of the 
assassination.  Nevertheless, Israeli assassination practices resulted in a significant 
number of civilian casualties.  The assassination of Hamas military leader Salah 
Shehade in Gaza City in 2002 led to an intense debate about the legality of such 
practices.  The assassination which killed Shehade also killed 19 bystanders and 
injured 140. In response to pressure from human rights organisations, an Israeli panel 
concluded its probe into the legality of the Hamas leader’s assassination in February 
2011 and found that the assassination was justified despite the death of 13 civilians, 
including 8 children, and women.  The human rights organisations had argued that 
dropping a one-ton bomb on a densely populated residential area such as Gaza City, 
constituted a criminal offence.
34
   
Hamas repeatedly argued that suicide bombings were in retaliation for the 
assassination carried out by the Israeli military.  A PFLP member stated that all 
                                                 
32 Brym and Araj, “Suicide Bombing,” 1978. 
33 Esposito, “Al-Aqsa Intifada ,” 121. 
34 “Israel: Shehadeh Assassination Justified Despite Mass Casualties,” Ma’an, 28 February 2011, 
http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=363986 (accessed 03 September 2011). 
182 
 
militant actions against Israel are a ‘reaction’ to Israeli policies.35  The PFLP took 
responsibility for the assassination of Israel’s far-right Tourist Minister Rehavam 
Ze’evi in Jerusalem’s Hyatt hotel on 17 October 2001.36  This was the first 
assassination of a political leader by a Palestinian group since the establishment of 
the State of Israel.  Rehavam  Ze’evi was well known for his extremely hostile stance 
against Palestinians, he openly advocated the transfer of Palestinians from the West 
Bank and Gaza to Jordan, he called on Sharon to ‘lay waste’ to the Palestinian 
Authority,  and he loudly supported Israel’s assassination policy of Palestinian 
militant as well as political leaders, even Yasser Arafat.
37
  In fact, it was the 
assassination of their own leader, Abu Ali Mustapha that prompted the PFLP to kill 
Ze’evi.38   
 
4.2 The Psychological Impact – The Individual 
 
While there is a strong argument that Israeli violence against Palestinian 
political and militant figures elicited a direct response from militant groups and 
supporters of these groups, there is also a question of how the ongoing level of 
violence may have affected the ordinary population and in what way this could have 
influenced individuals to volunteer for suicide bombing operations.  The individual 
bombers themselves may have been primarily affected by violence they experienced 
personally, or violence experienced by their friends or relatives, or even the violence 
to which the Palestinian people as a whole are subjected.  While organisations may 
stage attacks to avenge their leaders, feelings of revenge may be much closer to 
home for the actual perpetrators.  Indeed, Israeli violence Palestinians has always 
been part of any Palestinian life, not only the violence Palestinians experienced 
during the second intifada. Almost all Palestinians would have come into contact 
                                                 
35 When I used the word ‘violence’, the interviewee objected very strongly and said that this was not 
violence but a reaction to Israeli activities. 
36 See PFLP statement on Zeevi’s assassination “October 17: The Heroic Operation,” PFLP, 
http://www.pflp.ps/english/?q=october-17-heroic-operation (accessed 07 May 2011).   The PFLP also 
claims in that Zeevi’s assassination was a response to Israel’s assassination policy which, the party 
claims, to that point was responsible for seventy Palestinian victims.  “Statement on PA Banning of 
PFLP Military Wing,” PFLP,  http://www.pflp.ps/english/?q=statement-pa-banning-pflp-military-
wing-2001 (accessed 07 May 2011). 
37 Suzanne Goldberg, “Far-Right Leader Who Fell Victim to His Own Ideas,” The Guardian, 18 
October 2001, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/oct/18/israel2 (accessed 03 September 2011). 
38 This as a turning point in the intifada when the leadership began to lose control over the events.  
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with military occupation at one time or another during their lives through 
checkpoints, closures, curfews, house searches, arrests, imprisonment, and some may 
even have experienced the death of a relative, someone among one’s circle of friends 
or acquaintances.  Mental health specialists have investigated over the years what 
kind of effect various manifestations of Israeli violence have had on different age 
groups of Palestinians as well as the different gender groups. While effects and 
grievances emerging from the humiliation and frustration over lack of opportunity 
developed over decades of occupation will be the topic later on in the chapter, here 
we focus on how violence may have made individuals more prone for engaging in 
conflict and may have created feelings of revenge. 
Eyad Sarraj, a Gazan psychiatrist who has extensively researched the mental 
health effects of the conflict on Palestinians, especially children and youth, 
commented that suicide bombings and all other forms of violence committed are 
only symptoms or reactions, and in order to stop suicide bombings the real pathology 
– the ‘chronic and systematic process of humiliating people in an effort to destroy 
their hope and dignity,’ needs to be treated.39  Until the causes of the ‘illness’ are 
treated i.e. a just and dignified solution to the conflict and a national process of 
reconciliation that allows Palestinians to come to terms with their trauma and pain,
40
 
violence will not end.  Sarraj predicts that if no fair political solution is found, the 
next intifada will be even more violent and the first indicator for this is that it is the 
children of the first intifada that became the suicide bombers of the second intifada.
41
  
As children witnessed how helpless their fathers, normally the authority figure in the 
family, were in the face of occupation (55% of children had witnessed how Israeli 
soldiers beat or humiliated their fathers in the first intifada), the martyr has become a 
symbol of power that many have eagerly embraced.  Although it may appear slightly 
absurd or contradictory that someone destined to die is empowered, the martyr 
sacrifices his life for the sake of his community, as a symbol for the struggle to 
obtain freedom for the Palestinian people.
42
 As such, the bomber fulfils a powerful 
and important role in the eyes of the community.  Sarraj also recounts how 
Palestinian children no longer dream to be doctors or lawyers but they want to 
                                                 
39 “Suicide Bombers: Dignity, Despair, and the Need for Hope.  An Interview with Eyad Sarraj,” 
Journal of Palestine Studies 31, no.4 (Summer 2002): 73. 
40 Ibid., 75-6. 
41 Ibid., 71. 
42 One interviewee commented that suicide bombers make a huge sacrifice for the sake of their 
communities. INTERVIEW #14. 
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become martyrs.  The stories of small children, who celebrate the death of such 
martyrs and dream of meeting the same destiny one day, were picked up eagerly by 
sensationalist journalists and reporters.  However, as we are all deeply shaped by our 
environments, it does not seem very surprising that for individuals who grow up in 
this daily reality of violence, manifestations of violence no longer seem anything out 
of the ordinary but become the norm. 
There is some suggestion that experiencing violence as a collective may have 
less damaging effects on mental health, and act as protection. Knowing that everyone 
else is in the same boat and being able to talk about shared experiences may alleviate 
the potential damaging effect that violent or traumatic events may have on the 
mental health of individuals.
43
  Based on this assumption it would seem that shelling, 
bombardment, curfews and checkpoints are less likely to have damaging effects than 
arrests or administrative detention, for example.  However, a survey conducted of 
Palestinian 10
th
 and 11
th
 grade adolescents (15-18 years old) from the Ramallah 
District concluded, contrary to the initial hypothesis, that individual exposure to 
violence did not consistently have a greater negative effect on health outcomes than 
collective exposures.  The study was concluded in 2002-2003, during what was the 
most intense period of the conflict.
44
  Army invasions, the destruction of homes and 
property, prolonged curfews, house searches, and the erection of the separation wall, 
led to direct and intense exposure to violence.
45
 The survey found that, in terms of 
individual exposure, 35% of the respondents had their homes searched;  14% had 
their homes occupied whilst they were in them and 9% were thrown out in the 
process of house occupation; 15% were beaten by the Israeli army; 2.4% were beaten 
by Israeli settlers; 6% were used as a human shield; 30% were body searched; 17% 
were detained or arrested; 23% were humiliated; 2.1 % were stripped in public; 13% 
were interrogated; 4.8% were tortured; and 1.7% saw their homes demolished. 
Naturally the percentage of exposure to collective violence is higher: 31% 
experienced shelling in the neighbourhood; 60% reported they were exposed to 
teargas and 63% to sound bombs; 80% saw shooting, 50% explosion/shelling; 67% 
saw a stranger being humiliated; 62% saw a stranger being arrested; 49% saw a 
                                                 
43 INTERVIEW #14. 
44 Rita Giacaman, Harry S. Shannon, Hanna Saab, et al., “Individual and Collective Exposure to 
Political Violence: Palestinian Adolescents Coping with Conflict,” European Journal of Public Health 
17, no.4 (November 2006): 361. 
45 Ibid., 361. 
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stranger being injured; 28% saw a stranger being killed; 35% saw a neighbour or 
friend being humiliated; 37% saw a friend/neighbour being arrested; 37%saw a 
friend/neighbour being injured; and 11% saw a friend/neighbour being killed.
46
 
The study showed a strong relationship between exposure to trauma and 
violence and the adolescents’ mental health.  Girls tended to show more signs of 
depressive-like symptoms than boys, and such symptoms were also more prevalent 
among adolescents living in refugee camps than those living in cities, villages or 
towns.  The investigators of the study concluded that it is because of the particular 
meaning of identity and culture in the Palestinian context that, contrary to their initial 
assumption, individually experienced violence did not have a greater health impact 
than collective violence.  While in other situations collective violence may have a 
protective function, for Palestinians this may not be the case.  As Palestinians have a 
strong sense of community and family, violence against these social entities may 
have a stronger traumatic effect on individuals, rather than a protective one, because 
they identify with the collective.
47
  Moreover, the findings of this particular study 
appear to suggest that violence has resulted in depression rather than aggression. 
However, there is also evidence that the trauma of the second intifada triggered more 
reactionary and aggressive emotional states. For a Fateh member, who articulates 
suicide bombings as a struggle of a people under occupation when faced with 
Apache helicopters, experiencing house demolitions and other policies by the 
occupation, the violence of suicide bombings and the violence of the Israeli military 
are intrinsically connected.
48
  How suffering, emotional pain and humiliation 
developed into hatred and desire for revenge becomes evident in interviews 
conducted by WCLAC with women during the second intifada.  
The loss of dignity is a central and recurring theme for Palestinians.  
However, the sentiment is more borne out of discrimination and humiliation rather 
than aggression and violence. Humiliation and loss are not necessarily personal but 
the result of a traumatisation of a whole people through historical events as well as 
the present situation.  Similar to the point made in the study above, Palestinians have 
a strong sense of themselves as a people and therefore the humiliation experienced as 
a collective in the past and in the present determines how individuals see themselves.  
                                                 
46 Giacaman et al. “Individual and Collective Exposure,” 364. 
47 Ibid., 364. 
48 INTERVIEW # 17 
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Although ‘dignity’ was interestingly not a frequently used term during interviews 
(however concepts related to dignity such as humiliation did occur), in informal 
conversation humiliation, impotence in the face of Israeli policies and loss of dignity 
are recurring and crucial notions.  While such concepts are difficult to measure 
scientifically and its causal relations perhaps even less so, they are apparent and 
omnipresent to the alert observer: the long queues at Qalandia in the mornings of 
men waiting patiently for up to two hours to pass through the checkpoint to go to 
work in Israel, the shouting of disinterested teenage soldiers, the random closing of 
terminals and changing ID requirements for queues at will; young men kneeling at 
the road side, hands bound to the back and eyes to the floor, guarded by a soldier 
while their car is being searched; the segregation of cars at checkpoints within the 
West Bank where Israelis can pass freely while Palestinians have to get into a 
separate lane and wait patiently to be checked by the Israeli soldiers; the celebratory 
display of flags and honking of cars driving through West Bank territory on Israeli 
independence day, the same event that for Palestinians marks the nakba; perhaps the 
humiliation and dispossession was most acutely felt by the young men in the 
dilapidated refugee camps with high unemployment rates, whose families wistfully 
speak about their origins in villages inside Israel, their previous lives – often as 
farmers and fishermen – and their property which is no longer accessible to them. 
 
4.3 Territorial Fragmentation: Organisational Changes, the 
Individual and Social Networks 
 
Chapter three discussed at length the impact of territorial fragmentation on 
social and economic aspects of life.  This section seeks to establish if the 
fragmentation also affected the organisational and operational running of the militant 
activities and in what way this may have shaped the phenomenon of suicide 
bombing.  Some analysts have suggested that the structure of militant organisations 
changed with the second intifada.  While Hamas, for example, was previously more 
hierarchically structured, its configuration, at least in terms of its military wing, 
became much looser, based on cells organised around individual leaders.
49
  This new 
structure gave militant groups a great deal of flexibility.  Despite the assassination of 
                                                 
49 A shift noted by Ami Pedahzur and Arie Perlinger, “The Changing Nature of Suicide Attacks: A 
Social Network Perspective,” in Social Forces 84, no. 4 (June 2006): esp. 1988. 
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over 273 members of organisations, some belonging to political branches and some 
to militant wings, and many of them top leaders, the operations continued.  It appears 
that political and militant organisations were much more flexible and able to adapt to 
new circumstances than civil society organisations.  How civil society organisations 
were unable to offer support and organise themselves efficiently during the second 
uprising due to movement restrictions and the centralisation of their structures was 
already discussed in detail in chapter two.  Unlike the militant groups, they seem to 
have been unable to organise themselves more locally and independently and to 
adapt to the new environment quickly in order to make an impact.  One possible 
explanation for the swifter response from militants is that they necessarily had to 
adapt due to Israel’s widespread assassination policy, while civil society organisers 
certainly did not face threats to themselves or their organisation’s existence on the 
same scale.  Moreover, the Oslo period had weakened what had promised to flourish 
into a lively, pluralistic civil society after the first intifada.  Palestine’s civil society, 
now largely made up of NGOs had lost touch with the grassroots and this lack of 
grassroots-level involvement meant that during the second intifada NGOs were not 
able to mobilise the masses.  Militant groups, on the other hand, had a much easier 
task as they did not have to develop a political programme and did not have to 
mobilise the masses directly. Visible resistance to the occupation in general, and the 
‘spectacular’ suicide bombings in particular, succeeded in galvanising the masses. 
 Territorial fragmentation did not only lead to organisational adaptation but 
also affected individual participation. It may be one possible explanation of why 
suicide bombers tended to come from the same area. This coincides with an 
observation made by Ricolfi.  He identified a ‘clustering’ of places of origin of the 
bombers and concludes that emulation and peer pressure were the underlying forces 
behind this phenomenon.
50
  He argues that a tiny number of refugee camps around 
the towns of Hebron, Nablus and Jenin supplied the majority of suicide bombers.
51
 
For Ricolfi, the most telling example was the recruitment of 8 attackers from a 
football team of eleven players in Hebron.  Six of the eight attackers were 
neighbours too and belonged to the Al-Kwassama clan.
52
 
                                                 
50 Ricolfi, “Palestinians,” 113. 
51 However, we will see in the next section where we will discuss regional and social origins of the 
bombers, that this is not an accurate observation. 
52 See Ricolfi, “Palestinians,” 113.  For original source see Guido Olimpio, “I ragazzi della squadra 
della morte: Da terzini di calcio a bombe umane,” Corriere della Sera, 30 May 2003, 
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This phenomenon of ‘clustering’ may be best explained by emulation 
through social networks and while this is a helpful observation, we can only 
understand it in the context of territorial fragmentation and the contraction of space 
in which Palestinians go about their daily lives.  With the territorial changes over the 
Oslo period, people’s social worlds have come to revolve around their immediate 
locality. Figures discussed in chapter two showed that students increasingly began to 
attend universities in their own districts. Labour migration was also largely limited to 
districts.  These observations support the assumption that social interaction for 
Palestinians is confined to a relatively small geographical area.  While the size of the 
West Bank is only around 5860 km² (only a little over twice the size of County 
Durham which in comparison covers an area of 2676 km
2
) travelling for Palestinians 
is time-consuming and unpredictable because of the complex layers of movement 
restrictions.  During the second intifada between 2000 and 2009, the city of Nablus, 
for example, was surrounded by nine checkpoints, of which many were only 
passable on foot.
53
  As a result travellers could not use their own vehicles but had to 
change transport several times throughout their journey.  Even now in 2011 there are 
up to 1000 internal obstacles inside the West Bank that hinder movement.
54
  On a 
shopping errand in Ramallah, the author struck up a conversation with a young 
shopping assistant who explained she had never left Ramallah and was fascinated to 
meet someone from abroad.  She had relatives in Hebron but thought the journey 
was far too difficult and long.
55
 The author also met a family, who had not left 
Ramallah for years because they did not have the right identity documents and were 
afraid they may be deported if stopped at a checkpoint. 
We naturally tend to emulate the life style of those that we look up to around 
us.  The clustering of suicide bombings is essentially the product of the drive for 
emulation combined with geographical contraction.  The creation of martyr posters 
initiated a trend in which young teenagers went out to have their photo taken and 
                                                                                                                                          
http://archiviostorico.corriere.it/2003/maggio/30/ragazzi_della_squadra_della_morte_co_0_03053 
0001.shtml (accessed 12 September 2011). 
53 In the summer of 2009 for the first time in nine years Palestinian could drive their cars in or out of 
the city. 
54 “Aid work delayed by barriers,” Ma’an, 11 May 2011, http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails 
.aspx?ID=386606  (accessed 12 September 2011) 
55 Although it may on most occasions be safe and unproblematic to travel from Ramallah to Hebron 
under the current situation, the sense of unpredictability and fear have a significant impact on 
decisions people take.  Only a few years ago the journey to Hebron involved several changes of 
transport, passing of checkpoints on foot, and the journey could take up to four hours. 
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told their friends that if they would ever become a martyr they wanted this specific 
picture on the poster.  The young generation began to dream to be martyrs, just as 
Sarraj had observed among small children.  When a classmate died as a martyr, the 
children did not only want to remember him but they also aspired to be like him.  
Similarly, confronting the army became a manifestation of heroism.  Initially, when 
the army reoccupied Areas A of the West Bank territories, youths were frightened 
and sought to avoid the army but then later began to climb tanks and dismantle and 
collect pieces as a sign of bravery.
56
  In some cases teenagers even imitated to be 
martyrs and pretended to be suicide bombers on their way for a mission when in 
reality they did not even have explosives.
57
  While it does not seem to have been 
reported by the IDF that youths were arrested and found without explosives, it is 
difficult to establish whether this was the case or not.   
Although emulation in geographically contracted spaces provides some 
convincing insights into the motivations behind suicide bombing, following the 
example of those around us cannot be the full explanation. The problem with social 
network explanations is that they are selective in what networks or links they 
consider and do not explain why some individuals who are tied to people inside a 
given network are not part of the network: they are also linked through friendship 
and family but were not co-opted into the network.  Similarly, people may be 
recruited through family and friendship ties but family ties in Palestinian society are 
vast, so we would still have to explain why certain family ties would be pursued and 
hundreds of others not.  As such, social networks are a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for ‘membership’ in the network.  However, they may be helpful for 
explaining the workings within organisations and give some insight to recruitment 
mechanisms but can tell us little about motivations behind ‘selecting’ certain 
individuals or the motivation on the part of the individuals seeking to engage in this 
kind of activity.   
  
                                                 
56 Observations made by interviewee in Jenin refugee camp. INTERVIEW #20. 
57 Interviewee also pointed that out that in some cases teenagers wanted to be arrested for financial 
reasons because of the lack of work during the intifada so that their families would receive a salary 
whilst they were in jail. INTERVIEW #20.  
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4.4 Social Fragmentation: Geographic Origins and Social 
Backgrounds of Suicide Bombers 
 
 While the previous section investigated how territorial fragmentation may 
have had an impact on operational and organisational aspects and how it may have 
affected the recruitment of the perpetrators through emulation via their social 
networks, this section will look at whether the divisions that Israeli measures created 
in Palestinian society are reflected in the social and geographic background of 
suicide bombers.  The first question that will be examined is how regional inequality 
is related to the phenomenon of suicide bombing.  
One comment received during the interviews was that suicide bombers 
predominantly came from the North, probably because the North was more affected 
by checkpoints and settlements.
58
  This comment would suggest that a 
disproportionate geographic impact of Israeli territorial control would lead to 
disproportionate geographic participation in such operations.  The third chapter 
established that the occupation had affected rural and refugee populations 
disproportionally in comparison to urban inhabitants.   
Inequality in relation to suicide bombings is usually discussed in terms of 
relative deprivation. ‘[R]elative deprivation implies that the critical motivating factor 
for individuals is not an absolute measure of well-being, but it is the comparison 
between an individual’s well-being, and that of some unspecified reference group. 
Second, relative deprivation implies that the importance of the difference between 
that individual’s economic rewards and that of the reference group’s is based upon 
the psychological impact of the inequality.’59  Sayre’s study of Palestinian suicide 
bombing considers three reference groups. Firstly, it compares economic 
development in the West Bank to economic development in Israel in the post-Oslo 
years, highlighting that economic performance in the West Bank worsened 
considerably relative to Israel. While the West Bank economy recorded more years 
of negative growth in this period than positive growth, the Israeli economy showed 
continuous growth without a single year of negative real GDP per capita growth.  
Second, Sayre also investigated the relationship between education and employment 
and looked at economic data for the different Palestinian regions.  He finds that the 
                                                 
58 INTERVIEW #14. 
59 Sayre, “Relative Deprivation,” 458. 
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standard of living for young educated males in particular had declined.  Relative 
unemployment rates among youth were higher in 1999 and 2000 than in the 
subsequent years.  Third, he conducted an analysis looking into the economic 
outcomes for youth according to individual districts and comparing it to the number 
of suicide bombers produced by district. In Sayre’s analysis, Nablus and Jenin had 
particularly high unemployment rates and produced a high number of suicide 
bombers, while Bethlehem had a relatively good economic situation but relative to 
its population, still produced a high number of bombers.  This leads Sayre to infer 
that his findings are inconclusive.   
While relative deprivation may offer a helpful insight into the grievances of 
Palestinian suicide bombers, it leaves many others aspects of Israel’s occupation 
regime untouched.  Palestinians are aware that to a large extent it is the Israeli 
occupation, its tight control over mobility and resources and the presence of 
settlements that is responsible for their daily difficulties.  Checkpoints and 
settlements are the direct and immediate manifestations of Israel’s control and power 
over Palestinians. They obstruct free movement, devour Palestinian land and are the 
immediate obstacles to the political goal of the realisation of an independent 
Palestinian state.  Settlements especially are also often the source of violence, 
harassment and humiliation.  It would be logical to assume then, that people in closer 
and constant contact with settlements and checkpoints would be more likely to 
develop grievances against the occupation.   Hence, the next section will examine the 
regional origins of suicide bombers in order to later assess this against the regional 
distribution of checkpoints and settlements.  The subsequent section will then 
consider whether bombers originate from villages, towns or refugee camps. The 
second chapter of this thesis discussed how the occupation had an un-equalising 
effect on the Palestinian population and how those most affected by Israeli policies 
i.e. the rural and refugee populations were the driving forces behind the intifada.  
The question arises in how far they were also participants in suicide bombings 
relative to the urban population.  While we will not be able to reach conclusive 
statements - as multiple factors may be associated with originating from any of the 
three localities, independent of the occupation – considering these geographical 
aspects will nevertheless help us establish if there is any ground that supports this 
assumption. 
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4.4.1 Bombers and their Origin 
 
Out of 127 suicide operations carried out between the beginning of the 
second intifada and the end of 2004, we do not know the origin of 23 of the bombers.  
This is because the bombers have either not been identified
60
 or bombings are not 
recorded in the PHRMG data which provide the most detailed record on the 
bombers’ origins.61  Out of 104 known bombers, Nablus governorate had the highest 
participation in suicide operation with 26 suicide bombers, followed by Gaza with 
19, Jenin with 14, closely followed by Bethlehem with 13.  No suicide bombers 
originated from the Jericho and Salfit governorates, and only one came from the 
Jerusalem area.  Although Gaza is divided into five governorates because of its much 
smaller size, it is in this analysis considered as one entity.  In terms of urban, refugee 
and rural division, the same divisions are applied as in the West Bank, on the basis 
that MAS Social Monitor No.4 2001 identifies a noticeable socio-economic gap 
between the city of Gaza and the Gaza Strip regions.
62
 
 
 
 FIGURE 4.1. Number of suicide bombers between October 2000 and the end of 2004 
according to governorate  
 
 
                                                 
60 Organisations often do not claim responsibility; this seems to be particularly the case when the 
perpetrator is the only casualty. 
61 Based on data taken from the Esposito, “Al-Aqsa Intifada” and PHRMG, “Palestinians who Carried 
out Suicide Attacks in Israel and the Occupied Territories during the Al-Aqsa Intifada,” http://www. 
phrmg.org/Resources%20Tables%20new/Suicide%20attack%20English.htm (accessed 13 January 
2012).  While the PHRMG database includes suicide bombings as well as suicide attacks data 
included for this analysis only focuses on suicide bombings.  See Appendix I for table. 
62 MAS Social Monitor, no.4 (2001), 4-5. 
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 If we break down suicide bombings according to years we can clearly 
identify regional trends.  These findings tie in with the concept of emulation, 
especially through social networks, discussed in the previous section.  In 
geographically limited spaces, individuals come to emulate what their neighbours 
and peers do. This is the case with the ordinary such as fashion and car trends, and 
may also apply the same to more unusual pursuits, such as suicide bombing.  While 
Nablus and Jenin have largely been considered the main hotbeds for suicide 
bombers,
63
 a break-down in years reveals that, initially, participants from Gaza were 
the driving force during the first year of the intifada, with bombers from Gaza 
carrying out 8 attacks.  This was followed by Jenin with 5 attackers, while ‘only’ 3 
suicide bombers came from Nablus in 2001.  This trend changed in 2002 when 
Nablus took the lead accounting for 12 bombers, closely followed by Bethlehem 
with 10, and then by Jenin with 7.  In 2003, Nablus still remained ahead with 8 
bombers, but was followed by Hebron with 5.  In 2004, 5 bombers came from Gaza, 
and 3 from Nablus.  What is also interesting and further supports the notion of 
emulation is that regional participation in suicide bombings was often limited to 
specific periods of time.  In the second year of the intifada, for example, the 
Bethlehem governorate produced 10 suicide bombers, a year later none came from 
that same area.  Hebron was mostly active in the third year of the intifada, and in 
2004 no suicide bombers came from Jenin.  In percentages, Gaza had the highest 
number of bombers and accounted for 23.4% of bombings in 2001, followed by the 
Jenin district taking 14.7% of the share for that year.  In 2002, Nablus produced 24% 
of suicide bombers in that year, Bethlehem 20% and Jenin 14%. In 2003, 32% of 
suicide bombers came from Nablus and 20% from Hebron, and in 2004 Gaza 
accounted for 33.3% of the bombings and Nablus for 20%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
63 Interestingly, Ricolfi claims that suicide bombers largely originated from a handful of camps around 
Nablus and Hebron.  According to PHRMG data, however, a good number of suicide bombers came 
from the cities of Hebron and Nablus and not their camps.  Moreover, although the majority of 
bombers did originate in the governorate of Nablus, Bethlehem and Gaza produced more suicide 
bombers compared to Hebron. See Ricolfi, “Palestinians,” 113. 
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FIGURE 4.2. Distribution of bombers across governorates per year in percentages
 
 
 
 
While on the face of it, Nablus, Jenin, Bethlehem, and Gaza produced the 
highest number of suicide bombers, the governorates differ considerably in size and 
population.  If we adjust figures compared to population size of governorates we 
make an interesting discovery.
64
  The highest ratio of suicide bombers to population 
is in the Tubas governorate with a rate of almost 13 bombers per 100,000 population. 
Tubas is followed by Nablus and Bethlehem with just under 10 per 100,000, Jenin 
with less than 7 per 100.000, then Tulkarem, Hebron, Ramallah, Jerusalem and 
Gaza. Given that Gaza had a population of just over a million in 2000, the 19 suicide 
bombers from Gaza result in a rate of under 2 bombers per 100,000.  Hence, Tubas 
relative to its population size, was the most active in suicide bombings.  This has so 
far been completely overlooked because suicide bombing figures are seldom 
considered relative to its population size.
65
  Moreover, perhaps similar to the 
PHRMG database, in many other sources, localities in Tubas are often categorised as 
localities either in the Jenin or in the Nablus governorates.  In the PHRMG data 
Tubas city was classified as being located in the Jenin area, al Farah Camp was 
                                                 
64 Population projections for 2000 from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics were used.  PCBS, 
“Estimated Population in the Palestinian Territory Mid-Year by Governorate 1997-2016, 
http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_pcbs/populati/GOV1997-2016.htm (accessed 20 January 2012). 
65 Although Sayre does this, he does not come to the same conclusion, presumably because he uses 
figures that include Tubas in either the Jenin or Nablus districts. 
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allocated to the Nablus area, and the Jerusalem bombing from 08 September 2001 
was attributed to someone originating from “Qubeia” but the bomber came from al-
Aqabah village in Tubas.  
 One question that poses itself at this stage is, why does the division into 
districts matter conceptually and what does it tell us?  With the signing of the Oslo 
Accords the Palestinians Territories to be governed by the Palestinian Authority 
were divided into sixteen governorates (eleven in the West Bank and Jerusalem and 
five in the Gaza Strip) centring around major population centres.  Given the low 
level of migration and the increased focus on localities as their immediate centres of 
life,
66
 the quality of services provided within governorates, the overall living 
standard within this governorate, and Israeli interests in the area (settlements nearby, 
water wells, bypass roads, military zones etc.) will inevitably have an impact on the 
population in the area.  One reason behind the unequal participation in the 
phenomenon may be the unequal experience of Israeli occupation and differences in 
standards of living.
67
 
Sayre argues that the data on suicide bombers are not conclusive on relative 
deprivation because, while in Nablus and Jenin unemployment was high and would 
therefore correspond with the higher number of suicide bombers from these areas, 
unemployment rates in Bethlehem, a district that produced a high number of suicide 
bombers especially in the second year of the intifada, were low.  Nevertheless, MAS 
data suggest that prior to the outbreak of the intifada living standards in the North 
and South of West Bank declined continuously.  The previous chapter had also 
discussed how severely the Bethlehem governorate was affected due to land 
confiscation for settlements and the extension of Jerusalem’s municipal boundaries.  
Bethlehem’s proximity to Jerusalem has made its surrounding lands particularly 
attractive for Israel’s settlements and expansionist plans.  Irrespective of the 
economic situation of Bethlehem, this creates considerable hardship and frustration 
for the population in the area.  
                                                 
66 The author met several people who had never or had for a long time not left Ramallah – fear of 
movement restrictions or problems with identity documents were cited as the reasons for this. 
67 Emulation through networks may also be a helpful concept here; nevertheless it does not answer the 
question of why, in the first place, it is a more frequent phenomenon in some governorates and less in 
others.  One possible answer to this is the role of organisational networks – networks may have 
simply been stronger in some governorates than others, which will be briefly discussed later on.  
However, again one could then pose the question why would they be stronger in some than other 
districts. 
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4.3. Regional distribution of suicide bombers 
 
In terms of regional distribution the North has produced by far the highest 
number of bombers.  The impression offered by one of the interviewees is hence 
confirmed by statistics.  For the purpose of this analysis Jenin, Tulkarem, Tubas, 
Qalqilia, Salfit, and Nablus were included in the North; Ramallah, Jericho, and 
Jerusalem were considered as the Centre of the West Bank, and Bethlehem and 
Hebron constitute the South.
68
   
  
4.4.2 Rural & Refugee Camp Residents vs. Urban Dwellers 
 
Looking at the ‘social’ distribution of suicide bombers we find that 24 out of 
the 104 suicide bombings where we know the perpetrator’s origins were carried out 
by residents of refugee camps, 41 bombing by residents of the major urban centres
69
, 
and 39 by residents outside the major urban centres.  Consequently, over 37% of the 
bombings were carried out by ‘rural’ dwellers, around 39% by urban dwellers, and 
just fewer than 19% by camp residents.  According to these figures, the clear 
majority of bombers, namely 63, originated from outside the major urban centre and 
from refugee camps which would support the claim that the suicide bombings were 
primarily committed by those marginalised through measures taken since Oslo.  The 
distribution in favour of refugee and rural population is even more evident when we 
                                                 
68 The same division is used in MAS Social Monitors. 
69 I use a different measure of urban and rural here compared to that employed by the Palestinian 
Central Bureau of Statistics.  For the latter, most dwellings with over 2,000 inhabitants qualify as 
urban.  However, I have only included the major urban centres in my definitions because it is only 
there that people can go about their lives with minimal disturbance from the Israeli Administration or 
military.  I analysed refugee camps as a separate entity because refugees are inherently marginalised 
through their long-standing dispossession. 
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compare the number of perpetrators to their corresponding social groups. Then, we 
find that this translates to 3.7 bombers per 100,000 for refugee camp dwellers; 3.6 
per 100,000 for those outside the major urban centres; and 2.4 per 100,000 for urban 
dwellers. While at first glance it may have looked like urban dwellers had the highest 
participation rate in suicide bombing operations with 41 bombers, the urban 
population is much larger at 1695730,
70
 than the refugee population at 641995,
71
 and 
the population outside the major urban centres with 1069692.
72
  These figures would 
underpin the assumption that the rural and refugee population were more likely to 
participate in suicide bombings compared to the urban population.  One reason why 
this might be the case is that Israeli regime of control put in place after Oslo affected 
the rural and refugee population disproportionately and as a result these segments in 
society may have harboured more grievances and have been more likely to engage in 
violence to voice their frustration. Within the major cities we find fairly open 
cohesive spaces, free from the interference from the Israeli military or 
administration.  Perhaps the most significant and easily measurable manifestations of 
Israel’s colonial regime are checkpoints and settlements.  Although urban centres are 
not unaffected by the occupation as settlements limit their expansion, they 
experience water shortages over the summer months, and checkpoints guard the 
main entrances and exits of the city, normally inside the urban centres the population 
can go about their business relatively undisturbed by the day to day difficulties 
created by the Israeli occupation.
73
  The most obvious example is Ramallah, which, 
as we have seen in chapter three, presents a face of relative normality and stability.  
Hebron, on the other hand, is an exception as it is the only area in the Palestinian 
territories where Israeli settlements are located in the centre of a city.  However, after 
the separation of control between the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli 
government, those on the Palestinian side of the city have a similar experience to the 
rest of the urban population in the territories. 
While it is impossible to assess the effects of the occupation on each location 
from which suicide bombers originated, Aqabah in the Tubas governorate and Al-
                                                 
70 Data for 2000 from Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics.  
71 Compared to a total of 675,670 registered refugees in the West Bank and 938,531 in Gaza.  Data 
taken from UNWRA statistics for June 2004, “UNWRA in Figures,” UNWRA (August 2004), 
http://www.unrwa.org/userfiles/uif-june04.pdf (accessed 09 September 2011). 
72 Based on PCBS. 
73 For this reason only the main cities are included within the concept of urban areas, as only they 
offer larger coherent spaces, free of the immediate impact of the occupation. 
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Khader in the Bethlehem governorate are instructive examples.  Aqabah, the home 
town of Izz al-Masri who committed the Sbarro Pizza bombing in Jerusalem, lies in 
Area C where no construction is allowed and more than 2000 dunums have been 
confiscated since the occupation started in 1967.  The village has also been severely 
affected by two military bases adjacent to the village, one in the south and one to the 
east.
74
 The head of the village council, Hajj Sami Sadeq, described the situation in Al 
Aqaba to a Land Research Centre field worker as follows: 
 
The Israeli Army has exerted extensive pressure on the residents of the 
village since 1967 to force them to leave. One of the methods used 
included declaring the entire village as a Closed Military Area as well as 
frequent shooting at the houses, herds and the residents. Moreover, 
military manoeuvres and trainings using live ammunitions were 
conducted frequently to terrorise and to, thus, force the residents out of 
their village. Such hostile acts have led to the martyrdom of 8 residents 
and the injury of more than 50 throughout the years. […] There are a lot 
of barbaric acts committed by the Israeli Army such as what took place 
in 1999 when soldiers destroyed the electrical and phone networks as 
well as confiscating the heavy machinery used to rehabilitate the main 
and only road the village has. The Army also demolished a number of 
houses and barracks as we were prevented from building in the village 
since the occupation began in 1967.
75
 
 
 Al-Khader village, in the Bethlehem governorate which was home to Khaled 
Yousef Mohammed Musa who detonated his bomb at an IDF checkpoint in March 
2002, lost a considerable amount of its land to the construction of six settlements and 
connecting bypass roads.  The total village area consists of 20090 dunums, of which 
now 2791 dunums are taken up by settlements and 12 dunums by Israeli outposts.
76
 
 
                                                 
74 “Al-Aqaba Village Profile, ARIJ, February 2005, 8-9, http://vprofile.arij.org/tubas/static/localities 
/profiles/106_Profile.pdf  (accessed 17 January 2012). 
75 “Suffocation of all Forms of Viable Life in Al Aqaba Village,” ARIJ and Land Research Centre, 11 
May 2004, http://www.poica.org/editor/case_studies/view.php?recordID=388 (accessed 17 January 
2012). 
76 “Al-Khader Village to Lose its Land for the Construction of the Israeli Segregation Wall,” 6 May 
2009, ARIJ and Land Research Centre, http://www.poica.org/editor/case_studies/view.php?record 
ID=1931 (accessed 17 January 2012). 
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4.4.3. Regional Distribution of Settlements and Checkpoints 
 
Settlements and checkpoints undeniably have a significant impact on those 
living outside the urban centres.  They are the immediate visible manifestation of the 
occupation.  In the previous chapter it has already been pointed out that a significant 
proportion of Palestinians who relocate do so because of the proximity of their 
homes to settlements.  A study by the Land Research Centre found that attendance in 
schools in Hebron close to settlements has dropped to 50% since September 2000.
77
   
Checkpoints affect the population’s quality of life as they delay and restrict 
movement, often unpredictably.  This, of course, can have a severe impact on how 
Palestinians organise their life; getting to work, lessons, or lectures on time can be a 
trial.  For example, the distance between Ramallah and Bethlehem is just around 20 
miles but in reality it takes much longer to travel between the two cities than the 
distance would suggest.  On a good day, without any delays at the two checkpoints 
on the way (Juba and the Container checkpoint) the journey takes around one and a 
half hours.  West Bank ID card holders cannot access Jerusalem but the route 
through Jerusalem would be much quicker.  Instead, passengers find themselves 
zigzagging along Palestinian roads, shared highways and along settlements, first 
heading toward Jericho, then heading into the opposite direction back toward 
Jerusalem, along Ma’ale Adumim, and then on the Palestinian route through to the 
Wadi Nar valley and the Container Checkpoint.  At rush hour and with delays at the 
checkpoints, the journey can easily take over three hours.  The impact of 
checkpoints, however, can be even more severe.  Palestinians are routinely denied 
passage at checkpoints when they seek to reach hospitals in urban centres. Even 
women in labour are often stopped from reaching hospitals.  According to the World 
Health Organisation at least 69 Palestinian women gave birth at Israeli checkpoints 
between 2000 and 2006.  As a result of the extremely unsanitary conditions and lack 
of assistance at checkpoints 35 of the new-borns died and also 5 mothers died.
78
 In 
                                                 
77 “The Geopolitical Situation in Hebron Governorate, Palestine,” Land Research Centre (Jerusalem, 
2006), 11. 
78 “Checkpoints,” Palestine Monitor, 17 March 2010, http://www.palestinemonitor.org/spip/spip.php? 
article8 (accessed 09 September 2011). 
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total, the PHRMG recorded 110 deaths at checkpoints between 2000 and 2007, 
mostly when access to hospitals was denied.
79
 
According to an assessment by OCHA in November 2004 a total of 61 
checkpoints and 6 ‘partial checkpoints’80 are located around the West Bank and 
along entry points to Israel.
81
  If we match these to the respective governorates the 
distribution is as follows: Jenin 5, Tulkarem 2, Nablus 12, Tubas 2, Salfit 2, Qalqilia 
3, Jerusalem 8, Ramallah 8, Jericho 3, Bethlehem 10, and Hebron 12.
82
  In terms of 
regions, 26 checkpoints are situated in the North, 19 in the Centre, and 22 in the 
South.  The North then, is the area containing the most checkpoints which underpins 
the assumption that it is the region most affected by Israeli movement restrictions.  
However, the South and the Centre show similar restrictions, which is not reflected 
by the disparity in the numbers of suicide bombers coming from the two regions.  
One possible explanation for this may be that several checkpoints in the Centre are 
last-entry checkpoints to Israeli-controlled areas (although they are not always 
located on the Green Line).  In the North, checkpoints tend to be situated between 
Palestinian population centres where they have a much more significant impact on 
daily movement.  Last-entry checkpoints are less ‘visible’ to the majority of the 
population as many would never acquire a permit to try to enter Israeli controlled 
territory.  Moreover, only 4 out of the 16 last-entry checkpoints to Jerusalem are for 
the use of Palestinians with adequate permits, while the remaining twelve are for the 
use of settlers and Israeli residents (this does include blue identity card holders such 
as Palestinian residents of Jerusalem) only.
83
  
In addition to these permanent and partial checkpoints, the army can and 
frequently does set up flying checkpoints.  Because of the nature of these 
checkpoints it is impossible to provide any figures on their frequency and regional 
distribution. However, figures from OCHA suggest that flying checkpoints have 
been on the rise over the last three years.
84
  Because of their unpredictability they 
                                                 
79 “Died At Checkpoints,” PHRMG, 2000-2010, http://www.phrmg.org/Resources%20Tables%20new 
/Died%20at%20Checkpoints-%20English.htm (accessed 09 September 2011). 
80 An established checkpoint that is periodically staffed. 
81 This latter category may not affect Palestinians as much as the majority of the population is unable 
to travel to Israel because they lack the necessary permit. 
82 OCHA, “West Bank Closures,”  November 2004, http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/WB1_closure 
1Nov_04_A3.pdf (accessed 09 September 2011). 
83 OCHA oPt, “Movement and Access in the West Bank,”  September 2011, http://unispal.un.org/ 
UNISPAL.NSF/0/8F5CBCD2F464B6B18525791800541DA6 (accessed 09 September 2011). 
84 OCHA oPt, “Movement and Access in the West Bank,” September 2011. 
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have a particularly significant negative impact on free movement.  Forbidden roads 
are another means of restricting Palestinian movement.  According to B’Tselem a 
total of 20.5km of road in the Northern West Bank are not usable for Palestinians,
85
 
11.2 km in the Centre of the West Bank, 63.1 km in East Jerusalem, and 6.6 km in 
the Southern West Bank, all of which are located in the Israeli controlled H2 of 
Hebron.
86
 Further obstacles also include trenches, earth mounds and gates.  In terms 
of obstructions overall, the Hebron governorate tops the list with 210, which 
combined with 94 in the Bethlehem governorate amounts to 304 obstacles for the 
Southern region of the West Bank.  The Centre has a total of 169 physical 
obstructions with the majority situated in the Ramallah governorate.  In the North, 
the highest numbers of physical obstructions to movement are found in the Nablus 
governorate with 123, followed by Jenin with 44.  Obstructions in the North total 
202 which put it in second place after the Southern region.
87
  
      For many Palestinians the rapid growth of settlements during the Oslo 
period epitomises the failure of the Oslo process.  According to B’Tselem data, East 
Jerusalem comprised 11 settlements with a sizeable settler population of 165,076 (in 
2000).  Peace Now, an Israeli NGO, estimates that in 2009 135 settlements were 
distributed across the West Bank, of which 119 were already established by 2000.  
Settlers in the West Bank in 2000 amounted to a population of 191,125 (according to 
B’Tselem 190,206).  In the seven years since the signing of Oslo in 1993 the settler 
population in the West Bank had grown by over 80,000.  The settlements occupied a 
total area of 149 square kilometres, or 2.6% of the total area of the West Bank, of 
which 50.6 square kilometres were land privately owned by Palestinians.
88
  
However, the official jurisdiction of settlements extends further and according to 
Peace Now stands at 9.3% of West Bank land.
89
  In addition to this, 99 outposts were 
established between 1991 and 2004 with an estimated population of 5945, covering 
an area of just under 17 square kilometres, of which approximately 7 km² are 
                                                 
85 Both pedestrian and vehicular passage is prohibited for Palestinians. 
86 See B’Tselem, “West Bank Roads on Which Palestinian Vehicles are Forbidden.” 
87 OCHA, “West Bank Closures,” November 2004, http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/WB1_Closure 
1Nov_04_A3.pdf (accessed 12 September 2011). 
88 Calculations are based on list provided by Peace Now and include settlement activity until 2000.  
For list of settlements see Peace Now, “Full Settlement List,” under settlements and outposts, 
http://peacenow.org.il/eng/content/settlements-and-outposts (accessed 09 September 2011). 
89 Hagit Ofran and Noa Galili, “West Bank Settlements – Facts and Figures,” June 2009, http://peace 
now.org.il/eng/node/297 (accessed 09 September 2011).  
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privately owned Palestinian land.
90
  Moreover, 6.9 km² of the West Bank are 
occupied by nine Israeli industrial zones.   
Settlements are not homogenous and this may be a further factor in 
determining their effects on their surroundings.  Particularly significant here in terms 
of their relation to their Palestinian neighbours is their ideological orientation.   The 
majority of the settlements are ideological, that is 38.96% of the settlements, 0.87% 
extreme ideological, 31.09% not ideological (but depending on cheap housing and 
quality of life) and 29.08% ultra-orthodox.
91
  Ideological settlers use religious and 
nationalist arguments to justify their presence in the West Bank and are therefore 
less likely to agree to a withdrawal from Palestinian territory.  Settlements of this 
kind tend to be located deep inside the West Bank, often near Palestinian population 
centres
92
 and as a result, have a more significant impact on the Palestinian 
communities in their vicinity but also on the general cohesion of Palestinian life. 
It is difficult to pin down the location of settlements into Palestinian 
governorates because they often extend across several districts. As for distribution in 
terms of regions, the Northern District comprises 35 settlements, the Central District 
a clear majority with 57 settlements, and the South 30 settlements. Interestingly, this 
does not confirm the assumption that regions with higher settlement density may 
have produced more suicide bombers as a result of the grievances connected to 
settler presence.  While the Centre of the West Bank has the most settlements, it has 
produced, as we have already seen above, the least suicide bombers.  The North and 
the South on the other hand produced more suicide bombers but house fewer 
settlements.  An assessment of how settlements may relate to the grievances and 
frustrations that possibly drive suicide bombers cannot be conclusive as it is difficult 
to determine what kind of impact individual settlements have on their surrounding 
areas, which may depend on size, expansion and ideological motivation.  Such an 
assessment would require further research into how settlements situate themselves 
within their neighbourhood, what kind of specific effects the settlers’ presence has 
                                                 
90 Under the Road Map Israel is required to dismantle all outposts established after March 2001 as 
well as freeze all settlement construction, including natural growth settlement activity.  See “The 
Road Map: Full Text,” BBC, 30 April 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/2989783.stm (accessed 19 
January 2012).  For a list of outposts, see Peace Now, “Full Outpost List,” under settlements and 
outposts, http://peacenow.org.il/eng/content/settlements-and-outposts (accessed 09 September 2011). 
91 Ofran and Galili, “West Bank Settlements.” 
92 Lara Friedman, “Quality of Life Settlers,” January 2007, http://peacenow.org.il/eng/content/quality-
life-settlers (accessed 14 March 2012). 
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had on the neighbouring Palestinian communities, whether there are any forms of 
direct interaction, and how Palestinians view these settlers, if they connect their 
suffering and grievances to their presence, and if these translate into any kind of 
political or violent action. 
This section has sought to explore the relationship between suicide bombers 
and their place of origin. This was motivated by the assumption that suicide bombers 
may have been driven by grievances connected to the Israeli occupation, especially 
territorial policies such as movement restrictions, settlement expansion, restricted 
access to water and limitation of construction. Checkpoints and settlements represent 
the most immediate manifestation of Israel’s colonial policy.  An OCHA Report 
from 2009, concludes that more than 38% of the West Bank territory is inaccessible 
or only partially accessible to Palestinians as a result of being taken up by 
settlements, outposts, military bases and closed military areas, Israeli declared nature 
reserves or other related infrastructure.
93
  The discussion found that the strata of 
society that were thought to have been most affected by the occupation and were the 
driving forces behind the second intifada produced proportionately the highest 
number of suicide bombers. In terms of regional distribution, the North produced by 
far the highest number of bombers whilst the Centre produced the smallest number.  
When we tried to measure the regional impact of the occupation in terms of 
checkpoints and settlements, regions with the highest number of checkpoints also 
produced the highest number of suicide bombers while the results for settlements did 
not immediately support our thesis as we found that the highest number of 
settlements can be found in the Central West Bank which produced the smallest 
number of suicide bombers.  However, as already pointed out above, the real impact 
on the quality of life of the surrounding Palestinian community may have to be 
studied on the micro-level and measured through other factors such as ideology of 
the settlement, direct impact on the community, responsibility for land loss and 
access to water.  Some settlements have a reputation for being confrontational or 
particularly belligerent such as Halamish in the Centre, its land confiscation leads to 
weekly protests from the neighbouring village Nabi Saleh, or Yitzhar, a settlement 
located in the North, which is at the forefront of price-tag reprisals.  Without further 
                                                 
93 OCHA, The Humanitarian Impact on Palestinians of Israeli Settlements and Other Infrastructure 
in the West Bank, (July 2007), 8,  http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/TheHumanitarianImpactOf 
IsraeliInfrastructureTheWestBank_full.pdf (accessed 14 September 2011). 
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in-depth study into the impact of settlements on their surroundings it would be 
difficult to come to a valuable conclusion on whether they were a significant 
motivation factor for those that supported violence in the second intifada. 
 
4.5 Political Fragmentation and Competition: Inter-Group Relations 
and the Lack of Strategy 
 
   The fragmentation of the political spectrum, identified in chapter two, has 
already alluded to the ensuing competition between Hamas and Fateh.  This chapter 
will look at how political fragmentation, i.e. the division between and weakness of 
parties, and the inability of the leadership to take strategic political decisions, has 
affected the emergence of violence during the second uprising.   
Factional competition is at the centre of Mia Bloom’s thesis on suicide 
bombing.  She sees the cause for the escalation of such attacks as a result of 
competition in the market place.  Organisations engage in suicide bombing in order 
not to lose support in the street.  Hence, for Bloom, suicide bombing is the product 
of competition between different political groups.
94
  Naturally, this means that 
support for the tactic needs to come from the people.  This would tie in with many 
assumptions we have made so far.  Israel’s disproportionate use of violence whipped 
up support among the Palestinian population for violent tactics against Israel. What 
is interesting is that this popular support for suicide bombings, and we have seen 
previously that in the early stages of the intifada it stood at 58% for attacks against 
civilians in Israel and over 90% for attacks against soldiers and settlers in the West 
Bank and Gaza; but this did not substantially translate into gains in support for the 
political parties. We have also heard that it was Fateh which was the driving force 
behind the early stages of the intifada and not the Islamists, yet support for Fateh 
dropped from 37% in July 2000 to 28% in December 2001, while support for the 
Islamists increased from 17% in July 2000 to 25% by the end of 2001.  It is also 
striking that a large percentage of society must have considered themselves either 
unaffiliated or supported smaller parties.
95
  For Bloom, the undermining of Arafat 
was crucial to the burgeoning of the phenomenon.   Because of the lack of a centre of 
                                                 
94 Bloom, Dying to Kill, especially 29-31. 
95 PSR, “Public Opinion Poll no.3,” 19-24 December 2001, http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2001/ 
p3a.html#popularity (accessed 12 January 2012)  
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power, the groups began to compete and outbid one another with ever more 
spectacular bombings.
96
  Bloom sees proof in this competition also in the fact that 
secular groups began to use religious language in order to not lose ground on the 
Islamists.
97
  With the rise of Hamas religious identity had gained strength over the 
Oslo period, and a gradual ‘Islamisation’ of society had already taken place before 
the outbreak of the second intifada. As we had seen in an earlier chapter, Mahmood 
Mi’ari demonstrated that Palestinians’ identification with Islam grew substantially 
over the Oslo period. For Palestinians, Hamas’ continued use of militancy came to 
represent the continuation of the struggle against the occupation.  An earlier cited 
poll conducted in the wake of the Declaration of Principles established that a 
significant number of Palestinians supported the idea of continuing the intifada 
alongside negotiations.  For many this binary approach is still desirable because, in 
their view, without the continuation of the struggle, Palestinians have no leverage to 
bring about a fair settlement in negotiations.
98
  Fateh’s creation of the Al-Aqsa 
Martyrs’ Brigade was in a sense the party’s attempt to control the resistance and send 
a message to the population that Fateh does not only lead negotiations but it also 
resists: Fateh never gave up its history of liberating Palestine.
99
 
Moreover, religion and politics have always been intertwined in Palestine.  
Many early Fateh members, for example, had close ties with the Muslim 
Brotherhood or were at least sympathetic to it.  Arafat, for example, always used 
religious language in his speeches.  To use religious language and symbolism is 
hence not an innovation of the second intifada and it would also be wrong to assume 
that Fateh represents a secular party.  As such, Bloom’s observation of the 
competitive dynamics is superficial. 
In addition, it is often wrongly assumed that the religious groups were at the 
forefront in the early stages of the intifada but several authors and witnesses to the 
events contradict this.  Salim Tamari and Rema Hammami, both Palestinian 
academics, write:  
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While Hamas emerged as a major force during the first intifada, the 
religious character of that uprising was relatively muted.  In comparison, 
religion has played a major mobilizing and symbolic role in the current 
uprising, even while the participation of Hamas has been largely 
confined (at least at the time of writing) to raising Hamas flags at funeral 
processions.  Instead, the clashes have been dominated by secular groups 
(mainly Fateh, but with a visible presence of the Popular Front and other 
leftist organisations).
100
  
 
Another more recent competition model is presented by Ami Pedahzur and 
Arie Perlinger, who argue that those that sent suicide bombers have more 
resemblance to a horizontal network centred around hubs rather than a hierarchical 
organisation.  The reoccupation of Palestinian areas during the second intifada led 
most of the operational sectors to break up into regional cells.
101
  The authors 
conclude from their research into the networks that they are normally based on 
friendship and family ties and the main motivating factor behind their activity is 
competition with other local groups. The strengthening of the hamula identity that 
we identified in chapter three is reflected in this new shape of organisational 
structure. In essence, they take the concept of social networks from emulation to 
competition and apply competition to a different analytical level: rather than 
competition for power on the national level of organisations, it is competition for 
power on the local level between networks.
102
  Pedhazur and Perlinger even go so far 
to argue that loyalty to political factions was so weak that networks would 
sometimes switch their allegiances from one organisation to another.  The question 
that Pedahzur and Perlinger’s model does not answer is, however, how local 
networks garner support if the driving force is competition with other local networks 
and their political allegiance is unclear.  Their model is able to explain participation 
but it seems to detach networks from their social base. If networks are rooted in 
primordial ties, how can support for them be generated and why would it even 
matter?  Bloom’s strong point is that she connects organisations with their social 
base.  Her model also fits in with the veneration of martyrs that would explain 
support and participation in the phenomenon.  Moreover, there is an interesting 
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discrepancy in Pedahzur’s and Perlinger’s model between the number of bombers 
dispatched and the local base of the networks, and the numbers of bombers and their 
place of origin: while the Nablus network, which according to the authors is one of 
the older and perhaps more traditional networks, ‘only’ dispatched 4 bombers, as we 
saw above, the highest number of bombers originated from the Nablus area with 26 
coming from that governorate.
103
  Moreover, the authors did not identify a 
Bethlehem network despite the fact that 13 bombers originated from the area.  
However, they acknowledge that some suicide bombers were sent by other networks 
outside the main four identified in their study and some individuals acted 
independently of any organisation.
104
 While a localisation of group competition as 
described by Pedahzur and Perlinger did not clearly emerge from the interviews, the 
criminalisation of the resistance and an associated focus on local interest rather than 
political programmes did.  After the destruction of PA infrastructure and its capacity 
to police and maintain order, Palestinian groups began to control the streets and 
started to impose the ‘law’.  These groups were described as being composed largely 
of ‘uneducated people’, presumably lacking strategy and political vision.  In some 
cases they even demanded ‘protection money’ from merchants in return for 
defending the Palestinian streets.
105
  Israel’s assassination policy had managed to 
sieve off the top layer of the more traditional and respected political and militant 
leaders of Palestinian groups.  As the new leaders and their practices began to take 
hold, the population’s support began to wane.106 
The outbidding factor is also acknowledged by Azmi Bishara who laments an 
absence of an overall strategy among political organisations during the second 
intifada:  
 
The mentality and discourse of immature competition between 
Palestinian factions, of ‘who did what,’ of assessments over coffee that 
‘this operation was good,’ or ‘no it was bad,’ of ‘look how many martyrs 
we have,’ and so forth, continue to accompany the Palestinian armed 
struggle. Palestinian political culture still measures achievements of 
factions by the number of their martyrs rather than by the losses they 
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have been able to inflict. There is still the mentality of outbidding – that 
this faction has done such and such […]107 
 
  The cooperation between groups in the Jenin refugee camp during the 
Israeli operations in the camp was cited as an exception to this competitive 
mentality.  When under direct attack by the Israeli army the armed groups were 
working together.
108
  For Bishara, a coherent strategy devised by the leadership is 
crucial to ending the occupation: ‘It is a comprehensive issue that addresses the 
relationship between the current situation and the goals we seek to achieve through 
various forms of political action.’109  It can only succeed if it makes Israeli society 
pay a high price, which however, cannot be achieved by killing civilians.  Resistance 
is not necessarily at odds with state building and both can be pursued at the same 
time.  In his view, however, most of the activities during the second intifada did not 
grow out of a clear strategy but are instead a product of vengeance, reaction, or 
anger.
110
   
The lack of cooperation among the political factions and, indeed, the lack of 
leadership are particularly obvious when looking at the National and Islamic High 
Committee for the Follow–up of the Intifada (NIHC).  The committee came to the 
surface in November, just a month after the beginning of the intifada, although it was 
apparently formed in the first week of the intifada.
111
  Hamammi and Tamari point 
out that significantly, the committee did not follow in the footsteps of the UNLU of 
the first intifada and did not envisage itself as the ‘united leadership’ but simply calls 
itself ‘a follow-up committee’.112  A similar body was also established in Gaza.113  In 
its first leaflet the follow-up committee called for similar activities that had 
dominated the first intifada: ‘its operational suggestions to the population include the 
formation of defence committees, a boycott of Israeli products, the promotion of 
national products, the promotion of women’s inclusion, and general calls for unity of 
voices and actions.’114  One overall strategic objective can be discerned and that is 
that much of the action is targeted at settlements, including calls for a unified 
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isolation of the settlements and to disarm settlers, with a view to achieving their 
departure from occupied territory.
115
  This would support our earlier thesis that 
settlements were a clear point of grievance and a target of action.  The committee 
also published a calendar of events in the PA newspaper Al Hayat al Jadida, giving 
daily instructions to the population on activities, mainly calls for peaceful 
processions but also calls for escalation to break the siege of Palestinian towns and 
villages.
116
  However, few of the parties had the mass support base to implement 
these calls, Fatah and Hamas being the exception.
117
 
During the early months of the intifada attempts were made to find a 
common political platform in the NIHC.  However, this proved to be difficult as 
Hamas and Islamic Jihad did not agree with the main elements of the PLO 
programme or even the PLO itself as a representative body.  Rather than dissolving 
the committee after what would have been a very short existence, the decision was 
taken to continue on the basis of a minimum coordination of action.  Rather than 
determining the main line of policy, the body’s remit was then limited to deciding on 
the main plan of action.  However, even when it came to tactics there was radical 
disagreement over whether armed actions in the intifada should be focussed on the 
territories or beyond the Green Line, and if the tactic of suicide bombing should be 
adopted, and whether civilians could be targeted.  Despite the deep division within 
the coalition it did not break up until after the first two years of the intifada.  With 
the rise to power of Sharon and tactics implemented by his government, for many 
members of the coalition it was obvious that the militants had played into Sharon’s 
hands and this caused friction within the coalition.  After the major Israeli incursions 
in 2002, the coalition began to be less effective, the leadership disintegrated and each 
faction came to revert back to its own centre of direction.  Even Fateh was split 
between those who advocated the use of more extreme and militant tactics and others 
who thought that militancy was harmful to the intifada.  The NIHC was incapable of 
taking decisions on militant actions not only because of different lines of policy 
pursued by the different parties but also because the military wings of organisations 
are not directly under the command of the political organisations.
118
  
                                                 
115 Hamami and Tamari, “Second Uprising,”19. 
116 Ibid. 
117 Ibid., 20. 
118 Interviewee observations. INTERVIEW #19. 
210 
 
This coalition of parties, then, was unable to agree on a common political 
programme and instead it decided to unify over the lowest common denominator.  
The different views on objectives and means to achieve those goals appear to have 
been insurmountable, so what the coalition agreed on was mass action similar to the 
first intifada and the result of this were the leaflets described by Hammami and 
Tamari.  However, as the two authors describe, most parties lacked the political base 
to mobilise the masses for such activities.  In essence, the political leaders failed to 
formulate an overall strategy, which should have been their crucial role in the 
intifada, but instead sought to direct mass action, which they had neither the means 
to bring about nor the ability to make count.  Internal division and the lack of a clear 
programme had cost most parties their support base after Oslo. The fact that the 
subject of the NIHC primarily came up in conversation with politicians is 
symptomatic of its failure to reach beyond political circles.  As for suicide bombing, 
which within the political ranks seems to have generated heated debates, it does not 
appear to have grown out of an overall political strategy.   
  
4.6. Women and Suicide Bombing – Escape Route or Emancipation? 
 
With Wafa Idrees’ suicide bombing attack in Jerusalem 27 January 2002, the 
Palestinian conflict witnessed the first female suicide bomber.  As several other 
Palestinian females followed in her footsteps debates began to arise on the ‘new’ 
phenomenon. Not much later, Dareen Abu Ayshe, Ayat Akhras, and Andaleeb 
Takataqah followed suit with the Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade claiming responsibility 
in all three cases. It is not certain whether Wafa Idrees’ bombing was intended as a 
suicide bombing or if she intended merely to plant the bomb and it exploded 
prematurely.
119
  It is also not clear to what extent she was affiliated with the Al-Aqsa 
Martyrs’ Brigades despite the fact that the group took responsibility for the attack.  
Although her brother was a Fateh member, her family disputed that she may have 
acted on behalf of a group or had any political affiliation.
120
  This calls into question 
whether there was any intention to orchestrate a female suicide bombing attack by an 
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organisation or indeed by Idrees herself.
121
  Regardless of what the true motivations 
and intentions behind the attack were, it certainly has opened the door for many 
other females who committed suicide bombing attacks for the various Palestinian 
organisations, even the more religious-oriented Islamic Jihad and Hamas.  However, 
it was not until May 2003, about two and a half years into the intifada, that Islamic 
Jihad claimed responsibility jointly with Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade for a female 
bombing, and in January 2004 Hamas for the first time took responsibility for a 
suicide bombing attack carried out by a female from Gaza: Reem al-Riyashi.  
Interestingly, the participation of the Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade in suicide 
operations started with, or just after Wafa Idrees’ bombing operation.  Suicide 
bombings in the first year of the intifada were dominated almost exclusively by 
Islamic Jihad and Hamas.  This reflects an opposite trend of the general militant 
activities in the intifada.  As seen in the above-cited passage from Hammami and 
Tamari, in the early stages, the nationalist groups associated with Fateh were the 
driving forces behind the intifada while Hamas’ action was limited.  
The involvement of women in militant activities in what is still a largely 
conservative society generated considerable interest among journalists and in 
Western academia.  The inclusion of women bombers by the religious groups 
received particular attention as they are normally associated with the exclusion of 
women from the more public spheres of life.  The common conception of women as 
nurturers runs contrary to witnessing them in the role of suicide bombers.  However, 
women have made their mark as active participants in violent conflicts elsewhere, in 
conflicts in Lebanon, Sri Lanka, Colombia, as well as in the Palestinian context.  
Leila Khaled, who participated in several hijackings for the PFLP in the late 60s and 
early 70s, is an often cited example of female militancy.  
At the same time women are also victimised and exploited in conflict.  The 
occupation affects women disproportionately, partly because often the particular 
cultural context which makes women more vulnerable.  Women as the caretakers of 
the home experience house searches and arrests by the IDF, they are less likely to 
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obtain permits to visit Jerusalem because only a minority of women are part of the 
official labour force, and ultimately it is women who put the food on the table and 
worry about feeding their children during economic hardship.
122
  Because of the high 
levels of unemployment in the territories, informal economy is widespread. For 
women there are various opportunities to seek alternative income often through 
handicrafts or cookery which can ensure the survival of the family when the 
husbands are out of work.
123
  This often causes friction and violence within the 
family in what is still an essentially patriarchal society, in which men are expected to 
be the breadwinners.  Local research has shown that there is a significant connection 
between male unemployment and domestic violence.
124
 
Interviews conducted by WCLAC during the intifada, demonstrate how 
deeply women were affected by the immediate violence and destruction as mothers, 
wives and caretakers.  A woman pharmacist from Nablus described to the 
interviewer how she and her husband were unable to help their firstborn child: 
 
Waking on 12 April, I had a feeling there had been many bombings and a 
lot of gunfire in the night.  I felt strange, and I was really aware of all the 
stress we were living under.  The next day, I felt something. I didn’t 
think it was labour pains because I didn’t think I was due to give birth at 
that time.  When I felt the pain increasing, I realised that I was in 
premature labour.  I should have been in hospital because the baby was 
only 32 weeks old and needed an incubator and oxygen, of course, and 
medicine.  We tried all means to get to the hospital.  By then it was 
around 1:00pm.  We tried coordinating with the ambulance, with the Red 
Crescent, and with the International Committee of the Red Cross. 
Nothing worked.  The ambulance tried to reach our area twice to take us 
to the hospital.  Israeli troops fired at it.  The driver called us and told us 
what had happened and asked if he should try again.  My husband said: 
No, it is too dangerous.
125
   
 
The woman’s husband, a physician, together with a neighbour, also a 
physician, delivered the baby.  Through international institutions such as Save the 
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Children which contacted USAID and the Red Crescent, they tried to get an 
ambulance through because the baby needed oxygen as it was born prematurely.  
However, it was impossible because the area was under curfew.  The baby only 
survived for a few hours. 
The concept of helplessness was also at the core of a story told by a woman 
from Al Askar Camp in Nablus.  During one of the Israeli incursions in 2002, which 
lasted for 17 days, the water supply in the area was cut off.  She describes how 
difficult it was without water, especially for her mother who suffered from high 
blood pressure and was diabetic, and had to take medication as a result of which she 
needed water because the medicine is diuretic.  By the end of the incursion her 
mother could no longer talk and had difficulty breathing.  The woman describes how 
she tried several times to get out of the house to find water but every time the tank 
positioned near their house started firing.  Neighbours also came to ask for water: 
‘The 17 days passed like 17 years.  What made things worse was that our neighbour 
came to us asking for water.  How are we to give her water? And her boy behind her 
crying and begging for water.  You want to give it to him.  It was too much to 
take.’126 
One way to understand female suicide bombing is as an expression of 
emancipation and quest for gender equality.  Through the militarisation of the 
intifada women became marginalised because the roles they had previously occupied 
as organisers or motivators where no longer available or relevant.  Women have 
always participated in the Palestinian national struggle and they pushed for a role 
within the intifada.
127
  Pressure came from women who wanted to be part of the 
resistance as they had been during the first intifada, and the more secular Al Aqsa 
Martyrs’ Brigades enabled women to do exactly that.  The underlying principle is 
that no matter what tactic women demand equality.  So the question about female 
participation is more about the shape it takes rather than if females participate.  
Penny Johnson and Eileen Kuttab describe the encounter between a group of 
young men and women among one of the largest candlelight vigils in Ramallah in 
mid-October 2000 organised by the women’s movement.  The young men were 
highly charged for the coming confrontation as they were heading for the checkpoint 
and some scoffed at the candles and encouraged the crowd to go to the checkpoint 
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too.  The slogans shouted by the young men were less political but more fiery.  
However, the women managed to quieten the young men and Kuttab and Johnson 
see this as one of the few instances where there was any level of discussion between 
civil society and the combatants.
128
  As these public demonstrations received little 
publicity, those women who wanted their voices to be heard would have had to 
follow the men and participate in checkpoint confrontations.   
More often, however, rather than active participants women are portrayed as 
victims of the cultural constraints of their societies, especially in Western literature.  
Wafa Idrees, according to most sources, was divorced, apparently unable to have 
children and worked for the Red Crescent.  Many of those who reported her story 
suggested that her inability to have children and the subsequent divorce caused her 
so much distress that she decided to carry out a suicide bombing operation.  For 
other women, personal motivations were found too: illicit relationships outside 
marriage, or before marriage, pregnancy, inadequacy or a quest to save the family 
honour.
129
   
Interestingly political motivations are hardly ever attributed to women, 
especially by Israeli and Western analysts.
130
  If we accept the central argument of 
these analyses, it appears then that women and men are motivated by two completely 
different sets of reasons.  While male perpetrators grieve for the injustice and 
suffering caused by the Israeli occupation or are motivated by religious promises of 
paradise, women see suicide bombing as a dignified escape route when they have 
broken the rules of behaviour assigned to them by a society that does not endow 
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them with equal rights.  In his study of failed female Palestinian suicide bombers 
imprisoned in Israel, Schweitzer does acknowledge mixed motives for women but 
concludes from his research that women’s motivations and justifications for 
attempting suicide operations were initially personal, but with prolonged 
imprisonment became more political.  He attributes this development or 
indoctrination to the gradual influence from the more dominant political inmates 
within the prison environment.   
Such logic empties Palestinian female action of any political content and at 
the same time vilifies Palestinian culture and society for pushing females into such 
actions as a last resort in situations where they see, within the confines of their 
culture, no other dignified way out.
131
  The same logic has also discredited the image 
of Palestinian women and motherhood.
132
  As funerals are turned into celebrations, 
wives and mothers in particular are shown to be proud of their husbands and sons, 
raising the question how mothers could willingly send their children to die and kill 
the children of others.  A close reading of some of the interviews with mothers or 
wives of martyrs in the intifada, however, shows that they are deeply grieving the 
loss but their social surroundings do not always allow them to openly share these 
feelings. The concept of the martyr is a very complex and valuable concept in 
Palestinian society and he or she is seen as someone who sacrificed their life for the 
sake of the community.
133
  As such, they are seen as deserving admiration for their 
deeds. 
Questioning the basis of those who boil down the phenomenon of female 
suicide bombing to gender inequality and patriarchy, does not intend to deny the 
existence of severe restrictions on women within Palestinian society, nor can the 
unfortunate position that many women find themselves in be solely attributed to the 
Israeli occupation.  Looking at other areas in the region women face similar 
difficulties in Egypt and Jordan, for example.  Discrimination against women arises 
from a mix of deeply-rooted cultural practices and traditions and particular 
interpretations of Islam. Yet, the unique political situation in the Palestinian 
territories adds additional restrictions.  The rise of the Islamic movement, largely due 
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to its opposition to Oslo, had undoubtedly a negative impact on women’s liberation.  
Moreover, the division between Fateh and Hamas which came to the fore after the 
2006 elections also deeply affected women. Women’s bodies and personal rights 
became a political battleground.  Wearing the hijab is as much a political statement 
for many women as it is a religious one.
134
  Policies that affect women’s personal 
rights are a manifestation of political control and power.  Since Hamas took control 
of the Gaza Strip it advocated a number of policies restricting women’s personal 
choices such as banning women from smoking arguileh, a Middle Eastern tobacco 
water pipe popular with both men and women throughout Palestine. 
Women’s liberation does still have a long way to go in the eyes of local 
activists.  The context of the first intifada enabled women to carve out a role for 
themselves and formulate an agenda for women’s liberation.  As elsewhere, 
however, nationalist agendas began to take priority and side-lined women’s issues 
‘temporarily,’ but for many women national independence has to go hand in hand 
with equal rights for women.  In their view creating a democratic state with equal 
rights for everyone is crucial to Palestinian independence.  Hence, internal reform is 
essential. 
To date, reform in family and penal law has been stalled by political interests 
and division.  Arafat, for example, postponed any reform of the family and penal law 
in order not to sour the relationship with the Islamists.  Since 2007 the PLC has been 
defunct following the division between Fateh and Hamas and large-scale arrests of 
Hamas members of the parliament.  While reforms could be made through 
presidential decree, such a decree would no longer have had force in the Gaza Strip 
which since 2007 is under the control of Hamas, and Mahmoud Abbas’ term expired 
in 2009.
135
  The legal system in place in the Palestinian Territories is made up of an 
intricate mix of legal layers bearing witness to the complex history of the Palestinian 
Territories, including Ottoman, British Mandate, Jordanian, Egyptian and Israeli 
military law.  Which laws are in force where and when seems to be beyond the 
comprehension of a non-legal mind.  However, much of the penal and family law 
originate from Jordanian laws passed between 1948 and 1967.  One of the most 
controversial legal remnants from that era, is the legal loophole in the case of honour 
killings.  Under a Jordanian penal code, men who claim to have killed female 
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relatives because they are suspected of having dishonoured the family, generally get 
away with relative impunity.
136
  Although it is difficult to gather data on honour 
killings, some sources suggest they are on the rise in the Palestinian territories. 
137
   
The course of the women’s movement after the end of the first intifada and 
with the signing of Oslo reflected largely the developments of the rest of civil society 
as discussed in chapter two.  The signing of Oslo had divided Palestinian society 
over the suitable and most effective tactics and strategy to end occupation and to 
achieve independence.  The transition from informal politics to formal politics is one 
central factor in the decline of mass activism.
138
 As elsewhere in civil society, 
women activists became absorbed in the newly emerging PA apparatus after Oslo.  
Keeping one foot in the grassroots movement and one in the PA, largely rendered 
these ‘femocrats’ ineffective.139  This institutionalisation of the women’s movement 
is one of the main reasons why the movement was no longer able to mobilise and 
affect political developments.  Moreover, the severe movement restrictions put in 
place during the second intifada did, of course, categorically impede any large-scale 
grassroots activism.  Towards the end of the second intifada in November 2004 
OCHA counted 61 checkpoints around the West Bank, 6 partial checkpoints, 102 
roadblocks, 48 road gates, 374 earth mounds, 28 earth walls, 61 trenches, 39 
observation towers.  This amounts to a total of 719 physical obstructions in an area 
of 5640 km².  Nablus, for example, was surrounded by seven fully staffed 
checkpoints and two partial checkpoints.
140
  Moreover, the IDF also implemented 
prolonged curfews.  According to B’Tselem, Jenin, for example, was under curfew 
for just under 1800 hours with a break of just under 600 hours between 16 June and 
15 August 2002.  During the same time Nablus was under curfew for around 1700 
hours with less than 100 hours break.
141
  Under these circumstances, it was 
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impossible for activists to mobilise and organise on a large scale.  As already pointed 
out earlier in this thesis, with most of the leaders of the women’s movement based in 
Ramallah it was not possible travel and mobilise outside the city.    
The indirect consequences of the occupation such as unemployment, 
economic hardship and resulting domestic violence, was already touched on earlier, 
but women also suffered from the immediate impact of the violence during the 
intifada.  One woman from Rafah, interviewed by WCLAC, questions the humanity 
of the sniper who shot her seven year old daughter whilst sitting in the car next to 
her. So does another woman, who describes how soldiers trapped young men inside 
a taxi with a tear gas canister, and stood by, watching how the car filled with smoke 
and the men began gasping for air.
142
  For many women their experiences of loss and 
humiliation have turned into hatred for the people that they identify as the clear 
source of their suffering.  Under such circumstances, making peace appears no 
longer possible.
143
   
The woman, whose mother’s state of health severely deteriorated because of 
the lack of water during the prolonged curfew of Nablus, explains her feelings:  
 
I don’t like to read or think of that story because every time I imagine my 
mother right in front of me I would have killed him.  If a soldier were in front of me 
I would have killed him, believe me.  I wanted to go down just to see them, to fight 
with them.  What happened is so senseless! It is a tragedy!  I’ve never held a grudge 
against them.  I used to be against killing, but after that time I started to have the 
disturbing urge to kill (…).144 
 
For most women it is clear who is responsible for their suffering:  
 
It is the Israelis.  They are the reason I couldn’t reach the hospital in time to 
give my son the medical treatment he deserved.  He should have had a chance to 
live.  It’s impossible for my husband and me to forget those moments where we were 
on the verge of exploding.  We kept reliving them after his death.  It is impossible to 
forget! We just keep remembering and crying.
145
 
 
                                                                                                                                          
(accessed 17 January 2012). 
142 WCLAC, “If I Were Given the Choice,” 41, 63-64. 
143 Ibid., 61. 
144 Ibid., 63. 
145 Ibid., 62. 
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Loss and suffering often trigger severe emotional distress and sometimes 
channel into anger and hatred.  When the pain is so big, logic stops, argues one 
interviewee.
146
  A central theme in these interviews is the loss of humanity on both 
sides.  The women question the humanity of those who inflict violence and suffering 
on them and at the same time they feel deprived of their own human dignity.   
Retaining humanity is at the core of much unnoticed resistance activity. 
Resistance is a very comprehensive term for Palestinians: it even stretches to 
refusing to give way to army vehicles trying to cross a busy road for example, which 
normally would be considered a courtesy among drivers.  Resistance does not only 
refer to armed attacks against Israel but is essentially also about carrying on with 
life.  While we have already discussed the concept of sumud in an earlier chapter, 
which advocates maintaining presence on the land,  some forms of resistance are 
broader than that and touch on the human side of continuing life: they may include 
making a birthday cake, making a salad, or going to work.
147
  After weeks of 
prolonged closure of the West Bank in March 2010 and clashes across the major 
cities outside Ramallah, I wanted to get out of Ramallah for a day trip and asked a 
Palestinian colleague at the University if he thought it was a good idea to travel at 
the moment. He looked rather perplexed and answered: we have to go about our 
lives no matter what happens.  I have to go to work every day whether there are 
clashes or not.  I subsequently did end up going on a day trip to Bethlehem, on my 
return to Ramallah later that afternoon a battle had broken out near Qalandia 
checkpoint between the army and youths from the nearby refugee camp.  Whilst 
fully armed soldiers exchanged mainly teargas but possibly also rubber coated 
bullets and sound bombs for stones, drivers had found themselves a small path to 
pass alongside these confrontations on the pavement.  As traffic had built up it was 
slow moving. I kept turning around to observe what was happening only a few 
meters away from the car as I felt slightly uncomfortable about the proximity of the 
events, but none of the other passengers of the shared taxi even bothered to look 
twice.  While I found it strange how passers-by were carrying on with their journeys 
as if nothing was happening, for the other passengers it must have been something 
that they were so familiar with that they simply considered part of their daily lives. 
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the incursion when their houses were occupied. Ibid., 58. 
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Hanadi Jaradat was an often cited example in interviews.  A young lawyer 
from Jenin, both her fiancé and her brother had been killed by the Israeli army.  It is 
difficult to distinguish in this case whether she carried out the operation for personal 
or political reasons.  While losing a loved one is normally a very personal 
experience, in the Palestinian context many people lose their relatives and friends 
because of the political situation.  The fact that both men were killed by the army 
made Haradat’s motivations also political and provided her with a clear target for her 
anger and suffering.   
While equality in participation may not have been easily achieved, as far as 
reception in society was concerned, it appears that women martyrs were treated just 
the same as male martyrs: they received funeral processions, recorded last wills and 
appear to be venerated by the population in the same way as male martyrs.  Posters 
of female martyrs still appear throughout Ramallah on the anniversary of their 
deaths, even years later.  Nevertheless, female activism is not always welcomed by 
society.  Women prisoners for example, receive a mixed message from society.
148
  
While Palestinian men who had not been in prison, at least up until the second 
intifada, are rather the exception than the rule, for a Palestinian woman to be an ex-
prisoner is rather unusual.
149
  Having been imprisoned by Israel earns a man respect 
from the community as he has shown loyalty to his own community.    
The debates on female suicide bombers to date have largely centred on the 
cultural constraints imposed on women by their societies and women’s quest for 
equality.  However, the question for women seeking a role in the intifada went 
beyond equality with men.  For many voices in the women’s movement, it was 
rather a question of the emancipation of civil society, an emancipation of the 
masses.
150
  The experience of women was hence merely symptomatic of the wider 
underlying discrimination against mass participation in the intifada. Mass 
participation occurred in the closed spaces of cities unheard by the international 
media and unseen by the Israeli occupation, the clear target of the people’s 
frustration; and it occurred away from the public eye in people’s homes as they 
endured prolonged hardship during closures.  When the masses did seek to confront 
the soldiers at checkpoints they responded with disproportionate force causing them 
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to retreat. Those who wanted to voice their frustration in a public manner resorted to 
violence, choosing an approach that is more visible but also one that is more devoid 
of political content.   
 
4.7. Explaining Suicide Bombing, the Relationship between Politics & 
Violence, and Questioning the Importance of Strategy 
 
 The intention of this chapter was to discover the central driving factors 
behind suicide bombings.  The preceding chapters had outlined the major political, 
territorial and social trends since the end of the first intifada and explained how these 
transformations precluded the rise of collective forms of non-violent protest such as 
mass demonstrations and civil disobedience as the dominant tactics, but at the same 
time these developments prepared the ground for a more violent and fragmented 
intifada. 
 We have seen that suicide bombings were often reactionary to Israeli 
violence against Palestinians but most specifically a response to Israel’s 
assassination policies.  According to data of the Journal of Palestine Studies no 
assassinations were carried out between September 2000, immediately prior to the 
outbreak of the intifada, and early November.  The initial three months of the 
intifada saw three suicide bombings with the first being conducted on 26 October 
2000, wounding one, and the second on 9 November which is the same day that 
Israel’s first assassination operation during this period took place.151  By the time the 
third suicide bombing occurred on 22 December, Israeli security forces had in the 
span of a month and a half assassinated 13 Palestinians with political or militant 
roles, including a member of the DFLP which has a militant wing but did not engage 
in any suicide operations.  This would suggest that the Israeli military, from the 
beginning, responded with full force against suicide bombings and that in the early 
stages, at least, Palestinians did not react with equal force. 
 Conversely, one could argue that assassinations, violent incursions, 
reoccupation and curfews were all a reaction to Palestinian violence, especially 
suicide bombings.  This is certainly what Brym and Arraj sought to ascertain. For 
them Palestinians and Israelis became locked into an interactive cycle of violence.  
                                                 
151 For assassinations see Esposito, “Al-Aqsa Intifada,” 111-21. 
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However, we have also seen indications that Israeli violence was not always 
reactionary.  Before the outbreak of the intifada the Israeli military and security had 
already prepared themselves for major confrontations with the Palestinians and many 
Palestinians, especially in hindsight, feel that the leadership, by allowing the 
violence to go ahead, fell into the trap.  Palestinian violence provided Israel with the 
pretext for major incursions and military operations which they had prepared 
themselves for, months before the outbreak of the intifada. Michele K. Esposito also 
points out in his overview of Israeli military operations during the intifada, that some 
operations were already initiated or approved before major Palestinian suicide 
bombing attacks occurred.  Moreover, assassinations and incursions continued 
during periods of hudna on the Palestinian side.
152
  Hence, at least in part, Israeli 
policies were pre-emptive and not reactionary. 
 Internally, the political fragmentation and division under the lack of 
national leadership and the frustration among the population after the failure of Oslo 
fuelled the organisations’ activism, striving for popular support.  Moreover, the 
excessive violence used by Israel against Palestinian civilians in mass 
demonstrations in the initial stages of the intifada increased the populations’ support 
for violent action against Israel.  Suicide bombings came to symbolise empowerment 
in the face of a vastly superior military force. 
 Interestingly, while Palestinian organisations appear to be strongly driven 
by military realities on the ground, their competitive relationship with other 
organisations and their populations’ impetus, they showed little sensitivity to the 
international political mood.  Palestinians gained international support during the 
first intifada as the David in an inherently unequal struggle against Goliath.  In the 
second intifada, Palestinians were often framed as the sole aggressors against which 
Israel saw itself justified to deploy any means available to defend itself and its 
population.  Suicide bombings isolated Palestinians, it allowed the conflict to be 
framed in terms of security, and completely side-lined the demand for an end of the 
occupation. 
 Perpetrators tended to come from communities that have been affected 
more severely by Israeli occupation, especially movement restrictions and 
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223 
 
settlements, but also construction and access to water.  They also tended to originate 
mainly from the North and the South of the West Bank, which had both seen a 
decline in living standards in the years prior to the outbreak of the second intifada.  
Hence, movement restrictions had created a fragmented physical as well as social 
geography.  Individuals’ lives were confined to fairly small social spaces leading to 
localised cultures and close social networks.  With the rise of Hamas, religion had 
gained more influence in society but religion and politics had always between 
inseparable in Palestine and true secularism does not exist in Palestinian society.  
The failure of Oslo, the realisation of the true implications for Palestinians of the 
Oslo agreement and the Palestinian Authority’s own failures, created an explosive 
political atmosphere among the population.  People’s frustrations and support from 
the marginalised masses for the intifada was in part also a very vocal objection to the 
Palestinian Authority’s performance and could have easily turned against the 
Palestinian leadership itself.  The use of excessive force by Israeli army and police 
against civilians participating in mass demonstrations, especially in the initial stages 
of the intifada combined with the accumulated frustration of Palestinian political 
aspirations created an atmosphere in which the ‘martyr’ became an admirable and 
desirable symbol of power in an otherwise hopeless situation.  It appeared to 
introduce a measure of equality or parity where there was none on a daily basis.  
Amid this rise of the ‘culture of martyrdom’, emulating martyrs who were by many 
seen as heroes sacrificing themselves for their communities became a desirable goal, 
especially among the younger generation. 
 While some analysts argue that individuals (especially women) were 
victims of manipulation and pressure, others - particularly party members and 
leaders of organisations - argue that supply was bigger than demand and that 
individuals were the driving force behind this phenomenon.  It is difficult to come to 
any authoritative conclusion on personal motivations, yet political frustrations 
among the perpetrators appear to have been a significant motivating factor.  
However, organisations also offer incentives such as financial security for anyone 
who joins them.  Recruitment no longer seems to be as clear-cut as it used to be.  
While in the past individuals approached an organisation if they wanted to be 
politically active, this was not necessarily the case during the second intifada and 
short-term recruitment of people who had not been previously active for 
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organisations appears to have been widespread.
153
  Female suicide bombing had 
caused much interest but the argument here has been that it was less an expression of 
gender equality in itself but, rather, it was symptomatic of the exclusion of the whole 
of civil society, and not just women, from a new more violent mode of uprising.   
 The role of violence in the second intifada merits some further thought.  
Beyond being a response to Israeli aggression, violence had always played a key role 
in the Palestinian national struggle.  In the absence of a territorial base, Yezid Sayigh 
argued that armed struggle served as a key driving force in nation building, state 
building and the reviving of Palestinian national identity.
154
 British Mandate 
policies, the establishment of the state of Israel and the concomitant collective 
dispossession and dispersal of Palestinians had weakened and delayed the formation 
of Palestinian nationalism, but armed struggle was capable of unifying Palestinians 
and driving the Palestinian political project forward.  It was essentially of strategic 
value.  With Oslo and the establishment of the Palestinian Authority on Palestinian 
territory this allegiance between politics and violence changed considerably. Using 
armed struggle to promote Palestinian independence was no longer a viable option 
for those groups that accepted the Oslo framework because the Oslo agreement does 
not include any notion of legitimate use of violence for the stateless Palestinians 
against Israel.  Violence in the second intifada served no long-term strategy, it may 
have temporarily galvanised the masses, but it achieved next to nothing in terms of 
nation building or solidifying Palestinian identity.  
That the political level failed to put forward a strategy, has been a recurrent 
theme in this thesis.  Azmi Bishara argued that an uprising against Israel can only be 
successful with clear objectives and strategies to achieve these goals.  While the 
point on the lack of strategy is a fair one, it is nevertheless questionable whether a 
political strategy is really necessary and if it would make a difference.  The repeated 
failure of the Palestinian national project has less to do with the lack of strategy, but 
more with the dictates of power politics, because when political strategies are 
presented by the Palestinians, and the recent application for statehood at the UN is a 
good example here, such approaches bear little fruit.  In essence, Palestinians still 
find themselves in what Rashid Khalidi had described as an iron cage.  Rather than 
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an iron one, it has now, at least politically, become an invisible one that for some 
time has blinded Palestinians themselves and those outside with promises of limited 
sovereignty, international funding, and temporary stability.  However, on the ground 
nothing has changed.  Israel still has ultimate control of every inch of Palestinian 
territory, even Area A, and any attempts to develop an independent economy or 
meaningful political rights are choked.  Efforts to escape from the confines of this 
cage result in a wide range of punishments, even military action.  Just like the British 
Mandate, where a complex legal and constitutional framework prevented the 
Palestinians from developing the means for achieving independence vis-à-vis the 
Jewish immigrants, Israel and the international community have, through a carrot 
and stick approach, kept the Palestinians, within the confines of a clearly defined 
route that grants minor concessions yet cannot lead to a fully independent national 
state for the Palestinians with East Jerusalem as the capital.
155
  The turn away from a 
long-dead peace process and the proposal of a new strategy, namely the application 
to the UN, have shown that when the Palestinians diverge from the dictated route, 
funding is withdrawn by the US, Palestinian revenues are frozen by Israel, and even 
sanctions may be placed on the PA leadership.
156
 Palestinians alone cannot 
determine their fate but they are reliant on a change in the political framework that 
governs their marginalisation. 
 Hence, it is very questionable if a more articulated and cohesive strategy 
would have ultimately led to any success in the intifada.  While one may argue, as 
Khalidi has convincingly done, that it is due to the violent nature of the second 
intifada that Palestinians lost their moral battle, Palestinians always have used non-
violent methods too, but only with limited success.  In fact, Palestinians have used a 
wide range of non-violent means in their history of political activism against Israel, 
including mass demonstrations, strikes, refusal to pay taxes, planting trees, and more 
recently, riding on Israeli buses, attempting to drive on Israeli-only routes, or writing 
‘Free Palestine’ on Shekel notes. These recent attempts especially have directly 
sought to challenge the physical restrictions that are placed on them.
157
  How the 
conflict will evolve from here would be difficult to predict, and whether suicide 
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bombings will return to the scene in the future is also hard to tell.  However, what we 
have seen in this thesis is that when there is no space for non-violent forms of protest 
to develop and make a contribution, violence will dominate the conflict. 
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5. Drawing Conclusions 
 
The key question that this thesis posed at the outset was, how and why has 
Palestinian political activism changed from the first to the second Palestinian 
intifada?  Political activism was broadly defined as encompassing a wide range of 
action from non-violence to violence.  This concluding section will summarise the 
main findings of this discussion and look at the implications of this thesis for the 
literature on Palestine and on political violence more generally.  Beyond these 
reflections, this final chapter will consider the research process itself.  Insights into 
the particular challenges of conducting research in the Palestinian context, the 
influence of the researcher herself on the process, and on the ownership and transfer 
of knowledge will be discussed.  Some of these insights may be of particular interest 
to this field of enquiry and region, and little has been published to date on 
conducting fieldwork in the, in many ways, uniquely challenging context of the 
Palestinian territories, but some comments are also of a more general nature.  
Finally, the discussion in this thesis has at different junctures opened up a number of 
new questions and the concluding section of this chapter will identify some areas for 
potential future research. 
 
5.1 Summary of Findings and their Relevance 
 
The first chapter introduced central debates in the literature on Palestine and 
highlighted the de-contextualisation of violence in key texts on suicide bombing, 
proposing a very different approach to the perspectives put forward in terrorism 
studies.  The chapter argued for an interpretive and contextual model, one that moves 
away from abstract concepts but still has the ability to predict trends and what to do 
about them.  Studies by social movement scholars have tended to produce richer and 
more historically embedded analyses.  This thesis, however, instead of focusing on 
movement dynamics and structure, drew on insights from geography, emphasising 
the importance of key transformations of Palestinian geography and exploring their 
relevance to PA governance, modes of protest and social division.   
The discussion in the subsequent chapter highlighted Palestinian political 
fragmentation in the run-up to the second intifada, how it demobilised political 
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parties as well as civil society.  Cause for this fragmentation was certainly to a 
significant extent the autocratic rule and ambition for dominance of the largest 
Palestinian party and its leaders.  However, the Palestinian Authority and its leading 
political party were also locked into an agreement that forced on them a role that 
they could never satisfactorily fulfil.  The Oslo agreement, as has been pointed out 
numerous times in this thesis, was in its essence an agreement to protect the security 
of Israeli citizens.  The Palestinian Authority hence had the role of policing its own 
society while at the same time having no powers of protecting its own citizens.  This 
led to the fact that more and more Palestinians came to see the Palestinian Authority 
as a client of their colonial occupier writ large.  This very difficult position that the 
PA occupies also explains the conflicting messages sent and activities pursued by the 
PA leaders during the second intifada.  Finding the balance between resistance and 
cooperation, where cooperation never produces tangible results, is an impossible line 
to tread even for the most experienced and astute political leaders.  It is this 
irreconcilable gap between the two, or dissonance in these two cognitions as it was 
referred to earlier in the thesis, that the population sought to bridge with the intifada.  
The Palestinian Authority has, despite its name, no authority when it comes to 
anything vital for its citizens.  Water is the most obvious example here.  As 
explained at length in chapter two, the Palestinian Authority has no control over 
West Bank aquifers or over water distribution.  Any joint committees are purely 
nominal because Israel maintained veto-power.  Building and construction, another 
essential service to citizens, are also largely in firm Israeli hands.  Central to the 
PA’s weak governance is the division of control mapped out geographically as 
isolated compartments on West Bank territory.  While the Palestinian Authority can 
issue building permits in Area A and B, this amounts to less than 50% of West Bank 
territory. In many areas of the West Bank the existing housing does not satisfy the 
needs of the population and therefore many have begun to build illegally without 
permits, at the risk of being fined, and eventually their houses being demolished by 
the army.  Ultimately, the Palestinian Authority does not even have control over its 
own population.  It can arrest and prosecute Palestinians, but Israeli interests and 
measures concerning Palestinians always supersede any potential of the PA to 
protect its citizens, neither can the PA protect or control international passport 
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holders even within territory under its control (Area A).
158
  Despite the continuous 
talk of the need for economic growth and the influx of international aid since Oslo, 
the situation for Palestinians has only improved marginally; however, without 
control over territory, resources and borders it is impossible to build a viable 
independent Palestinian economy.  Said and other critics had already warned early 
on that Palestinian leaders had committed themselves to an agreement that was 
bound to manoeuvre them into a profound and essential contradiction between their 
citizens’ needs and the conditions set by Israel, (and to some extent the international 
community).   
Chapter 2 demonstrated how internal political events had ‘disabled’ political 
activism through parties and civil society, which had for the most part become 
ineffective at responding to and mobilising the grassroots.  The only parties that had 
retained power were Fateh and Hamas, the former exercising it through PLO 
structures and the PA, while the latter had gained its popularity through its extensive 
charitable networks among the lower ranks within society.  The developments during 
the Oslo years and even more so the increasingly visible competitive spirit between 
the two parties already paved the way for the devastating political division yet to 
come.  The PA, which was ineffective in its politics in Palestinian eyes as it had no 
authority where it mattered, was also unable to channel its population’s frustrations 
at the blatant failure of the Oslo agreement that had given so much hope.  The 
dramatic rise of settlements in the occupied territories during the Oslo period, the 
continuing incursions, house demolitions, control over basic resources such as water 
and land, land confiscations and the increasingly tighter closure policies were a 
visible testimony to this failure that could not be ignored.  However, because of the 
weakness of civil society organisations and political parties there was no effective 
‘institutional’ outlet for the population through channels of either politics or civil 
society which could mobilise and direct frustration and grievances.  The popular 
activism of the first intifada through demonstrations and civil disobedience was 
hence very short-lived during the uprising.  What took root instead was activism by 
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individuals who were already within the framework of militant groups but also those 
outside them lacking any political affiliation. 
Chapter 3 outlined the growing territorial fragmentation, how this territorial 
re-configuration shaped the possibilities of the second intifada, and how it 
contributed to accelerating social fragmentation.  Since the end of the Mandate 
period, Palestinians increasingly lost access to territory that they historically 
considered theirs.  Now, the majority of Palestinians are strictly confined to the West 
Bank and Gaza with a tight closure and movement policy in place, and a minority, 
only a third, have the freedom to move around relatively freely as citizens of Israel 
or Jerusalem residents.  Through investigating the concept and realities of territory in 
Palestine and the nature of Israel’s colonialism we discovered how deeply the 
conflict runs, how it encompasses every sphere of life, and the different levels it is 
being conducted on.     
The imposed division between Palestinian and Israeli areas, and the resulting 
fragmentation of territory, especially the cantonisation of Palestinian life, uniquely 
shaped the possibilities for confrontation between the Israeli military and 
Palestinians in the second intifada.  The division into different areas of control led to 
the withdrawal of Israeli military as well as administration from the Palestinian 
population centres which meant that Israel no longer had a day-to-day presence in 
the Palestinian-controlled areas.  With checkpoints having become the only points of 
encounter between the occupied and the occupiers, these were the only visible spaces 
for voicing grievances and hence they became the location of popular protests, 
especially in the early stages of the second intifada.  The demonstrations staged in 
the Palestinian population centres remained largely invisible to the international 
community and had no impact on Israel.  The preparedness of the Israeli army and its 
determination to quench the uprising in its early stages undoubtedly contributed to 
the ensuing violence.  The early months of the intifada, which were mostly 
characterised by peaceful mass demonstration on the Palestinian side, saw the 
highest number of casualties throughout the uprising.  This in turn raised support 
among the population for a violent response.  The retreat of the masses enabled 
militants to gain visibility and eventually, the upper hand in the confrontations. 
The division into different zones of control has also created inequality among 
the various social groups.  Rural dwellers were most affected by the settlements, land 
confiscation for settlement construction, military incursions, violent confrontations 
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with settlers, and water shortages, especially significant for those working in 
agriculture.  Those living in Area C also find it almost impossible to obtain building 
permits.  While refugee camps are normally located within urban centres or on their 
outskirts, refugees are inherently disadvantaged.  They have been dispossessed for 
three generations with little hope of recovering their rights, property and, perhaps 
most significantly, a sense of dignity.  Amid high unemployment rates in the camps 
it is difficult for refugee families to make ends meet; moreover, because of the 
difficulty of getting building permits, for many, moving out of the camp is not an 
option.  Only the very poorest receive food assistance from UNRWA, which itself 
has dire financial concerns as its mandate has been much longer than intended and at 
least in part, is envisaged as financially independent from the United Nations regular 
budget.
159
  Hence, refugees are already among the most vulnerable in Palestinian 
society.  Refugee camps are often portrayed as the hotbed of violence but we have 
seen in our analysis in chapter four that a large number of suicide bombers came 
from the rural areas, proportionately almost in equal numbers, questioning the 
necessary link between refugees and violence.  Nevertheless, refugee camps are 
often the target of military incursions leading to violence and destruction of property, 
often dispossessing refugees yet again.
160
  Inhabitants of the major cities, on the 
other hand, enjoy a much larger radius of free movement as opposed to rural 
dwellers, within which they can, at least most of the time, go about their daily life 
undisturbed.  Ramallah is the quintessential exception in the Palestinian territories 
and has almost become an anomaly, no longer representative of the general 
Palestinian experience but rather an almost carefree bubble devoid of any political 
motivation or engagement, but a place where commercialisation is the driving force.  
For any visitor to Ramallah or its inhabitants, the occupation is momentarily 
invisible.  This difference in experience is reflected in the origins of suicide bombers 
as we saw in chapter four.  Chapter three also raised the issue of changes in identity 
and a shift away from the national interest.  As one interviewee put it, Palestinians 
                                                 
159 “General Assembly, Noting Grave Financial Situation of UNRWA, Calls for Institutional 
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are more concerned with their own survival now than the realisation of a state.
161
  
The very idea of a Palestinian state was directly challenged by the complete 
reoccupation of the West Bank during the second intifada, as the geographical 
division of control, which had initially signalled the phased withdrawal of Israeli 
forces but had then become a permanent state, was completely reversed.  The now 
firmly entrenched closure policy, which physically divides the three entities that for 
Palestinians should form the future state, the unrelenting building of settlements on 
Palestinian land, and the continued division between Fateh and Hamas have further 
distanced the project of an independent state for the Palestinians.  With the peace 
talks stagnating, a future Palestinian state seems further away than ever.  The 
frustration and disappointment of the Oslo years and the sheer hopelessness of the 
current situation have caused Palestinians to look inward. What is clear is that more 
and more Palestinians accept that with all the facts created on the ground by Israel a 
two-state solution is no longer realistic. One interviewee explained; if they give it to 
us today we will accept it but there is no point talking about a two-state solution for 
tomorrow.
162
 The two overlapping national geographies, as described in Weizman’s 
analysis of Israeli architecture in the occupied territories, connected through tunnels 
and bridges and separated from one another through walls and barriers, are no longer 
neatly separable. 
 Chapter 4 offered a contextual analysis of suicide bombing during the second 
intifada and picked up on the major themes identified in the previous two chapters.  
Israeli aggression and retribution to such aggression was identified as one significant 
factor, both in terms of psychological impact on the individual and a relationship 
with justification of retribution for organisations.  Changes in the structure of 
organisations were traced back to the territorial fragmentation as well as Israeli 
aggression.  Social fragmentation was assessed against geographic origins and social 
backgrounds of suicide bombers and it was found that suicide bombers came 
primarily from rural areas and refugee camps while, proportionately, only a minority 
came from the cities in the West Bank.  This further reinforced the initial hypothesis 
that suicide bombers were those that were most affected by the occupation, if we 
accept that villages and refugee camps have been the most vulnerable and 
susceptible to occupation policies.  One very obvious manifestation of Israeli 
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occupation is the presence of settlements, representing its ‘human’ extension.  
However, when we compared the regional distribution of suicide bombers with the 
regional distribution of settlements, findings were inconclusive.  The same study of 
checkpoints, the occupation’s military face, supported the thesis that suicide bombers 
came from geographical areas that were more affected by Israel’s system of 
movement control.   
Conventional accounts have emphasised the absence of the masses and at the 
same time highlighted the centrality of political and militant groups as the main 
actors in the events.  This thesis has questioned both.  While the armed attacks of the 
militant wings of the political parties, or their loose affiliates, were certainly the most 
visible activities in the second intifada, and although civil society as a cohesive 
organised body was largely absent from the struggle, society as a supporter and 
participant was not.  The second intifada was an uprising supported and driven by 
particular groups in society, namely those that were disproportionately affected by 
Israel’s occupation policy and who were at the same time excluded from the benefits 
that a Palestinian leadership would bring.  In essence, the uprising was an expression 
of frustration of the disadvantaged.  Female participation in political violence is no 
exception here.  This thesis argued that thinking of female suicide bombings as an 
escape from the constraints of a conservative culture, itself deprived women of an 
equal voice in articulating national and political sentiments.  Portraying the 
phenomenon as a means of emancipation, however, is also simplistic.  Rather, just as 
those unable to express their frustrations through absent and ineffective social and 
political institutions, women claimed a place for themselves in this particular form of 
political activism. 
This thesis, then, has sought to connect the rise in political violence during 
the second intifada to the underlying political, territorial and social fragmentation.  In 
making its argument it tapped into the literature on Palestine in terms of the roots 
debate of the conflict, the continuous contraction of territory accessible to 
Palestinians that started with 1948, the territorial and political transformations over 
Oslo, women in Palestine and their role in violent as well as non-violent resistance, 
and the history of Palestinian political protest.  
In turn, the study contributes to the literature on Palestine in two ways.  First, 
it offers an account of Palestinian political violence in the second intifada that 
engages with the military and political realities of the situation but also incorporates 
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wider debates.  Second, the thesis has brought together discussions on Palestinian 
geography, political violence and social inequality in a new way.  This convergence 
has given rise to questions on where protests occur, what kind of protests they are 
and what they are an expression of.  Furthermore, it follows a trend identified by 
Harker that differentiates people as individuals and communities rather than treating 
Palestinians simply as ‘a population’.163  This thesis, in looking at how occupation 
was experienced differently in different spaces, made some judgement on ‘who’ and 
‘why’ particular groups in society participated in violence during the second intifada 
and why others did not.  Rosemary Sayigh concluded that peasants had been the key 
participants in previous resistance in her work on refugee camps in Lebanon.  My 
work has suggested that it is still predominantly the rural population together with 
refugees that were the driving force behind violent action during the second intifada. 
This geographic perspective in conjunction with the question of modes of 
governance, forms of protest and social division also speaks more widely to the 
literature on political violence.  Chapter one outlined how geography and violence 
are closely connected in a number of different ways in Northern Ireland, Algeria, 
South Africa and Lebanon.  The thesis adopted the premise that looking at ‘where’ 
human beings do ‘what’ will give us some interesting insights into the ‘why’.164   
Violence is likely to occur where large-scale non-violent protests are 
ineffective.  In Palestine this was an outcome of a complex division of control that 
rendered the PA powerless, large-scale non-violent protest activities ineffectual or 
invisible, and disadvantaged particular geographically-defined groups of society.  
Non-violent forms of protest may hence be eclipsed by violent forms of protest in 
other conflict zones where territorial fragmentation overlaps with division of power 
combined with excessive repression.  Fragmentation of territorial control would 
suggest an increased escalation of violence as the entering of spaces controlled by 
the ‘other’ represents a clear challenge to this control.  This would be the case in 
particular where such spaces are ethnically or religiously homogenous as in the case 
of Loyalist marches through Catholic streets in Northern Ireland.  This combined 
with the absence of civil spaces for protest increases the likelihood of violence. 
                                                 
163 Harker, “New Geographies,” 204. 
164 André Bank, for example, discussed in a paper at the DAVO conference where Syrian protests 
against the government erupted and why.  See André Bank, “Syrien: Protestdynamiken und 
Regimerepression” (paper presented at the annual congress of the DAVO, Free University Berlin, 7 
October 2011). 
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The thesis has also contributed to understanding political violence as part of a 
range of political tools that populations under repression employ.  Terrorism studies 
tend to divorce particular elements of violence from a much more complex set of 
tools that organisations use.  Such approaches cannot fully account for why political 
violence occurs because they are unable to trace the evolution of violence and fail to 
understand when violent action supersedes non-violent political alternatives.   
Finally, this thesis identified several trends within the Palestinian context.  
One such development is a trend away from violence, as the political leadership has 
re-defined the perimeter of acceptable political activism.  The thesis has also 
suggested that when spaces for non-violent activism are ineffective or unavailable, 
violence will take over.  While at present, at least to some extent, other forms of 
protest and ways to realise the national project are being pursued, including the 
application to the UN, a return to violence is not inconceivable.  However, at the 
same time counteracting a return to violence is also a general trend of 
individualisation and a turning away from the national cause, partly fuelled by 
prolonged political frustration and partly by ‘distractions’ such as growing 
consumerism which have undermined the fervour of political activism.  Away from 
the national priority of an occupied people, Palestinian priorities have shifted to 
human concerns shared the world over: obtaining work, building a home, and 
providing for one’s family. 
 
5.2 Reflections on the Research Process 
 
Unsurprisingly, conducting research in Palestine is a challenging endeavour.  
The fragile political situation, the military occupation, and internal divisions all 
make the Palestinian Territories an extremely difficult terrain for research.  While 
the safety of the researcher is always a justified concern, many of the difficulties 
encountered go beyond what meets the eye and in this sense are also relevant to how 
future research on projects like these should be conducted.  Some of the aspects 
discussed here may be predictable by the outsider, but other difficulties cannot be 
known to someone who is not familiar with this particular research environment.  In 
a recently published volume Critical Research in the Social Science – A 
Transdisciplinary East – West Handbook, Majdi al-Malki describes Palestine as a 
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hostile environment for researchers.  What al-Malki refers to, however, is not 
physical risks to the researcher but he identifies elements in Palestinian history, 
society and politics that make Palestine ‘resistant’ to research.  For al-Malki research 
methodologies are often adopted without any reflection on ‘the historical, social and 
cultural specificities of the societies which produced them.’165  If we accept that 
knowledge is a social production, research should be adapted to the culture the 
researcher finds himself or herself in.  If the cultural context is not taken into 
account, the researcher risks affecting the quality of his research, the research 
process and its results.
166
  In the Palestinian context it is a set of political, cultural 
and social factors that influence the researcher.
167
  Many of the factors that al-Malki 
identifies affect Palestinian researchers in particular, but the transformation of the 
field due to instability and rapid political change as well as social fragmentation 
resulting from the political situation, is also relevant to outside researchers, 
generating their own data.  Without significant knowledge of the context within 
which one is researching, the researcher is unable to devise his or her research 
problem suitably, choose adequate methodologies and ask the ‘right’ questions.  
What is also relevant in assessing the research process are the attributes of the 
researcher.  Being foreign, female, not a journalist, and also being fairly young and 
still largely inexperienced in academia in comparison to many interviewees, all 
played a significant role in the interview process for this research and demand 
reflection.  How these particular attributes affected the research process will be 
discussed below.   
The field work proved to be an adventurous process with many ups and 
downs and a very slow start.  Preparations for the fieldwork had already been made 
the previous summer when I attended an Arabic course at Birzeit and discussed the 
suitability of the research with a contact, who had proven helpful and reliable to 
other colleagues in the department, and who assured me the research would be 
feasible and that he could introduce me to relevant interviewees belonging to a range 
of different parties.  However, on my return this contact did not respond to any of my 
attempts to get in touch and instead of being able to, more or less, hit the ground 
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running, I had to start from scratch, which was an extremely difficult experience 
because, as I learnt throughout the process, being introduced by someone, was often 
essential for getting interview appointments.  Because of the sensitivity of the 
research I was also extremely cautious about making initial contact.  During the first 
three months of my visit these difficulties were aggravated further by an incessant 
wave of strikes by both students and academics at Palestinian universities. While the 
strike of academics was naturally an obstacle to getting the research process 
underway, the student strikes were equally inhibiting as they were enforced with 
absolute ferocity by representatives of the Student Union and on one occasion I was 
followed and physically stopped by a young male from reaching the university.  
Only after some careful negotiation and explanation that I was a foreign researcher 
visiting for research purposes, was I categorised as an ‘employee’ and let go.  The 
clashes throughout March in the major cities of the West Bank, with the exception of 
Ramallah, at Qalandia and in East Jerusalem, also made travelling outside Ramallah 
unpredictable and unattractive.  
Particularly difficult was also the period of Ramadan.  During the 30-day 
fasting month, as well as the week prior and the week after, it was impossible to get 
any interviews.  It was an unusually hot summer in the West Bank that year with 
several days reaching 40ºC or more, to the extent that even locals complained about 
the heat, which made the fasting period an even more difficult one.  Offices shut 
early and only the most necessary work was done.  In the evening, after the breaking 
of the fast, everyone naturally wanted to be with friends and family.  Whenever I 
tried to make interview arrangements in the run-up or during Ramadan I was told 
that I should ring back after Eid al-Fitr.  This essentially took out six weeks of my 
research schedule.  Instead, I tried to use this time to collect other useful research 
material from local NGOs and research institutes.  
Finding the right means for making contact was also a challenge.  Email was 
an incredibly inefficient tool for getting responses, which was rather surprising in the 
academic context.  This also applied to fieldwork I had carried out for Birzeit 
University where emails received the lowest response rate and as such its 
unsuitability for making initial contact cannot have been connected to the sensitivity 
of my research subject.  Moreover, over the summer months many of the secretaries 
appeared to be on holiday so phone calls could not be forwarded either.  Phoning, 
where phone numbers were available was successful, or in the first instance, turning 
238 
 
up to a research institute, NGO or cultural centre to introduce myself and make 
enquiries was often a very good, even if it was a time-consuming approach as it 
usually involved several trips. 
Sometimes obtaining interviews was also a very lengthy process and 
stretched over several months. I negotiated concerning three interviews with activists 
originating from Balata refugee camp for three months and unfortunately only one 
materialised shortly before I left.  Beyond the difficulties of making contact and 
obtaining interviews a number of other challenges inherent in the Palestinian 
environment need to be tackled by the researcher.    
 
Formulating Research in the Local Context 
 
The thesis has already outlined to some extent how, since the turn of the 19
th
 
century, Palestinians have undergone drastic and rapid social and political changes 
from the collapse of the Ottoman empire, to Palestine under the British Mandate, the 
establishment of the Israeli state and the subsequent nakba for Palestinians that 
dispersed hundreds of thousands to the West Bank, East Jerusalem, Gaza, the 
neighbouring Arab states or further afield, and the occupation of the West Bank, East 
Jerusalem and Gaza after 1967.  The rapid occurrence of events has and still does 
create complex social and political dynamics and shifts the fault lines of relevant 
debates swiftly, making it difficult for research to keep up and remain policy 
relevant.  As with research anywhere, not having an insight into some of the local 
social and political dynamics may lead researchers down the wrong path and to 
overlook the salient questions in society while only posing those that seem relevant 
from the outside. One sizeable challenge in designing questions for research is, of 
course, to determine the significant components or representations of concepts that 
are to be explored or tested.  For example, when wanting to learn about 
transformations in society in terms of gender, the kind of topics that are significant 
and relevant are not always immediately visible to the outsider.  Cultural knowledge 
will indicate to the researcher which questions will not yield useful answers.  
‘Outsiders’ often find it difficult to discern what does matter and what does not and 
some, as David Landy observes in his paper on study trips to Palestine, appropriate 
expertise and authority over local knowledge.  Landy describes how some 
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participants in the study trip repeatedly asked the director of a Palestinian women’s 
centre about the dangers of Sharia Law and disagreed with her assessment that 
Sharia Law was not an issue for Palestinian women.
168
  Questions on economic 
standards are also particularly illustrative here.  Accurate information on income and 
standards of living is unlikely to be gained through direct questions. Economic 
hardship is something that can be observed or discovered, especially if the researcher 
manages to build good personal relationships, but such information is not normally 
openly shared.  Topics that generated little response in interviews were class and 
social background, not in the sense that they were not deemed significant, but there 
seemed to be an unwillingness to elaborate.  Interviewees also tended to talk 
sparingly about religion.  This experience ties in with the example referred to above, 
in which a local activist maintains that the role of religion is not as significant as it 
appears from a Western viewpoint.  Sensitivities in talking about religion may play a 
role here but a significant part of the problem is posed by the application of Western-
based concepts, the confusion over secularism, and the failure to see that politics and 
religion are subject to different dynamics in the Palestinian context. 
   
 
The Researcher Self - Being Female, Foreign and Had I Been a Journalist… 
 
Conducting research in conservative societies, where in many areas of life 
men and women are traditionally segregated, poses particular challenges to female 
researchers if their research stretches beyond gender boundaries, especially in terms 
of data gathering.
169
  Here foreign females are often thought to be able to circumvent 
these limitations.  Coming from a different culture and in the absence of the female’s 
family networks that might prevent her from engaging with men, a foreign female 
can more easily move in male circles and hence obtain interviews that may be 
impossible for females within the culture.
170
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Nevertheless, this is not always the case.  One potential interviewee refused 
to meet with me because I am a woman and he did not want to be seen to receive me 
in his office.  That women and men are not supposed to mix unobserved also 
contributed to the fact that in meetings doors to offices were always left open, as 
interviews always had to be conducted in the presence of other people such as in 
family homes or in public spaces such as restaurants or coffee houses.  This raised a 
number of issues.  When sensitive topics are discussed, especially in academic 
institutions, which are thought to be a hotbed of informants, it is questionable how 
honest or sincere an answer one will get.  The same also applies to other public 
spaces for discussing sensitive, especially politically sensitive topics.   
What also has to be taken into account is that, if public spaces are the desired 
meeting place for interviews, this will necessarily exclude some interviewees, 
especially women as well as particular social strata of society.  Women are excluded 
in more than one way.  There are very few places for women where one can meet in 
public, especially outside Ramallah.  Coffee shops are the clear domain of men in 
Palestine.  There are a handful of cafes in Ramallah that would make a suitable 
meeting place but they cater to a certain clientele and would never be frequented by 
the majority of Palestinians, partly because of their pricing and partly also because of 
what they represent.  Most of these coffee shops and restaurants are the meeting 
places of the globalised elites, the professionals working in international or 
internationally funded NGOs, expatriates, and often returnees from America.  People 
from villages or refugee camps, however, do not socialise in these more Westernised 
places.  Hence such a requirement excludes a particular group in society and 
especially women because they would have no easy other alternative to meet 
publicly.  It is, of course, also exclusive as regards the researcher because a female 
researcher would not be able to visit the places that are used by men from this 
excluded social group. In a family home on the other hand a researcher could be 
received as a guest, with all the extended family members present ensuring that 
proper conduct and cultural norms are observed.  Hence, excluding family homes as 
an interview location, which was one of the conditions imposed on this fieldwork by 
the university for safety reasons, has favoured an approach that focuses on officials 
and academics who have public offices to receive interviewers in.  What was also 
noticeable was that it was easier to obtain interviews with women than with men and 
the data these interviews generated was much richer. 
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The fact that I am foreign has given me slightly more liberties than a 
Palestinian female doing a similar project may have had.  However, not being a 
Palestinian also mattered in other ways. Italians are generally viewed as being 
supportive of the Palestinian cause (many work in the area as doctors or for local 
NGOs) and as a Mediterranean people are perceived to have strong similarities with 
Arabs.  Fortunately, the then Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi’s remark to Mahmoud 
Abbas on his visit, which coincided with my field trip, that he had not noticed the 
separation wall when he passed through the gate in the wall at the Bethlehem 
checkpoint and his outright support for Israel the day before was not taken all too 
seriously on the Palestinian side and did not colour in any way their positive view of 
Italians.
171
  Several of the interviewees had some connection with Italy through 
relatives or had visited the country and this often provided a very good closing topic. 
However, undoubtedly some information would have been more readily disclosed to 
a Palestinian interviewer.  On the other hand, the political climate that the research 
was conducted in was a difficult one and particular political opinions would probably 
also not have been shared with a fellow Palestinian.  Suspicion was most evident 
when a member of the PFLP-GC refused to be interviewed.  He met with me for 
coffee and very politely explained he would not agree to an interview because he 
could not be certain that I was not a spy and even if I were not, my work could be 
inadvertently used by Israel for their benefit.  There is, of course, little one can say to 
convince someone else that one is no such thing.  This incident highlights the deep-
seated fear in Palestinians of Israeli intelligence and its resourceful ways of 
penetrating Palestinian society.  Being attached to Birzeit University did certainly 
lend me credibility with some interviewees.  On some occasions I was asked to 
elaborate a little more on my background.  The length of my visit in the area, the fact 
that I lived in Ramallah and that I had previously attended an Arabic course at 
Birzeit all resonated very positively with the interviewees.  During my stay my 
spoken Arabic improved considerably which visibly helped in making interviewees 
feel at ease as it allowed me to have some, even if still relatively simple, informal 
                                                 
171 Amira Hass and Jonathan Lis, “Italian PM Berlusconi in Bethlehem: We Mourn Gaza Victims Just 
as We Cry over Holocaust,” The Haaretz, 4 February 2010, http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/ 
news/italian-pm-berlusconi-in-bethlehem-we-mourn-gaza-victims-just-as-we-cry-over-the-holocaust-
1.262721 (accessed 15 January 2012).  Also see “Address by Prime Minister of Italy Silvio 
Berlusconi to the Knesset on February 3, 2010,” Knesset, unofficial translation, 3 February 2010, 
http://www.knesset.gov.il/description/eng/doc/speech_berlusconi_2010_eng.pdf (accessed 15 January 
2012). 
242 
 
conversation in Arabic before and after the interview.  However, the association with 
Birzeit and academia did not always work out favourably.  A good example here was 
my visit to the cultural centre at Balata refugee camp where the view was certainly 
that academics were too far removed from the actual life of ordinary Palestinians, 
especially when it came to refugees, and that it had taken academics far too long to 
realise the refugee issue is central and needed to be tackled.  In the light of my 
interview experience, attachment to a human rights NGO or a cultural centre in a 
refugee camp would have been more conducive to obtaining interviews with 
ordinary participants in the intifada and grassroots activists.  
Being foreign also had an impact in other ways.  One academic expressed a 
very strong resentment towards Western academic institutions and their apparent 
expectation that Palestinian academics could afford to see international students and 
researchers for free, given that they were considerably underpaid in comparison to 
their counterparts in Europe.  This, I felt, was a rather unfair response to my 
interview request because I had given Birzeit University much of my time and 
commitment during my field work.  I had tried to get in touch with this particular 
interviewee several months earlier but she explained later that she ignored all 
interview requests outside term time because she could not be expected to use her 
own time for foreign students and because of this I was only able to secure the 
interview once the autumn term had started.  What did eventually sway this 
particular interviewee was my Masters degree from St Andrews University as it 
turned out her daughter had hoped to study at the same institution but was eventually 
unable to secure funding.  This parallel and the fact that I had also moved away from 
my family to a different country in order to pursue my education, just like the 
interviewee’s daughter, then added a much more positive note to the interview that 
followed.  The resentment expressed by this particular academic may possibly be 
more widespread and explain why I found it so difficult to obtain interviews, 
especially over the summer months, even at Birzeit, despite the fact that I was myself 
based there.  My experience in trying to arrange an interview with an academic at 
Bethlehem University followed similar lines.  After several attempts to make 
contact, a friend who studied at Bethlehem University and used to be a student on 
her course, asked if I could arrange to see her. Her response was that it would have 
to be within her office hour and that was usually very busy with her own students so 
there was no guarantee there would be enough time.  As a result I decided at this 
243 
 
stage of the process to focus on interviews in Ramallah rather than spending almost 
an entire day on a round trip to Bethlehem for an unlikely interview. 
Participants naturally have motives for participating in interviews.  One 
possible objective is the dissemination of one’s views or more often a particular 
political agenda, which applies to politicians in particular.  One recurring theme 
during my search for interviewees was that had I been a journalist, I would have 
more easily obtained interviews.  Several people I talked to argued that I would find 
it much easier to obtain interviews, especially with party representatives but also 
some academics and journalists, if I were working for a newspaper or the media.  
Especially smaller parties are more likely to grant interviews as they seek exposure 
to compete with their larger and more powerful competitors.  One journalist herself 
also openly declined to be interviewed because she could not see any benefit to 
herself in participating.  
 
 
Bargaining Over Knowledge 
 
 Individuals have ownership over their own knowledge and ultimately decide 
how much and in what way they want to share it.  This manifested itself in various 
forms throughout the interview process.  It was noticeable that academics had a 
tendency to point to their already published articles or theses or attempted to sell 
books published by their institutes, but it was not always clear whether and how this 
material answered the question I had posed.  They also feel, perhaps sometimes 
rightly so, in a position to evaluate one’s research and perhaps even more difficult 
and frustratingly, one’s questions and research methodology.  One interviewee 
responded to my concluding comment, whether there was anything more to add, by 
saying that there would be if I had asked the right questions. The participant thought 
my questions had been too general and criticised in particular my question on 
significant social changes regarding women in the period between the first and the 
second intifada, elaborating that such a question should have been replaced by 
several smaller questions on particular elements of society or culture, such as, how 
have weddings changed, or how had the relationship between daughters and their 
father changed etc.  This approach clearly reflected that particular academic’s 
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training and work in oral history.  A discussion with an interviewee on the 
methodology that I had chosen was, although to some extent insightful, overall not 
particularly helpful.   
Another instance where my questions encountered criticism was, when I 
asked a sociologist if and how the occupation had changed since the first intifada.  
The interviewee responded that he did not understand the question and when I 
elaborated he commented the question made no sense to him and as a result he 
offered no answer. In this instance, to see the occupation as an unchanging ‘other’ 
says more about the interviewee and his view of the Israeli occupation than of the 
occupation itself, or the question posed.  It emerged in the course of the conversation 
that the interviewee was a Palestinian citizen of Israel and hence had a very different 
relationship to the occupation compared to someone from the West Bank or Gaza.  
Isis Nusair, who is herself a Palestinian citizen of Israel, explores in some of her 
work how Palestinian citizens of Israel view Israel as the distant ‘other’.172  Until 
1966 Palestinians in Israel were subject to martial law.  However, even since then 
they have been discriminated against in all spheres within Israeli society.  Nusair’s 
work suggests that this detachment from the state of Israel could be the result of 
having been ‘othered’ by the rest of Israeli society and being largely excluded from 
the Israeli narrative or also having its origins in a lack of engagement with Israeli 
institutions. 
An interviewer, in essence, has to bargain for and negotiate for knowledge.  
How much the interviewee is prepared to disclose is, under normal conditions, 
naturally up to him or herself.  The nature of questions appeared to be an essential 
component but commitment to the research and a willingness to genuinely 
understand the situation also are a factor.  During my internship with the university a 
student who visited the university spent three days in the region to conduct 
interviews on Sharon’s politics.  One of the academics who had been interviewed by 
the student on the student’s departure seemed very irritated by the fact that the 
student expected to gain valuable and insightful interviews on such a short visit.   
Asking original and incisive questions to academics proved to be particularly 
challenging for a number of reasons. First, while in the European context 
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information on academics and their expertise is readily available online, this is not 
the case in the Palestinian context where in most cases there is no information on 
research interests provided at all. While some academics have published in English 
and hence their research expertise is clearer, others predominantly publish in Arabic 
or French, languages that to date are not fully accessible to me.  This combined with 
the snowballing technique made prior in-depth preparation before interviews more 
difficult.  An additional issue is also that it is not always clear in advance what range 
of roles the interviewee holds as a small group of people in Palestine have their 
fingers in many pies.  Some academics, are or were activists, are politically active 
within the framework of the PA, and are also involved in NGO work.  In fact, NGOs 
seem to be run by a handful of intellectual and political elite as the same group of 
people appear in various capacities across a number of different organisations.  
While interviewees may often not want to disclose information for political or 
security reasons, it is not only in these cases that interviewees withhold information 
but, as has become apparent through the field research process, also in cases where 
the interviewer does not fulfil certain conditions set by the interviewer. 
 
 
5.3 Areas for Future Research 
 
 The discussion in this thesis has opened up several interesting questions for 
future research.  I will limit myself here to discussing four potential avenues for 
further research.   
The research presented has demonstrated how Israeli occupation has affected 
Palestinian society unequally and has, even if not created, certainly reinforced a 
particular kind of social division.  Exploring in more detail how these different 
segments of society are affected by various policies of the occupation, and here a 
micro-level study of how settlements affect particular Palestinian neighbourhoods 
has already been suggested earlier, would be beneficial.  A study of the Nablus area 
would also be rewarding here.  The easing of movement restrictions around the city 
are expected to have had a significant impact on the surrounding villages.  Naturally, 
such analysis would also have to include a study on the effects of the separation wall 
and its adjacent communities.  Several villages on its route have made it onto the 
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international map through their weekly protests.  Interestingly, others have not 
organised themselves, established committees and become active in demonstrations.  
In a further step, it would then be interesting to explore where these different 
segments of society stand in relation to political activism, what types of activism 
they support and engage in, and in particular whether there is support for political 
violence.  A discussion of the fragmentation of Palestinian society will be relevant to 
the establishment of a future Palestinian state.  How the experience of territorially 
demarcated different forms of governance will affect the establishment of a state 
would be interesting to see. 
It would also be rewarding, albeit sensitive, to explore division within 
Palestinian society along different lines, namely religious ones.  In one particular 
interview, resentment was at least implicit on the absence of the participation of 
Palestinian Christians in activism against Israel. When I then posed a question on 
Christian participation in activism to a PFLP member, a party which has traditionally 
enjoyed support from Christians, the response was very defensive.  How Palestinian 
Christians relate to various forms of political activism, violent and non-violent, and 
to what extent they are participants in Palestinian resistance against the occupation 
would be a rewarding and also original study.  While the Christian community in the 
West Bank is a small and dwindling one, its relation to the national struggle and the 
project of an independent Palestinian state is still a significant one.  For the moment 
Palestinian Christians are united, so to speak, with Muslim Palestinians in their 
experience of discrimination and oppression by Israeli policies, but should there be a 
solution to the conflict the dynamics between the two groups is expected to change.  
While some research has been done on the Palestinian Christian minority in Israel it 
is yet to see what place a Palestinian Christian minority would occupy within an 
independent Palestinian state. 
Third, this thesis has explored how Palestinian activism is rooted in the 
specific political situation of the Palestinians.  From this a larger question arises, 
namely what is the relationship between politics and violence.  In established states 
this relationship is much more clearly defined while violence used by non-state 
actors is legally, ethically and politically more ambiguous.  The Palestinian National 
Authority is in essence, and despite the absence of any progress in settling final 
status issues, a state in the making.  Much effort and international funding has gone 
into state building, including the training of a Palestinian police and security force, 
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and although the PA only holds civil powers over its population vis-à-vis the Israeli 
military regime, through its security and police force it also has control over 
violence.  An investigation into the relationship between violence and politics in the 
Palestinian case hence promises to be a worthwhile one and one of wider theoretical 
interest.  The conclusion in chapter four already briefly reflected on the changing 
nature of this relationship since the Oslo agreement.  Although the thesis has 
discussed the various ways in which the political situation has motivated the use of 
violence during the second intifada, there was also a question in how far the violence 
still served national goals or if it became mainly reactive and, as suggested by some 
scholars, even deteriorated to an expression of local rivalries.  If such an examination 
indeed finds that violence used has increasingly become devoid of politics, so to 
speak, it will be necessary to reflect on what this means and what the implications of 
this are when we speak of political violence.  
Finally, what has emerged at different points in this thesis is the existence of 
multiple competing narratives on the Israeli and Palestinian sides, with both claiming 
ownership of the land, but also, debating political legitimacy as well as 
reconstructing meanings of peace and resistance.  Such constructions of narratives as 
a key political move cannot be captured by models that rest on epistemological 
claims to neutrality and impartiality.  Gleaning insights from social psychology, 
further study of the construction and role of collective memory in the conflict would 
methodologically enrich political science accounts of Palestinian political violence. 
This thesis’ study of the transformation of Palestinian political activism 
between the first and the second intifada has not only provided an in-depth analysis 
of the workings of activism against Israel amidst changing political, territorial and 
social circumstances but also provides the platform for further investigation into 
social and religious divisions in Palestinian society and how they intersect with 
national liberation, non-violent protest, armed struggle, and state building.  On a 
more abstract level the thesis opens up the possibility for tracing the intricacies of the 
complex relationship between politics and violence over time as the Palestinian 
guerrilla movement grew into an emergent state.  The methodological questions 
opened up in this thesis’ analysis would make valuable contributions to political 
science perspectives on Palestinian political violence.  Such examinations could 
contribute much to debates on Palestinian politics and society, the Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict, and political violence.  
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Appendix I: List of Suicide bombings with origins of bombers 2000-2004 
 
Attacks located on the Palestinian side of the Green Line, including East Jerusalem 
Attacks on the Israeli side of the Green Line 
Date Location Organisation Origin of Perpetrator 
26/10/00 Kissufim Crossing Islamic Jihad Shajaiyeh neighbourhood, Gaza 
??/11/00 IDF boat off Gaza beach Unclaimed Shatti Camp, Gaza 
22/12/00 Mechola settlement Unclaimed Hebron 
01/03/01 Northern Israel Unclaimed  Unknown 
04/03/01 Netanya Hamas Nour Shams Camp, Tulkarem 
27/03/01 French Hill Junction, East Jerusalem 2 Islamic Jihad Al-Bireh, Ramallah 
28/03/01 Inside Green Line, near Qalqilia Hamas Qalqilia 
22/04/01 Kefar Saba Popular Army Front Return 
Battalions 
Gaza 
29/04/01 Settler bus, Deir Sharaf - Nablus Unclaimed Nablus 
18/05/01 Netanya Hamas Tulkarem 
25/05/01 Hadera 2 Islamic Jihad Jenin and Jenin Camp 
25/05/01 IDF post Gaza Hamas Beit Lahya, Gaza 
01/06/01 Tel Aviv Hamas Qalqilia 
22/06/01 IDF patrol Gaza Hamas Unkonwn 
09/07/01 Near Gush Katif settlement Hamas Jabalia Camp, Gaza 
16/07/01 Binyamina Islamic Jihad  Unknown 
08/08/01 IDF checkpoint West Bank Unclaimed Nablus 
09/08/01 Jerusalem Hamas Jenin 
12/08/01 Kiryat Motzkin Islamic Jihad Qabatiya, Jenin 
04/09/01 Jerusalem PFLP or Hamas Aboud, Ramallah 
09/09/01 Nahariya Israeli Arab, maybe Hamas Abu Shan, Israel 
09/09/01 Beyt Lid Unclaimed Irtah, Tulkarem 
13/09/01 IDF patrol Jenin Unclaimed Unknown 
07/10/01 Kibbutz Shluhot Islamic Jihad Tubas 
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17/10/01 IDF patrol, Gaza PFLP Zaytouna, Gaza 
08/11/01 Baqa Sharqiyya Hamas  Tulkarem 
26/11/01 Erez crossing Hamas Jabaliya Camp, Gaza 
29/11/01 Hadera Islamic Jihad Salat al-Daher, Jenin 
01/12/01 Jerusalem 2 Hamas Abu Dis, Jerusalem 
02/12/01 Haifa Hamas Nablus 
05/12/01 Jerusalem Islamic Jihad Artas, Bethlehem 
09/12/01 Haifa Hamas Unknown 
12/12/01 Near Neveh Dekalim settlement, Gaza 2 Hamas Khan Younis, Gaza 
25/01/02 Tel Aviv Islamic Jihad Beit Wazan 
27/01/02 Jerusalem Female, maybe AMB Al-Amari Camp, Ramallah 
30/01/02 Taibeh, Israel Fatah Anabta, Tulkarem 
16/02/02 Karnei Shomron settlement PFLP Qalqilia 
17/02/02 Hadera AMB  Nablus 
18/02/02 Settler car near Kissufim AMB Khan Younis 
19/02/02 Near Mihola settlement, West Bank Unclaimed Unknown 
27/02/02 Makabim checkpoint, West Bank AMB female Beit Wazan, Nablus 
02/03/02 Jerusalem AMB Deheisheh Camp, Bethlehem 
05/03/02 Afula Unclaimed Shlah al Tuher, Jenin 
07/03/02 Ariel settlement PFLP Madamah village, Nablus 
09/03/02 Jerusalem Hamas Al-Arrub Camp, Hebron 
17/03/02 French Hill settlement, East Jerusalem Islamic Jihad Al-Doha, Bethlehem 
20/03/02 Umm al-Fahm Islamic Jihad Jenin 
21/03/02 Jerusalem AMB Talusah, Nablus 
22/03/02 IDF checkpoint into Jenin AMB Ein Beit al-Ma’/Camp No. 1, Nablus 
26/03/02 IDF checkpoint into Jerusalem AMB Al-Khader, Bethlehem 
27/03/02 Netanya Hamas Tulkarem 
29/03/02 Jerusalem AMB female Deheishe Camp, Bethlehem 
30/03/02 Tel Aviv AMB Al-Farah Camp, Tubas 
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31/03/02 Haifa Hamas Jenin Camp 
31/03/02 Efrat settlement Unclaimed Bethlehem 
01/04/02 Checkpoint btw East/West Jerusalem Unclaimed Deheishe Camp, Bethlehem 
02/04/02 Checkpoint into Jerusalem Unclaimed Unknown 
09/04/02 IDF patrol, Jenin Camp Unclaimed Unknown 
10/04/02 Haifa Hamas Unknown 
11/04/02 Hebron checkpoint Unclaimed Unknown 
12/04/02 Jerusalem AMB female Bethlehem 
19/04/02 Gaza checkpoint Islamic Jihad Khan Younis, Gaza 
07/05/02 Rishon Letzion Probably Hamas Tulkarem 
08/05/02 Haifa Unclaimed Unknown 
19/05/02 Netanya PFLP Nablus 
20/05/02 Afula Unclaimed Unknown 
22/05/02 Rishon Letzion AMB Al-Doha, Bethlehem 
24/05/02 Tel Aviv AMB Unknown 
27/05/02 Petah Tikva AMB Balata Camp, Nablus 
05/06/02 Megiddo Islamic Jihad Jenin 
11/06/02 Herzliya Unclaimed Madamah Village, Nablus 
17/06/02 Israeli border police, near Tulkarem Unclaimed Unknown 
18/06/02 Jerusalem Hamas Al-Farah Camp, Tubas 
19/06/02 Jerusalem AMB Unknown 
17/07/02 Tel Aviv Islamic Jihad or al-Nathir Balata Camp, Nablus 
30/07/02 Jerusalem Unclaimed Bethlehem 
04/08/02 Northern Israel Hamas Jenin 
18/09/02 Northern Israel Islamic Jihad Unknown 
19/09/02 Tel Aviv Hamas Unknown 
10/10/02 Bar Ilan Junction, Jerusalem Hamas Unknown 
21/10/02 Tel Aviv 2 Islamic Jihad  Jenin 
27/10/02 Ariel Hamas Nablus 
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04/11/02 Tel Aviv Islamic Jihad Balata Camp, Nablus 
21/11/02 Jerusalem Islamic Jihad Doura, Hebron 
22/11/02 IDF boat off Gaza 2 Islamic Jihad Al-Bureij Camp and Beit Hanoun, Gaza 
27/12/02 IDF post in Gaza PFLP Gaza 
05/01/03 Tel Aviv 2 AMB Nablus 
17/01/03 IDF boat off Gaza Hamas Unknown 
09/02/03 Gush Katif settlement 3 Islamic Jihad Gaza 
18/02/03 IDF patrol, Gaza City Hamas Gaza 
05/03/03 Haifa Hamas Hebron 
30/03/03 Netanya Islamic Jihad Tulkarem 
24/04/03 Kefar Saba AMB – Nablus faction Balata Camp, Nablus 
29/04/03 Tel Aviv 2 AMB & Hamas British citizens 
08/05/03 Kefar Darom settlement Unclaimed Unknown 
17/05/03 Hebron Hamas Hebron 
18/05/03 French Hill 2 Hamas Hebron 
19/05/03 Afula AMB & Islamic Jihad, female Tubas 
19/05/03 Outside Kefar Darom Unclaimed Unknown 
11/06/03 Jerusalem Hamas Hebron 
19/06/03 Baysan Islamic Jihad Unknown 
07/07/03 Kfar Yavetz Islamic Jihad – Jenin faction Kofor Ra’e, Jenin 
12/08/03 Rosh Ha’yan AMB – Nablus faction Askar Camp, Nablus 
12/08/03 Outside Ariel Hamas – Nablus faction Askar Camp, Nablus 
19/08/03 Jerusalem Renegade Hamas Hebron 
09/09/03 Rishon Letzion, IDF base Hamas Rantis, Ramallah 
09/09/03 Jerusalem Hamas Rantis, Ramallah 
04/10/03 Haifa Islamic Jihad, female Jenin 
09/10/03 IDF checkpoint near Tulkarm AMB Oref, Nablus 
03/11/03 IDF patrol, Azun, West Bank AMB Rafidia, Nablus 
25/12/03 Tel Aviv PFLP Beit Fourek, Nablus 
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11/01/04 IDF patrol, Nablus Unclaimed Nablus 
14/01/04 Erez crossing, Gaza AMB & Hamas female Al Zaytoun, Gaza 
29/01/04 Jerusalem AMB or Hamas Al Aida Camp, Bethlehem 
22/02/04 Jerusalem AMB Hussan village, Bethlehem 
27/02/04 Outside Kefar Darom Islamic Jihad  Unknown 
14/03/04 Ashdod port 1 AMB, 1 Hamas Jabalyia, Gaza 
17/04/04 Erez industrial zone AMB and Hamas  Beit Lahya, Gaza 
28/04/04 Outside Kefar Darom Hamas Al Nusayrat Camp 
22/05/04 Outside settlement near Nablus PFLP Unknown  
28/05/04 Rafah crossing Unclaimed Gaza 
31/08/04 Beersheba 2 Hamas Hebron, Hebron 
14/09/04 Checkpoint near Qalqilia Unclaimed  Qalqilia 
22/09/04 French Hill, East Jerusalem AMB female Al Askar Camp, Nablus 
01/11/04 Tel Aviv Not clear Al Askar Camp, Nablus 
 
Data for this table has been taken from the Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group and Michele K. Esposito, “The al-Aqsa Intifada: Military Operations, 
Suicide Attacks, Assassinations, and Losses in the First Four Years” Journal of Palestine Studies 34, no.2 (Winter 2005).  Where inconsistencies emerged or 
information of the location was unclear, news sources were consulted.  
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